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PREFACE 
 
The first European Academy of Excellence has been organised during 
the Austrian Presidency of the EU in 1998. The idea was to have a high 
level forum on European policy issues – gathering a selected number of 
outstanding politicians, businessmen, university professors and other 
renowned experts to discuss relevant topics which seemed important in 
European policy making.  
The first Academy of November 1998, devoted to the "Future 
Competitiveness of Europe", turned out a quite successful event which 
helped shape the discussion of various Council meetings of the EU. 
Since then Eastern Enlargement has turned out to be the most important 
single issue that economists in the EU have become engaged with. 
Future competitiveness of Europe will be strongly dependent on an 
early perception of the adjustment needs due to Eastern Enlargement – 
in the countries of transition as well as in the European Union. 
In order to put more emphasis on this topic, it was a pleasure for me to 
be the host of the second European Academy of Excellence devoted to 
"Eastern Enlargement: The Sooner, the Better?". It was held in 
Vienna on 16-17 June 2000.  
After completion of the internal market and the introduction of the Euro, 
Eastern Enlargement has become the most important challenge for the 
European Union. At the outset of the next millennium, the process of 
deepening and widening integration put substantial adjustment pressure 
on the economies involved. Since the opening up of the East, the EU, 
and especially Austria, have gained a lot from this process. The 
prospects for further development of the economies involved are even 
more positive. 
Started in Luxembourg in December 1997, the enlargement process 
aims at the stability and prosperity for the entire European continent. In 
March 1998 the EU entered negotiations with five Central and Eastern 
European Countries, the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 opened the 
door to another five Eastern applicants. 
Adjustments are needed on both sides: The enlargement process, on the 
one hand, enhances European institutional reform. On the other hand, 
the envisaged integration into the Single Market, and eventually into 
EMU, mark important milestones in the reform efforts of the transition 
countries. Special efforts have to be made regarding the implementation 
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of the acquis communautaire and the relating economic and structural 
adjustments. 
The intention of the Academy was to discuss the enlargement from the 
point of view of the accession countries. The first session dealt with the 
process of narrowing the structural gap and the search for an optimal 
exchange rate regime. The second session was devoted to the effects of 
fragmentation and outsourcing components production to Central and 
Eastern Europe on employment in East and West Europe. 
During the Academy, many issues were raised and many questions 
posed. Can the current momentum of reform in the accession countries 
be sustained, although the political commitment towards enlargement 
within the Union seems to be hampered by public fears of the resulting 
social and economic change? What are the milestones for the CEECs in 
complying with the acquis communautaire and thereby meeting the 
accession requirements? Are timely negotiated and stable conditions and 
a well-defined timetable for accession indispensable for foreign 
investment to evolve smoothly? Should politicians strive for an early 
enlargement, regardless of the accession countries' state of transition? Is 
the claim "The sooner, the better" likely to jeopardise an optimal 
enlargement process? 
Although the academy tried to develop answers to all these questions, 
further discussion will be necessary and even more emphasis has to be 
put on these issues. 
In order to present the results of the Academy to a wider audience and to 
provide some input to further initiatives, the compendium presents the 
conference proceedings, including the discussion and other related 
material. The results of the academy will again be utilised as an input 
for the negotiations of the various EU Council formations I am a 
member of (inter alia, Internal Market, Industry, Energy, Foreign Trade 
and Employment and Social Policy). 
In my view, the second European Academy of Excellence has again 
been a great success, thanks to the valuable contributions and the 
participation of some outstanding academics, politicians and 
businessmen in this field. Especially, I have been very pleased to 
welcome Nobel Laureate Prof. Robert Mundell and to follow his 
presentation on Exchange Rate Arrangements in Eastern and Central 
Europe. I wish to thank all participants for their ambition – especially 
the chairmen Prof. Dominick Salvatore and Prof. Sven Arndt – and I am 
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convinced that this event has contributed – as expected – a great deal to 
the current understanding of the enlargement process. 
 
Martin Bartenstein 
Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Labour 
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EUROPEAN ACADEMY OF EXCELLENCE 2000 
EASTERN ENLARGEMENT: THE SOONER THE BETTER? 
 
 
1. Background and aim 
 
European integration has gained considerable momentum over the past 
couple of years. After completion of the internal market and the 
introduction of the Euro, the EU has put Eastern Enlargement on the 
agenda for the outset of the next millennium. These processes of 
deepening and widening integration put substantial adjustment pressure 
on the economies involved.  
 
When the enlargement process was started in Luxembourg in December 
1997, it was aiming at "the stability and prosperity for the entire 
European continent". In March 1998 the EU entered negotiations with 
five Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), the Helsinki 
Summit in December 1999 opened the door to another five Eastern 
applicants. All ten CEECs are now competing for a timely fulfilment of 
the EU's acquis communautaire. 
 
The envisaged integration into the Single Market, and eventually into 
EMU, mark important milestones in the reform efforts of the countries 
in transition. In addition, the enlargement process enhances European 
institutional reform: the Intergovernmental Conference on this issue is 
supposed to be completed by December 2000, putting the Union in a 
position to "welcome new Member States from the end of 2002 as soon 
as they have demonstrated their ability to assume the obligations of 
membership...". In the accession countries (ACs), as a consequence, 
many policy areas are up for change, even though past reform efforts 
have already been adopted in view of EU requirements. Apart from the 
legal and institutional setting, the accession process will put much 
emphasis on the quality of implementing the acquis as well as on the 
economic convergence process. 
 
On these grounds, and pursuing the idea of a high level forum on 
European policy issues – bringing together a selected international body 
from academia, business and politics – the Austrian Federal Minister of 
Economics and Labour invites to a second European Academy of 
Excellence devoted to the issue of "Eastern Enlargement: The Sooner, 
Background paper 
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the Better?" As a member of several Council formations of the EU, the 
host would utilise the discussion and the results in his interventions in 
the Council meetings. 
 
In his introductory remarks, the Academy's host will touch upon the 
following questions: 
 
1. Can the current momentum of reform in the accession countries be 
sustained, although within the Union the political commitment 
towards enlargement seems to be hampered by public fears of the 
resulting social and economic change? 
2. What are the milestones for the CEECs in complying with the acquis 
and thereby meeting the accession requirements? How far is it up to 
the applicants themselves to decide about the accession date? Since 
membership will be extended on a country-by-country basis, what is 
the likely overall time span for the enlargement process? 
3. Are timely negotiated and stable conditions and a well-defined 
timetable for accession indispensable for foreign investment to 
evolve smoothly? 
4. Should politicians strive for an early enlargement, regardless of the 
ACs' state of transition? Is the claim "The sooner, the better" likely 
to jeopardise an optimal enlargement process? 
 
 
2. Issues for discussion 
 
2.1. Session 1a: Narrowing the structural gap 
 
Since the beginning of the 1990s much progress has been made in 
transforming the former command economies into market economies: 
Legal and economic stability has been spreading, hyper-inflation has 
subsided, privatisation has helped establish a business sector. Currently 
most of the accession candidates seem to be on the right track as far as 
macro-policies are concerned. What remains to be done is the 
completion of structural reforms with a twofold aim: (a) to adopt the 
acquis, in particular the provisions of the single market; and (b) to speed 
up convergence of income levels towards the average of EU member 
states. The ACs' economies are still characterised by low wages and 
productivity. In the event of enlargement this may induce migration 
which would be unfortunate both from the point of view of ACs 
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(because of the likely brain drain) as well as of current EU member 
states (because of the resulting labour market pressure). 
 
In the course of the reform process, the general employment situation in 
the CEECs has worsened dramatically with unemployment rates 
reaching double-digit figures. In the euro-zone, with virtually perfect 
capital mobility, the rather immobile factor labour will bear most of the 
adjustment burden. There is, however, no hard empirical evidence in 
favour of the widely-held opinion, that CEECs, based on inadequate 
social security provisions, would be dumping the EU labour markets. 
 
Recent data on the economic structure of ACs will be provided by the 
Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies (WIIW). In 
addition, a poll among (potential) Austrian investors in CEECs should 
reveal the (subjective) reasons for investing or not in these countries.  
The overall aim of this subsession is to evaluate, in view of the ongoing 
negotiations with applicant countries, the size, diversity and nature of 
the structural gaps between ACs and EU member states, and 
crystallising out an optimal path for the enlargement process. The 
questions raised in this context may include the following: 
 
1. What is the optimal policy mix conducive to narrowing the structural 
gap between accession countries and current EU member states? 
2. Sticking to an inflation target at the expense of investment may be 
required for stability in the short run. What are the long-term 
consequences for growth? 
3. Can an efficient capital market and banking sector emerge quickly 
enough to provide for the necessary amounts and qualities of 
external capital? 
4. FDI in the CEECs is characterised by low R&D spending. This can 
be attributed to weak protection of intellectual property rights. Have 
the CEECs neglected to improve important areas of their institutional 
framework to international standards? 
5. Should migration be restricted, or can a brain drain from the East and 
labour market pressure in the West be avoided by just having market 
forces work? 
6. On their path towards EU membership, the starting position of ACs is 
rather diverse. What are the peculiarities and the prospects of 
individual CEECs in view of future EU membership? 
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7. Will extended periods of transition perpetuate distorted economic 
structures or have a catalyst effect on industrial adjustment? What 
sectoral adaptations are to be expected for the CEECs? 
 
2.2. Session 1b: In search of the optimal exchange rate regime 
 
This subsession will be devoted to the presentation and discussion of a 
paper on "Exchange Rate Arrangements in Eastern and Central Europe" 
by Professor Robert A. Mundell, Nobel Laureate in economics of 1999. 
Without prejudice to this presentation, one can judge from official 
statements that many ACs will strive for an early adoption of the Euro. 
Such an emphasis on exchange rate targets may be inadequate, as real 
convergence is likely to take much longer than just achieving the 
Maastricht criteria. As a consequence, transforming countries may apply 
a suboptimal policy mix which drives them into EMU membership long 
before their fundamentals have reached adequate levels. On the positive 
side, the introduction of the euro will further diminish inflationary 
pressures in the CEECs due to stable production costs and shrinking 
profit margins in the union. Subject to Professor Mundell's presentation, 
possible questions to be raised are: 
 
1. What is the proper exchange rate regime for a transition economy? 
What are the consequences for the macroeconomic policy mix?  
2. Given that inflation in the CEECs has already come under control and 
net capital inflows are occurring in substantial amounts, what is the 
additional virtue of closely monitoring, or even fixing, the exchange 
rate? 
3. What is the optimal institutional setting for a currency peg? What 
provisions (in particular for restricting hot money flows) must be 
taken to avoid disruptive shocks?  
4. What are the economic preconditions for successfully introducing the 
euro in the accession countries? 
5. Careful real appreciation may support structural change and foster 
labour flows from inefficient (public sector) production to market-
oriented private production. Is real appreciation then a means to 
support growth? 
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2.3. Session 2: The effects of fragmentation on employment 
 
The international fragmentation of the value-added chain (vertical 
specialisation) is gaining importance as the globalisation of markets is 
spreading. Manufacturing firms enhance their competitiveness by 
outsourcing parts of their production which can be produced more 
efficiently by other companies and perhaps in other countries. Cross-
border trade increases when certain (usually labour-intensive) 
production stages are transposed from a high-wage to a low-wage 
country, and when the intermediate product is re-imported for assembly 
by the high-wage country. This phenomenon has stimulated a debate on 
the consequences for domestic value-added and employment in the 
high-wage country. 
 
Trade theory provides a number of arguments which make it plausible 
that international fragmentation can stimulate growth and employment 
in both the outsourcing and the producing country. However, in models 
employing realistic assumptions, the outcome usually remains 
ambiguous, unless it can be narrowed down by empirical analyses. 
Towards this end, and in addition to the material already publicly 
accessible, a case study will be prepared for and presented in this 
session by the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO). 
 
In the EU the preparation of Eastern Enlargement is accompanied by the 
fear, on either side, of trade-linked delocation of production. In these 
circumstances, a preferential treatment of the entrants as well as 
standards for safeguarding "fair" trade are likely to be fostered. 
However, preferential trade liberalisation may inhibit the realisation of 
the welfare effects of intra-product specialisation. Although the Europe 
Agreements clearly benefit the ACs, the prevailing system of trade 
arrangements is centred around and mostly targeted to the EU. This may 
limit macroeconomic convergence and integration among the CEECs, as 
it does not fully utilise, through intra-CEEC trade, the possibilities for 
reducing transaction costs. 
 
1. What are the theoretical preconditions for positive net effects on 
growth and employment in outsourcing countries as a result of 
transposing labour-intensive production stages to low-wage 
countries? 
Background paper 
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2. Do empirical studies on the fragmentation issue suggest net gains or 
losses of value-added and employment as a consequence of 
outsourcing the production of goods and services to other countries? 
3. What are the structural effects on production and employment of 
outsourcing labour-intensive parts of the production process to 
Eastern Europe?  
4. How does it affect income distribution on both sides? 
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WHAT WILL EASTERN ENLARGEMENT DO TO 
ACCESSION COUNTRIES? 
Christina Burger, Heinz Handler 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When westerners talk about Eastern Enlargement, they usually adopt the 
view from the west. This comes as no surprise, as it is the EU that sets 
the conditions for accession and will have to adjust its institutional and 
financial setup. Equally important, however, seems the view from the 
accession countries themselves, their starting position, their ambitions to 
adjust to the acquis communautaire, and the quality of such adjustment.  
 
During the second European Academy of Excellence, the discussions on 
Eastern Enlargement focussed on the problems of accession for the 
candidate countries. The questions raised in the background paper 
(reproduced in this volume) explored the structural gaps between the EU 
and the reforming countries, the options for an exchange rate regime, 
and the consequences for trade structures and jobs of outsourcing 
production from the EU to the low-wage eastern countries. 
 
The scope of the discussions may best be summarized by the following 
questions which will be elaborated one by one in what follows: 
 
1. How far play income differences between current EU member states 
and accession countries a role in the adjustment process of the 
latter? 
2. Can monetary and fiscal stability already be deemed permanently 
established in the accession countries? 
3. How can quality of technical and legal implementation of the acquis 
communautaire be secured? 
4. How can accession countries gain competitiveness on European and 
world markets? 
 
 
2. Income differences and their role for the adjustment 
process 
 
Burger, Handler 
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One of the specifics of Eastern Enlargement will be that the candidate 
countries on average are significantly poorer than the EU. Compared 
with the 1998 EU average GDP per head, income levels of citizens in 
the transition economies amounted, according to Salvatore1, to 51% in 
Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Croatia, the 
Slovak Republic and Slovenia), to 32.6% in the Baltic States (Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania) and to just 22.1% in South-Eastern Europe 
(Albania, Bulgaria, FYR of Macedonia and Romania). Since the 
opening of the east in 1989, the income-per-capita gap vis-à-vis EU 
countries has widened, and current estimates seem to indicate that 
income differences will be halved only some 20-30 years after accession 
(or not even before 35 years, according to an EBRD estimate of 1993). 
 
Possible consequences of such a long-lasting gap are: 
• Investors from the west will seek to gain from the relatively high 
rate of return on capital and the low wage level. This in turn will 
increase the demand for labour and, in the medium term, raise per 
capita income. 
• As predominantly low-wage components of production will move to 
the east, such investment will to some extent petrify the given 
production structure. As a result of the fragmentation of production, 
there will be income and employment gains in the east as well as in 
the west. 
• A study by DIW (2000) concludes that accession to the EU will not 
lead to massive migration from the east. Already now - before EU 
accession – there is a continuous stream of migration to the west 
which is seen abating as a result of capital inflows and the ensuing 
rise in wage levels in the transition economies. Including the 
additional migration following from full freedom of personal 
movement of some 336.000 persons by, say, 2002, the total stream 
may culminate at some 1,1 million persons. The additional flow of 
persons is seen to come down to some 42.000 persons by the year 
2020 (Breuss).  
• However, migration may be of minor importance compared with the 
commuter problem. A number of people from the east will tend to 
move (at least periodically or on a daily basis) to the west in order 
to optimize their earnings opportunities. In border areas this may 
temporarily disturb western labour markets and create adverse 
                                                     
1 Quotations without year refer to the contributions in this volume or to the 
discussion at the Academy. 
 Introduction and summary 12 
feelings of the working population against foreign workers. From 
this, restrictive policies in the west against the influx of foreigners 
could result, which would impede the restructuring process on both 
sides of the border.  
• The brain drain from the east already visible now will continue. 
The possibility of acquiring new qualifications may induce 
temporary migration, a phenomenon which is particularly observed 
for people with higher qualification. 
 
As the development since the opening of the east, and in particular the 
creation of a free trade association of reforming countries with the EU, 
has shown, do most of these possible effects not materialise 
immediately. They emerge rather slowly and can thus be influenced to 
some extent by economic and social policies. 
 
The accession countries have adopted the view that speedy adjustment 
to the institutional and economic framework of the EU is the best way to 
minimise the negative consequences of open borders towards the EU 
and to gain as soon as possible from the market conditions in the EU. 
 
Adjustment progress so far has not been completed. Apart from an 
almost complete restructuring of foreign trade and establishing new 
foreign exchange regimes, not enough advances are visible in other 
important areas, such as competition policies, banking and securities 
markets, non-financial institutions as well as enterprise restructuring. In 
spite of good results in (small-scale) privatisation, the cost efficiency 
within firms is still unsatisfactorily low. 
 
However, this should not be seen as an impediment to EU accession. As 
Pelkmans et al. (2000) have argued, the claim for substantial ex ante real 
convergence towards EU standards of accession candidates is of limited 
relevance only, not least because no meaningful definition exists of "real 
convergence". As for current EU members, such adjustment occurs 
anyway on a more or less continuous basis. What should rather be 
considered is institutional adjustment, such as the abolition of border 
controls and changes in legal system. Adjustments of this sort are 
required for a smooth functioning of the EU and are by and by 
considered in a number of candidate countries.  
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3. Macroeconomic and exchange-rate stability as the 
basis for gaining competitiveness 
 
In a market economy, macroeconomic stability is an essential 
precondition for private entrepreneurs and for structural policies to be 
successful. Sujan/Sujanova (1999) therefore proposed the following 
sequence of measures for the preparation of EU membership by the 
accession countries: 
• economic stabilisation; 
• economic reforms: definition of rules of private ownership, 
structural reforms which are necessary to achieve a functioning 
market economy; 
• changing of rules and regulations to achieve compatibility with EU 
law. 
 
These groups of measures are not independent. If, in the long run, 
stabilisation is pursued without structural reforms, this may result in a 
depression. On the other hand, structural reforms without stabilisation 
may produce high inflation and an increase in the current account 
deficit. 
 
In the decade following 1989, the political and economic opening of 
eastern European countries caused a GDP depression which turned out 
much deeper than the great depression in the 1930s. This was partly due 
to the adjustment gap vis-à-vis market economies and partly to policy 
prescriptions, particularly to the lack of consistency between monetary 
policy and real sector developments. Nearly all transition countries went 
through long phases of inflation which brought the credit mechanism 
and the investment system to a standstill. 
 
Real sector developments, however, should not be assessed exclusively 
by GDP movements. In the communist era a major part of GDP was just 
waste products, military expenditure and irrelevant investment (Fink). 
Per capita consumption seems to be a more relevant indicator not 
affected by the factors listed above. Measured in these terms, real 
income by now exceeds significantly the level of 1990. A large income 
gap remains, however, when compared with the average income level in 
EU countries (see Salvatore, Table 3). To narrow this gap, transition 
countries will have to improve on their competitiveness in international 
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markets which can successfully be pursued only on the basis of 
macroeconomic and exchange-rate stability.  
 
Towards this end, what is the optimal mix of fiscal, monetary and 
exchange-rate policies?  
 
According to Mundell, the transition countries should fix their 
exchange rates to the euro in order to gain from low inflation and low 
nominal interest rates. Euroisation should preferably be attained by 
means of a currency board arrangement which best ensures credibility 
of monetary policy and thereby fosters macroeconomic stability. 
Currency boards may be defined as fixed exchange-rate regimes with a 
firm link between foreign reserves and domestic money creation (based 
on a high coverage ratio). The "classic" currency boards of the late 19th 
and early 20th century were often run by external agents deliberately 
shielded from domestic political pressure. According to Ghosh et al. 
(2000), currency boards have been remarkably successful in reducing 
high inflation and simultaneously maintaining comparatively high GDP 
growth rates. This is attributed to the "discipline effect" of lower money 
supply growth and the "credibility effect" which fosters the growth of 
money demand.  
 
To be successful, however, currency boards should be footed on an 
appropriate legal and institutional framework as well as on a broad 
social and economic consensus. In addition, large scale currency 
reserves are needed to establish and maintain currency boards. Fixing 
the exchange rate vis-a-vis the euro may be a problem for accession 
countries who have important trade relations with the USA or hold a 
large part of their external debt in US dollars. Moreover, the ECB has 
no obligation to consider the special needs of accession countries which 
have linked their exchange rate to the euro. 
 
According to Mundell, the reforming countries should be persuaded to 
immediately join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) , though 
under the condition of complying with the convergence criteria - 
otherwise, the euro itself could be harmed. The accession countries 
would then not only benefit from EU transfer payments but in addition, 
and even more so, from quickly establishing efficient monetary and 
financial conditions and the access to functioning capital markets. 
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However, a fixed exchange-rate regime cannot be established all at 
once. As a major precondition, transition countries will have to stabilise 
their macroeconomic environment, although this may cause severe 
adjustment problems, in particular for the banking sector. Another 
unresolved question is the conversion rate at which to enter the euro 
zone as long as the transition phase continues. During transition it is 
more or less arbitrary which rate to apply as the equilibrium exchange 
rate. Gros (2000) arrives at the conclusion that the strongest transition 
economies (like Poland) need not hurry in joining the euro. On the other 
hand, transition countries with a weak monetary environment may wish 
to find an early anchor in the euro.  
 
Considering these arguments, von Hagen proposes that accession 
countries should introduce a regime of floating exchange rates. He 
stresses in particular that free international capital mobility, fixed 
exchange rates and monetary policy autonomy cannot be maintained at 
one and the same time – as frequently considered by governments. A 
policy which aims at achieving all these goals would result in strong 
exchange market pressure and speculative attacks, as several examples 
of the last 20 years demonstrate. 
 
Another alternative to a fixed exchange rate regime would be inflation 
targeting which is, however, more difficult to pursue. Central bankers 
in the transition countries are much less than their western colleagues 
used to make decisions concerning interest rates or the appropriate 
volume of money supply. As in the west, these decisions are seen as 
rather demanding, because they have to meet the criteria of credibility 
and, therefore, should not change too often. Even under fixed exchange 
rates, a country cannot acquire another currency's credibility: this is 
solely the product of the government's own policies. 
 
Bofinger argues that most member countries of the EU were successful 
under an adjustable peg mechanism and therefore pleads for such an 
exchange-rate regime also for the accession countries. Tumpell-Gugerell 
supports a middle-way somewhere between fixed exchange rates and 
adjustable pegs. She maintains that euroisation would only be a second 
best solution which was moreover rather costly as the accession 
countries would forego the seigniorage profit from issuing bank notes.  
 
Monetary and exchange-rate policies are just one side of the 
stabilisation coin, fiscal consolidation the other. According to Halpern, 
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the budgetary situation is seen even more important than the exchange 
rate regime. Actual budget deficits in the accession countries are 
generally rather low by now, as privatisation and commercialisation of 
state-owned enterprises have worked out quite well. This does not yet 
hold to the same extent for the reduction of quasi-fiscal deficits which 
are hidden, e.g., in extra-budgetary funds or as state bank credits to 
enterprises (Nuti). Also, liberalisation and privatisation did not 
automatically result in new capital formation. Therefore, tax policies 
had to be adjusted in order to set incentives for saving and capital 
formation in both forms – material and immaterial capital. A shift from 
direct to indirect taxation (i.e. from money earned to money spent) can 
provide such incentives. In the communist era corporate tax was a key 
source of revenue. During the transition period, income taxes and VAT 
have by and by taken precedence over corporate taxation. Public 
expenditures which go to unproductive uses (such as a boosted 
bureaucracy) should be reduced in favour of increasing investment in 
human capital (education, R&D) and infrastructure. Hence, the Central 
and Eastern European countries (CEECs) face at their level of economic 
development similar challenges concerning tax and expenditure policies 
as the EU-member states. 
 
The reform of financial markets has not been a top priority in the 
accession countries (Hochreiter/Kowalski, 2000), but all of them have, 
during the last 10 years, established a two-tier banking system. 
Competing commercial banks emerged due to liberalised entrance rules. 
Efficient financial markets are an essential requirement for economic 
growth and macroeconomic stability. However, the CEECs tail behind 
the EU and where the financial system has expanded, governments have 
often been the main beneficiaries. Many enterprises have continued to 
be excluded from the access to bank finance, but they have at least 
access to the equity market (EBRD 2000). According to Fink, the 
efficiency of financial markets is not only a consequence of market 
forces; public policies may also contribute a lot by, e.g., being 
transparent, providing reliable supervisory structures, and continuing 
credibly with the liberalisation of capital movements. Further 
privatisation would also point in the same direction. 
 
New central bank laws were also adopted, but they need to be 
amended to meet the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty. The top 
executives of the central banks are now appointed by parliament, the 
governor usually by the state president. They are all appointed for at 
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least 5 years. Legally their degree of independence is rather high, there 
is however evidence that actual independence is less than the statutes 
suggest. Central banks have functional independence, i.e., they may 
freely choose instruments and techniques of monetary control. The 
prime objective of the central banks is price stability in Latvia and 
Poland, and currency stability in the other countries. Apart from these 
objectives, the central banks are supposed to support the economic 
policy of the government. However, in line with EU law, fiscal 
financing is limited or even not permitted. To mitigate the cost of 
further disinflation, the monetary policy strategy should clearly be layed 
down and the accountability of the central banks strengthened. 
 
The process of real economic convergence is usually accompanied by 
strong real appreciation in the accession countries, i.e., by an increase 
in relative prices vis-à-vis their respective partner countries. 
Halpern/Wyplosz (1997) quote a number of reasons for this, inter alia 
the switch from command to market economies, the adjustment to the 
international price level of raw material prices, the demand for direct 
investments from abroad, and the productivity increase which is higher 
for tradable goods than in the non-tradable sectors („Balassa-Samuelson 
effect“). According to Gros (2000), the inflationary pressure arising 
from the latter effect may be strong enough to jeopardise unconditional 
EMU membership. 
 
Because of the necessity to organise production more efficiently in a 
market-oriented economy, the situation on the labour market has 
changed completely. Excessive employment was cut back, firms were 
shut down and new production branches were established. However, the 
capacities freed thereby have not yet been absorbed completely. Hence, 
eastern European countries still face high unemployment, especially in 
those regions where large firms were closed (Pöschl, 2000). To cope 
with open unemployment, passive labour market policy was mainly 
used at the beginning of the transition period. Active labour market 
policies (ALMP) had to be implemented without prior experience, and 
have now been carried out since only a few years. Empirical analyses 
(see e.g. Puhani/Steiner, 1997) of ALMP effects have come to the 
conclusion that both, macroeconomic matching and microeconomic 
targeting of problem groups, could be improved. 
 
An overall assessment of macroeconomic stability in the accession 
countries leads to the following result: Many of them are tying their 
 Introduction and summary 18 
national currencies to the euro which limits the autonomy of monetary 
policy, but lets them share the stability of the euro zone. Fiscal 
autonomy is also limited because of the stability and growth pact. The 
scope for independent stabilisation policies is thus rather low, and 
exogenous shocks will not easily be absorbed by market forces. In order 
to permit exchange rates to be pegged successfully to the euro, more 
flexible labour markets and wages seem indispensable (Welfens, 1998). 
 
Von Hagen warns that accession countries should not be assessed 
individually, but as a more or less homogenous group, as do investors 
from abroad: economic problems in one country will induce investors to 
pull their money out from other countries of that group as well, simply 
because they feel that disturbances in one country are likely to spread 
out over the whole area.  
 
 
4. Implementing the acquis communautaire 
 
The European Council of Copenhagen in June 1993 endorsed the 
conditions for the accession of eastern European countries: 
“...Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to 
assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and 
political conditions required. Membership requires that the candidate 
country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union....”  
 
The European Association Agreements, signed with all accession 
candidates, foresee the creation of a free trade area in two stages 
within ten years. As a first step, all quantitative restrictions were 
removed, and the most important tariffs had to be phased out (at a faster 
pace by the EU than by the accession countries). This process is still not 
completed and will be followed by the full implementation of the acquis 
communautaire. 
 
According to Salvatore when summarising the discussion, too much 
emphasis is laid on purely economic indicators. Policymakers will judge 
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the readiness for accession not just by the differences in GDP per 
capita, by productivity or by similar indicators. The largest emphasis 
will be on what the Commission calls today the “quality of 
implementation of the acquis” which includes many microeconomic 
factors such as the capability of implementing European competition 
law, administrative law and financial markets law as well as the quality 
of institutions. Inotai (1999) considers the benefits, but also the costs, of 
preparing for EU membership, in particular in areas such as 
environmental and social policies. His view is that the quality of 
implementing EU law will largely depend on the adjustment capabilities 
at the micro-level. Concerning environmental policies, the signing and 
ratification of environmental treaties can be seen as a first step in the 
direction of compliance with international environmental policy and a 
good preparation for the relevant EU policies. Significant progress has 
been made in this area (EBRD, 1999). The costs of full compliance with 
EU environmental regulation are by no means negligible – they are 
estimated at 1.6 to 3.2% of GDP (Gacs, 1999b).  
 
As Fink stressed in the discussion, advances in European integration 
have always depended on binding time schedules – e.g. the creation of 
EMU. Similarly, a precise and well-defined time schedule can help 
achieve the goals which were set by and for the accession countries. 
However, participants in the Academy agreed that there is some lack of 
speed in preparing for the Eastern Enlargement, although a certain trade 
off may exist between the speed and the quality of implementing the 
acquis. According to Fink, the accession countries should not be given a 
free choice when to join the EU. They would anyway have to be 
prepared to join, not only with respect to implementing and adopting the 
acquis, but also by adjusting economic policies to the accession criteria 
of the growth and stability pact. 
For the accession countries it is more difficult to comply with all EU 
directives than it was for existing EU members when they entered, 
simply because the number of directives has significantly increased over 
the years, reflecting the start of EMU, the euro etc. (Franke, 1999). 
Steinherr believes that accession will not depend on complete 
compliance with the Copenhagen criteria, but will eventually be 
based on a compromise between what is politically desirable and what is 
economically feasible. He favours a political decision which opens the 
EU door for as many countries as possible as quickly as possible.  
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According to Salvatore, small-scale privatisation, foreign trade and the 
exchange system all meet the standards of performance of the advanced 
industrial nations and therefore make the transition countries ready for 
accession. On the other hand governance and enterprise restructuring, 
price liberalisation, securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions have not proceeded that far. Only some years ago, in 1989, 
the share of the official private business in all business was lower than 
the share of the hidden economy. Now the opposite is true – the further 
the transition has proceeded, the higher is the share of the private 
economy (Lacko, 1999). 
 
For the preparation of the accession negotiations, the negotiations 
themselves and the implementation of the acquis, an enormous increase 
in efficiency and improvement in public administration will be required. 
Effective co-ordination, careful planning and the building-up of 
institutions are the main requirements for the preparation of EU-
membership. So far, the restructuring of the public sector in the CEECs 
has not been completed yet. Better regulation in the CEECs is not 
completely equal to less public intervention. Partly, new regulation is 
needed, e.g., for the protection of private ownership (Gacs, 1999a). 
 
The CEECs will receive payment from the structural funds of the EU 
from which also enterprises may benefit. On the other hand, the CEECs 
have to decrease the direct and indirect subsidies which they disburse to 
enterprises, mainly to publicly owned enterprises. This is a necessary 
condition for accession, which other EU members had to fulfil as well 
when they entered the EU. Moreover, the process of “depoliticising” 
enterprises has to go on in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria 
(EBRD, 1999). 
5. How to gain competitiveness in accession countries? 
 
The recession in the early transition phase, caused – among other factors 
– by the trade shock of economic disintegration and the credit shock of 
high real interest rates, is overcome by now. Catching up with western 
income and productivity levels is sometimes seen as the most important 
aim in the transition period. However, this is a difficult, if not an 
impossible, task, as the least developed EU countries grow quite fast as 
well. In order to decrease the gap in national income, accession 
countries would have to grow even faster. Obviously, it makes sense to 
envisage equality in terms of macroeconomic stability, but much less so 
in terms of structural features (such as export price structures).  
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The accession countries are enormously diverse in their process of 
catching up, with Hungary , Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia 
taking the lead. This process not only differs between countries, but also 
between industries. Moreover, productivity catching-up is very different 
across branches of industry, while wage catching-up is distributed more 
evenly across sectors and branches. Productivity catches up at greater 
speed in electrical equipment and transport and much lower in textiles, 
leather and machinery. In general, the productivity advances are fastest 
in high-tech and medium-tech sectors. Combined with a strong wage 
drift, this leads to a shift in comparative advantage towards the medium-
tech sector and away from low-tech, labour intensive sectors 
(Landesmann). Nowotny stated that, in the discussion on 
competitiveness of the accession countries, too much emphasis is 
usually put on wage developments. According to his opinion, the 
institutional and material infrastructure plays a more important role than 
wages. If these factors are neglected, regional problems are likely to 
evolve. 
 
Traditionally, the secondary sector played an important role in socialist 
countries. According to Landesmann, deindustrialisation characterised 
the first years of the transition process, but is of rather minor importance 
now. In fact, some accession countries seem to move towards re-
industrialisation. Since reconstruction is an important task in most of the 
CEECs, the construction industry is largely responsible for the high 
share of industry in total production, this share still exceeding the 
average level in the EU. Landesmann supposes that the development 
from deindustrialisation to re-industrialisation shows specialisation of 
the CEECs in manufactured goods. As a consequence, the service sector 
has remained underrepre-sented. 
 
Foreign direct investment still plays an important role in the CEECs, 
although FDI inflows differ from country to country and are allocated 
predominantly near the western borders (Landesmann). It has been 
subject to discussion whether or not the efficiency of a firm depends, 
among other factors, also on the nationality of the owner. The causality 
may run either way, and it is by no means clear that foreign ownership 
has a favourable impact on the efficiency of production. In fact, foreign-
controlled companies do exhibit the best production results, but this is 
because, early on in the transformation process, foreign capital was able 
to select and enter the most dynamic branches of industry. 
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FDIs still finance considerable parts of investment in the CEECs who 
would otherwise depend on the more volatile financial capital inflows. 
Another aspect is the transfer of management techniques and 
technological skills linked to FDIs (Brenton et al., 1999) and the 
contribution to reach conformity with EU law (Inotai, 1999). Therefore, 
CEECs generally continue to encourage FDIs, which requires that 
financial systems be liberalised further (strict rules for banking, 
effective banking supervision) and financial markets transmit reliable 
information. It is likely that FDIs will increase further after accession to 
the EU because of the expected fall in risk premia. This fall will be a 
consequence of an increase in legal security, the reduction of still 
existing transaction obstacles, lower administrational burden and the 
reduction of political risks. 
 
When looking at Austrian projects in CEECs, market-driven motives 
clearly dominate: More than 80% of firms in a survey mentioned this 
motive as main reason for their engagement. In contrast, efficiency-
oriented motives (in particular low wage costs) seem to be of rather 
minor importance. At the beginning of the opening-up of the east, FDIs 
were directed towards the existing, already privatised, enterprises. 
Today greenfield investments play an increasing role (Pfaffermayer 
/Stankovsky, 1999, Burger).  
 
As to the motives for investing in plants in eastern Europe, outsourcing 
of production by western companies is of particular interest in terms of 
value-added and employment for both the outsourcing and the receiving 
country: Outsourcing means that the value-added chain of production is 
fragmented and part of it is moved to an eastern country. The advantage 
for the western company may lie in lower production costs which may 
help maintain international competitiveness. For CEECs it has the 
advantage of generating additional value added combined with a 
transfer of technological skills and management know-how. According 
to Kohler, real income per capita is likely to rise in CEECs by receiving 
western outsourcing. The accession to the EU will significantly broaden 
the outsourcing potential, because the traditional rules of origin will 
disappear for goods produced (partly) in eastern European countries. 
Like international trade in general, outsourcing is welfare-enhancing as 
it facilitates the specialisation and thereby the optimal allocation and use 
of resources. This is true for EU countries as well as the accession 
countries, but, given the relative size of the EU and the CEECs, the 
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latter should benefit more than current EU members. Therefore, CEECs 
may be better off by becoming a part of the global production network 
than by attempting to start entire new industries from scratch. 
 
Production and trade structures are rather diverse across the CEEC 
region, even after the enormous adjustments during the transformation 
process. Sectoral trade structures and the factor intensity of exports have 
long been regarded as indicators of the level of development of an 
economy and of its value-added generating capacity. Exports from 
CEECs are on average much more labour intensive than exports from 
the EU. But in both regions the importance of labour intensive goods is 
on a strong decline. In the CEECs' exports, the R&D-intensive branches 
were underrepresented at the beginning of the transition period, but 
gained importance during that period. Hungary in particular seems to 
evolve as a “Pannonian tiger” (Landesmann).  
 
In contrast to the factor-intensity of trade, according to Salvatore, the 
question whether transition economies should trade with industralized 
western countries or within their own group is virtually meaningless. 
What is important is that they trade – no matter with whom. The 
benefits of trade can be reaped off only if there are no trade distortions. 
However, as Fink found out, some 122 trade-distorting measures have 
been introduced by the five most developed CEECs (i.e. Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia). This new wave of 
protectionism is strongly motivated by real currency appreciations 
which make it more difficult for eastern firms to successfully compete 
on world markets. Nevertheless, if these distortions are abolished the 
liberalisation of foreign trade may save the country from employing 
strict competition rules (Welfens, 1998). The Schengen border 
regulations are seen by eastern countries as an important distortion of 
trade because the new procedures increase the waiting time at the border 
and thereby discriminate against competitors within the Schengen area. 
 
 
6. Eastern Enlargement: The sooner the better? 
 
The accession candidates have made remarkable advances from the 
starting point in 1989. In contrast to the situation after World War II, 
when the appropriate institutions were not available and prices did not 
function, the CEECs need restructuring not reconstruction which means 
that no "Marshall Plan"-type of financing is needed. Moreover, the 
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opening up of the east takes now place in a global world – in contrast to 
the state of closed economies right after the war (Kohler, 2000). 
Accession countries are now eligible to receive payment from the EU 
structural funds. As the Cologne Summit stressed in June 1999, the EU 
is aware of the importance of preparing the accession countries in time 
for future EU membership. This does of course not mean that all 
accession costs will be financed by the EU, candidate countries will 
certainly have to contribute themselves as well at varying degrees. The 
accession countries are still very uneven, measured by macroeconomic 
indicators like differences in GDP per head and inflation, but also with 
respect to the stages of institutional and economic reform. 
 
Given the large number of candidates and their diverging income levels, 
it is clear that the EU system of transfer payments will have to be 
altered. The existing system would require to increase the EU budget by 
almost 100%, and incoming new members would then receive up to 30 
% of their GDP as EU transfer payments. This would be unsustainable 
for both the EU and the accession countries. 
 
The candidates have accepted by now to enter the EU not before 2003. 
When the readiness for accession will be judged, not only economic 
factors will be taken into account. Readiness will be evaluated by the 
successful implementation of market structures, the establishment of 
appropriate institutions and infrastructure, and the establishment of 
market attitudes, but certainly also by factors like internal security.  
 
When the time table for the accession process is discussed, a number of 
arguments can be quoted in favour of early accession: 
• keeps pressure on adjustment in the transition economies and thus 
avoids the prolongation of adjustment costs; 
• enhances expectations in the west of successful transformation 
towards market structures in the east; 
• with more speedy adjustment, the wage gap will be narrowed early 
enough to contain migration pressures; 
• eastern products will early on become competitive on western 
markets; 
• structural funds of the EU will disperse more money at earlier times; 
• according to estimations by Breuss, an early enlargement results in 
higher GDP effects than later enlargement, for both, EU-15 and 
CEEC-10. 
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But there are of course also arguments against early accession: 
• adjustment pressure may be too harsh for some of the transition 
economies, they may face the danger of social unrest and economic 
disturbance; 
• full freedom of migration will cause a brain drain to EU countries in 
the first phase of membership when the high-qualified workers are 
especially needed (Breuss). 
 
On balance, the discussion during the second Academy of Excellence 
seemed to be in favour of early accession. The title of the Academy, 
“Eastern Enlargement: The sooner, the better?”, could therefore be 
slightly transformed into “Eastern Enlargement: The sooner, the 
better!”. This does not mean though that accession could take place 
before 2003. 
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NARROWING THE STRUCTURAL GAP IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES 
Dominick Salvatore 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
During the past decade we have witnessed some of the most dramatic political 
and economic changes in human memory with the collapse of the Communist 
regimes in Central, South and Eastern Europe. All these countries are now in 
the process of restructuring their economies along market lines. The required 
restructuring and privatization are on a scale larger than anything that has been 
attempted in the past. Even the reconstruction of Europe after the devastation of 
World War II was to some extent easier since it involved the reestablishment of 
functioning markets rather than the creation of a brand new market system. 
Western economists generally found themselves at a loss, for the most part, 
when it came to advising the government of former communist nations on the 
best road to a market economy. Only some general broad principles were 
agreed upon. The most important of these was the need to privatize the 
economy. But when it came on how to do it and on how rapidly to proceed (for 
example, gradually or all at once) disagreements abounded.  
 
This paper examines how far the restructuring process toward a market system 
has proceeded in transition economies during the past decade, how ready these 
economies are for admission into the European Union, and how the 
globalization of the world economy is affecting them. Part 2 of this paper 
examines present economic conditions in Central Europe, the Baltic States and 
the South-Eastern transition economies. Part 3 presents a model of 
restructuring for transition economies and examines the actual progress in 
transition made in the ten years since the collapse of communism. Part 4 
analyzes the relative structure and the international competitiveness of 
transition economies. Part 5 presents a model of international trade during the 
restructuring process, as well as the actual trade restructuring that took place 
and the revealed comparative advantage of transition economies. Finally, Part 6 
examines their current exchange rate arrangements and evaluates those best 
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suited to prepare these countries for admission into the European Union and 
European Monetary System.  
 
 
2. Economic conditions in transition economies 
 
Table 1 shows that the countries of Central Europe (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Croatia, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia) faced the 
greatest restructuring burden in the form of negative growth of real GDP 
from 1990 to 1993. This was earlier than the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania), which faced declining GDP from 1990 to 1994. On the 
other hand, the transition economies of South-Eastern Europe (Albania, 
Bulgaria, the FYR of Macedonia, and Romania) experienced negative 
growth rates more or less over the entire decade of the 1990s. By 1998, only 
Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia had reached or surpassed their 
real GDP level of 1989. The Czech Republic and Hungary had reached 95 
percent of their 1989 GDP, while Croatia had 78 percent. The Baltic States 
and the transition economies of South-Eastern Europe had GDPs only from 
59 to 86 percent of their 1989 level in 1998. Thus, after a decade of 
restructuring most transition economies (TE) had yet to reach the GDP they 
had before the collapse of communism. 
 
Table 2 shows that the inflation level in TE fell below 10 percent only since 
1995 in Croatia, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, since 1997 in Latvia, 
Lithuania and the FYR of Macedonia, since 1998 in the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Estonia, Albania, and Bulgaria, and it is projected to fall below 10 
percent only for 1999 in Hungary. Romania still faces strong inflationary 
pressures. Thus, TE (except Romania) seem to have conquered inflation 
only during the past few years. From table 3 we see that the average PPP 
GDP/capita was $10,217 for the transition economies of Central Europe, 
$6,534 for the Baltic States, and $4,429 for the transition economies of 
South-Eastern Europe. These represent, respectively, 51.0 percent, 32.6 
percent, and 22.1 percent of the PPP GDP/capita of EU15.  
 
Table 4 shows that although the overstressing of industry that had 
characterized the communist period had declined significantly by 1998, it 
was still excessive in the transition economies of Central, South and Eastern 
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Europe in relation to other market economies at the same stage of 
development. Gross domestic investment (GDI) as a percentage of GDP was 
similar to other developing countries with similar level of per capita 
incomes. Government budget (GB) deficits at between 2.3 and 3.2 percent 
of GDP seem sustainable and so does the external debt (ED) at between 42 
and 46 percent of GDP. Current account (CA) deficits, however, seem 
excessive, except for the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Bulgaria in view of 
the limited inflow of foreign capital (especially foreign direct investments) 
into these economies.    
 
  
 
Table 1:  Growth of real GDP in Central Europe, Baltic States, and South-Eastern Europe transition  
economies, 1989-1999 (percentage changes) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
1998
with 1989=100
Central Europe:             
Czech Republic 1.4 -1.2 -11.5 -3.3 0.6 3.2 6.4 3.8 0.3 -2.3 0.0 95
Hungary 0.7 -3.5 -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 5.1 3.0 95
Poland 0.2 -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9 4.8 3.5 117
Croatia -1.6 -7.1 -21.1 -11.7 -8.0 5.9 6.8 6.0 6.5 2.3 -0.5 78
Slovak Republic 1.4 -2.5 -14.6 -6.5 -3.7 4.9 6.9 6.6 6.5 4.4 1.8 100
Slovenia -1.8 -4.7 -8.9 -5.5 2.8 5.3 4.1 3.5 4.6 3.9 3.5 104
  
Baltic States:  
Estonia -1.1 -8.1 -13.6 -14.2 -9.0 -2.0 4.3 3.9 10.6 4.0 0.0 76
Latvia 6.8 2.9 -10.4 -34.9 -14.9 0.6 -0.8 3.3 8.6 3.6 1.5 59
Lithuania 1.5 -5.0 -6.2 -21.3 -16.0 -9.5 3.5 4.9 7.4 5.2 0.0 65
  
South-Eastern Europe:  
Albania 9.8 -10.0 -27.7 -7.2 9.6 9.4 8.9 9.1 -7.0 8.0 8.0 86
Bulgaria 0.5 -9.1 -11.7 -7.3 -1.5 1.8 2.1 -10.1 -7.0 3.5 0.0 66
FYR Macedonia 0.9 -9.9 -7.0 -8.0 -9.1 -1.8 -1.2 0.8 1.5 2.9 0.0 72
Romania -5.8 -5.6 -12.9 -8.8 1.5 3.9 7.1 4.1 -6.9 -7.3 -4.0 76
  
Weighted average -0.2 -6.6 -10.7 -3.6 0.4 3.9 5.5 4.0 3.6 2.4 1.6 95
*Projection 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 1999. 
  
Table 2:  Inflation in Central Europe, Baltic States, and South-Eastern Europe transition economies,  
1989-1999 (percentage changes) 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999*
Central Europe:            
Czech Republic 1.5 18.4 52.0 12.7 18.2 9.7 7.9 8.6 10.0 6.8 3.5
Hungary 18.1 33.4 32.2 21.6 21.1 21.2 28.3 19.8 18.4 10.3 8.0
Poland 639.5 249.0 60.4 44.3 37.6 29.4 21.6 18.5 13.2 8.6 6.5
Croatia na 136.0 249.8 938.2 1149.0 -3.0 3.8 3.4 3.8 5.4 4.0
Slovak Republic 1.5 18.4 58.3 9.1 25.1 11.7 7.2 5.4 6.4 5.6 14.5
Slovenia 2772.0 104.6 247.1 92.9 22.8 19.5 9.0 9.0 8.8 6.5 6.5
  
Baltic States:  
Estonia na na 303.8 953.5 35.6 42.0 29.0 15.0 12.5 4.4 3.1
Latvia na na 262.4 959.0 35.0 26.0 23.1 13.1 7.0 2.8 2.1
Lithuania na na 345.0 1161.1 188.8 45.0 35.5 13.1 8.5 2.4 2.5
  
South-Eastern Europe:  
Albania 0.0 0.0 104.1 236.6 30.9 15.8 6.0 17.4 42.1 8.7 2.0
Bulgaria 10.0 72.5 338.9 79.4 63.8 121.9 32.9 310.8 578.6 1.0 2.0
FYR Macedonia na na 229.7 1935.0 241.8 55.0 9.0 -0.6 2.6 -3.1 2.0
Romania 0.6 37.7 222.8 199.2 295.5 61.7 27.8 56.9 151.4 40.6 40.0
  
Median a 5.8 37.7 229.7 199.2 35.6 26.0 21.6 13.1 10.0 5.6 3.5
Mean b 430.4 74.4 192.8 511.0 166.6 35.1 18.5 37.7 66.4 7.7 7.4
na=not available; *Projection, a the median is the median value after all inflation rates have been arranged in order of size. 
b the mean (unweighted average) tends to exceed the median due to outliers.   
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 1999. 
  
Table 3:  GDP of Central Europe, Baltic States, and South-Eastern Europe transition economies, 1998 (% 
changes) 
 GDP 
(billion $) 
Population 
(millions) 
GDP/Capita 
($) 
PPP GDP/Capita 
($) 
Average growth  
in GDP/Capita  
(1994-98, %/Year) 
PPP GDP/Capita 
(as % of EU15) 
Central Europe:       
Czech Republic   52.0 10.3   5,479 12,479 2.2 62.3 
Hungary   45.7 10.1   4,730 10,202 3.1 50.9 
Poland 148.0 38.7   3,887   7,658 6.0 38.2 
Croatia    19.1   4.5   4,820   6,839 5.5 34.1 
Slovak Republic    19.5   5.4   3,793   9,817 5.9 49.0 
Slovenia    18.2   2.0   9,779 14,305 4.3 71.4 
   Average    50.4 11.8   5,415 10,217 4.5 51.0 
       
Baltic States:       
Estonia    5.5   1.5   3,593   7,607 4.2 38.0 
Latvia    5.5   2.4   2,622   5,557 3.2 27.7 
Lithuania 10.5   3.7 10,692   6,437 2.1 32.1 
   Average   7.2   2.5   5,636   6,534 3.2 32.6 
       
South-Eastern Europe: 
Albania   2.5   3.2      930   2,860 5.7 14.3 
Bulgaria 10.1   8.3   1,315   4,776 -2.1 23.8 
FYR Macedonia   2.2   2.0   1,548   4,432 0.4 22.1 
Romania 34.8 22.5   1,695   5,646 0.2 28.2 
   Average 12.4   9.0   1,372   4,429 1.1 22.1 
       
Overall Average 28.8   8.8   4,222   7,586 3.1 35.5 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 1999. 
  
Table 4: Economic structure of Central European, Baltic States, and South-Eastern European transition 
economies, 1998                               
 % of GDP 
in industry 
% of GDP in 
agriculture 
Gross domestic 
investment  
(% GDP) 
Government 
balance  
(% GDP) 
Current 
account  
(% GDP)
External 
debt  
(% GDP) 
FDI/Capita  
1989-1999 
(million $) 
Central Europe:        
Czech Republic 36.6   5.0 34.0  -2.6   -1.9 41.7   967 
Hungary 34.0   6.0 27.0  -4.8   -4.8 55.9 1,627 
Poland 28.1   4.0 24.0  -3.0   -4.5 29.9   389 
Croatia 25.4   8.9 15.0    0.6   -7.1 37.5   444 
Slovak Republic 26.7   4.4 35.0  -5.8 -10.1 58.5   326 
Slovenia 27.5   3.8 24.0  -1.4    0.0 25.4   596 
   Average 29.7   5.4 26.5  -2.8   -2.8 41.5   725 
Baltic States:        
Estonia 18.1   5.6 26.0  -0.3   -9.2 55.8   953 
Latvia 24.3   4.5 20.0  -0.8 -11.1 47.6   642 
Lithuania 23.6 10.1 28.0  -5.8 -12.1 34.8   415 
   Average 22.0   6.7 24.7  -2.3 -10.8 46.1   670 
South-Eastern Europe:        
Albania 18.0 63.0 12.0 -10.4   -6.3 29.4   132 
Bulgaria 25.5 18.7 12.0    1.0   -2.3 92.6   159 
FYR Macedonia 27.0 12.0 20.0   -1.7   -9.0 39.5   121 
Romania 31.7 16.0 20.0   -3.3   -7.9 25.2   200 
   Average 25.6 27.4 16.0   -3.6   -6.4 46.7   153 
        
Overall average 26.7 12.5 20.2   -3.2   -6.6 44.1   522 
Legend: GDP=Gross domestic product; FDI=Foreign direct investment (cumulative).  
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 1999 and World Bank, World Development Report, 1999/2000. 
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3. Transition process and progress 
 
In this section we present a model of the transition process and examine 
the actual progress that TE have made during the past decade. 
 
3.1. A model of transition 
 
The transition process, involving as it does the restructuring of the 
economy, the inflow of FDI, international trade, and migration, can be 
visualized with the aid of figure 1. The lower factor-price frontier (curve) 
in figure 1 shows the trade-off between the real rate of return on capital and 
the real wage rate in TE as compared with the higher factor-price frontier 
or trade-off curve for the West because of the lower level of economic 
efficiency in TE after decades of communism and non-market allocations. 
For example, in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, productivity is 
estimated to be from 20 to 40 percent below that of Greece, Portugal and 
Spain. It is much lower for the Baltic States and the transition economies of 
South-Eastern Europe. With a lower capital-labour ratio (K/L), TE might 
be initially at point E, showing a higher rate of return of capital but a much 
lower real wage than Western Europe (point W). The higher rate of return 
on capital in Central Europe will attract capital from the West. This not 
only lowers the rate of return on capital and increases the real wages of 
labour in TE (i.e., point E moves down the trade-off curve) but it also shifts 
the entire TE factor-price frontier or trade-off curve upward because 
foreign capital (which embodies new and more efficient technologies) 
increases economic efficiency in TE.  
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On the other hand, the West moves up its unchanged trade-off curve 
(but by very little, since the economy of the West is so much larger than 
that TE). The process will continue until the rate of return to capital is 
the same in TE and in the West (point E' and W', respectively, in the 
figure). The problem, however, is that at E' and W', real wages in the 
West are still much higher than in TE, thus leaving a strong stimulus for 
labor migrations to the West. The only way for real wages in TE to 
become equal to those in the West is if all the less productive capital in 
TE is scrapped and replaced with capital as productive as in the West 
and all other economic inefficiencies in TE are removed. Such 
convergence of wages may take several decades to occur. Migratory 
pressures, however, would be significantly reduced if sufficient 
employment opportunities were created in the meantime in TE, even if 
wide differences in real wage between TE and Western Europe remain.  
International trade operates in the same way as FDI in reducing real 
Western-TE wage differentials and stimulating efficiency improvements 
(i.e., causing upward shifts in the trade-off curve) in TE. That is, according 
to the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, the export of labor-intensive commodities 
(in which TE seem to have a comparative advantage) increases the relative 
demand for labor in TE (just like an inflow of capital from the West) and 
Figure 1: Restructuring in transition economies:  
FDI, labor productivity, trade and migration 
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thus reduces real wage differences and the pressure of TE labor to migrate 
to the West. Thus, large scale capital inflows from the West and free access 
of TE products in Western markets are complementary and reinforce each 
other in reducing Western-TE wage differentials and the pressure for 
migration to Western Europe.  
 
To be noted is that even though capital is relatively scarce in TE, 
inefficiencies could be so pervasive (as for example, in Bulgaria or 
Rumania) as to result in a lower rate of return on capital in these 
countries than in the West. A perverse capital movement from TE could 
then occur, which would increase rather than reduce real wage 
differentials. On the other hand, in those transition economies such as 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland where the process of 
restructuring is further along but returns on capital are not much higher 
than in the West, only a very small amount of capital inflow would take 
place and this would have negligible effects on reducing TE-Western 
European real wage differentials and migratory pressures.  
 
Even if the rate of return on capital were much larger in TE than in Western 
Europe, this could still fail to attract large capital inflows to TE if Western 
investors are not convinced that economic restructuring will be 
aggressively pursued in the future or if they are unsure of political stability 
in TE. This may be one explanation for the relatively small flow of capital 
from the West in the transition economies of South-Eastern Europe since 
the collapse of communism (see the last column of table 4.) Potential 
investors could be adopting a low-risk, wait-and-see attitude and postpone 
investing until many others do. This slows down the process of wage 
convergence with Western Europe and keep migration pressure strong.  
 
Even with large scale Western investments in transition economies and free 
access to Western markets, it will take many more years for real wage 
differentials to be significantly reduced. In 1993, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) estimated that it would take 35 
years for living standards in most TE to reach half those of developed 
countries, and so pressure to migrate to the West is likely to persist for a 
long time to come. Some labor migration from TE may in fact be beneficial 
to Western Europe in view of the zero or even negative growth rates and 
aging of their native labor forces. The problem is that under present 
conditions of high structural unemployment it is economically difficult and 
politically dangerous for Western Europe to absorb a large influx of labor 
from TE. But by avoiding short-term absorption costs by strictly limiting 
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labor migration from TE, Western European countries may be foregoing 
the long-term benefits that labor migration from the TE would provide (and 
at the same time slow down the restructuring process in TE).  
 
3.2. Transition progress 
 
With the above theoretical background in mind, we can now examine 
the progress that TE have made in restructuring their economies during 
the past decade. The first column of table 5 shows that from 55 percent 
to 80 percent of the economy has been privatized in TE. This percentage 
is highest for the Czech Republic and Hungary and smallest for 
Slovenia and the FYR of Macedonia. Large-scale privatization is 
highest in the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic and 
Estonia, but it is smaller than small-scale privatization, which has 
reached standards of performance similar to those in advanced industrial 
nations. On the other hand, governance and enterprise restructuring has 
not proceeded as much. Table 5B shows that the foreign trade and the 
foreign exchange systems have been fully restructured and now have 
standards of performance of the advanced industrial nations. On the 
other hand, progress in price liberalization, competition policy, banking 
and interest liberalization, and securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions have not proceeded as far. On a scale from zero to 100, they 
are at between 50% and 75% of the level in the advanced industrial 
nations (closer to 75% in the TE of Central Europe and the Baltic States 
and closer to the 50% mark in the TE of South-Eastern Europe). Thus, 
except for small-scale privatization and foreign trade and exchange 
systems, TE (including the more advanced ones in Central Europe) still 
have a great deal of restructuring to undertake before they are ready for 
admission into the European Union. 
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Table 5: Transition progress in Central Europe, Baltic States and South-
Eastern Europe transition economies, 1999 
Enterprises   
private 
sector 
% of GDP 
large-scale 
privatization 
small-scale 
privatization 
governance & 
enterprise 
restructuring 
Central Europe:     
Czech Republic 80 4   4+ 3 
Hungary 80 4   4+    3+ 
Poland 65    3+   4+ 3 
     
Croatia 60 3   4+  3- 
Slovak Republic 75 4   4+ 3 
Slovenia 55    3+   4+  3- 
     
Baltic States:     
Estonia 75 4   4+ 3 
Latvia 65 3 4  3- 
Lithuania 70 3   4+  3- 
     
South-Eastern Europe:     
Albania 75 2 4 2 
Bulgaria 60 3    3+    2+ 
FYR Macedonia 55 3 4 2 
Romania 60   3-   4- 2 
Legend: 1 = Little progress (i.e., less than 25 percent, except for large-scale 
privatization, where percent is close to zero); 
 2 = Good progress (i.e., about 50 percent, less than 25 percent for large scale); 
 3 = Substantial progress (i.e., about 75 percent; more than 25 percent for large 
scale); 
 4 = Standards of performance almost equal to that in industrial nations; 
 4+=Standards of performance of advanced industrial nations. 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 1999. 
 
 
4. Relative structure and international competitiveness of 
transition economies 
 
In order to place the degree of restructuring that has take place in TE in 
the proper perspective and get an indication of how much farther it must 
proceed before they are ready for admission into the EU, we compare 
the relative structure and international competitiveness of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland (the most advanced of the TE) with 
those of Greece, Portugal and Spain (the least advanced members of the 
EU).  
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Table 6 shows that the most advanced Central European TE have 
average per capita incomes about 42 percent lower than for the three 
least advanced EU members. As a percentage of GDP, their gross 
domestic investment (GDI) is higher, but so are their government deficit 
(GB) and current account (CA) deficit, which, however, remain entirely 
sustainable. With a much lower per capita incomes, however, TE would 
contribute much less than they would benefit from EU resources, 
especially EU regional funds, and this is one serious objection to the 
early admission of even the most advanced TE of Central Europe into 
the EU. 
 
Table 6: Structural comparison of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland, With Spain, Portugal and Greece in 1998 
 
Country 
PPP 
GDP/Capita ($) 
GDI 
(% of GDP) 
GB* 
(% of GDP) 
CA* 
(% of GDP) 
Czech Republic 12,479 34.0 -2.4 -1.9 
Hungary 10,202 27.0 -4.6 -4.8 
Poland   7,658 24.0 -2.5 -5.0 
   Average 10,113 28.3 -3.2 -3.9 
     
Spain 16,060 21.0 -2.3 -0.2 
Portugal 14,380 24.0 -2.2 -6.7 
Greece 13,010 19.0 -2.5 -3.0 
   Average 14,483 21.3 -2.3 -3.3 
* OECD data differ somewhat from EBRD data. 
Legend: GDI = Gross domestic investment; GB = Government balance; CA = Current 
account 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report 1999 and World Bank, World Development Report 
1999/2000. 
 
Table 7 presents data on the international productivity of the Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Poland in relation to that of Greece, Portugal 
and Spain, as calculated by the Institute for Management Development 
in 1999. Column (1) of table 7 shows that the average overall 
productivity index of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland 
(henceforth HCP) is 53 (on a scale from 0 to 100) as compared with an 
average of 63 for Greece, Portugal and Spain (henceforth GPS), or 
about 19 percent lower. The overall average productivity ranking for the 
47 countries for which the index was calculated places HCP in the 37th 
place, as compared with the average 27th place for GPS, or about 27 
percent lower.  
 
Salvatore 
 
43 
Table 7: International competitiveness ranking of Hungary, Czech 
Republic and Poland; relative to Spain, Portugal and Greece in 
1999 (overall productivity index from 0 to 100; other rankings 
from 1 to 47) 
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Hungary 64 26 17 17 26 28 26 30 27 26 
Czech Rep. 48 41 44 35 42 42 32 45 41 34 
Poland 47 44 37 45 44 37 38 44 43 38 
   Average 53 37 33 32 37 36 32 40 37 33 
           
Spain 69 23 24 14 13 14 22 23 26 22 
Portugal 63 28 21 19 25 21 27 34 38 25 
Greece 57 31 25 32 36 31 35 31 31 30 
   Average 63 27 23 22 25 22 28 29 32 26 
Legend: 
  (1) Overall Productivity Index  (1-100) 
  (2) Overall Ranking  (1-47) 
  (3) Domestic Economic Strength  (Macroeconomic Conditions) 
  (4) Internationalization  (Openness) 
  (5) Government  (Policies Conducive to Competitiveness) 
  (6) Finance  (Efficiency of Capital Markets) 
  (7) Infrastructure  (Availability and Quality) 
  (8) Management (Level of Managerial Skills) 
  (9) Science and Technology  (Scientific and Technology Capacity) 
 (10)Labor Quality  (Availability and Qualifications of Human Resources) 
Source: IMD, The World Competitiveness Yearbook 1999. 
 
Columns (3) to (10) of table 7 then give the ranking for the two groups 
of nations in each of the 8 indices that were used to calculate the overall 
index given in column (1). These are domestic economic strength, 
internationalization, government, finance, infrastructure, management, 
science and technology, and labor quality. The table shows that only in 
infrastructure (column 7) and science and technology (column 9), HCP 
score reasonably well (being, respectively, on the average 13 percent 
and 14 percent lower than GPS). In the other six indices, they are on the 
average between 21  and 39 percent or more below GPS. These data are 
useful because they indicate the areas in which HCP need to make major 
improvements and the degree of improvement that they need to make 
before they are ready for admission into the EU.   
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5. International trade theory, trade restructuring and the 
revealed comparative advantage of transaction 
economies 
 
This section presents a model of trade restructuring during transition and 
then examines the actual restructuring that actually took place in TE’s 
international trade during the past decade, as well as the change that has 
taken place in their revealed comparative advantage. 
 
5.1. A model of trade restructuring during transition  
 
At the present stage of industrial development in TE, intra-industry 
trade is minimal and so the main stimulus for growth must come from 
inter-industry trade with the West based on differences in resource 
endowments. Differences in relative resource endowments are largest 
between Western and TE rather than among TE themselves. As a result, 
while some beneficial market-based trade can certainly take place 
among TE, by far the largest benefits are likely to result from trade with 
the West. In short, the hotly debated question that took place after the 
fall of the Berlin wall as to how much TE should trade among 
themselves or with Western Europe was a false choice. TE should trade 
as much as market principles allow – without concern of whether this is 
intra-TE or TE-Western European trade. The fact that TE have a very 
similar industrial structure and factor endowment bases and are all 
trying to restructure their economies along the same lines only means 
that market forces lead to much more trade with the West than among 
themselves (OECD, 1994; Rosati, 1992; Salvatore, 1992, 1993, 2000; 
Van Brabant). This can be seen by examining the figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Czech Republic specialization in machinery 
  
Figure 2 shows the case of the Czech Republic. In the figure, A is the point 
of production and consumption in the Czech Republic under autarky (i.e., 
without any trade). With free trade with other TE only, the Czech Republic 
(as the most industrialized of the TE) is likely to specialize in the 
production of manufactured goods (machinery) and move to point B in 
production. By then exchanging some manufactured goods for agricultural 
products (food) with other TE, the Czech Republic is able to reach a point 
such as C (on the trade consumption frontier shown by line P), which is 
above and to the right of (and therefore superior to) autarky point A. 
However, since the Czech Republic has a similar economic structure and 
resource endowment as other TE, the gains from trade resulting from 
exporting manufactured goods in exchange for agricultural products 
(shown by point C with trade as compared with autarky point A) are not 
very large.  
 
On the other hand, opening up trade with Western Europe would lead the 
Czech Republic to specialize much more in the production of manufactured 
goods (shown in the figure by a movement from point A to point B') than 
was the case with trade with other TE only because of the much greater 
difference in resource endowments between the Czech Republic and 
Y 
(Machinery) 
X (Food) 
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Western Europe than between the Czech Republic and other TE. By then 
trading much more with Western Europe, it could consume at a point such 
as C' (on the free-trade consumption frontier given by line P'), which shows 
very large gains from trade. If Western Europe imposed some export 
restrictions on Czech manufactured exports, the Czech Republic would 
specialize only up to a point such as B* and trade along P* (since it collects 
the rents from the export restrictions) and consume at a point such as C* 
which, though below C' (the consumption point with free trade with 
Western Europe) is much higher than point C (with free trade only with 
other Western European countries). Only if the West imposed very high 
trade restrictions on Czech exports, would trade with other TE possibly 
prove more beneficial to the Czech Republic than trade with the West. But 
from figure 2, we can see that this is quite unlikely. 
 
Be that as it may, the conclusion from the above analysis is that there was 
and is no reason for TE to abandon or neglect trade among themselves, but 
to engage in trade both with other TE and with the West on the same 
market basis. That much greater gains from trade result from trade with the 
West does not mean that TE should reject the smaller (additional) gains 
that would come from also trading among themselves on the basis of the 
same market principles as for their trade with the West. Thus, the long and 
often acrimonious debate that took place in the years immediately after the 
fall of the Berlin wall on whether TE should have abandoned its traditional 
trade links and concentrate on trading only with the West was, to say the 
least, a waste of time, had government official applied standard 
international trade theory. 
 
5.2. Trade restructuring and the revealed comparative advantage of 
transition economies 
 
Table 8 shows that the share of trade of TE with non-TE ranged from 55 
percent to 85 percent in 1998 and it increased from 1993 for seven of 
the 13 countries. The six countries for which the share on non-TE trade 
declined from 1993 to 1998 (Poland, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Bulgaria and Romania) are the ones that may had overstressed trade 
with the West to the neglect of trade with other TE during the first part 
of the 1990s and then redressed the balance from 1993 to 1998. Be that 
as it may, there was a major restructuring of TE’s trade from other TE to 
the West since the collapse of the Berlin wall. Although precise data are 
not available it seems that the share of TE trade with the West was only 
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about 10-15 percent a decade ago (except for Romania where it was 
substantial even in the late 1980s).  
 
Table 8: Share of trade with non-transition economies (TE) and share of 
trade to GDP of Central Europe, Baltic States and South-Eastern 
Europe transition economies, 1993 and 1999 (percent) 
 Share of trade with Non-TE Share of trade in GDP 
 1993 1998 1998 
Central Europe:    
Czech Republic 66.1 77.0 49.0 
Hungary 80.9 83.8 45.6 
Poland 86.5 82.5 24.7 
    
Croatia 73.4 72.1 30.6 
Slovak Republic 39.3 62.0 58.0 
Slovenia 76.0 79.0 48.5 
    
Baltic States:    
Estonia 68.7 71.8 62.5 
Latvia 76.4 65.7 40.3 
Lithuania 74.6 54.8 44.2 
    
South-Eastern 
Europe: 
   
Albania na 85.1 17.3 
Bulgaria 74.8 64.8 40.8 
FYR Macedonia na 65.1 49.2 
Romania 84.6 79.9 25.2 
Source: IMF, Direction of  Trade Yearbook, 1999 and April 2000. 
 
Table 8 also shows the share of trade in GDP for TE in 1998. According to 
the well-known proposition of international trade, the share of trade in 
GDP is lower for larger countries such as Poland and Romania than for the 
other smaller TE, but it is still higher for Poland and Romania than for 
Spain (21.9%) and higher for the other smaller TE than for Greece (16.0%) 
and Portugal (29.9%). Only Albania seems to have a lower share of trade in 
GDP than predicted, but this is very likely due to being the poorest TE.  
 
 
Table 9:  Revealed comparative advantage (RCA) , trend an main exports of central Europe, Baltic States, and south-
eastern Europe tranisition economies, 1993-1997 
 
Note: RCAi=(ESi-ISi)/(ESi+ISi) for sector i; where ES is export share and IS is import share in each commodity group. The SITC-2 digit 
commodity groups are:  
Agriculture: 0, 1, 4, 22, 29; Natural resources: 21, 24, 26-28, 32-35, 63, 66, 68 (wood, oil, gas, electricity, coal, stone, non-ferrous metals, 
skins and furs, and textile fibers); Capital-intensive: 23, 25, 51-53, 55-59, 63, 67, 69-71, 73, 74, 78, 79 (paper, chemicals, rubber, plastic, 
ferrous metals, transport and industrial machinery); Labor-intensive: 26, 60, 61, 65, 77, 80-85, 89 (textiles, clothes, footwear, other); Skill-
intensive: 54, 72, 75, 76, 87, 88. 
Source: EBRD, Transition Report, 1999. 
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Table 9 shows the revealed comparative advantage of TE in 1997 (the 
most recent data available) and how it changed between 1993 and 1997 in 
agriculture, resource-based products, and in capital-intensive products 
(such as steel and automobiles), labor-intensive products (such as 
clothing), and skill-intensive products (such as high-tech products). The 
table shows that only Hungary, Poland and Romania have a comparative 
advantage in agriculture and only in Romania this has increased from 1993 
to 1997. All TE except Hungary, Slovenia, and Bulgaria have a 
comparative advantage in resource-based products but all faced a decline 
in their comparative advantage in these products, except for Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Only the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria seem to have a 
comparative advantage in capital-intensive commodities and this increased 
from 1993 to 1997. All the other countries have a comparative 
disadvantage in capital-intensive commodities, but this has declined in all 
countries, except in Estonia, Lithuania, Albania, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
As expected all TE have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive 
commodities based on their relative low wages, but in all their comparative 
advantage has declined, except for Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Finally, all TE except Hungary have a comparative 
disadvantage in skill-intensive products, but for most TE their comparative 
disadvantage has decreased from 1993 to 1997.  
 
The last column of table 9 shows the two principal exports of the nation 
and the percentage of the total exports of the nation that they represent. 
The principal export is clothing for Croatia, Poland, Lithuania, and all the 
countries of South-Eastern Europe. Thus, except for the Czech Republic 
(where the principal export is vehicles), Hungary (electrical products), the 
Slovak Republic (iron and steel) and Estonia and Latvia (oil), TE face 
significant trade restrictions from Europe and other Western countries 
aimed at protecting domestic jobs and substantial competition from other 
emerging markets, especially China. Thus, most TE face a difficult trade 
situation. One possible way to overcome this situation is to establish joint 
ventures with Western countries, especially EU countries, and specialize in 
the more labor-intensive aspects of the production of clothing (the same as 
the United States does with Mexico) and in this way ensure employment 
and markets in the EU. Of course, in the long run, these countries should 
enter other more advanced products and thus exploit to the fullest their 
comparative advantage in labor-intensive commodities and strive to 
develop a comparative advantage in more skill-intensive products.  
The comparative advantage that Central European countries have in some 
manufactured products is based to a large extent on their relatively well-
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trained, educated and cheap labor force. Real wages in TE are currently 
much lower than in the West. TE, however, cannot at present fully exploit 
their comparative advantage because of obsolete capital equipment, 
backward technology, and inefficient managerial skills. Even if domestic 
sources of capital were available, technological backwardness and lack of 
modern managerial skills still represent a serious stumbling block to the 
successful restructuring of their economies along market lines and prevents 
their comparative advantage from becoming entirely evident and fully 
exploited. TE also need access to Western markets to be able to sell their 
manufactured goods. But the very high structural unemployment rates now 
prevailing in most of Europe, is another reason for the delay in the 
admission of TE into the EU.  
 
Taking advantage of their well-trained, educated and cheap labor, TE 
could initially specialize in the production of and export parts and 
components (i.e., intermediate products) and the assembly of high-quality 
manufactured goods at low cost for the Western European market, before 
moving to a more diversified and complex manufacturing base. This is the 
most promising way for TE to stimulate the process of economic 
restructuring and become quickly integrated into the world economy. This 
was the strategy followed by the Newly industrializing Economies or NIEs 
(South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, etc.) for rapid growth. TE 
could then replace the NIEs in their dealings with the EU. This type of 
initial growth strategy is also likely to minimize EU protection against TE 
exports and smooth and speed up the process of admission of TE into the 
EU. 
 
TE would also do very well not to neglect their agriculture. This does not 
mean that they can be expected to specialize in the production of and 
export agricultural products since their comparative advantage does not 
generally lie in agriculture. Furthermore, with most countries or areas 
(particularly the EU) still heavily protecting their agriculture, specialization 
in agricultural products for export does not seem to feasible on a large 
scale for TE. TE, however, should privatize and rationalize their 
agriculture as rapidly as possible and place it on a fully market basis. Once 
again, the choice is not so much between industry or agriculture but the 
pursuit of all the production in each sector that can be justified on market 
conditions. In the end, Poland and Hungary are likely to end up with a 
relatively larger agricultural sector than the Czech Republic in accordance 
with their greater natural-resource base, but they would still have a 
relatively smaller agricultural sector than most other TE.  
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6. Exchange rate arrangements  
 
Table 10 presents the current exchange rate arrangements of TE. From the 
table we see that TE have many different exchange arrangements, ranging 
from currency boards (or rigidly fixed exchange rates to a foreign 
currency) to independent floating, and different monetary policy 
framework, from IMF-supported programs to inflation targeting. The 
question then arises as to the best exchange rate system in preparation for 
admission into the EU. Here, however, TE face the dilemma of achieving 
simultaneously stable exchange rates and stable prices, as required for 
admission into the EU. Specifically, with fixed exchange rates and high 
productivity growth, TE will not be able to contain price increases to 2 
percent but may instead face inflation in the range of 3-5% per year. 
Although these rates of inflation are not excessive, they violate the nominal 
inflation convergence criterion required for ultimate admission into the 
EU. On the other hand, if they allow their exchange rates to appreciate (as 
a reflection of their strong productivity growth – as postulated by the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect), TE will violate the stability-of-exchange rate 
criterion for admission. 
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Table 10: Exchange rate arrangements and monetary policy framework 
of Central Europe, Baltic States and South-Eastern Europe 
transition economies, May 2000 
 exchange rate arrangements monetary policy framework 
Central Europe:   
Czech Republic managed floating inflation targeting 
Hungary crawling peg exchange rate anchor 
Poland managed floating inflation targeting 
   
Croatia managed floating IMF-supported program 
Slovak Republic managed floating monitors various indicators 
Slovenia managed floating monetary aggregate target 
   
Baltic States:   
Estonia currency board (€) exchange rate anchor 
Latvia fixed peg against SDR exchange rate anchor 
Lithuania currency board (US Dollar) exchange rate anchor 
   
South-Eastern Europe:   
Albania independent floating IMF-supported program 
Bulgaria currency board (€) IMF-supported program 
FYR Macedonia fixed peg against € IMF-supported program 
Romania managed floating IMF-supported program 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics, May 2000. 
 
The Balassa-Samuelson effect refers to the pressure on the non-tradable-
goods prices to rise when the prices of tradable goods are not allowed to 
fall (as it occurs if the domestic currency is not allowed to appreciate) 
when the productivity in tradable goods rises rapidly (a feature of 
economies undergoing a productivity catch-up to advanced-economy 
levels). To be pointed out, however, is that the Balassa-Samuelson price 
increases are not symptoms of macroeconomic imbalance and are required 
to preserve microeconomic equilibrium, and so there would be justification 
for the EU to relax either the price or exchange rate convergence criterion 
for admission for the TE that face this dilemma. 
 
More generally, a fixed exchange rate system appears to be a natural 
anchor for open economies that are converging rapidly with a major 
currency bloc. On the other hand, exchange rate pegs are open to the 
criticisms that they heighten market pressures in a world of liberalized 
international capital flows because they can be viewed by the markets as a 
safe one-way bet and attacked – exactly as it happened in the financial 
crisis in South-East-Asia emerging market crisis of the mid-1997. 
Concerns about the vulnerability of pegs have led to the adoption of a 
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currency board in Estonia, Lithuania and Bulgaria, and led to interest in 
early "euroization" in some TE. These regimes, however, have 
drawbacks for economies in rapid transformation because they allow 
limited room for banking support, and eliminate a key safety valve in 
the event of financial shocks.  
 
As an alternative to currency boards or euroization is inflation targeting, 
as in the Czech Republic and Poland. One fundamental issue is whether 
inflation targeting, on the road to EU accession, will prove less 
vulnerable than pegs to speculative pressures. Although many observers 
believe pegs are exceptionally demanding on policy makers, they also 
recognize that inflation targeting regimes present the serious dilemma at 
times of large potential capital inflows of abandoning the inflation target 
or allowing a real appreciation of the nation’s currency, which could 
lead to an unsustainable current account deterioration. 
 
Given these uncertainties, some have advocated hybrid regimes of 
crawling pegs and inflation targeting in the range of 3 to 5 percent. But 
these violate both the stable-exchange-rate and the inflation criteria for 
partiipating in the euro. Here, however, it is important to keep in mind 
that the requirements for joining the EU (the Copenhagen criteria) are 
different from the Maastricht and Stability Pact criteria for joining the 
euro area. The Copenhagen criteria include, among others, the existence 
of a functioning market economy able to meet EU competitive pressures 
and able to sustain the obligations of membership. This means that the 
most advanced TE may satisfy the Copenhagen criteria for admission 
into the EU before being able to meet the more stringent Maastricht and 
Stability Pact criteria for participating into the euro. That would leave 
the problem of reconciling exchange rate and price stability in TE.  
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
After a decade of restructuring, most transition economies have yet to 
reach the GDP they had before the collapse of communism and 
conquered inflation only during the past few years. By 1998, the PPP 
GDP/capita was only 51.0 percent of the EU15 for Central European 
TE, 32.6 percent for the Baltic States and 22.1 for the South-Eastern 
European TE. Although the overstressing of industry that had 
characterized the communist period had declined significantly by 1998, 
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it was still excessive in most TE. Gross domestic investment as a 
percentage of GDP was similar to other developing countries with 
similar level of per capita incomes, government deficits and the external 
debt seems sustainable, but current account deficits seem excessive, 
except for the Czech Republic and Slovenia, in view of the limited 
inflow of foreign capital (especially FDI) into these economies.   
 
A model of economic restructuring shows how the inflow of FDI shifts E’s 
factor-ratio curves upward while lowering the rate of return on capital and 
increasing wages. From 55 percent to 80 percent of the economy of TE 
has now been privatized. Small firms and foreign trade and exchange 
systems have achieved the standards of performance of advanced 
industrial nations in TE, but large-scale privatization, price 
liberalization, competition policy, banking and interest liberalization, 
and securities markets and non-bank financial institutions are only 
between 50% and 75% of the level in the advanced industrial nations 
(closer to 75% in Central Europe and the Baltic States and closer to the 
50% mark in the TE of South-Eastern Europe). Thus, TE still have a 
great deal of restructuring to undertake before they are ready for 
admission into the EU. 
 
The most advanced Central European TE (the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland) have average per capita incomes about 42 percent lower 
than for the three least advanced EU members Greece, Portugal and 
Spain). As a percentage of GDP, their gross domestic investment is 
higher, but so are their government deficit and current account deficit 
(which, however, remain entirely sustainable). Their international 
competitiveness is between 20 and 30 percent lower than that of the 
least advanced EU members. With a much lower per capita incomes and 
competitiveness, TE would contribute much less than they would 
benefit from EU resources, especially EU regional funds, and this is one 
serious obstacle to the early admission of even the most advanced TE of 
Central Europe into the EU. 
 
The hotly debated question that took place after the fall of the Berlin wall 
as to how much TE should trade among themselves or with Western 
Europe was a false choice. Trade theory clearly shows that TE should trade 
as much as market principles allow – without concern of whether this is 
intra-TE or TE-Western European trade. Although precise data are not 
available, it seems that the share of TE trade with the West increased from 
about 10-15 percent a decade a decade ago to between 55 percent to 85 
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percent today. TE now engage in international trade as much or more than 
other market economies of similar size and level of economic development. 
Most TE have a comparative advantage in labor-intensive commodities, 
especially clothing, except for the Czech Republic (where the principal 
export is vehicles), Hungary (electrical products), the Slovak Republic 
(iron and steel) and Estonia and Latvia (oil).  
 
TE have many different exchange arrangements, ranging from currency 
boards to independent floating, and different monetary policy frameworks, 
from IMF-supported programs to inflation targeting. TE, however, face the 
dilemma of targeting the exchange-rate or inflation and may not be able to 
achieve both as required for participating in the euro. A pragmatic solution 
would be to have a crawling peg and inflation targeting in the range of 3-5 
percent. This means that TE may qualify for admission into the EU before 
being able to join the euro. 
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NARROWING THE STRUCTURAL GAP: STRUCTURAL 
CHANGE IN THE TRANSITION ECONOMIES,  
1989 TO 1999 
Michael Landesmann 
 
 
Introduction 
 
One should start a paper on "structural change" in candidate countries 
with a discussion, or at least a definition, of what one means by 
structural change. For the purpose of this paper I shall refer to structural 
change in two ways: 
 
• changes in compositional structures (of output, employment, 
exports, etc.) 
• changes in behaviour: we can think of this as changes in the ways 
how different variables relate to each other, such as output-
employment relationships or FDI-import/export dynamic, etc. 
 
The issue of structural change is, of course, of great relevance to 
candidate countries as fundamental "regime changes", particularly the 
systemic changes which transformed the basic principles of allocation 
decisions, as well as dramatic changes in external economic 
relationships (from a largely autarkic CMEA bloc towards external 
liberalization) induced structural changes in the above two senses. 
Furthermore, there are a number of relationships which attract the 
economists’ interest in "structural change": 
 
• the relationship between "economic structure" and the level of 
economic development  
• "economic structure" as an indicator of a country’s position in the 
international division of labour 
• "structural change" as an indication of an economy’s dynamism or 
lack of dynamism (and, in the case of transition economies, of the 
speed and direction of its transformation towards a well-functioning 
market economy) 
 
We shall refer to all the above issues, although mostly not in a rigorous 
manner, in the following sections of this paper which point to some of 
the important structural features in candidate countries and their 
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developments over the past decade. The analysis in this paper is 
restricted to a sub-sample of transition economies, namely the countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs) – with the exception of the 
Baltic countries – which are currently also candidate countries for EU 
accession. While it would be interesting to extend the analysis to a 
wider range of transition economies, we were restricted by the use of a 
disaggregated database which allows reliable cross-country comparative 
analysis of patterns of structural change.1 Furthermore, we shall only 
deal with a subset of issues which come under heading of "structural 
change": the focus of the analysis will be on changes in the structures of 
production, employment and in the positions of CEECs in the European 
division of labour, i.e. on the CEECs’ international specialization. We 
shall leave out important topics such as institutional change, changes in 
the geographic pattern of economic activity, micro-/firm-level changes 
and changes in income- and wealth-distribution. All these are essential 
issues in a fuller analysis of structural change in transition economies, 
but they cannot all be squeezed into one overview. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 1 presents the broad 
patterns of sectoral change, i.e. the processes of deagrarization, 
deindustrialization and tertiarization which have taken place since the 
beginning of transition. Section 2 looks at the broad picture of 
developments in employment levels, participation rates and 
unemployment. Section 3 reviews some of the evidence on industrial 
restructuring and shows some interesting inter-country and inter-
industry differences in this respect. Section 4 examines whether we can 
detect patterns of convergence in structure with different groups of EU 
economies. Section 5 reviews the developments of inter-industry and 
intra-industry specialization of CEECs in international trade with the 
EU. Section 6 reports the results of an econometric analysis of patterns 
of industry-level catching-up; the first part (6.1.) of this section deals 
with catching-up in productivity levels and wage rates, the second part 
(6.2.) with catching-up in product quality (measured by export unit 
values at a very detailed product level). Section 7 refers to the role 
which FDI plays in industrial restructuring and in the processes of 
industrial specialization of CEE economies. Section 8 summarises some 
of the main results and concludes with some remarks on the impact that 
                                                     
1 The database upon which the analysis in this paper mostly relies on is: The 
Vienna Insitute for International Economic Studies Industrial Database 
(WIIW-IDB). 
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EU accession might have on patterns of structural transformation and 
further East-West European integration. 
 
 
1.  Broad patterns of structural change: Deindustriali-
zation – tertiarization – de-(and re-)agrarization 
 
In this section we review shortly the patterns of structural change which 
took place in the CEECs at the broad sectoral level. 
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution over the period 1989 to 1998 of the 
shares of the three classical sectors (agriculture, industry, services) in 
value added and employment respectively; figure 2 also allows a 
comparison of the sectoral composition between the CEECs and two 
groups of EU countries, the "EU North" (composed of Belgium, France, 
Germany, UK) and the "EU South" (composed of Greece, Portugal, 
Spain). We can observe the following tendencies: 
 
De- and re-agrarization 
While there was a tendency in most of the CEECs to reduce the size of 
the agricultural sector, there are exceptions to this: in some economies 
the share of the labour force in agriculture (and in Romania even the 
absolute number) has increased; this is true for Bulgaria and Romania, 
while for all the other CEECs there are losses in the shares (and 
dramatic losses in absolute numbers) of agricultural employment. 
Interestingly, the economies with the larger agricultural sectors (Poland, 
Bulgaria, Romania) had smaller percentage declines (or even increases) 
in the employment shares of this sector, than the countries which started 
off with a smaller agricultural sector (Czech and Slovak Republics, 
Hungary, Slovenia). Hence, regarding the "primary sector", the 
transition brought about processes both of "deagrarization" as well as – 
in some countries – of "reagrarization". The second type of pattern 
should be considered a transitory phenomenon, resulting from the severe 
employment crisis in the industrial sector (especially in countries such 
as Bulgaria and Romania) and – so far – limited absorption capacity in 
the services sector. There are also interesting discrepancies in the 
movements of value added shares and employment shares in agriculture: 
In value added, the shares of the agricultural sectors are declining in the 
most recent period also in those economies in which there were 
previously signs of "reagrarization" (Bulgaria and Romania); this trend 
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supports the view that the phenomenon reflects mostly the dramatic 
overall jobs crisis in these countries. 
 
Deindustrialization  
Broadly, one can speak of a general process of "deindustrialization" 
with falling absolute employment levels in the industrial sectors 
(comprising manufacturing, mining, water and electricity supply, 
construction). In share terms, however, there are some interesting 
exceptions to the general decline of employment in the industrial sector. 
In Hungary the employment shares of the industrial sector have 
recovered after the initial drop at the beginning of the transition and 
value added shares have risen in Hungary and the Czech Republic and 
stabilized in Slovenia. In relation to both the EU North and the EU 
South, some of the CEECs maintain, also at the end of the first decade 
of transition, a high share of manufacturing/industry in both value added 
and employment (for employment shares see figure 1). There are 
differences in value added and employment shares: the Czech Republic 
and Slovenia, followed by the Slovak Republic and Hungary are the 
countries with the highest employment shares in industry, while the 
Czech Republic, Slovenia and Romania, followed by Poland are the 
countries with the highest shares in value added. These differences 
reflect, of course, differences in relative sectoral productivity levels, e.g. 
the extremely low productivity level in Romanian agriculture would 
push up industry’s share in value added in spite of its own low level of 
productivity. The levelling off of relative employment losses in 
manufacturing in some of the CEECs (such as Hungary and Poland) and 
persistence of manufacturing’s relatively high value added shares could 
be an indication of the attractiveness of some of the CEECs as locations 
for some of Europe’s industries within the context of an overall 
European division of labour. We shall return to this issue in later 
sections of this paper. 
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Figure 1: Comparison of CEECs' employment structures in 1989, 1993 
and 1998 and employment structures in EU-north and EU-
south in 1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of CEECs value added structures in 1989,1993 
and 1998 
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As regards the "tertiary sector", there are clear signs of a catching-up 
process of the CEECs in the relative size of this sector (although, just as 
in the West, the changes are partially due to statistical reclassifications 
and sourcing out of service activities previously undertaken within the 
other sectors). Again, the relative increase of the importance of the 
services sector in the CEECs over the last decade has not necessarily 
been in line with the size of the initial gap (relative to the Western 
European employment structure). Thus, countries such as Hungary, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic experienced very substantial 
increases in the shares of the services sector, while countries such as 
Romania, Bulgaria and Poland where the initial shares of the services 
sector in overall employment were relatively low, experienced rather 
modest share increases. In absolute terms, the employment gains in the 
services sector were far from sufficient to compensate for the 
employment losses in the other two sectors. 
 
 
2. Employment, participation rates and unemployment 
 
Structural shifts as well as the overall macroeconomic developments 
since the beginning of the transition fundamentally affected overall 
employment levels, participation rates and unemployment. Overall 
employment drops since the beginning of the transition were very 
substantial in the CEECs (see figure 3). As one can see, the employment 
reductions were concentrated in some countries (Hungary, Poland) in 
the early phases of the transition, 1990-93, while in other economies, 
such as Romania and the Slovak Republic, substantial overall 
employment declines took place also in periods after 1993. The GDP 
growth – employment growth relationship (see table 1) reveals big 
changes between the periods 1990-93 and 1993-99 and also great 
diversity across countries in terms of relative GDP growth and the 
responsiveness of employment to GDP growth. 
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Figure 3: Employment trends in CEECs (1989 = 100) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: GDP and employment growth 1990-1999 (cumulated growth in 
%) 
 GDP Employment 
 1990-93 1994-99 1990-99 1990-93 1994-99 1990-99 
Czech Republic -13.1   9.6 -4.7 -10.3 -3.2 -13.1 
Hungary -18.1 21.3 -0.7 -26.8 -0.4 -27.1 
Poland -12.4 39.0 21.7 -15.7   9.6   -7.6 
Slovak Republic -25.0 34.0   0.5 -15.4   0.7 -14.9 
Slovenia -15.6 29.2   9.1 -20.1   0.3 -19.8 
Bulgaria -26.7 -7.2 -32.0 -26.2 -4.7 -29.6 
Romania -23.9 -0.5 -24.3   -8.1 -14.0 -21.0 
Source: WIIW Database incorporating national statistics. 
 
The large cumulative employment drop in the CEE region is reflected in 
falling labour force participation rates in all CEECs since the beginning 
of the transition.2 A comparison between the transition countries 
covered here and the EU-15 shows that, despite considerable falls in the 
initial period of transition, participation rates are higher than the EU 
average (68%) in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, similar to 
the EU-15 level in Poland, and lower than in the EU in Hungary and 
Bulgaria. Employment rates (total number of employed relative to the 
population aged 15-64) also showed a wide range, from close to 70% in 
Romania and the Czech Republic (in 1998) to 54% in Hungary (see 
                                                     
2 See Vidovic (2000). 
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table 2). A comparison of employment rates in CEECs and the EU in 
1998 shows that the average CEE-7 rate stood at 62.7%, slightly higher 
than the EU average of 61%. The gender gap in employment rates 
remained smaller in the CEECs compared to most countries in the EU. 
 
Unemployment rates reveal moves to rates between 7% and 15% in the 
CEECs (by LFS statistics) by the year 1999 which reflect the 
development patterns of employment levels on the one hand and of the 
labour force (particularly of participation rates) on the other. The Czech 
"unemployment miracle" which lasted until 1996 has evaporated. The 
slight falls of the unemployment rates in the mid-1990s in most 
countries of the region and their deterioration in the late 1990s reflected, 
first, higher GDP growth in the region and, more recently, a slow-down 
(after 1999 positive growth is recorded again). Unemployment rates 
across the region have reached a range not dissimilar to the EU in the 
1990s and reflect now more strongly GDP growth patterns. 
 
Table 2: Unemployment rates and employment rates 1996, 1998 
(according to Labor Force Survey) 
 Unemploy-
ment rates 
Employment rates 
 1996 1998 1996 1998 
 total total total men women total men women 
Czech Republic   3.9   6.5 69.5 77.8 61.3 67.6 76.0 59.2 
Hungary   9.9   7.8 53.0 60.6 45.8 54.2 61.1 47.5 
Poland 12.3 10.6 60.4 67.3 53.7 60.8 68.0 53.8 
Slovak Republic 11.3 12.5 62.1 69.6 54.7 60.3 66.9 53.7 
Slovenia   7.3   7.9 63.0 67.4 58.7 65.1 69.5 60.5 
Bulgaria 13.6 14.1 55.3 59.2 51.4 54.2 58.3 50.2 
Romania   6.7   6.3 71.3 78.4 64.3 70.8 77.3 64.3 
EU – 15 10.8 10.0 60.3 70.4 50.2 61.1 71.1 51.2 
Source: Eurostat: Central European countries' employment and labour market review, 
Employment in Europe 1999. 
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3. Patterns of industrial restructuring 
 
We shall now concentrate on features of the process of restructuring 
which took place in the industrial (or manufacturing) sector and 
examine the developments over two phases: the phase immediately after 
the beginning of the transition (1990-93) and the phase after that (1993-
1998). 
 
Figure 4 depicts annual growth rates of production, employment, 
(labour) productivity, investment, and exports in the industrial sectors of 
the CEE-7. It shows clearly the features of the two distinct 
developmental phases since the beginning of the transformation: deep 
"transformational recessions" followed by economic recoveries in the 
CEE-5 (with, however, growth interruptions which the annual time 
series indicate) while there was still a negative trend growth rate of 
production for the EE-2 (Bulgaria and Romania). 
 
Over the more recent period 1993-98, patterns across the CEECs 
continued to differ: the strongest resumption of industrial production 
could be observed in Poland and Hungary, while (labour) productivity 
growth was highest in Hungary (where production growth went along 
with continued employment declines), followed by Poland (with high 
output growth and nearly stable employment levels); productivity 
growth was more moderate in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Slovenia where more moderate trend growth rates of output went along 
with less labour shake-out from industry compared to Hungary. The EE-
2 continued to be characterized by declining industrial production, and 
even sharper contraction of employment (particularly in Bulgaria) which 
led to moderate increases in productivity levels and a sharp slump in 
industrial investment; overall export performance remained 
disappointing in Bulgaria, while the Romanian experience was more 
successful on these accounts. 
 
  
Figure 4: Industrial production, employees, productivity, investment and exports average annual growth rate in %, 
1990-92 and 1993-98 
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In the features of the growth profiles of the two periods we can detect 
some of the important peculiarities of the transition processes in CEECs:  
• There is evidence for non-market conforming behaviour particularly 
in the first period, and for the "laggards" also in the second period: 
e.g. substantial labour hoarding in the face of declining output, or 
investment declining less than output; however, the evidence for 
such behaviour (at this macro-level) is much less evident over the 
second period. 
• The diversity of performance across the CEE economies remains 
very pronounced also over the second period, evidenced in the first 
place by the difference in performance between the CEE-5 and the 
EE-2 group; but also within the CEE-5 group we can perceive 
sharply differing trend growth rates in productivity, investment and 
export performance. The fast trend growth rates in productivity and 
high export growth rates in some of them (productivity growth 
being high in Hungary and Poland, export growth in Hungary, 
Poland and the Czech Republic) does provide some evidence of a 
move towards "active restructuring", i.e. of a change in behavioural 
responses by enterprises moving actively into new markets, 
upgrading the composition and quality of their products (see 
sections 5 and 6 below) and restructuring their production 
processes.  
 
Differences in patterns of catching up and the development of cost 
competitiveness can be observed from figure 5 where wage rate growth 
(at current exchange rates) and productivity levels have been plotted in 
relation to the Austrian levels (Austrian levels have been kept constant 
to avoid taking in wage and exchange rate movements on the Austrian 
side as well) over the period 1991-98. We can see the superior 
Hungarian and Polish performances leading to improving or stationary 
relative labour unit costs in these two countries, while in the other CEE-
5 (Czech and Slovak Republics, Slovenia) the relationship between 
wage growth and productivity growth was such that relative labour unit 
costs rose. Wage growth (at current exchange rates) in Bulgaria and 
Romania was very low so that moderate productivity growth led to 
relatively stable labour unit cost positions of these two economies. 
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Patterns of catching up at the branch level 
Next, we look at branch patterns of productivity, wage and unit labour 
cost growth. A cross-industry analysis shows that wage rate growth is 
less dispersed than productivity growth (see Havlik/Landesmann, 2000) 
so that cross-industry differences in (labour) productivity growth also 
show up in relative labour unit cost movements, i.e. the industries with 
above average productivity growth also improve their relative position 
in relative labour unit costs.  
 
We shall return to this issue when discussing the scope for the dynamics 
of CEE economies in the structures of comparative advantage within the 
overall European economy in section 6 of this paper. 
 
For the moment we just want to point to some interesting patterns in the 
catching-up processes of a select group of industries. Figure 6 shows 
such patterns for 5 industries (at the NACE 2-digit level), namely 
textiles (DB), leather (DC), machinery (DK), electrical goods (DL), and 
transport equipment (DM)3. It shows the evolution of wage and 
productivity levels and of unit labour costs relative to Austria over the 
period 1991 to 1998. Productivity levels are expressed at constant prices 
for 1996 (with output levels compared at PPP rates); wage levels are 
compared at current exchange rates.4  
                                                     
3 For reasons of space only three countries are singled out; further information 
can be obtained from the author. 
4 For a more detailed discussion of the methodology used and further results 
based on industry-level PPP rates, see Havlik/Landesmann (2000). 
   
Figure 5: Total manufacturing: wages (ECU), productivity (PPP) and unit labour costs (ECU); Austria 1996=100 
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Figure 6: Dynamics of wages, productivity and unit labour costs in 
CEECs, 1991-98, relative to Austria (1996=100) 
 
 
As we can see there are quite large differences if one looks at individual 
branches. Without going into detail and describing the different 
trajectories for each country and industry we only want to emphasize 
some general patterns. In most CEECs the productivity levels of the five 
industries (relative to Austria) have initially been rather higher in the 
"low-tech" sectors (textiles, clothing, footwear and leather products). 
Looking now at the evolution over time, the general pattern is that 
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catching-up is stronger and in some cases much stronger in the 
"medium/high-tech" (machinery, electrical equipment, transport) than in 
the "low-tech" sectors. In the low-tech branches, relative productivity 
growth is either stagnant or pretty low. Wage catching-up, on the other 
hand, is very similar across branches, which means that there is a wage 
drift between industries and that the countries depicted are gaining 
comparative (unit cost) advantages in the medium-/high-tech industries. 
This can also be seen by looking at the ULCs, which in most countries 
are rising much faster in the low-tech than in the medium-/high-tech 
industries. We shall return to a discussion of this issue in section 6 of 
the paper. 
 
Next we divide the 14 NACE 2 digit industries into three subgroups5: a 
low-tech group (including DA (food products, beverages, and tobacco; 
letters refer to NACE codes), DB (textiles and textile products), and DC 
(leather and leather products)); a medium/high-tech group (including 
DK (machinery and equipment), DL (electrical and optical equipment) 
and DM (transport equipment)), and a resource- (and scale-)intensive 
group (including DD (wood and wood products), DF (coke, refined 
petroleum products and nuclear fuel), DG (chemicals, chemical products 
and man-made fibres), and DI (other non-metallic mineral products)). 
We refer to table 3 for initial gaps and growth rates (more precisely: per 
annum rates of decline in the gap) in the productivity levels and wage 
rates of the three industrial groupings across the whole country sample 
(i.e. the CEE-7) over the period 1991-97. 
 
Table 3: Average initial gap and growth rate for industry groups 
  low-tech  resource-intensive high-tech 
 productivity wages productivity wages productivity  wages 
Gap (in %)      38.2 33.7      44.6   29.2 34.3 27.4 
Growth rate (in %) 3.5 4.9 7.0 7.8 16.1 7.9 
Note: Gap is defined as: level of a variable (productivity, wage rate) in CEECs in 1991 x 
100 divided by the level of that variable in Austria in 1991. Growth rate refers to the per 
annum rate of decline (in %) of the Gap over the period 1991-97. 
 
As regards productivity catching-up, the high-tech industries 
experienced the highest average growth rate (16% p.a.) and, compared 
to the resource-intensive industries, show a rather high initial gap. The 
low-tech industries have an initial gap comparable to the high-tech 
                                                     
5 The following calculations are taken from Stehrer et al. (1999). 
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industries, but a very low growth rate in the closure of the gap for the 
branches within this group (4% p.a.). The resource-intensive industries 
show the lowest initial gap on average and a relatively high growth rate 
in the closure of the gap (7% p.a.).  
 
Table 3 also allows us to make some comparisons between productivity 
and wage catching-up across the three industrial groupings. (Note, 
however, that wages are in this calculation expressed in current PPP’s 
and productivity levels at constant prices; thus the absolute values for 
the growth rates are not comparable, but the relative structure across 
branches is interesting):  
 
The initial gap in labour productivity levels is highest in the medium-
/high-tech industries and lowest in the resource-intensive industries, 
with the low-tech sectors lying in between. The initial gap of wages is 
higher than that of productivity levels in all three groups and much more 
similar across industries. This pattern is quite different if one looks at 
the growth rates of these two variables. Productivity growth is by far the 
highest on average in the medium-/high-tech sectors, medium in the 
resource-intensive industries and lowest in the low-tech sectors. But the 
growth rates in wages are much more similar across these industry 
groups, almost the same in the medium-/high-tech and resource-
intensive industries, and a little bit lower in the low-tech industries. In 
the low-tech and resource-intensive industries the wage growth rate is 
higher than the productivity growth rate; in the medium-/high-tech 
industry the productivity growth rate is much higher than wage growth. 
Thus, whereas the comparative cost advantage in 1991 was in the 
resource based industries for the CEECs, this pattern may have changed. 
The CEECs are gaining comparative cost advantages in the "medium-
/higher-tech" sectors and losing comparative cost advantages in the 
"low-tech" industries. 
 
Let us draw some conclusions from our analysis of catching-up patterns 
at the disaggregated level: 
 
The overall pattern is that the CEE-5 are catching up in productivity 
levels relatively faster in the technologically more sophisticated 
industries than in the low-tech industries. We shall report in section 6 
some econometric results obtained for a wider range of catching-up 
economies which also shows this pattern. How do we explain such a 
pattern? Without going into a full discussion at this stage, we know that 
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there is the general hypothesis from the "convergence" growth literature 
that countries lagging further behind at a starting point of such a 
convergence process are catching up faster. Applying this idea at the 
level of industries, this would indicate that the rate of closure of a 
productivity gap can be higher in those industries in which the initial 
gaps (and hence the "learning potential") would be higher. Other factors 
which could further substantiate the analysis are the impact of FDI 
across branches, industry-specific skill endowments and different 
learning curves across industries. A second important result is that the 
catching-up of wages is much more similar across branches within the 
countries. Although the statistical database for the CEECs is rather 
small, this pattern emerges quite clearly (see also the more general 
results reported in section 6.1.). The overall result of this general pattern 
is that, due to the uneven industrial pattern of catching up in 
productivity levels across industries and, on the other hand, the wage 
drift across industrial branches, the CEECs as catching-up countries 
have the potential to increasingly gain comparative advantages in the 
technologically more sophisticated industries. 
 
 
4. Convergence in structures?  
 
A theme which occupied researchers at the Vienna Institute for 
International Economic Studies (WIIW) for quite a while is the question 
whether there is a "convergence in structures" or whether there are 
specialization processes in production and employment between the 
CEECs and the EU economies. In this research we looked at indicators 
which provide a summary information on the similarity (or distance) 
between the industrial structures of different countries or country 
groupings. Table 4 gives some information concerning the calculated 
indicators for structural similarity of output shares in manufacturing 
industries (the underlying database used for calculating these summary 
indicators are two-digit NACE industrial statistics). We distinguished 
two groups of reference countries with whom CEEC countries have 
been compared: A group of EU northern countries (composed of 
Belgium, France, Germany, UK) and a group of EU southern countries 
(composed of Greece, Portugal, Spain). 
Table 4: Comparison of individual CEECs’ industrial (output) 
structures with various groups of West European  
countries 1) 
 1989  1990 1991 1992 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
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 Structural deviation indicator (S)2) 
EU-advanced (Belgium, France, Germany, United Kingdom)3)     
Hungary 3.08  3.79 4.98 5.794) 5.92 5.00 4.59 3.93 3.89 5.04 7.31 
Poland 4.63 4) 4.83 5.89 . 5.67 5.51 5.34 5.01 4.87 4.49 4.40 
Czech Rep.5) 4.65  4.71 4.34 . 3.45 3.49 3.51 3.57 3.21 3.10 2.79 
Slovak Rep.5) 3.55  3.46 4.08 . 4.10 4.00 4.20 3.90 3.08 3.21 3.34 
Slovenia 2.18  2.03 1.85 . 2.17 2.07 1.87 1.71 1.53 1.65 1.52 
Bulgaria 4.06  5.10 5.56 . 6.15 4.97 4.46 4.49 4.98 4.55 4.62 
Romania6) 4.32  4.50 4.98  5.57 4.27 4.01 3.40 3.67 4.40 n.a. 
EU-South (Greece, Portugal, Spain)3)        
Hungary 3.49  3.21 3.36 3.844) 3.86 3.16 3.10 3.02 3.58 6.18 8.35 
Poland 3.12 4) 2.48 3.19 . 2.78 2.64 2.55 2.55 2.57 2.46 2.54 
Czech Rep.5) 6.65  6.59 4.42 . 4.20 4.09 4.17 4.66 4.67 4.98 5.22 
Slovak Rep.5) 4.81  4.38 4.10 . 4.36 4.96 5.70 6.35 5.92 6.29 6.73 
Slovenia 5.88  5.27 4.81 . 4.93 4.73 5.10 5.25 4.90 4.90 5.14 
Bulgaria 2.96  2.76 3.15 . 3.47 2.67 3.14 3.75 4.44 4.28 3.36 
Romania6) 2.84  2.63 2.36 . 2.81 2.37 3.64 3.54 3.04 3.60 n.a. 
Structural deviation indicator (S) between selected West European countries    
  1992     1992   
Germany/France  2.77  EU-North / EU-South 4.60   
Germany/UK   2.75  Portugal / Germany 6.95   
UK/France  2.48  Spain / Germany  5.25   
Notes: 
1) Based on 2-digit level NACE rev.1 data for output (at constant prices)   
2) See following formula: 
 
 
 
 
 
          
3) For EU-North and EU-South, the reference year is 1992 throughout; the regions were 
calculated as the unweighted arithmetic mean of the country structures.  
4) Comparable 2-digit NACE data were available from 1990 onwards only; the figures 
have been aggregated from ISIC-statistics by WIIW.  
5) Until 1993, the Czech resp. Slovak part of former Czechoslovakia.  
6) As Romania production shares at constant prices do not seem reliable after 1993, 
from 1994 onwards shares at current prices were used for comparison with the EU 
instead. (1997 was the last year available.) 
Source: compiled from the WIIW Industrial Database. 
Broadly we can see the following: 
• There is a clear difference across CEECs in their respective 
similarities or dissimilarities to the EU northern and EU southern 
group. The countries closest in the structure of manufacturing 
S sh sh shk
x
k
k
y
k
y= − ⋅∑ ( ) ( / )2 100
x = individual CEEC compared
y = individual West-European country or region compared
k = individual industry
shk
y = share of industry k in total output at constant prices of country y (in %)
shk
x = share of industry k in total output at constant prices of country x (in %)
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industry to the EU northern group are Slovenia and the Czech 
Republic followed by the Slovak Republic. The countries closest to 
the southern EU reference group are Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. 
The distance to the southern EU reference group is quite large for 
the other CEECs. 
• As regards developments over time we can see that there was a 
general convergence in structures between the CEE-5 and the 
northern EU reference group over the period 1992 to 1998 (with the 
exception of Hungary over the last two years which results mostly 
from the sharp increase in the share of electrical and optical 
equipment). Bulgaria and Romania seem to occupy a stationary 
position in their distance with respect to the EU northern reference 
group. 
 
Detailed information with respect to structural comparisons for the two 
years 1993 and 1998 between the CEECs and the two EU reference 
groups can be obtained from table 5. (in the case of output shares these 
have been calculated in this table for the CEECs at current prices with 
the EU structures shown for 1996). We can see substantial structural 
differences between the EU northern and EU southern industrial 
structures in manufacturing: the stronger representation of food 
products, as well as of the more labour-intensive branches of textiles 
and leather products and the raw material based wood products and non-
metallic mineral products in the EU southern countries, while chemicals 
and all the engineering products as well as transport equipment with its 
supplier industries (rubber and plastics) are more strongly represented in 
the northern EU industrial structures. In the CEECs, we can see a strong 
representation of some of the CEECs in food products (Bulgaria, 
Poland, Romania, while there was a strong decline of the importance of 
that industry in Hungary), of wood and wood products in some of the 
economies with a lot of forests (Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) and paper 
and paper products as a wood derivative. 
     
 
Table 5: Production and employment structure 
 PRODUCTION STRUCTURE (current prices)
BULGARIA CZECH REPUBLIC HUNGARY POLAND ROMANIA SLOVAK REPUBLIC SLOVENIA AUSTRIA EU-N (3) EU-South
1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1997 1993 1998 1993 1997 1993 1998 1996 1996
D Manufacturing total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco 25.2 24.8 19.4 17.1 28.1 18.9 27.3 24.6 23.6 21.9 17.9 14.7 15.4 15.4 17.5 12.5 15.3 22.9
DB Textiles and textile products 6.6 6.8 6.3 4.6 5.3 3.7 7.2 5.6 8.2 6.3 5.3 4.3 8.4 7.1 5.1 3.7 3.6 9.6
DC Leather and leather products 1.7 1.4 2.1 0.7 1.3 0.8 1.4 1.0 1.9 1.6 2.1 1.0 3.0 1.9 0.9 0.8 0.5 2.7
DD Wood and wood products 2.6 1.2 2.0 2.4 1.6 1.4 2.8 3.5 2.1 2.2 1.8 3.3 3.7 3.3 3.0 4.6 1.4 2.8
DE Pulp, paper & paper products; publishin 3.0 3.9 3.8 4.6 5.1 4.0 4.4 6.0 2.9 2.6 5.5 6.0 6.3 7.5 7.5 8.4 7.5 6.4
DF Coke, refined petroleum products & nuc 10.1 11.3 6.0 2.5 9.4 5.8 8.6 3.9 10.2 10.5 9.2 5.9 1.2 1.0 3.2 4.6 5.2 7.0
DG Chemicals, chemical products and man 8.6 10.0 6.7 6.4 10.9 8.0 7.0 6.9 8.8 9.1 9.3 6.8 10.6 10.5 8.4 6.5 10.6 8.8
DH Rubber and plastic products 2.6 2.6 2.5 4.1 2.9 3.5 3.3 4.3 2.7 2.1 3.8 3.5 4.6 4.2 2.9 3.9 4.1 3.4
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 4.2 4.8 5.4 5.9 4.0 3.2 4.4 4.9 3.4 5.3 4.9 5.0 4.6 4.7 6.0 5.1 3.1 6.1
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal produ 12.5 12.0 17.6 18.4 10.8 9.3 11.6 11.8 13.3 17.9 19.0 17.7 12.3 11.5 13.4 14.4 10.7 10.4
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 6.4 12.4 9.4 9.3 6.0 4.8 6.3 6.3 7.3 5.9 8.5 7.2 7.8 10.0 9.0 10.5 10.6 3.6
DL Electrical and optical equipment 5.4 4.4 4.9 7.3 7.2 19.5 5.5 7.0 7.4 4.9 5.3 7.9 8.2 9.1 12.8 12.7 10.6 5.9
DM Transport equipment 4.3 3.2 10.6 13.0 5.4 15.7 6.8 9.7 5.1 6.4 4.6 13.9 9.5 9.2 6.1 8.2 14.1 7.9
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 6.7 1.3 3.2 3.7 1.9 1.3 3.4 4.5 3.0 3.3 2.8 3.0 4.5 4.7 4.2 4.2 2.6 2.3
EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE
BULGARIA CZECH REPUBLIC HUNGARY POLAND ROMANIA SLOVAK REPUBLIC SLOVENIA AUSTRIA EU-N (3) EU-South
1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1993 1998 1996 1996
D Manufacturing total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
DA Food products; beverages and tobacco 10.7 16.2 9.3 12.0 20.7 18.1 17.7 18.6 10.1 12.6 10.9 11.6 7.5 9.1 11.3 11.6 11.2 17.2
DB Textiles and textile products 13.5 18.3 11.0 9.9 14.4 15.4 14.9 13.8 18.3 18.7 11.7 11.3 17.3 15.0 7.9 5.6 6.4 19.2
DC Leather and leather products 2.8 3.6 2.8 2.1 4.1 3.5 3.0 2.3 3.7 3.8 4.9 3.4 4.4 3.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 4.4
DD Wood and wood products 3.4 2.2 1.9 3.1 2.4 2.2 3.5 4.3 3.1 4.0 3.1 4.9 4.9 4.8 2.8 5.7 1.9 3.7
DE Pulp, paper & paper products; publishin 2.3 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.7 3.5 3.5 4.4 2.5 2.5 4.9 5.2 5.9 6.3 7.3 7.2 8.4 6.2
DF Coke, refined petroleum products & nuc 1.8 1.9 1.5 0.3 2.8 2.3 0.9 0.8 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.8
DG Chemicals, chemical products and man 6.0 6.4 4.7 3.8 6.6 5.8 5.0 4.7 5.8 5.3 6.2 4.9 4.5 5.4 6.3 4.5 7.4 5.5
DH Rubber and plastic products 2.7 3.2 2.6 4.1 2.7 3.9 2.9 3.9 2.1 2.1 2.8 3.1 3.7 4.8 3.6 4.6 5.5 3.5
DI Other non-metallic mineral products 4.9 5.1 6.1 6.2 4.7 4.7 6.2 5.9 5.3 5.6 6.2 5.8 4.7 4.9 6.1 5.7 3.7 7.3
DJ Basic metals and fabricated metal produ 10.6 5.5 17.4 17.2 10.6 8.9 11.4 11.8 12.2 11.7 11.5 14.9 15.0 14.0 15.8 16.2 13.0 11.1
DK Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 13.9 21.0 16.6 13.9 8.8 8.1 11.5 9.5 15.1 12.8 17.1 13.7 9.6 10.2 10.4 12.2 12.4 4.5
DL Electrical and optical equipment 8.6 6.5 8.4 9.9 9.4 14.3 6.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 8.5 10.2 11.0 11.2 14.3 12.3 12.6 5.3
DM Transport equipment 6.7 3.2 9.2 8.0 4.5 6.1 7.9 7.1 8.5 8.3 6.1 5.2 6.2 4.5 5.0 5.6 12.0 6.3
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 12.1 3.2 5.0 5.7 3.5 3.1 4.9 6.5 6.6 6.3 4.5 4.8 5.1 6.1 7.0 7.1 4.1 4.9
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There is also a strong inherited position of basic metals and of 
machinery in some of the CEECs. Striking are the new, strong 
specializations of some CEECs in transport equipment (Hungary, Czech 
and Slovak Republics) and the remarkable strength of Hungary in 
electrical equipment (including electronics). The diversity and also 
dynamic in evolving specializations of some of the CEECs is apparent 
and also the "in-between" position between the EU northern and EU 
southern economies as regards patterns of industrial specialization (in 
labour-intensive and resource-based industries, on the one hand, and 
capital-, technology- and skill-intensive-industries, on the other; this 
will be further examined in the following section using trade statistics). 
 
 
5. Trade specialization 
 
5.1.  Patterns of trade specialization with the EU: inter-industry 
specialization 
 
In the following we refer to research concerning the pattern of trade 
specialization of CEECs (see past WIIW research in this area using a 
similar methodology: Landesmann, 1996, Havlik, 1999). In this research 
we analysed the factor intensities of trade flows between the CEECs and 
the EU.6 The methodology used analysed the representation of the 10-, 
20-, 30- most x-factor-intensive industries (where x stands respectively 
for labour, capital, R&D, skill, and energy) out of the full sample of 3-
digit NACE industries in the CEECs export structures;  
 
 
                                                     
6 The EU-12 rather than the EU-15 grouping was used to provide a consistent 
time series going back to 1989. 
  
Table 6: RCA values in trade with the EU(12) of the 30 most x-factor intensive industries 
Factor intensity 
  Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Romania Bulgaria Greece Portugal Spain Ireland Turkey
Capital intensity 
1989  -0.19 0.06 0.62 -0.43 
1993  -0.11 -0.37 -0.23 0.22 -0.24 -0.36 -0.28 -0.57 -0.41 -0.07 0.29 -0.40
1998  -0.13 0.16 -0.27 0.11 -0.13 -0.23 0.13 -0.63 -0.28 -0.06 0.19 -0.32
Labour intensity  
1989  0.13 0.17 0.64 -0.40 
1993  0.03 0.16 0.26 0.18 0.33 0.38 0.12 -0.16 0.28 -0.20 -0.05 0.33
1998  0.00 -0.14 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.42 0.27 -0.39 0.13 -0.16 -0.07 0.27
R&D intensity 
1989  -0.59 -0.54 -0.84 
1993  -0.45 -0.42 -0.54 -0.60 -0.16 -0.72 -0.64 -0.86 -0.50 -0.14 0.19 -0.81
1998  -0.14 0.04 -0.47 -0.08 -0.09 -0.62 -0.58 -0.87 -0.35 -0.13 0.13 -0.60
Skill intensity 
1989  -0.54 -0.54 -0.77 
1993  -0.46 -0.38 -0.53 -0.38 -0.05 -0.60 -0.54 -0.82 -0.40 -0.33 0.22 -0.76
1998  -0.24 -0.12 -0.48 -0.28 -0.11 -0.55 -0.49 -0.83 -0.33 -0.30 0.21 -0.53
Energy intensity 
1-30   
1989  -0.15 0.09 0.49 -0.49 
1993  0.07 -0.18 -0.06 0.37 -0.01 -0.15 -0.01 -0.52 -0.19 -0.15 -0.12 -0.47
1998  -0.05 -0.20 -0.21 0.10 -0.19 -0.07 0.25 -0.54 -0.19 -0.16 -0.22 -0.21
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these were compared to total EU import structures or the export 
structures of other EU trading partners.7 Also the revealed comparative 
advantage indicators (RCA)  were calculated for these groups of x-
factor intensive groups of industries (see table 6 for these values of the 
30 x-factor intensive branches)8. 
 
We summarize here the results from the factor intensity analysis of 
CEEC trade flows in relation to other importers to the EU (including EU 
countries trading in EU markets): 
 
• The CEECs started in 1989 with a trade specialisation profile to the 
EU which would be typical for a less developed economy trading 
with more developed economies: their representation in the labour-
intensive industrial branches was above average, in the capital-, 
R&D- and skill-intensive branches below average (particularly in 
the latter two), while their representation in energy-intensive 
branches was, except for Hungary, above-average which reflects the 
heritage of cheap energy supplies within the CMEA in the CEECs 
industrial export structure. 
• Over time, important changes took place in the CEECs export 
structure vis-à-vis overall EU imports and in their RCAs (see table 6 
for the latter) in these different categories of industries. The most 
remarkable change took place in Hungary: from sizeable deficits in 
its exports (relative to total EU imports) in the areas of capital-, 
                                                     
7 The factor intensities of the different 3-digit NACE industries have been 
compiled from EU sources; they have been previously used in Landesmann 
(1996) and Havlik (1999) where also the caveats with respect to these 
measures are discussed. The factor intensity definitions are the following 
ones: capital intensity has been measured as cumulative (5 year) investment 
flows per employee, labour intensity as employees/output, R&D intensity as 
cumulative R&D flows (5years) per employee, skill intensity as non-
production workers/total labour force and energy-intensity as energy inputs in 
total inputs. 
Some of these indicators (such as R&D) were not always available at the 3-
digit level; in this case the 2-digit information has been applied to all the 3-
digit NACE industries belonging to the 2-digit industry. 
8 RCAs of an industry are defined as: (Xi - Mi)/(Xi + Mi) where Xi and Mi refer 
to exports and imports of industry i (to/from the EU) respectively. We refer in 
the following also to export structure comparisons for which we omit to 
present the corresponding figures for lack of space; they are available upon 
request. 
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R&D- and skill-intensive industries, it either completely eroded 
these deficits to zero or even achieved surpluses relative to the 
overall EU import structure. This pattern is followed in a much less 
spectacular manner in Poland and the Czech Republic where deficits 
in the representation of skill-, R&D- and capital-intensive branches 
have been reduced. For these economies and also for the Slovak 
Republic the relatively strong presence of energy-intensive branches 
has been substantially reduced while this has not at all been the case 
with Romanian and Bulgarian exports to the EU (particularly in the 
latter case, dependence upon energy-intensive exports to the EU has 
increased markedly). Also the picture with respect to labour-
intensive industries is remarkably different in the cases of Romania 
and Bulgaria, on the one hand, and the CEE-5 on the other. The 
dependence upon labour intensive export products has increased 
markedly in the case of the EE-2 while it has declined strongly in 
the case of the CEE-5 who show no longer any positive 
specialization in this direction. 
• Lastly, we turn to the CEECs’ position in their trade structure with 
the EU in relation to specific other lower income economies, 
particularly the Southern EU economies, but also Turkey and 
Ireland (which underwent a remarkable catching-up process). The 
comparisons can be seen in table 6 for the revealed comparative 
advantage indicators (RCAs) . We can see the following:  
- With the exception of the EE-2 the CEECs show (by 1998) a 
much lower representation of labour intensive industries in the 
export structure to the EU than do Greece, Portugal and Turkey; 
their export structure is more in line with that of Spain in this 
respect. 
- The same could be said with respect to the representation of 
R&D- and skill- intensive branches in their exports to the EU: 
Most CEECs – again with the exception of the EE-2 – have 
reduced their sizeable deficits here relative to the EU overall 
import structure, which brings them more in line with the more 
advanced of the Southern EU economies rather than with the 
less advanced ones. 
- Particularly remarkable are the developments of Hungary’s 
trading structure with the EU. Given the degree of inter-industry 
branch specialization of this data set we observe features of 
Hungary’s export structure and RCA performance which are 
close to Ireland’s performance. This is an economy whose 
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trading structure has similarly been shaped by the very strong 
involvement of FDI in its industrial development. 
 
5.2. Patterns of trade specialization with the EU: vertical product 
differentiation and product quality catching-up 
 
The pattern of inter-industry trade specialization or erosion of such 
specialization should not distract from another dimension in which 
substantial differentiation across producers can be observed in 
international trade. I refer here to "vertical product differentiation" in 
international trade, an area in which substantial recent research has been 
undertaken (see Burgstaller/Landesmann, 1999, Jansen/Landesmann, 
1999, Fontagné/Freudenberg, 1997, Aiginger, 2000, etc.). Vertical 
product differentiation refers to a situation in which producers are 
differentiated by the "quality" of the product variant which they sell as 
compared to "horizontal product differentiation" in which different 
consumers might prefer one variant over another, but in which no 
agreed quality ranking across products exists. 
 
The measure used in our own analysis of "quality differentiation" is the 
unit price charged for a very narrowly defined product (at the 8-digit 
CN product level of international trade statistics) in the same – i.e. EU – 
market. At the 3-digit level the following "price/quality gap" measure 
has been compiled: 
For each industry the full (8-digit CN) product level information was 
used to construct an industry-level (weighted) price gap indicator for 
country c's exports to the EU, which was arrived at as: 
 
Qcj = Σ (pci / pEUi). χci 
i∈I(j) 
where 
pci is the price (per kg) at which country c sells exports of the 
product item i on EU markets (which refers here to the EU 
12 market), 
pEUi is the average price of product item i in total EU 12 imports 
and 
χci is the share of product item i in country c’s exports to the 
EU 12 market, i.e. 
 χci = xci / Σ xci , i∈I(j) 
with Σ χci = 1, i∈I(j) 
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where xci is the export value of product i for country c and 
 I(j) is the set of product items i belonging to (3-digit NACE) 
industry j. 
 
In the following, we present some selective evidence for the positions of 
CEECs in the vertically differentiated structure of EU trade (for a fuller 
set of results see Burgstaller and Landesmann, 1999). 
 
In figure 7 we can see the export price ("product quality") hierarchies as 
they reveal themselves for a select group of engineering industries (all 
engineering products except for transport equipment) over the period 
1988 to 1996. The graph reveals a clear picture of a hierarchy in which 
the "Northern EU" countries occupy the top positions in the export unit 
values which their engineering products fetch on EU markets, followed 
by the Southern EU countries, with two groups of Asian NICs (the "four 
tigers" as NICs1 and a second group composed of Thailand, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Indonesia as NICs2) selling at similar price levels as 
Greece, followed by China and India. The starting point in 1988-91 for 
CEECs was characterized by extremely low (current ECU) export prices 
which their engineering products could fetch on EU markets, but after 
that we can see clearly rapid upward movements for the group of the 
CEE-5 in narrowing the "price/quality gap" of their export products. 
There is no evidence of a narrowing of this gap for EE-2, Slovakia and 
Russia. They remain the "lowest price/quality" suppliers on EU markets. 
Amongst the CEE-5, the Hungarian performance is again particularly 
impressive. 
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Figure 7: Price gap measures for engineering industries (EU 12 = 1), 
exports to EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We shall present some econometric evidence for the speed of 
"price/quality" convergence of CEECs’ export products for a number of 
different sectors in section 6.2. 
 
 
6. Some conjectures on the dynamics of comparative 
advantage 
 
In this section we shall summarize the results of a recent study (see 
Stehrer/Landesmann/Burgstaller, 2000) which attempted to analyse the 
dynamics of catching-up at the industrial level. 
 
We report the results of the estimation of a simple (standard) model of 
"convergence/catching-up" at the level of individual industries and show 
that the estimates of convergence parameters point in the direction of an 
interesting dynamics of comparative advantage for catching-up 
economies which might explain the pattern observed for some of the 
CEECs (see also sections 3 and 4b of the paper). A model of this type 
has been widely estimated at the level of aggregate economies, but 
seldom at the level of individual industries upon which the following 
analysis will focus. 
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As the time series for the CEECs are rather short for the period after the 
transition, and especially after the first impact of the transformational 
recession, it is nearly impossible to estimate a catching-up model for the 
CEECs after say 1993. We therefore try to look at the historical 
experiences of a larger group of catching-up economies (comprising 
Southern EU economies, and a set of Asian and Latin American 
economies) to obtain some estimates concerning the "structural 
dynamics of catching-up" which serves as a background to evaluate the 
industry-level developments we observe in CEECs (see section 3). 
 
We shall first present some results concerning catching-up patterns in 
productivity levels and wage rates, the variables which have been 
referred to in section 3 of this paper, and we shall then report the results 
of a convergence analysis for the variable introduced in section 5.2., 
namely export unit values, which we have interpreted as an indicator for 
product quality. 
 
Let us first sketch a simple modelling approach to 
convergence/catching-up: 
 
We define the productivity, wage or product quality gap as  
 
 Gct = ln(vtc/vtL) = ln(vtc)-ln(vtL)  (1) 
 
where v denotes the considered variables (OUTPROD, VALPROD, 
WAGEMP or QUALITY)9, C is the country index, L stands for a leader 
or lead group, and t represents time. The long run motion of the 
productivity (either for OUTPROD or VALPROD) or wage or quality 
gap G is estimated by OLS regression on a constant and a time trend t. 
 
 Gct = α0 + Φc t + ε  (2) 
 
This estimator uses the whole time series information on Gct and not just 
the first and last point. Thus the OLS estimator is robust with respect to 
short term effects of shocks and cycles. Φc denotes the growth rate of 
                                                     
9 OUTPROD and VALPROD refer respectively to output per employee and 
value added per employee, WAGEMP for wages per employee, QUALITY 
for the export unit price variable defined in section 5.2. 
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the gap in country c over the period. The last step is to regress the 
growth rate on the initial technology gap: 
 
 Φc = β0 + βc1 Gc0 + ε  (3) 
 
Similarly, Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1997) present a model of catching up to 
the technology leader, where the growth rate of output per worker in the 
catching-up country depends on the growth rate of the leading country, 
the gap, and the steady-state level of the gap.10,11  
 
6.1. Productivity and wage catching-up 
 
Table 7 reports the results of regression (3) for the three variables 
estimated over a wide range of countries excluding the CEECs (see 
Stehrer/Landesmann/Burgstaller, 1999, for details).  
 
All coefficients have the expected negative sign, i.e. showing evidence 
for convergence, and are significant at least at the 5% level. The speed 
of convergence of the technology gap can be computed from the 
estimated coefficients ß1. A coefficient of 0.024 (such as the one 
estimated for productivity level catching-up) implies that 2.4% of the 
gap vanishes in one year. The average half life – i.e. the time period 
necessary to reduce the initial gap by one half – would then be ln(0.5)/ 
ß1 = ln(0.5)/(-0.024) ~28 years. The coefficient for wage convergence is 
much lower, ß1 = -0.016, and thus predicts a half life time of about 43 
years. But this effect is mainly due to the inclusion of the NIC2 country 
group. Running the regression without this group gives a coefficient of -
0.026 and a R2 of 0.76. 
 
                                                     
10 Barro/Sala-i-Martin (1995) propose to run non-linear least squares 
regressions of the form Φ=β0+[(1-exp(β1 T)/T]G0+ε to average over the 
time span. The results are very similar to the linear regressions and thus we 
report only the latter ones. 
11  Verspagen (1992) proposes a non-linear form of equation (3), namely: 
 Φc = β0 + β1P + βc2Gc0expβ3(Go/E) + ε (3a) 
 β1 estimates the effect of an exogenous rate of knowledge growth in the 
backward country (proxied for example by patent data, R&D expenditures, 
etc. and represented by variable P in 3a). The third term introduces a non-
linear relationship between the initial gap and a parameter E measuring 
endowment with human capital, education, infrastructure, etc. 
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Table 7: Cross-country regression1):  total manufacturing – 300 
 OUTPROD VALPROD WAGEMP 
Coeff.  -0.024  -0.018  -0.016 
t-value  -4.940  -3.575  -4.171 
Std.Dev.    0.005   0.005   0.004 
R squ.    0.449   0.299   0.367 
R squ. Adj.    0.430   0.275   0.346 
F-value 24.410 12.780 17.400 
1)  Estimated over the period 1965-95 for a large country dataset comprising all the 
OECD countries and a group of Asian and Latin American economies; the dataset 
was compiled from UNIDO statistics. 
 
Catching up at the disaggregated/industrial level 
After looking at the convergence patterns at the aggregate 
manufacturing level, we now present evidence on the convergence 
patterns at a more disaggregated level (3-digit ISIC, rev. 2) to show 
differences between higher-tech and lower tech sectors. In this section 
we only include two typical low-tech sectors (textiles ISIC321 and 
wearing apparel ISIC322) and two typical high- or medium-tech sectors 
(non-electrical machinery ISIC381 and electrical machinery ISIC383).  
 
We use the same methodology introduced above and compare the two 
sectors with regard to their prospects and performance of convergence 
and catching-up. 
 
Table 8 presents the results of the cross-country analysis of convergence 
patterns (equation 3) at the industrial 3-digit level for the four industries.  
 
Again, all the coefficients have a negative sign and are significant thus 
indicating convergence. Further, the coefficients for the productivity 
measures (OUTPROD and VALPROD) are higher than the coefficients 
for wages (WAGEMP). The striking difference is if one compares the 
two types of sectors. The coefficients for the two low-tech sectors 
(textiles and wearing apparel) are much lower than for the medium-
/high-tech sectors. The half time of convergence in the low-tech sectors 
is 27 years in textiles and about 46 years in wearing apparel, whereas 
the half time in non-electrical machinery and in electrical machinery is 
about 20 years. (One has to keep in mind, though, that not all 
differences in coefficients are statistically significant.) This indicates 
faster convergence in the higher-tech sectors. On the other hand, the 
coefficients for wage catching-up are quite similar across the sectors, 
which indicates again that a wage drift exists, as discussed above. 
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Hence, catching-up countries are losing comparative advantages in the 
low-tech sectors. The two main results can be summarized as follows: 
First, the two medium-/high-tech sectors (non-electric machinery 
ISIC382 and electrical machinery, ISIC383) show higher coefficients 
for the productivity variables OUTPROD and VALPROD (although not 
statistically different from the other sectors in most cases) than the other 
two sectors, which indicates faster catching up in these sectors. Second, 
the estimated coefficient for the wage variable WAGEMP is very 
similar in all sectors with a minimum of 0.15 and a maximum of 0.22.  
 
Table 8: Results of cross-country regressions – selected industries 1) 
 OUTPROD VALPROD WAGEMP 
Textiles 321  
Coeff. -0.025 -0.024 -0.017 
t-value -5.131 -3.707 -3.697 
Std.Dev. 0.005 0.006 0.005 
R squ. 0.467 0.314 0.336 
R squ. Adj. 0.450 0.291 0.311 
F-value 26.330 13.740 13.670 
Wearing apparel 322    
Coeff. -0.015 -0.016 -0.018 
t-value -1.624 -2.638 -4.466 
Std.Dev. 0.009 0.006 0.004 
R squ. 0.081 0.188 0.408 
R squ. Adj. 0.050 0.161 0.387 
F-value 2.634 6.960 19.950 
Machinery (except electric) 382 
Coeff. -0.035 -0.030 -0.018 
t-value -5.440 -5.557 -4.799 
Std.Dev. 0.006 0.005 0.004 
R squ. 0.505 0.516 0.451 
R squ. Adj. 0.488 0.499 0.432 
F-value 29.600 30.880 23.030 
Machinery electric 383    
Coeff. -0.033 -0.029 -0.016 
t-value -5.190 -3.898 -3.832 
Std.Dev. 0.006 0.008 0.004 
R squ. 0.473 0.336 0.336 
R squ. Adj. 0.456 0.314 0.313 
F-value 26.930 15.190 14.690 
1) Estimated over the period 1965-95. 
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The dynamics of comparative advantage 
Let us briefly summarize the results obtained and their relevance for 
interpreting the observations we made with respect to industry level 
productivity, wage and labour unit cost movements in CEECs in section 
3. The econometric analysis revealed the following features: 
• At a disaggregated level, we observed a wider diversity in 
productivity catching-up across industries than in wage catching-up 
which we interpret as evidence for a wage-drift. 
• In the sample as a whole, we found that the estimated productivity 
catching-up parameters were higher in the "medium-/high-tech" 
industries than in the "low-tech" industries, while the estimated 
wage catching-up parameters were more uniform. 
 
The above results have important implications for potential switchovers 
in the "comparative advantage" positions of catching-up economies 
from "low-" to "medium- to high-tech" branches even when the absolute 
productivity (and wage) gap is still high. We elaborate these 
comparative advantage dynamics in some detail in Landesmann/Stehrer 
(2000). 
 
6.2. Product quality catching-up by CEE producers in EU markets 
 
We shall now report some of the econometric results obtained from 
applying the same convergence/catching up model to export unit values 
which, as discussed in section 5.2., are interpreted as "product quality" 
indicators. 
 
We start again with estimates for a large sample of countries.12 The 
indicator was calculated for each year from 1977 up to 1996 except for 
1980-82 because data were lacking. We interpolated values for these 
years assuming constant growth rates. The specific industries (ISIC 
classification) are 321 (textiles), 322 (wearing apparel), 323 (here 
leather products and footwear are subsumed), 382 (mechanical 
engineering), 383 (electrical engineering) and 385 (professional goods). 
 
We had to name a "price/quality leader" to whom convergence shall be 
examined throughout this study since actual price leadership can be 
                                                     
12  The country sample is wider than the one used for the productivity and 
wage catching-up analysis above. It includes again the Southern EU 
economies and a wider range of Asian and Latin American economies. 
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changing with industry and time. We decided that a group of countries 
comprising the six core EU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and the USA should play this 
role (referred to as USAEUN). 
 
Cross-country industry-level regressions on quality catching-up 
We tried to account for differences in convergence between industries 
by dividing the sample into two groups of industries (engineering 
comprising ISIC industries 382, 383, 385 and textiles, clothing and 
leather products comprising ISIC industries 321, 322, 323) and into 
country groups. From 1993 on, the country groups consist of Hungary, 
Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovak Republic and the Baltic 
countries (CEECW) and Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and the 
rest of the CIS nations (CEECE). Unfortunately, the number of 
industries and years here is too small to dig deeper into differences 
across countries and country groups. 
 
The results, of linear regressions, are given in table 913. The first case 
comprises 18 countries from the above-mentioned groups. With linear 
regressions, the β-coefficients are negative and significant. The average 
half life can be calculated as ln(0.5)/β1, resulting in approximately 33 
years when looking at the equation including all of the six industries. 
Convergence is found to occur faster in the textiles, clothing and leather 
products industries. The panel regressions show a similar picture. Both 
models, fixed and random effects, are given and can be technically 
discriminated by LM and Hausman tests. 
 
In a next step, only the seven CEECs (Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia) are in the sample 
with data starting in 1991. The estimated parameter for convergence 
speed is now much higher leading to an average half life of about 10 
years (when covering all six industries). Again, the process is faster for 
textiles etc., and β1 is insignificant for the engineering industries 
potentially because of a delayed and slow closure of the gap for some 
countries within the CEECE group especially for industries 382 and 
385. This is confirmed by a highly significant estimate of β1 of -0.094 
                                                     
13  To save space the results from panel regressions are not presented. These 
are included in Stehrer/Landesmann/Burgstall and available under 
www.wiiw.ac.at. 
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(resulting in a half life of 7.37 years!) in the linear regression which 
includes only the four "Western" CEECs. 
 
When looking at the period after 1993, it is possible to include more 
CEE countries (Slovakia, the group of Baltic countries, the Ukraine and 
a "Rest of CIS"-group); the estimated parameter rises to -0.149 
(estimated average half life is 4.65 years!) in the linear regression 
including all industries. But now the closure of the gap in export prices 
seems to be somewhat faster for the engineering industries. Again, the 
more "Western" CEE countries seem to be able to reduce their gap faster 
(see the estimates for only the six countries). 
 
These high values obtained for the convergence parameter from the 
regressions for the CEECs (with those from the panel regressions which 
are even higher than the ones obtained from linear regressions) may 
stem from a nonlinear relationship between the gap and the speed of 
convergence which we did not incorporate here. The implication of such 
a nonlinearity would be a slowing down of the convergence speed in the 
following years. 
 
Some of the results given here are not too reliable in a statistical sense 
because of the low numbers of degrees of freedom in some of the panel 
estimations. 
 
In conclusion: The analysis of catching-up processes in export prices as 
indicators of product quality complements well the analysis of 
productivity levels and of wage rates conducted in sections 3 and 6.1. 
We found generally significant (econometric) evidence for convergence 
processes in export prices across a wide range of international suppliers. 
Interestingly, while the estimated catching-up parameters for the wide 
sample of suppliers to EU markets including those from Southern 
Europe, South America and South and South-East Asia over the long 
estimation period 1977-1996 were bigger for the (more labour-
intensive) branches textiles, clothing and leather products than for the 
technologically more sophisticated engineering branches, the opposite 
was the case for the parameters estimated for the Central and Eastern 
European countries over the shorter period 1991-96 and even more so 
for the group of "Western" CEECs. Hence our conclusion in section 6.1. 
concerning the potential for relatively fast catching-up processes in the 
(technologically) more advanced engineering branches in the case of  
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Table 9: Regression results (price gap variables)  
country group, methode and time period as indicated 
 
 
18 countries: Southern EU, South America, Southeast Asia, China, India
LINEAR REGRESSION
Total (6 industries) Textile industries Engineering industries
coefficient -0.021 coefficient -0.036 coefficient -0.016
s. d. 0.005 s. d. 0.008 s. d. 0.007
t-value -4.339 *** t-value -4.642 *** t-value -2.338 **
R sq. 0.152 R sq. 0.293 R sq. 0.097
R sq. adj. 0.144 R sq. adj. 0.279 R sq. adj. 0.079
F-value 18.830 *** F-value 21.540 *** F-value 5.470 **
obs. 107 obs. 54 obs. 53
7 countries: Hungary, Czech Rep., Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia; since 1991
LINEAR REGRESSION
Total (6 industries) Textile industries Engineering industries
coefficient -0.068 coefficient -0.064 coefficient -0.052
s. d. 0.023 s. d. 0.023 s. d. 0.055
t-value -2.969 *** t-value -2.770 ** t-value -0.940
R sq. 0.181 R sq. 0.288 R sq. 0.045
R sq. adj. 0.160 R sq. adj. 0.250 R sq. adj. -0.006
F-value 8.810 *** F-value 7.670 ** F-value 0.880
obs. 42 obs. 21 obs. 21
11 countries: Hungary, Czech Rep., Poland, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia,
Slovakia, Baltic countries, Ukraine, Rest of GUS; since 1993
LINEAR REGRESSION
Total (6 industries) Textile industries Engineering industries
coefficient -0.149 coefficient -0.133 coefficient -0.164
s. d. 0.024 s. d. 0.027 s. d. 0.045
t-value -6.316 *** t-value -4.929 *** t-value -3.617 ***
R sq. 0.384 R sq. 0.439 R sq. 0.297
R sq. adj. 0.374 R sq. adj. 0.421 R sq. adj. 0.274
F-value 39.890 *** F-value 24.300 *** F-value 13.090 ***
obs. 66 obs. 33 obs. 33
6 countries: Hungary, Czech Rep., Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Baltic countries; since 1993
LINEAR REGRESSION
Total (6 industries) Textile industries Engineering industries
coefficient -0.193 coefficient -0.180 coefficient -0.208
s. d. 0.024 s. d. 0.042 s. d. 0.038
t-value -8.100 *** t-value -4.267 *** t-value -5.491 ***
R sq. 0.659 R sq. 0.532 R sq. 0.653
R sq. adj. 0.649 R sq. adj. 0.503 R sq. adj. 0.632
F-value 65.600 *** F-value 18.210 *** F-value 30.150 ***
obs. 36 obs. 18 obs. 18
*** significant at the 1 % level
** significant at the 5 % level
* significant at the 10 % level
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the more advanced group of CEECs is also confirmed here by our 
analysis of the catching-up processes in export prices as indicators for 
product quality. 
 
 
7. FDI involvement by branch 
 
FDI involvement in the candidate countries has attracted a lot of 
attention both in research as well as in policy discussion. The topic is 
also a very important one for the subject matter of this paper, as most 
research has shown that FDI acts as a very important agent of change in 
transition economies. In fact, most of the company level analysis 
available (see e.g. Carlin et al., 1997, 1999) indicates that it provides the 
indispensable change of governance structure needed for "active 
restructuring". The research material available in this area is vast and I 
shall restrict myself to a few select points: 
 
• Those CEECs which were able to attract substantial FDI have 
positioned themselves amongst those economies internationally 
with the strongest FDI presence in their economies. 
• It can be shown that firms with foreign ownership involvement 
(FIEs) are more capital-intensive and invest more, show higher 
productivity levels and are more export-oriented than the 
domestically owned enterprises (DCs). 
• While there are a wide range of motives for foreign capital to get 
involved in different branches (domestic market orientation, export 
base, strategic actions to obtain early entry advantages vis-à-vis 
competitors, etc.) there is no sign that FDI in CEECs is mostly 
oriented towards labour-intensive, low-skill, or domestic market-
oriented manufacturing branches. 
 
We shall now proceed to present some supportive material for the above 
points. 
 
Figures 8 shows the relevance of FDI in CEECs. It gives the value of 
the FDI stock in relation to GDP. We also present such values for a 
range of non-CEE economies some of which have over the 1990s been 
amongst the largest FDI receivers globally (in relation to the size of 
their economies). We can see that some of the CEECs have joined some 
of the lead nations internationally to receive FDI; this is remarkable 
since this stock had to be accumulated over a much shorter period of 
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time in the CEECs (which, before the transition started in 1990, were 
hardly open to FDI at all) than was the case for the comparative group 
of economies. 
 
Figure 8: FDI stock as a percentage of gross domestic product 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WIIW database compiled from UNCTAD statistics 
 
However, we also clearly see the unevenness of the FDI presence across 
CEECs, a fact which is well known and does not need to be discussed 
here further. An examination of the time pattern of FDI flows also 
reveals, among other things, the sequencing of the privatization 
processes and when or whether the participation in the privatization 
processes were opened up to foreigners. This, of course, also affects the 
distribution of FDI across sectors and branches (see below). 
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Table 10: Share of foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) by main 
indicators of manufacturing companies, 1996, 1997, per 
cent 
 Equity capital Employment Investments Sales/output Export sales 
Czech Republic1   21.52 13.1 33.5 22.6 . 
Czech R. 19973 . 16.0 31.2 26.3 42.0 
Hungary   67.44 36.1 82.5 61.4 77.5 
Hungary 1997 71.84 42.8 79.85 66.7 75.4 
Poland6 30.4 15 43.1 30.3 33.8 
Slovakia3  19.4 13.0 24.7 21.6 . 
Slovenia  15.6 10.1 20.3 19.6 25.8 
Notes: 1) Companies with 100 and more employees. 2) Own capital. 3) companies with 
25 and more employees. 4) Nominal capital in cash. 5) Compared to the whole industry; 
corresponding figure for 1996: 68.6%; 6) Corporate sector. 
Source: Hunya (1998b); Poland: Durka et al. (1998); 1997 data for the Czech Republic: 
Zemplinerová (1998); Hungary 1997:CSO (1999), Foreign Direct investment in 
Hungary, 1996-1997.  
 
Table 11:  Most significant FIE industries by output/sales, 1996,  
per cent 
Czech Republic  Hungary   
 (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
DM Transport equipment 55.0 28.0  DF Coke, Petroleum 99.2 15.6 
DI Non-metallic minerals 45.6 11.0  DK Transport equipment 84.1 10.2 
DH Rubber, plastic 43.8 5.9  DA Food, beverages, 
tobacco 
51.1 20.9 
DL Electrical, optical 
equipment 
30.7 8.7  DL Electrical, optical 
equipment 
65.1 12.7 
DN Manufacturing n.e.c. 28.2 4.2  DG Chemicals  78.7 11.8 
DA Food, beverages, 
tobacco 
24.7 18.8  DE Paper, publishing 71.6 7.2 
D Total 
manufacturing/together 
22.6 76.6  D Total manufacturing 61.4 78.4 
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Table 11 (continued): 
Slovenia  Slovak Republic   
 (1) (2)   (1) (2) 
DM Transport equipment 82.3 40.3  DM Transport equipment 61.4 26.3 
DK Machinery, equipment 
n.e.c. 
21.3 9.7  DL Electrical, optical 
equipment 
37.0 9.5 
DL Electrical, optical 
equipment 
20.1 9.5  DE Paper, printing, publ. 25.6 7.9 
DE Pulp, paper, printing 19.8 8.5  DB Textile and textile 
products 
18.9 3.3 
DG Chemicals 17.4 9.0  DK Machinery, equipment 
n.e.c. 
17.2 6.8 
DH Rubber, plastic 15.9 3.8  DA Food, beverages, 
tobacco 
16.5 12.2 
D Total manufacturing 21.1 80.8  D Total manufacturing 21.6 66.0 
(1) FIEs’ share in total output/sales of the industry (penetration) 
(2) Share of industry in total manufacturing FIE output/sale (specialization) 
Source: Hunya (1998b). 
 
Next, we report some performance measures of FIEs in relation to 
general performance14. Table 10 presents the shares of FIEs in the 
manufacturing sectors of the CEE-5 in relation to a number of variables 
(equity capital, employment, investment, sales or output, exports).  
 
We can clearly see that FIEs are more strongly represented in sales or 
output than in employment; hence the levels of (labour) productivity are 
higher than the manufacturing average. They are more strongly 
represented in investments than in either sales or employment; hence 
their investment/sales and investment/employee ratios – i.e. their 
investment intensities – are higher than the national average and so are 
the capital intensities as measured by assets per employee. Finally, their 
export shares are higher than their sales/output shares; hence they are 
more export-intensive than the national manufacturing firms in total. 
This shows some of the features of and the role which FIEs play in the 
CEE economies. 
 
                                                     
14  We rely here on research by Gábor Hunya who compiled within an ACE 
research network a database on FIEs from company level balance sheets 
(see e.g. Hunya, 1999). FIEs are defined as companies with some degree of 
foreign ownership involvement. This broad definition is less restrictive than 
it seems at first sight, as foreign ownership means in most cases a decisive 
influence on the governance structure. 
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As to the last point to be discussed in this section: table 11 shows the 
distribution of FIEs across manufacturing branches and picks out those 
branches in four of the CEECs in which they are most heavily involved. 
The table does not include Poland or the EE-2. For the given economies, 
it shows that FIE involvement is strong in a number of capital-intensive, 
skill-intensive and export-intensive industries (particularly, transport 
equipment and electrical and optical equipment) although domestic 
market-oriented industries are also represented (such as food, beverages, 
tobacco) and some natural resource-intensive ones (pulp and paper in 
Slovenia, non-metallic minerals in the Czech Republic). The distribution 
of FIEs across branches gives an additional indication of "revealed 
comparative advantage" of CEE economies which is complementary to 
the analysis of trade flows (analysed in section 5 above). For reasons of 
space we shall not elaborate this point in this paper. 
 
Further research should build on the comparisons referred to above 
between FIEs and DCs. It would need to go deeper into the analysis of 
the possible development of "dual structures" in the CEECs between the 
FIE and the DC sectors and whether performance indicators converge or 
diverge between them over time. Little detailed research is available so 
far on this question as well as on "spillovers" between FIEs and DCs in 
a wider sense (i.e. not only in the same sectors but also across sectors) 
and on the nature of these spillovers (sub-contracting and supplier 
networks, human capital and knowledge transfers, etc.)  
 
 
8. Structural change in central and eastern Europe, EU 
accession and the further course of east-west European 
integration: concluding remarks 
 
We start this concluding section with a summary of some of the 
principal results which emerge from the analysis in this paper. 
 
• There is evidence of dramatic processes of de-agrarization, de-
industrialization and tertiarization which have taken place in the 
CEECs since 1989; the re-agrarization observed in some of the 
economies (Bulgaria, Romania) is judged to be a transitory 
phenomenon, reflecting the dramatic jobs crisis resulting from job 
losses in manufacturing and the slow development of tertiary job 
opportunities in these economies. 
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• There were dramatic (and possibly irreversible) declines in overall 
employment levels and employment rates, as well as changes in 
gender-specific participation rates. 
• Industrial restructuring since 1989 clearly proceeded over a number 
of phases with differences revealed across the CEE economies: the 
most successful of the candidate countries experienced, like the 
others, a dramatic transformation crisis in the first phase 1989-1992, 
followed by the beginnings of a sustained growth period (Poland). 
Others experienced secondary transformation crises (Hungary in the 
mid-1990s, Czech and Slovak Republics in the late 1990s), and they 
seem to emerge now onto a sustained growth path. Other CEECs are 
still likely to undergo further transformation crises. 
• The pattern of industrial restructuring shows a lot of diversity across 
CEECs: The degree to which productivity increases are achieved 
through output growth or employment loss (or both), the degree to 
which output growth is strongly driven by exports or domestic 
demand, the degree to which wage growth lags behind or exceeds 
productivity growth and thus affects cost competitiveness, etc., are 
all examples of such diversity. We also pointed to an interesting 
pattern of relative catching-up across industrial branches, which is 
not only typical for the more successful CEECs, but reflects the 
available experience of a wide range of catching-up economies: 
Productivity catching-up is high in the medium- to higher-tech 
industries (such as engineering), while wage catching-up is more 
evenly spread across branches. As a result, the successfully 
catching-up economies are gaining competitive advantages in the 
medium- to higher-tech industries and losing the competitive 
advantages in low wage, labour-intensive branches. 
• The analysis of trade flows with the EU showed again a lot of 
differentiation across the CEECs: As a starting point in 1989, the 
CEECs showed a general trade profile with the EU which would be 
typical for a less developed trading partner. Exports from the 
CEECs were mostly in the areas of labour-intensive and energy-
intensive (due to the legacy of cheap oil supplies from the Soviet 
Union) products; there were substantial deficits in R&D-, skill- and 
– to a lesser extent – in capital-intensive branches. Over time, 
however, the more advanced of the CEECs managed to change their 
trade specialization profile relative to the EU: large specialization 
disadvantages in R&D-, skill- and capital-intensive areas declined 
significantly, while specialization in labour-intensive branches got 
substantially reduced. The star performer in this respect is Hungary, 
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but also in the Czech Republic and Slovenia this change in trade 
specialisation can be observed; the CEE-2 (Bulgaria and Romania) 
on the other hand, seem to be stuck in the specialisation profile 
typical for less developed economies; Poland occupies an in-
between position.  
• In parallel with the change in the pattern of inter-industry trade 
specialization, there were also substantial changes in the positions 
of CEE producers in the quality of products they produce and export 
(i.e. in their position in "vertically differentiated" intra-industry 
trade). The CEE economies started off in 1989/90 at the very low 
quality end of the product spectrum. Econometric estimates show, 
however, a very fast catching-up process in export unit values for 
the CEE-5 over the period 1989-96. Again, the CEE-2 (and Russia) 
lag far behind in this respect. 
• Finally, as in many other studies, the important role of FDI was 
pointed out in developing a segment of economic activity which has 
an above-average investment propensity, productivity growth and 
export intensity. We also showed that FDI did not necessarily tend 
towards low wage, labour-intensive branches in countries belonging 
to the CEE-5 group. 
 
We now conclude with some remarks on the impact of EU accession of 
some of the candidate countries on the further processes of structural 
transformation in CEECs and on patterns of East-West European 
integration.  
 
East-West European economic integration has proceeded at a very rapid 
rate since the beginning of the transition in 1989. It has led to a dramatic 
process of trade integration and substantial FDI flows which (together 
with other forms of cross-border corporate activities, such as outward 
processing trade, OPT) have paved the way to important production 
linkages between sites in Central and Eastern Europe and those in 
Western Europe. At least at the start of the transition, there were also 
substantial population and labour flows between CEE and the EU and, 
with EU accession, these are expected to increase again. Hence we can 
speak of three forms of integration: 
• through product markets via increased trade flows, 
• through capital markets via FDI flows and other forms of cross-
border firm activities,  
• directly through labour markets via the international/inter-regional 
mobility of labour. 
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There are interesting issues involved in the extent to which these three 
different channels through which East-West European integration 
proceeds complement or substitute for one another. There is a large 
theoretical literature which analyses under which circumstances one or 
the other is the case (see e.g. Markusen, 1983). This issue is important 
to be able to evaluate to which extent full accession to the EU – which 
implies full liberalization of relationships on all these three channels – 
will affect the structures of East-West European integration as against 
the current situation in which integration proceeds almost solely through 
the first two channels which are mostly, but not fully, liberalized, while 
the third channel is very highly restricted. Even concerning the first two 
channels, full membership of the EU implies a further regime change as 
it implies: full membership of the Single Market arrangements, a 
dismantling of border controls, complete liberalization of access by 
member firms to each others’ markets, the adoption of EU competition 
policy rules, of the Common External Trade Policy, etc. This amounts to 
a much higher degree of liberalization of economic relationships 
between the CEECs and the EU and will have a further impact upon the 
patterns of integration and specialization in Europe. 
 
The increased integration between the acceding countries and the EU 
will also affect the countries which are lagging in the accession process. 
There is a discussion amongst economists as to whether the sequential 
process by which EU accession will most likely proceed will have 
negative or positive effects on the "laggards", the "left-outs" and the 
"stay-outs" (on this issue, see the contributions in Landesmann/Rosati, 
2000). The issue here is whether the ease of access to EU markets, the 
increased attractiveness for FDI, the speeding up of convergence in 
macro- and microeconomic policies and in the legislative process of the 
"first-rounders" will increase further the gaps between them and the 
other transition countries or whether the movement of the EU borders to 
the east will yield the benefits of contiguity and of spillovers also to 
those countries which do not have the prospects to join the EU in the 
short- or even medium-term. 
 
The enormous diversity ("West-East-Gefälle") in the development 
patterns of the different CEECs emerged clearly in almost every section 
of the paper, with very dynamic patterns of catching-up being observed 
for some of the CEE countries bordering with the EU and sluggishness 
in structural (including behavioural) transformation of the countries 
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further east. The fate of this differentiation process is closely linked to 
the issue discussed above on whether EU accession of a first group of 
candidate countries will further increase the gap to the other CEE 
economies and, furthermore, whether patterns of structural change and 
specialization get cemented ("hysteretic effects") or will gradually 
follow the developmental patterns observed for the more advanced 
transition economies. Economists can at this stage not forecast which of 
these two scenarios is likely to emerge. 
 
It is clear that structural change (just as the transition process itself) has 
quantitative as well as qualitative aspects to it. The quantitative aspects 
(such as evidenced by the analysis of "convergence in structures" or of 
purely quantitative measures of productivity level catching-up) do 
convey the outward symptoms of differences in developmental levels, of 
catching-up or lack of catching-up and convergence in structural or 
behavioural terms. However, there is a qualitative side to the 
transformation and the catching-up processes which would require a 
deeper analysis of the interaction between institutional change and 
behavioural change, of the transformation of organizational structures at 
the micro-economic level, of the complicated interface between 
political, economic and cultural change which is at the root of why 
transformation processes take one course or another, of why 
development takes place or is stalling, why the conditions for EU 
accession can be fulfilled within a particular time horizon in some 
CEECs and not in others. It is clear that our understanding of the 
qualitative side of transformation and developmental processes is far 
less advanced than of the quantitative side and the analysis provided in 
this paper is testimony to this. Nonetheless, the description and 
systematic assessment of "symptoms" is a necessary component of a 
proper diagnosis. 
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WHICH REFORMS WILL BE NECESSARY FOLLOWING 
EASTERN ENLARGEMENT? 
Alfred Steinherr 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The American press is conveying the impression that Europe is stuck in 
lethargy due to bureaucracy, inflexible regulations and political 
disunity. The fact that Europe has created new structures and institutions 
like no other region in the world over the past 15 years, i.e. a continental 
market with its own currency, is being overlooked here. The completion 
of the internal market and monetary union, bringing along free 
movement of capital and an integrated financial market, German unity, 
the expansion of the Union from 12 to 15 member countries, the 
preparation for Eastern Enlargement: Europe as Prometheus unbound? 
The extent of these successes becomes clear if we take the decade-long 
discussion about the repeal of the Glass-Steagall-Act in the USA as a 
comparison. Whether Nafta, Mercosur or Asean: all regional projects 
outside Europe are on a much more modest scale. 
 
Europe has achieved great things, yet no one disputes that fact that the 
EU is in need of reform. The Community has so far not managed to 
carry out the institutional reforms necessary in order to increase its 
effectiveness. This has been evident recently at the Amsterdam Summit, 
where the decisions reached did not nearly live up to expectations. 
Another inter-governmental conference will be held in the year 2000, 
hopefully with more encouraging results. 
 
A medium-sized company that has developed into an international 
concern must change its organisational and decision-making structure. It 
has to continually ask itself what its core activities consist of and 
concentrate on them. The EC must put itself to the same test. 
 
In the following I will not go into the reforms that can be expected, but 
concentrate on normative considerations. If the goal is attractive 
enough, ways will be found to achieve it. 
 
2. The particular features of Eastern Enlargement 
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Eastern Enlargement does not throw up any new theoretical questions 
for the theory of economic integration. A particular factor is the large 
gap between the different stages of development of the Community and 
the accession candidate countries. The Community overcame this 
difficulty in individual cases with the entry of Ireland in 1973, Greece in 
1981 and Spain\Portugal in 1985. The challenge of Eastern Enlargement 
lies in the fact that there are almost 20 countries waiting to join. 
 
The EU-15 is a prosperous Community, although it contains many 
differences. What kind of Community would an EU-25 or an EU-30 be? 
Would it be possible to manage its heterogeneous nature? What point 
would there be in a "Community"? 
 
Beyond institutional reform, Eastern Enlargement raises questions about 
the process of European unification. What goals for the achievement of 
integration are being set in the economic field and what tasks are being 
taken up? Is what is being done on the EU level in harmony with what 
the integration process as an economic rationality is based on? 
 
Eastern Enlargement feeds the debate about reform because the stage of 
economic development of all Eastern European entry candidate 
countries clearly lies under that of the EU-15, which would have a 
negative effect on the EU’s economic cost-benefit calculations as a 
result. This is mainly due to the fact that the movement of goods and 
services between the EU and the entry countries has now already been 
extensively liberalised and the movement of capital is only subject to a 
few restrictions. The benefit for the EU-15 is insignificant. The costs are 
admittedly limited in relation to the GDP of the EU but they could be 
considerable in relation to the EU budget, as almost all the entry 
candidate countries will be net receivers, not to mention the increasing 
inefficiency within an already over-taxed institutional context. 
 
The budgetary costs will be mainly caused by the large difference in 
affluence between the EU-15 and the entry countries and are 
concentrated on two Community policies: the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and structural assistance. The EU budget would have to be 
increased by almost 100% in the case of a simple expansion of current 
EU policies. The new members would receive up to 30% of their GDP 
annually in the form of EU transfer payments (Gros/Steinherr, 1995). 
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EU membership is not only attractive to the entry candidate countries 
for reasons that can be measured in terms of net financial transfers. It 
will accelerate the process of political and economic reform and 
immediately guarantees the states a secure legal and institutional EU 
framework and full and equal political co-determination on all EU 
committees. Even without transfer payments membership would be 
attractive and this should be taken into account in the EU expansion 
strategy. 
 
The theory of integration works on the assumption that those countries 
with economic development lying furthest beneath the EU level can 
expect to profit the most from integration, even if this brings with it 
relatively high structural adjustment costs. Therefore it was more 
difficult for Italy, for example, to achieve the conditions required for 
acceptance to economic and monetary union than it was for Germany. 
At the same time these efforts were greatly rewarded through an 
increase in price stability, lower interest rates and the acquisition of an 
international currency. In spite of this, the EC invented compensation 
payments for the structural adjustment with every step towards 
integration. We see the need for reform in this area, too. 
 
The EU borders existing today have arisen from a dynamic political 
process, and political considerations also dominate in the question of 
Eastern Enlargement, as the schedule and establishing of the circle of 
candidates shows. The EU, however, did attempt to lay down 
"objective" accession criteria with the Copenhagen criteria. Nonetheless, 
it is already clear that the expansion will not depend on the complete 
fulfilment of these criteria. A compromise between what is politically 
desirable – the accession of as many countries as possible as quickly as 
possible and what is economically possible (taking into account the 
weaknesses in reform of the EU and the entry candidates) will be 
sought, using exception regulations and extended deadlines. 
 
 
3. Integration goals and tasks 
 
The Community of States has succeeded in growing from a customs 
union to an economic and monetary union within a period of 40 years. 
Integrated markets and the European currency area create excellent 
conditions for dynamic growth accompanied by stable prices. This 
potential, however, can only be fully exploited if market processes can 
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be developed and political decisions adapted to suit the requirements of 
the global economy. 
 
The promotion of balanced economic development was only very 
vaguely addressed in the founding treaties and there was no talk of a 
possible distribution of income between member countries or regions. 
Gradually, the EC introduced policies for political reasons in order to 
level out incomes between regions and countries (Bollen, 1997): in 1975 
the Regional Development Fund, following the entry of Great Britain, 
Ireland and Denmark; in 1988 the structural funds were doubled with 
expansion to the south and the internal market programme; 1992 saw a 
further doubling: the creation of a cohesion fund in 1993 was one of the 
concessions set out in the Maastricht Treaty1, made to Spain, Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece to facilitate their preparation for monetary union. 
Finally, the strengthening of economic and social cohesion was 
explicitly taken up in the Maastricht Treaty as one of the goals of the 
EU. 
 
The distribution of income between countries and regions via long-term 
transfer payments – as happened in the nation states – cannot and should 
not be achieved via the EU budget. They should neither take place in the 
form of an EU-wide levelling out of finances, as is repeatedly demanded 
on the occasion of the introduction of the euro, nor in the current form 
of the structural funds. The national budgets or the automatic stabilising 
mechanisms on the level of the member states already ensure at least the 
same degree of stabilisation as the US budget – an argument (e.g. see 
Giovannini, 1992) that is widely gaining acceptance. 
 
The contribution that the structural funds make towards regional 
convergence has not yet been confirmed. It is not only the fact that 
comparable regions receiving comparable support sums are developing 
in completely different ways that gives rise to considerable doubt as to 
their effectiveness. Even the EU commission came to the conclusion 
during an evaluation of the internal market programme that the 
structural funds available make no significant contribution to the 
convergence of the regions (European Economy, 1996)2. The numerous 
                                                     
1 The means available for structural funds were quadrupled over the course of 
10 years: an increase from 6.4 million € in 1988 EU12 to 28.6 million € 
EU15; (statement of current prices; European Commission). 
2 "...taking into account differences between Member States, the speed of 
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problems already conceptionally involved in the structural funds 
policies can be summarised as follows: the call for additionality that 
obliges the receiver countries to co-financing leads to a mainly 
undesirable increase in public debt and to a distortion of its structure3; 
the narrow fencing off of areas sometimes provokes absurd distortions 
in allocation; and a dominant role of the national or regional and local 
authorities renders a guarantee that the funds are being put to good use 
impossible (Hooge, 1996). 
 
Besides, a subvention policy with no time limit has not yet helped any 
country to obtain more efficient structures. The distribution of income in 
the EU has always been justified by the fact that the adjusting of 
structurally disadvantaged countries or regions to suit the Community 
market is difficult and costly. Here the fact that the potential profit is the 
greatest for these countries is forgotten (see above). 
 
Risk-sharing in order to overcome asymmetric shocks4 and financial 
assistance with a strict time limit for the putting into action of EU 
policies are tenable. In the case of long-term assistance for the 
sustaining of industrial branches that have lost their international 
competitiveness (e.g. steel) there is great danger that this assistance 
could hinder structural adjustment and present an obstacle to 
development in the medium term. 
 
Many problems could be avoided – in the EU, at the expansion 
negotiations and on the side of the entry candidate countries – if the 
structural funds were to be replaced by credit (at market conditions) (if 
nothing else is possible with interest subsidies). This task could be taken 
over by the EIB, which has experience in financing investment projects. 
 
                                                                                                                     
convergence of the regions is broadly similar. The question here is to what 
extent convergence is due to the Single Market Programme or to structural 
funds support ... Econometric analysis shows that variances in structural 
fund spending per capita did not have a significant effect on regional growth 
variations" (European Economy, 1996, no. 4, p. 11). 
3 The disadvantages involved in transfer of finances are known from the 
literature. 
4 At any rate the probability of an asymmetric shock in European economic 
and monetary union is decreasing (European Economy, no. 44,1990 and no. 
53, 1993). 
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The fact that the great increase of structural funds available is mainly 
politically-motivated becomes even clearer if we analyse the Agenda 
2000 i.e. the EU’s response to the financial and political challenge of 
expansion. An unchanged framework of expenditure of 1.27% of the 
EU’s GDP has been established for the years 2000-2006 in order not to 
overtax the current EU member countries (also politically). A ceiling of 
4% of the GDP per member country should limit the influx of structural 
funds available. The structural funds should continue to make up a good 
third of the EU budget (0.46% of the EU’s GDP). Leeway for 
expenditure on agriculture is restricted with these constraints. As the 
inclusion of the new member countries in the price support system of 
the CAP will automatically lead to an increase in income for the 
agricultural sector in the countries joining the EU, the new members 
will have to miss out on the direct payments. In the medium term it is 
also hoped on the side of the EU that, in harmony with the progress 
made at the WTO negotiations, intervention prices will sink further, 
direct payment will increase, that there will be altogether lower 
expenditure on agriculture and that at some point the reform will be 
successful enough to make a uniform conversion of the CAP possible in 
an extended EU. 
 
The Agenda 2000 clearly shows that the basic economic principles of 
the cohesion policy the funds should be for the benefit of those regions 
with the lowest income – will be turned upside down if this is politically 
possible. The decisions arrived at in Berlin regarding the Agenda 2000 
predict that the present member states will receive around five times as 
much in structural assistance between 2000 and 2006 as the new 
member states (213.010 billion € against 46.860 billion €, Official 
journal of the European Communities, 1999)5. In connection with 
Eastern Enlargement the EU is obviously only aiming at allocative goals 
because it does not consider a redistribution financially viable. The EU 
has admitted that its structural policy is full of contradictions and not 
economically justifiable. The Agenda 2000 is evidence that Eastern 
Enlargement brings about the necessity for long overdue reforms that 
should be taken much further from an economic point of view. A drastic 
                                                     
5 The financial forecasts go by the assumption that the first accessions will take 
place in 2002. 
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reduction of structural funds available is just as necessary as a radical 
reform of the CAP. 
 
Through the dismantling of the CAP and the structural funds it would 
also become clearer to a wider public that the EU does not derive the 
justification for its existence from the distribution of income within the 
framework of the EU budget. The existence of a community justifies 
itself through a gain in prosperity, which ensures an integrated 
economic area, connected via a uniform legal framework with a 
supranational jurisdiction and the long-term goal of political integration. 
In preparing itself for economic and monetary union the EU has turned 
more and more away from dirigiste market regulations. The historical 
burden of staunchly defended market regulations at the beginning of the 
EU should be, consequently, dismantled. The EU would emerge from 
this process stronger and less afflicted by internal conflict. A clearer 
definition and conversion of the integration goals of the EU could 
increase acceptance of the union, both inside and outside the 
Community. 
 
These arguments will be clarified in figure 1. The vertical axis measures 
the costs and benefits of integration. It is assumed that the marginal 
costs will increase with the number of member countries, but the 
marginal utility will decrease after a certain number of members (see 
Gros/Steinherr, 1995, pp. 507-509, for a more detailed description). The 
optimal EU membership M* is smaller than Mº (the EU-15) regarding 
certain institutional tasks. This supposition that the EU-15 have already 
exceeded the optimal size for the Union is based on the fact that e.g. 
some member countries either do not want to take part in monetary 
union (their cost-benefit analysis turned out negatively) or are not 
allowed to take part (the cost-benefit analysis of the Community turned 
out negatively). An additional enlargement can only be economically 
justified under these conditions if either the marginal benefits (MB) can 
be shifted upwards through reform or the marginal costs (MC) shifted 
downwards. Both require reforms in the entry candidate countries and 
the community. 
 
Figure 1: 
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4. Allocation of tasks 
 
The distribution of tasks between the various decision-making levels in 
the EU should be reexamined in many areas. The allocation and 
perception of areas of competence for regulation functions, expenses 
and taxation, or the harmonising of the tax system can often not be 
justified from an economic point of view. The basic principles of fiscal 
federalism are, however, only partially applicable in connection with the 
EU (Walsh/Petchey, 19936). Nonetheless, literature on fiscal federalism 
provides a good starting point for rationalising the competence 
distribution in the EU. 
 
Tasks not connected with national spillover effects or increasing returns 
to scale should in principle not be introduced at EU level. From this 
point of view European research policy, for example, is completely 
over-sized. Does it make sense to operate a policy for the support of 
smaller and medium-sized companies at EU level? Must there be 
uniform hunting rights all over Europe? Even in areas that the EU 
should be dealing with enthusiasm often runs ahead of common sense. 
Tax harmonisation makes sense where the tax-payer or the tax basis is 
mobile, but harmonisation also for non-tradable goods? And why should 
competition in this area only do harm? Regulatory and tax competition 
can provide a useful balance to market-unfriendly political tendencies. 
In the same way, heterogeneous regional preferences speak for a 
minimum in harmonisation at EU level. 
 
It makes no sense for tasks transferred to the Community to be carried 
out unchanged in the member countries. This is demonstrated in 
development policy, where national development policy shaped by 
national interests and traditions often contradicts community policy. In 
                                                     
6 The literature on fiscal federalism mainly deals with the question which tasks 
should be assumed by a central government and the rest de-centralised. In 
connection with the EU, on the other hand, the question arises as to why tasks 
recognised by the member countries or their regional or local area bodies 
should be introduced at EU level when the central level has no comparable 
efficient decision-making structures and preferences within the EU are often 
very heterogeneous. Problems to do with co-ordination, questions of 
administrative efficiency, signalling and mobility costs play a significantly 
different role in many cases than in discussions on de-centralising as they are 
usually carried out in connection with nation states. (Walsh/Petchey, 1993). 
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other areas, such as competitiveness policy, representatives of national 
interests still refuse to recognise the fact that the European market is the 
only relevant market. 
 
 
5. Decision-making and organisational structure 
 
The overdue reform of the decision-making and organisational structure 
of the EU likewise takes place in the area of conflict between national 
interests and Community interests. The organisational form of the EU is 
a compromise that does not claim to be ideal. However, the more the EU 
expands, the more difficult the organisational and decision-making 
process becomes. There is an urgent need for the reduction of the 
official languages to one working language (in the EIB it is two). 
Translation procedures occupy one third of the staff in the EU and the 
results often require the original to be consulted anyway. For this reason 
translations, when required, should be dealt with by the national 
administration. 
 
The current discussion about the desirable simplification of the 
decision-making structure is going in the right direction: a reduction of 
the Commission combined with a change in the vote weighting in the 
Council; more majority decisions at Council level. The number of 
Commissioners however, should be greatly reduced: large member 
countries should be able to put forward a Commissioner, smaller 
countries should form voting rights groups and nominate a 
Commissioner on the rotation principle. The EIB can serve as a model. 
It is important that these reforms are also accompanied by a thorough 
internal re-organisation of the Commission: further strengthening of the 
Commission, no more "national hereditary houses" in the general 
management, rotation duties, changes in recruitment policy. 
 
Every radical reform is naturally hindered by the lack of readiness of the 
member countries to accept a federal structure – a situation that has no 
solution. A radical strengthening of Community interests at the expense 
of national interests in the EU decision-making process could go in a 
direction that, incidentally, the EU Commission has also addressed 
under explicit reference to Eastern Enlargement (European Economy, 
1993): that of replacing the Commission with a genuine European 
government, elected by Parliament instead of the member states. A 
substantial strengthening of the political role and legitimacy of the 
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European Parliament should naturally precede this. The 
inter-governmental body that the Council of Ministers represents today 
and which the citizens wish to see in an extended and also 
heterogeneous Europe could also be represented through the creation of 
a second chamber (chamber of senators) in the European Parliament. 
 
 
6. The ideal extension of the EU 
 
Although this question will, in the first place, be decided from a political 
standpoint, it is helpful to give it economic sense, too. The answer is 
usually sought on the level of the entry candidate countries and the 
Copenhagen criteria, on the basis of which the "readiness for accession" 
of the candidates is evaluated. Although this dimension is important, in 
my opinion the answer to the question regarding the ideal geographical 
extension of the EU depends primarily on the tasks and organisation of 
the EU. The ideal expansion of a free trade zone is the world. 
Geographical restrictions for the EU must therefore derive from 
additional steps towards deepening and tasks – this against the 
background of the principle that the acquis communautaire is to be 
accepted in all member countries (which is not always ideal for 
latecomers). The ideal size of the EU shrinks the more responsibility it 
takes on. The other way round: if restricting the re-distribution function 
and dismantling the CAP are successful, the ideal dimensions would be 
greatly extended. Progress towards fiscal federalism as well as a more 
efficient decision-making and organisational structure would increase 
the expansion potential of the EU even more. 
 
In figure 2 the horizontal axis measures the extent (depth) of integration 
e.g. with or without monetary union. Deepening of integration requires 
compromises, i.e. expenses. The MC15 curve represents the marginal 
costs for the EU-15; the MC20 curve the costs for a community 
extended to 20 members. The gain in prosperity as a result of monetary 
union with an additional 5 Eastern European countries is expected to be 
insignificant. This increases greatly in the unchanged MB15 curve. The 
ideal depth of integration consequently decreases from D*15 to D*20. If 
the existing integration, as taken in figure 2, is at D15, there will still be 
the need for integration. However, if D15 falls to the right of D20, the 
danger of internal conflict will arise. 
Figure 2: 
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7. Conclusion 
 
Eastern Enlargement requires a reconsidering of integration goals and a 
restricting to the core tasks set down in economic and monetary union 
with the simultaneous revision of the CAP and structural assistance, a 
settling of tasks and a basic reform of the decision-making and 
organisational structure of the EU institutions. The more successful the 
EU is in reforming itself in this direction, the more success we can 
expect from Eastern Enlargement. The "readiness for accession" of the 
candidate countries is the other side of the coin, even if the EU also has 
to provide the most important contribution itself. Efficient expansion 
negotiations require precisely formulated entry criteria – the 
Copenhagen criteria do not go far enough here. The test, whether they 
will be fulfilled by the candidate countries or not, should proceed via as 
transparent a process as possible. 
 
Besides the accession of Russia, the Ukraine and Turkey, the 
membership of no single European country would present the 
Community with a task that could not be overcome. The problem lies in 
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the large number of structurally weak accession candidates that are not 
politically established and have little purchasing power. How efficient 
would a Community containing not only central European countries, but 
also the small Baltic states, the medium-sized south-eastern European 
countries, the numerous successor countries of Yugoslavia, Albania and 
two Mediterranean island countries be? In addition, something that 
nobody wants to think too much about: what about Russia, the Ukraine 
and Turkey? 
 
Is the theory that the nature, the style and the effectiveness of the 
Community would not suffer under a more than marginal Eastern 
Enlargement really credible? Would the integration process really not be 
impaired by Enlargement? Difficulties cannot be overcome with 
"variable speeds" without having a negative effect on the way the 
Community holds together.  
 
The starting points for a strategy of Eastern Enlargement suggested in 
this paper are the following (the larger the enlargement is, the more they 
should be observed): 
• Eastern Enlargement can be justified politically, but it brings the 
Community no significant economic gain; 
• Far-reaching reforms in the Community are vital for an efficient 
extended Community; 
• However, the enlargement will make a further deepening of the 
Community more difficult and limit the equal participation of all 
member countries in deepening steps already carried out to an 
increasingly smaller circle. The development of the Community to a 
federal Europe would be slowed down by a "large" Eastern 
Enlargement, if not made impossible; 
• The costs and risks are also considerable. In order to reduce these 
and to not provoke unfundable redistribution claims at the same 
time, the EU should confine entry to countries whose GDP per 
capita at purchasing power parity does not deviate from the EU 
average by more than 30%. This, above all, because political and 
structural indicators correlate positively with GDP. 
 
The best way to help the entry candidates would be with a set of "club 
membership rules" that are as clear as possible and which would 
eliminate any suspicion of discrimination. The positioning in the queue 
to join would be given a clear direction and could follow a self-chosen 
timetable. This would give the decision-makers in the entry candidate 
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countries greater support and increased international credibility in 
putting the reforms into practice. According to me, this would be an 
acceptable expansion strategy for the Balkan countries as well as for 
Turkey, even with accession conditions ranging from the demanding to 
the hard. 
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THE ROLE OF TIME IN EU ENLARGEMENT 
Fritz Breuss 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The Enlargement debate in the EU and in the Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEECs) centers on different priorities. "The earlier 
the better" seems to be the maxim in the east. In the west a cautious 
attitude towards enlargement is prevalent. It is no wonder that the 
approaches differ. Integrating rich with poor countries is never an easy 
business as the example of NAFTA shows. The rich suspect an 
abandonment of their privileged position whereas the poor hope for an 
improvement of their unsatisfactory situation. In contrast to NAFTA, 
however, the EU enlargement project differs in many other respects. 
The CEECs carry a long communist era’s legacy. They started only a 
decade ago to introduce democracies of western standards and to 
transform their economies from planned to market-oriented systems. 
Therefore the European Council on its Copenhagen meeting in June 
1993 formulated the famous three "Copenhagen criteria" (political 
standards of the EU concerning human rights and protection of 
minorities; a functioning market economy; acceptance of the acquis 
communautaire of the EU and the final goals of the EU, i.e. EMU and 
political union). An EU accession is only possible if these criteria are 
fulfilled. Besides the difficulty in evaluating the fulfilment of the 
criteria, they are a practical political instrument in delaying enlargement 
at any moment in time. 
 
After the Helsinki summit of the European Council in December 1999 
the priorities were clearly shifted towards integration of 10 CEECs plus 
Cyprus and Malta. Turkey got the status of an applicant country. The 
EU itself has to reform its institutions (Council, Commission, European 
Parliament) in order to be able to handle a larger number of members. 
This task should be completed in 2000 (Treaty of Nice). After the 
ratification procedure the Union should be ready for enlargement in 
2003. At present, the EU deals with two groups of applicant countries: 
with the "Luxembourg group" (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia and Cyprus) concrete negotiations have already started 
in October 1998; with the "Helsinki group" (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Rumania, Slovak Republic and Malta) negotiations have started in 
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January 2000. Whether the negotiations end with an accession of all 10 
CEECs (plus Cyprus and Malta) at once, or whether there will be a 
sequence of accessions with the more mature countries first and the 
countries adjusting only slowly to the Copenhagen criteria second is an 
open question. Furthermore the exact date when the first CEECs will 
enter the EU has not been defined yet. So the enlargement game is open. 
 
The major purpose of this contribution is to tackle the question whether 
there are more gains from a rapid or a delayed EU enlargement. Or to 
put it differently: how can the factor time be quantified when evaluating 
integration effects. Second, it tries to answer the question which region 
will gain or lose from a speedy enlargement and in which respect. For 
this purpose a simple enlargement model is constructed for the two 
regions EU-15 and CEEC-10 (neglecting Cyprus and Malta) with the 
major ingredients of integration. Then simulations with this calibrated 
model will show which role time may play in the process of integrating 
the CEECs into the EU. 
 
 
2. A simple model of EU enlargement 
 
There are many models around to evaluate integration effects in general 
and those of EU enlargement in particular (for a survey, see Breuss, 
1999): single and multi-country (world) models and in each case macro 
models and computable general equilibirum (CGE) models. Each model 
has advantages and disadvantages. Neither model is able to catch all 
theoretically thinkable effects of regional integration, nor are the 
simulation models able to "correctly" quantify the wide variety of 
integration effects, simply because the EU enlargment is a unique future 
challenge. Therefore it is no wonder that the results differ according to 
the method and model used. However, there is a consensus in the 
conclusions of all hitherto done simulation experiments: the applicant 
countries (CEECs) in general can expect to gain more welfare than the 
EU. 
 
For our exercise a simple model is constructed which covers most of the 
integration effects expected in connection with EU enlargement. The 
model is highly aggregated and only deals with volume effects. Price 
effects are neglected. Likewise, it makes no difference in this model 
(which does not include money) whether the CEECs, when becoming 
full members of the EU are participating in EMU or not. The model 
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variables are first calibrated to its starting values in the year 2000 and 
then used to construct a baseline scenario (without EU integration) up to 
the year 2020. The data mainly stem from Eurostat. The model covers 
trade effects, effects of factor movements (FDIs from west to east and 
migration from east to west) as well as the budgetary burden of 
enlargement for the EU and the transfer benefits for the CEECs. The 
model supplies results for GDP as well as welfare and indirectly it also 
tells to which degree a convergence of CEECs income per capita will 
take place during integration. 
 
The enlargement model starts with Cobb-Douglas production functions 
for both regions (EU-15 and CEEC-10; see equations (1a) and (1b) in 
the appendix). Real GDP is explained by the inputs capital and 
population as well as total factor productivity (TFP) as a residual. As an 
additional factor exports of both regions to the respective other region 
enter into the production function. As externalities, the exports 
contribute positively to GDP. Via this channel static trade effects are 
translated into dynamic integration effects (spill-overs of technological 
progress). Population is transformed into the production factor labour by 
multiplication with a 40% participation rate factor. For the baseline 
scenario it is assumed that real GDP will grow annually by 2 percent in 
the EU and by 5 percent in the CEECs from 2000 to 2020. The capital 
stock is approximated by using a constant capital-output ratio of two. 
Population growth for both regions is taken from United Nations long-
run population scenarios which foresee a considerable decline in both 
regions for the future. This calibration procedure results in a TFP for the 
EU-15 which is 2 ¼ higher than those in the CEEC-10. Due to a natural 
catching-up process this relationship will shrink to 1.4 until the year 
2020. Measured by real GDP the EU-15 is ten times larger than the 
CEEC-10, EU‘s population is only 3 ½ times that of CEEC-10 in the 
year 2000. 
 
The capital stocks (equations (2a) and (2b) in the appendix) are 
generated by multiplying GDP by a constant capital-output ratio of two. 
They are reduced (increased) in the EU-15 (CEEC-10) by FDI flows 
from the EU to the CEECs by half of its size. The transfers from the EU 
budget to the poor CEECs are partly (by half of its value) used to build 
up capital (infrastructure) in the CEECs, but in turn reduce the potential 
of building up capital in the EU (transfers are costs for the EU member 
states). 
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FDI flows from the EU to the CEECs (equation (3) in the appendix) are 
growing with CEEC’s GDP at a factor of 0.01. Similar to the reasoning 
by Baldwin/Francois/Portes (1997) it is assumed that the participation in 
the single market of the EU will reduce the risk to invest in the CEECs 
and may therefore contribute to building up the capital stock and lastly 
GDP. We take this risk factor into account with 0.002 of CEEC’s GDP. 
Starting with FDI’s of the EU amounting to 8 billion € in 2000 a 
complete elimination of this risk factor would increase by 1.6 billion € 
which is 20 percent of the initial level of FDIs. 
 
Whereas the relatively high rental price of capital and the low wages 
attract capital from the west (FDIs) the huge income difference between 
east and west (CEEC’s real GDP per capital in PPP was only 1/3 of that 
in the EU-15 in the year 2000) will induce migration of population from 
the east to the west. This model is calibrated to the most recent estimates 
by DIW (2000), a study conducted on behalf of the European 
Commission. Total migration (equation (5) in the appendix) consists of 
a baseline stream of migrants without EU accession of the CEECs plus 
migration due to the full freedom for persons to move within the single 
market right from the beginning of EU accession. This will result in a 
migration of 1.1 million persons from the CEECs to the EU-15 in the 
year 2002. But with convergence of income per capita over time this 
additional flow of migrants (compared to a scenario without the full 
freedom) will diminish from an annual increase of 336.000 in 2002 
down to 42.000 in the year 2020 (DIW, 2000, p. 324). In equation (4) 
we could also simulate a reduced flow of migration when temporary 
arrangements delay the complete implementation of the freedom of 
movement of persons with EU accession. In our simulations we do not 
use this opportunity. In addition migration is mitigated over time by the 
catching-up of CEEC’s GDP per capita. 
 
Population is driven by natural factors of birth and death and by net 
migration. By the latter factor population increases in the EU and hence 
potentially fuels GDP, whereas it reduces population in the CEEC-10 
and thereby also production potentials (see equations (6a) and (6b) in 
the appendix). 
 
The traditional integration effects are caught with foreign trade (trade 
creation and trade diversion). Here we only concentrate on trade 
relations between the two integration blocks. Real exports from the EU 
to the CEECs (equation (7) in the appendix) are explained by an income 
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effect – relating exports to CEEC’s GDP – and by a policy variable 
representing trade costs. We assume that trade costs amount to around 5 
percent of trade in both directions. This means for EU’s exports trade 
costs of 0.05 percent of EU’s GDP. EU’s real imports from the CEEC-
10 are explained by the same pattern as the exports (see equation (8) in 
the appendix). Trade costs for the CEECs‘ amount to 0.4 percent of their 
GDP. At the beginning the EU has a trade surplus of 22 billion € in real 
terms (see equation (9) in the appendix). The exports of the EU to the 
CEECs are the imports of the CEECs from the EU. The imports of the 
EU from the CEECs are equivalent to the exports of the CEECs to the 
EU. 
 
Finally, we consider the not unimportant – and heavily debated – feature 
in EU enlargement, namely the question of the costs. According to the 
Agenda 2000, agreed upon at a special European Council summit in 
Berlin in March 1999 the gross costs of enlargement amount to 80 
billion € over the financial horizon 2000-2006. If one deducts around 20 
billion € as own resources which the applicant countries will have to 
pay into the EU budget (with an upper limit of 1.27 percent of GDP) as 
is the duty of each EU member state, then the cumulated costs of 
enlargement over the period 2000-2006 will amount to 60 billion Euro. 
This is equivalent to 0.15 to 0.2 percent of EU-15‘s GDP (see Breuss, 
1999, p. 8). However these cost calculations are only due for the 
"Luxembourg group" of 5 CEECs and Cyprus. In our case we deal with 
CEEC-10. Measured by absolute GDP the "Luxembourg group" makes 
up 69 percent and the "Helsinki group" 31 percent of total CEEC-10 
(excluding Cyprus and Malta). Taking into account the group of CEEC-
10 one can approximate the annual costs of enlargement by around 0.3 
percent of EU-15‘s GDP. This value is used to calibrate the costs of 
enlargement in percent of EU’s GDP (see equation (10) in the 
appendix). The costs of enlargement decline over time as the CEECs 
will gradually catch-up with their income to those of the EU and hence 
will be less eligible for the full range of structural funds money. Total 
costs of EU enlargement are then calculated starting from the pre-
accession costs for preparation of EU membership of around 3 billion € 
per year plus the enlargement costs due to the integration the CEECs 
into the CAP and the regional policy of the EU (see equation (11) in the 
appendix). 
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Finally, the model shows that integration will lead to a speedier 
convergence of the CEEC’s GDP per capita to that of the EU (see the 
equations (12) and (13) in the appendix). 
 
 
3. Who gains and who loses from a rapid enlargement? 
 
In evaluating which role time will play in the enlargement game, two 
different scenarios are simulated. First, it is assumed that CEEC-10 
enter the EU as full members in the year 2003. Second, this region will 
be fully integrated into the EU only in the year 2008. In both scenarios 
the simulations run up to the year 2020. 
 
In each case we can identify five integration effects: 
(1) Trade creation effects through the elimination of trade costs 
(2) Direct growth effects via an increase of TFP in the CEECs 
(3) FDI effects on growth 
(4) Migration effects on population and growth 
(5) Budgetary effects (costs of enlargement for the EU and benefits for 
the CEECs) 
 
This adds up to total GDP effects. In addition we can also calculate a 
simple welfare measure by assuming that the income effect is generated 
by GDP plus net-transfers out of the EU budget. 
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Figure 1: EU Enlargement in 2003: GDP Effects and its components for CEEC-10
                (Cumulative deviations from baseline in %)
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Figure 2: EU Enlargement in 2003: GDP Effects and its components for EU-15
               (Cumulative deviations from baseline in %)
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Integration effects of an EU enlargement in 2003 
First, we discuss the results of an EU accession of the CEEC-10 in the 
year 2003: 
 
Ad (1) Trade creation: It is assumed that trade costs are eliminated 
gradually (within three years after accession). This results in a long-run 
GDP effect of cumulated 1.4 percent in the CEEC-10 and of 0.6 percent 
in EU-15 (see figures 1 and 2). The simulation runs over 18 years (from 
2003 to 2020). The annual integration effects of reducing trade costs are 
very modest (0.08 percent in the CEECs and only 0.03 percent in EU-
15). The asymmetric start in the year 2003 (the EU has a trade surplus in 
trade with the CEECs) leads to a continuous increase in the surplus in 
absolute values. However, expressed in percent of GDP it only increases 
up to the year 2006. Afterwards the surplus in percent of GDP declines. 
In the end the surplus is smaller than in the baseline scenario. 
 
Ad (2): Direct growth effects: Many researchers have assumed that 
taking part in EU’s single market will result in a push in total factor 
productivity in order to be able to withstand the competitive pressure of 
the incumbents of the EU. Taking such arguments into account we 
assume that TFP in the CEEC-10 will increase by roughly one 
percentage point per year when entering into the EU. However, this 
increase has been calibrated with decreasing returns over time. As can 
be seen from figure 1 the assumption of an exogenous increase of TFP 
in the CEECs is the most important single contributor to GDP growth. 
Over a 18 years period the GDP effects due to TFP increase amount to 
15.6 percentage points (or 0.9 percentage points per year) in the CEEC-
10. Via spill-over effects this single cause will result in a cumulated 
increase of GDP of 2.1 percentage points in the EU over the period of 
18 years (or 0.12 percent per year). In their simulations in the case of the 
less conservative scenario Baldwin/Francois/Portes (1997) came to 
similar results for the long-run real income increase in the CEECs but 
lower income increases for the EU. However, the increase of CEECs‘ 
GDP in the long-run of similar two-digit dimensions is fueled in their 
model via the channel of more capital accumulation (after the 
elimination of risk premia for foreign investors). 
 
Ad (3) FDI effects on growth: FDIs have complicated implications for 
growth and trade. The literature has not reached a consensus to what 
degree FDIs will contribute to capital accumulation in the host country 
(and possible reduce it in the sender country) and hence which influence 
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FDI flows will have on GDP in the end. Similarly, it is not easy to 
decide whether FDIs and trade are related in a substitutive or in a 
complementary way. For our purpose we assumed that there is a direct 
link between FDIs and capital accumulation (decumulation) in the 
CEECs (in the EU) and hence via the production function also on GDP 
growth. Indirectly, higher GDP growth also attracts more imports. In 
our context more FDI flows from the EU to the CEECs also increase 
exports from the EU to the CEECs. In contrast to the extreme results by 
Baldwin/Francois/Portes (1997) the GDP effects of FDI flows after 
integration (which is modelled by eliminating the risk premia for 
investing in the CEECs) are very modest (see the figures 1 and 2). In the 
long-run FDIs will increase by 4 billion €. But their implications on 
GDP growth are only 0.02 percentage points in the CEECs and zero in 
the EU-15. 
 
Ad (4) Migration: Politically the hottest potato in the enlargement 
debate is the case of migration. In particular in the border countries 
Germany and Austria the fear is great that their labour markets could be 
disturbed dramatically by an influx of foreign labour. On the other hand 
serious estimates come to the conclusion that immediately granting free 
movement of persons when entering the EU will not lead to massive 
migration from east to west (DIW, 2000). If one takes into account that 
in the long-run the population of EU-15 will decline (over the period 
2003 to 2020 by around 14 million persons) than one would need an 
equivalent amount of immigrants in order to keep the standard of living 
and be able to sustain the social security system. In our simulations – 
taking into account the DIW estimates of migration – EU accession of 
the CEEC-10 result in a long-run migration stream of 17.7 million 
persons. According to our model specification this implies an increase 
of the growth potential in the EU-15 by 0.1 percentage points in the 
long-run and would cause a decrease of one percentage point in the 
CEEC-10. 
 
Ad (5) Budgetary effects: The costs of enlargement are welfare 
improving for the CEECs and welfare reducing for the EU-15. The 
direct GDP effect is 0.2 percentage points in the CEECs in the long-run 
but negligible in the EU-15. The costs of enlargement, however, play a 
role when evaluating the welfare effects. 
Overall, the cumulated GDP effects of an EU enlargement in the year 
2003 are high in the CEEC-10 (+16.7 percentage points over 18 years, 
which is +0.9 percent per year) and relatively low in the EU-15 (+2.8 
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percentage points and +0.16 percent respectively). Measuring welfare as 
the total income effect (GDP plus income from net-transfers out of the 
EU budget) the CEECs even gain more than measured solely by GDP. 
However, the EU-15 – because enlargement causes costs – will gain less 
in welfare than in GDP (see table 1, third and fourth column). 
 
Table 1: Gains and losses from an early EU enlargement 
  Integration effects of 
EU enlargement  
in 2003 
Additional  
gains/losses:  
EU accession  
in 2003-2008 
  EU15 CEEC10 EU15 CEEC10 
  (cumulated over 
2003-2020) 
(cumulated over 
2003-2020) 
Trade effects (exports-imports) billion € 355 -355 115 -115 
  (in % of GDP) % 0.17 -1.24 0.60 -0.40 
TFP effects (TFPceec/TFPeu) % p.a. - 0.60 - 0.10 
FDI flows from EU15 to CEEC10 billion € -86 86 -21 21 
  (in % of GDP) % 0.04 0.30 0.07 0.01 
Migration from CEEC10 to EU15 in 1000 17800 -17800 6200 -6200 
  (average per year) in 1000 990 -990 295 -295 
  (in % of population) % 0.28 1.02 0.08 0.30 
Budgetary costs (gains) billion € -521 521 -126 126 
  (in % of GDP) % -0.25 1.82 -0.06 0.44 
   
GDP effects billion € 4148 3394 1424 1066 
  (in % of GDP) % 2.80 16.70 0.70 3.70 
Welfare effects billion € 3627 3915 1298 1192 
  (in % of GDP) % 2.50 18.20 0.63 4.17 
 
Gainers and losers from an early EU enlargement? 
The major question is whether an early enlargement will result in higher 
gains than a delayed enlargement (see figures 3 and 4 and table 1). 
 
Due to the specification of our model, in general an early enlargement 
results in higher GDP effects than a later enlargement. Thus, time is 
money! The gains are measured as the difference between the 
integration effects of enlarging in 2003 and those of enlarging the EU in 
2008 (see table 1, fifth and sixth column). The EU gains more net-trade 
(115 billion €). The gains of the EU are the losses of the CEECs. The 
earlier start in pushing TFP in the CEECs results in a lead in 
productivity increase. In the long-run – due to the decreasing returns 
assumption – relative TFP (CEEC/EU) converges in the year 2020. In 
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the meantime, however, a lead of five percentage points is possible in 
the case of an earlier integration of the CEECs. 
 
Figure 3: EU Enlargement in 2003 or in 2008: GDP Effects for EU-15 and CEEC-10
                (Cumulative deviations from baseline in %)
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Figure 4: EU Enlargement in 2003 or in 2008: Welfare Effects for EU-15
                and CEEC-10
                (Cumulative deviations from baseline in %)
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As far as FDI flows are concerned the CEECs will get more when 
entering the EU earlier. This may be counted as gain for the CEECs and 
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loss for the EU. But indirectly, also the EU would gain from more 
opportunities to invest in the east. An early enlargement with full 
freedom for the movement of persons would result in more migration 
from east to west by around 6 million persons over the period of 18 
years. Economically, this would be a gain for the EU and a loss for the 
CEECs. In one respect the EU probably would favour a delayed 
enlargement. This is the case of the costs of enlargement. If enlargement 
takes place in 2008, the costs will be lower for the EU by some 126 
billion € over the 18 years period. Equivalently, this would result in 
income losses in the CEECs. Overall, both regions will gain more GDP 
when the enlargement would start earlier. However, due to the lower 
cost burden, a later enlargement would increase the welfare gains in the 
EU and reduce it in the CEECs. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Time plays a role in different respects in the enlargement game. An 
early EU enlargement would give way to build up more capital and 
hence GDP. It would, however, initiate the expected migration wave 
earlier with the consequence of loss of growth potential in the east and 
an improvement in the west. Seen from the costs side a later 
enlargement would be preferred by the EU but not by the CEECs. The 
former would save income, the latter would get transfers out of the EU 
budget only later. All in all, an early enlargement would help to bring 
the poor CEECs more rapidly to the EU standards. Convergence of total 
factor productivity and GDP per capita would be accelerated by an 
enlargement as soon as possible. In the long run this would help to 
facilitate the process of integration of the east with the west which is not 
easy, anyhow. 
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6. Appendix: A simple model of EU enlargement 
 
Production functions 
(1a) EU-15 ( ) γβα λ= CEEC_EUEUEUEUEU XPOPKTFPY    
  with 1=γ+β+α  
 (1b) CEEC-10 ( ) γ −βα λ= CEECEUCEECEUCEECCEEC MPOPKTFPY   
  with 1=γ+β+α  
 
Capital stocks 
(2a) EU-15
 CEECEUCEECEUEUEUEU EUBFDIYConstK −− τ−σ−κ+=  
(2b) CEEC-10
 CEECEUCEECEUCEECCEECCEEC EUBFDIYConstK −− τ+σ+κ+=  
 
Net Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from EU-15 to  
CEEC-10 
(3) EU-15/CEEC-10
 CEECCEECFDICEECEU RiskYYConstFDI −µ+=−  
 
Migration from CEEC-10 to EU-15 
(4) CEEC-10/EU-15
 )YBceecYB(PoliticsConstMIG EUMIGEUCEEC −ρ+=−  
(5) CEEC-10/EU-15 EUCEECbaseEUCEEC MIGMIGMIGtotal −− +=  
 
Population 
(6a) EU-15  EUCEECEUbaseEU MIGPOPPOP −− +=  
(6b) CEEC-10  EUCEECCEECbaseCEEC MIGPOPPOP −− −=  
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Exports from EU-15 to CEEC-10 
(7) EU-15/CEEC-10 EUCEECCEECCEECEU YTCYX −=− η  
 
Imports of EU-15 from CEEC-10 
(8) EU-15/CEEC-10 CEECEUEUCEECEU YTCYM −=− θ  
 
Trade balance of EU-15 in trade with CEEC-10 
(9) EU-15/CEEC-10 CEECEUCEECEUCEECEU MXTB −−− −=  
 
EU budget costs of Enlargement 
Costs of enlargement in % of EU-GDP: 
(10) EU-15/CEEC-10 )( CEECbaseCEECbaseEU YYTT −−−= ε  
Costs of enlargement (billion €): 
(11) EU-15/CEEC-10 EUEUbaseCEECEU YTEUBEUB +=−  
 
Convergence of GDP per capita 
(12a) EU-15  EUEUEU POP/)1000000Y(YB =  
(12b) CEEC-10  CEECCEECCEEC POP/)1000000Y(YB =  
(13) CEEC-10/EU-15 EUCEEC YB/YBYBrelat =  
 
Variables 
=Y  real GDP (billion €), =YB real GDP per capita (€), 
=relatYB relative real GDP per capita (CEEC/EU), =TFP total factor 
productivity, =K capital stock (billion €), =POP Population (in 1.000 
persons), =X real exports (EU-15 to CEEC-10, billion €), =M  real 
imports (EU-15 from CEEC-10, billion €), =TB  trade balance of EU-
15 in trade with CEEC-10 (billion €), =FDI foreign direct investment 
flows from EU-15 to CEEC-10 (billion €), =MIG additional migration 
from CEEC-10 to EU-15 (in 1.000 persons) after EU accession, 
=T costs of EU enlargment in % of EU-GDP, EUB = costs of EU 
enlargement (billion €). 
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Policy instruments 
=TC  trade costs (in % GDP), =Risk  risk premia for FDI in CEEC-10, 
=Politics migration politics (transitional arrangements for the free 
movement of persons), =T costs of EU enlargement (here 
endogeneous). The suffixes )CEEC(EU  stand for EU-15 and CEEC-
10 respectively. 
 
Parameters 
=γβα ,, production function elasticities; =λ participation rate; 
=κ capital-output ratio; =σ  capital-augmenting effect of FDI in 
CEECs; =τ  capital-augmenting effect of EU budget transfers due to 
enlargement costs; =µ income elasticity of FDIs with respect to 
CEEC‘s GDP; =η  income elasticity of EU’s exports to CEEC-10 with 
respect to CEEC’s GDP; =θ  income elasticity of EU’s imports 
(CEEC’s exports to EU-15) from CEEC-10 with respect to EU’s GDP; 
=ρ effect of income difference between EU-15 and CEEC-10 on 
migration; baseMIG  = baseline migration without EU accession of 
CEEC-10; =ε enlargement cost dampening effect due to an increase of 
CEEC’s GDP; =Const  constants. 
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TRADE PROTECTION IN FIVE EU MEMBER CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES BY EXCHANGE RATE ADJUSTMENT, 
CUSTOMS TARIFFS AND NON-TARIFF MEASURES1 
Gerhard Fink 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Current account deficits indicate that the domestic economy cannot keep 
up with competitive pressure by foreign enterprises. If there are current 
account deficits foreign competitors can more easily sell on the 
domestic markets than domestic firms abroad. In financial analyses we 
often find the argument that a high current account deficit due to 
borrowing for financing vital investment is likely to be more sustainable 
than deficits generated by too large consumption. It is also assumed that 
foreign direct investment, i.e. long term capital commitment, also makes 
current account deficits sustainable in the long run. However, both 
features indicate weak competitiveness of domestic firms. In case of 
deficits due to excess investment domestic firms producing investment 
goods are not competitive to keep up with foreign suppliers of 
investment goods. 
 
In addition, long term foreign direct investment is changing the 
ownership structure within the national economy, foreign corporations 
gain an increasing share in the domestic economy. Thus, growing 
current account deficits are a strong indicator for a decline in 
competitiveness. While domestic firms are losing, foreign firms are 
gaining in strength. This is raising desires to promote competitiveness of 
the domestic industry and to constrain the competitive power of 
foreigners. Current account deficits contribute to the emergence of 
restrictive trading practices (Salvatore 1987, 19). 
 
There are numerous measures possible at the macro-, meso- and micro-
level to influence the balance of competitiveness between domestic and 
foreign firms. Each measure has mostly a direct effect either on prices or 
quantities but also indirect effects on quantities or prices. Each measure 
also has an effect on the distribution of income and wealth, on 
                                                     
1 I thank Christian Mantler for research support, Fritz Breuss and Dominick 
Salvatore for helpful comments. 
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productivity and on creation of net value added in the domestic 
economy (Salvatore 1996, 1998). Basically we can distinguish between 
three sets of measures: adjustment of the foreign exchange rate; 
introduction of a customs tariff; and non-tariff trade barriers. 
 
Depreciating the currency has certain disadvantages from a 
government’s perspective. Nominally stable currencies have a strong 
prestige effect for governments. As can be observed in most Central 
European countries governments are willing to sacrifice export industry 
in order to enjoy this prestige effect at least for some time. Of course, 
linked to currency depreciation is also an additional direct inflationary 
push as with every depreciation imports become more expensive and 
contribute to price increases in the domestic economy. In fact, this 
inflationary push cannot be avoided when other trade restricting 
measures are applied. In case of non-tariff barriers the effect works 
indirectly. As quantities are restricted and demand remains unchanged 
prices go up, too, but possibly with a time lag. 
 
In this setting governments are in search of new protectionist measures 
(except currency depreciation) to get relieve in competitive pressure for 
industries or corporations which are close to political power centers 
(Salvatore 1987), e.g. CEECs could have referred to the GATT/WTO 
exemption of "infant industry" protection (at least for some time). 
However, there is a strong preference to set at least temporary measures 
like surcharges on imports or additional import taxes and to take 
selective measures. Due to the global scenario (WTO membership) and 
the Europe Agreements there remain four fields in which measures are 
taken:  
• regional discrimination: There is a tendency to implement relatively 
high third country tariffs. However, these tariffs meet countervailing 
political pressure by strong trading partners. 
• sectoral discrimination: There is a wide differentiation of tariffs by 
products. 
• implementation of non-tariff administrative barriers (which also 
meet countervailing political pressures by trading partners, but at 
least work for some time). 
• measures in other fields e.g. to fight fraud, which have restrictive 
effects on trade. 
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In this paper exchange rate policies, customs tariffs and non-tariff 
protection by more developed Central European EU member candidates 
are analysed: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
 
 
2. Exchange rate policy 
 
Exchange rate policies in the five countries under investigation changed 
twice during the 1990s. In the first years after the collapse of 
communism some countries were inclined to use exchange rate 
undervaluation as a stabilization anchor and also to protect the domestic 
economy. In a second period from 1992-1995 there was a tendency of 
real currency appreciation and in 1996 and 1997 exchange rate policies 
converged towards adjustment according to purchasing power parity 
change. 
 
In 1990 the annual real currency appreciation/depreciation ranged 
between +11.7% (Hungary) and -14.8% (Czech Republic), in 1993 
between +11.7% (Czech Republic) and -6.4% in Slovenia, and in 1997 
between -4.7% (Hungary) and -9.6% in Slovenia. As in the second half 
of the 1990s current account deficits became more difficult to finance 
the gap between maximum and minimum currency 
appreciation/depreciation development became narrower. We note 
increasing convergence of exchange rate policies in the five countries. 
Exchange rate changes were much more in line with changes in the 
purchasing power parity (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Purchasing power parity gap 1990-1998 
Implicit real currency appreciation/depreciation in per cent of 
previous year 
Source: Fink (1999) update with Economic Survey of Europe, UN/ECE 1999/3 
 
The cumulative effects of real currency appreciation and depreciation 
during 1990-1998 indicate that firms of four countries had to cope with 
higher competitive pressure in 1998 than in 1990. Slovenia is the 
exception. We find a small cumulative real currency depreciation (Table 
1).  
 
On a country basis it is interesting to compare the cumulated real 
appreciation/depreciation effects with current account balances. 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia initially started with undervalued 
currencies and recorded a current account surplus in 1990. The Czech 
Republic undervalued its currency in 1991. Slovenian exchange rate 
policy remained very much in line with changes in purchasing power 
parity. Thus, Slovenia rather recorded small surplusses than deficits on 
current account. The other four countries appreciated their currencies in 
real terms with the effect that after 1993 current account balances 
deteriorated and finally were highly negative in 1996-8. This indicates 
that under the given exchange rate policy competitiveness of firms in 
these countries declined. Political pressure for more protection may 
have increased in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia 
(Table 1). 
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Table 1:  Purchasing power parity gap and current account balances of 5 
EU member candidate countries 1990-1998 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Implicit real currency appreciation/depreciation in % per year 
Czech Rep. -14.8   -3.5 11.6 11.7 8.0 14.2  3.2 -8.7  6.3 
Hungary   11.7   7.4 10.9  1.9 1.3 3.7 -1.0 -4.7 -1.8 
Poland   -0.2 24.5  6.7  0.0 2.7 13.5  4.0 -6.7  3.0 
Slovakia -14.4   -1.7 10.9  8.2 5.5 14.4 -0.2 -5.1  0.4 
Slovenia - -   0.4 -6.4 3.1 18.1 -6.2 -9.6  2.0 
Cumulative effect since 1990 
Czech Rep. -14.8 -17.8 -8.3  2.4 10.6 26.3 30.4 19.0 26.5 
Hungary  11.7  19.9 33.0 35.5 37.2 42.3 40.9 34.3 31.8 
Poland  -0.2  24.2 32.5 32.5 36.1 54.4 60.5 49.8 54.3 
Slovakia -14.4 -15.8 -6.7  0.9  6.5 21.9 21.6 15.3 15.8 
Slovenia - -  0.4 -6.0 -3.1 14.4  7.4 -2.9 -1.0 
Current account balances in million dollars 
Czech Rep. -122 1708 -456 456 -787 -1369 -4292 -3211 -1059 
Hungary 127 267 324 -3455 -3911 -2480 -1678 -981 -2298 
Poland 716 -1359 -269 -2868 677 5310 -1371 -4312 -6858 
Slovakia -767 -786 173 -601 665 391 -2098 -1952 -2059 
Slovenia 518 129 978 191 600 -23 39 37 -4 
Sum of 5 -472 616 750 -6277 -2758 1829 -9400 -10419 -12278 
Notes: Poland - change in definition in 1995, 7935 million dollars were added as non-
classified current account transactions; Slovenia - without transactions with former 
Yugoslavia in 1990 and 1991. 
Source: Fink (1999) update with Economic Survey of Europe, UN/ECE 1999/3 
 
The aggregated current account of the region (five countries) is 
indicating significant loss in competitiveness, which was statistically 
only cushioned by a "definition change" in the current account of 
Poland in 1995 when an extra non-classified amount of almost 8 billion 
dollars was added as revenue of Poland. 
From this brief analysis we can conclude that exchange rate policies 
increased competitive pressure in four of the five central European 
member candidate countries. Thus, we have to assume that other 
instruments (tariff and non-tariff barriers) played an important and 
possibly increasing role as measures to avoid dramatic deterioration in 
the current account.  
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3. Customs tariffs 
 
In 1996 when in the CE-10 competitive pressure by foreign firms was 
strongest the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, applied 
average tariffs between 8 and slightly more than 10%. Slovenia’s 
average customs tariff was 29%. This level is to be compared with the 
European Union tariffs with an unweighted average of 7.2% (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: An overview of Central European tariffs (in percent) 
 MFN tariff, unweighted averages Output- 
  Processed   weighted 
 All food Manu- Sensitive tariff 
 goods sectors facturinga sectors averagesb 
Czech Republic   8.0 19.0   5.9   7.2 - 
Hungary 10.0 10.4 10.1 10.9 10.2 
Poland 10.3 18.3   8.4   9.0 21.2 
Slovakia 10.0 22.3   7.6   9.6 10.3 
Slovenia 29.0 28.9 24.8 24.7 - 
For comparison:     
EU   7.2 16.0   6.6   8.1 - 
Source: P. Messerlin, "The MFN and preferential trade policies of the CECs: Singapore 
and Geneva are on the shortest road to Brussels", PHARE Programme, mimeo, Institut 
d’Etudes Politiques (Paris), 1996, table 4, for the first four Columns: UNIDO industrial 
production database; Messerlin’s calculations 
a Only non-sensitive sectors 
b Output-weighted tariffs, for 3 digit-ISIC industrial sectors 
ECE/UN, Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol. 48 (1996), p. 86. 
 
When looking at tariffs by three digit ISIC classification there were 
relatively large differences between the maximum tariff applied in the 
Central European countries and by the European Union in 1996. Only in 
the case of the Czech Republic for about 75% of the ISIC three digit 
items differences could be found which were smaller than 5 percentage 
points. In almost 25% of all commodity positions differences in customs 
tariffs were larger than 5% and for 2% of the positions differences were 
more than 12%. In case of Poland and Slovakia, differences in customs 
tariffs were significantly larger. E.g. Poland in more than ¾ of all 
commodity positions applied customs tariffs which were more than 5 
percentage points higher than in the European Union. In trade relations 
with the rest of the world, which includes trade relations with the United 
States, Poland applied higher tariffs than the European Union, between 
5 and 12% higher tariffs than the European Union in 84.4% of the 
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commodity groups, and customs tariffs more than 12% higher than the 
European Union in 2.8% of the commodity groups 
 
The five member candidate countries tended to impose relatively high 
customs tariffs in third country relations while at the same time aiming 
at free trade in industrial goods with the European Union in the 
framework of the European Agreements. In addition, the Central 
European countries among themselves applied different customs tariffs 
in 45.8% of the commodity groups. Although in the WTO and CEFTA 
framework tariffs will become lower the given customs tariff structure 
may lead to significant trade diversion in the process of accession to the 
European Union. Given the size of the differences in customs tariffs one 
may even expect that a one step adjustment to the European Union tariff 
level may lead to crises in individual sectors of the economies of the 
candidate countries (UN/ECE 1996). 
 
 
4. Non tariff barriers in the five EU member candidate 
countries 
 
The UNCTAD Coding System of Trade Control Measures (UNCTAD 
1994) distinguishes 7 types of non-tariff measures for trade protection: 
para-tariff measures, price control measures, finance measures, 
automatic licensing measures, quantity control measures, monopolistic 
measures, and technical measures. It has become customary to consider 
as protectionist measures also "measures concerning production" like 
state aid, tax allowances, public procurement, and exemptions form 
tariffs, as they may constitute an element of unfair competition, giving 
advantage to local producers over foreign exporters.  
 
The European Union (Market Access Sectoral and Trade Barriers 
Database 1998a-e, and 1999a-e), the US State Department (Country 
Commercial Guide 1998a-e, 1999a-e) and the Austrian Chamber of 
Commerce (Andrecs 1997) are collecting reports from firms affected by 
these measures. 
 
Poland seemingly is the country which makes most widespread use of 
non-tariff measures (39 measures, i.e. one third of the reported 
measures), followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia 
(each about 20% of the cases). Slovenia which reports rather balanced 
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current account applies significantly less non-tariff measures than the 
other four countries. 
 
Technical measures figure prominently with about 48 of the reported 
measures (40%), followed by quantity controls (24), para-tariff 
measures (23) and measures concerning production (15 cases). Only two 
cases of finance measures are reported. Price control measures are 
apparently not applied by (not reported about) these five countries. 
Monopolistic measures (2) are only applied by Poland. 
 
A broad range of non-tariff barriers (about 30% of the identified 
measures) is affecting trade with all goods or goods from more than one 
sector, as e.g. import deposits, special billing rules or discriminating 
certification requirements. Industry specific measures affect in all five 
countries food, tobacco, and (mostly alcoholic) beverages (36 measures 
identified). Protection of the automotive industry is strong in the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland (14 measures) which are supporting local 
production by foreign direct investors with discriminating measures 
against imports of used cars, in particular. Protection of the chemical 
sector (including pharmaceuticals) is relatively strong in Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia. Only 7 industry specific measures are reported 
against imports of textiles and 4 in machinery and equipment. In these 
fields the Czech Republic applies 5 out of 11 reported measures. 
 
 
5. Technical barriers to trade 
 
Technical certification of products is a useful instrument for consumer 
information and protection. Standardization of technical products can 
help to reduce production cost of industry by reducing the number of 
technical variants. International production norms secure the 
comparability of a broad range of internationally produced technical 
equipment. However, beyond these obvious advantages of technical 
norms and product certification there is a threat that certification 
requirements will be used as an administrative barrier to imports. 
 
As it turned out to be very difficult to harmonize the certification 
requirements within the European Union an appropriate solution seemed 
to be found by the concept of mutual recognition. Nevertheless there 
were and still are numerous cases of non recognition which impede the 
"common market" despite the path breaking European court rulings in 
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the Dassonville case in 1974 and the Cassis de Dijon case in 1978 
(Griller 1990, Nentwich 1994, 52). 
The problem was also dealt with in the framework of the Uruguay 
Round. "Under Art. 2 (2.1, 2.2 and 2.7) of the new Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade the [WTO] members shall ensure that in 
respect of technical regulations, "products imported from the territory 
of any member shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin and to like products 
originating in any other country". Technical regulations must not create 
"unnecessary obstacles to international trade". "Members shall give 
positive consideration to accepting as equivalent technical regulations 
of other Members, even if these regulations differ from their own, 
provided they are satisfied that these regulations adequately fulfil the 
objectives of their own regulations. These obligations do not seem to 
include a (directly effective and strict) principle of mutual recognition, 
but rather an obligation to assess the equivalence of regulations." 
(Griller 1995, 301-2). 
 
In the application of technical norms and standards and the related 
certification procedures Central European member candidates are not 
only constrained by their membership to the WTO, but also by the 
Association Agreements with the European Union ("Europe 
Agreements"). On the one hand the agreements imply that the member 
candidates set up rules and procedures equivalent to those applied 
within the European Union. As a precondition for mutual recognition of 
norms and standards among EU countries and member candidates at the 
time of accession, at latest. On the other hand it is expected that the 
member candidate countries do not impose any new trade restricting 
measure.  
 
During 1994-97 when systems of mandatory quality control and 
certification were introduced by the member candidates on a wide range 
of consumer and industrial products the new rules turned out to be 
highly protectionist in Poland, in the Czech and the Slovak Republic. 
Although reported as a single measure there is a strong effect on a broad 
range of products and sectors. Neither the EU principle of "mutual 
recognition" nor the weaker WTO principle of "positive consideration 
of equivalent technical regulations" are applied.  
Quite often the respective law does not specify clear rules of 
certification. In addition, rules were applied to discriminate foreign 
producers and importers. In many instances access to certification was 
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and still is different for local producers and importers. E.g. foreigners 
can get certification only at a limited number of authorized institutions, 
certificates for importers expire within relatively short periods of time or 
are valid only for individual import shipments, and charges for 
certification of foreign products are prohibitively high.  
 
Czech Republic 
Under Act 22/1997, introduced in September 1997, the Czech Republic 
applies a system of mandatory quality control and certification on a 
wide range of consumer and industrial products and sectors. The system 
appears to have been introduced on health and consumer protection 
grounds. The law specifies neither the list of products to be tested nor 
the quality criteria or the technical requirements. Certification 
procedures appear to be long (between 1 to 6 weeks) and very costly 
(reportedly up to 120.000 DM per year in certain sectors). These costs 
have to be paid by the importer or the producer. 
 
Poland 
Since 1994, Poland has applied a system of obligatory certification ("B" 
mark certificate for bezpienczenstwo, "safety" in Polish) on more than 
1.400 industrial products (especially in the following sectors: steel, 
chemicals, pottery and ceramics, paper, electrical appliances and 
automobiles). The certification procedures were long (between 3 and 7 
month) and costly (from several hundred to several thousand Zloty) and 
had to be complete for each type of product creating significant market 
access problems (EU 1999b: Non-Tariff Barriers). 
In 1995 the Polish Council for certification eased the negative effects of 
this legislation. Products are allowed to be brought on the market after 
registration and are not required any more to wait for testing results. The 
initial legislation ruled that firms selling goods without the mark are 
obligated to pay fines amounting to 100% of the value of the good sold 
(USSD 1999b: Trade Regulations and Standards; USTR 1999b). 
 
The European Commission has undertaken a series of demarches 
seeking to remedy this situation, leading to a draft agreement on a 
Protocol in 1997 ("European Conformity Assessment Agreement"). 
After initial progress, however, the reform process stopped due to the 
adoption of a new Polish Constitution, and subsequent changes in the 
competence of the national implementation bodies. In order to carry out 
the necessary reforms, the Polish Government has established an inter 
ministerial task force, which changes some parts in the Polish 
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certification law. Nevertheless there are still considerable technical 
barriers to trade (EU 1999b: Non-Tariff Barriers). 
 
Slovak Republic 
The testing and certification system introduced by Slovakia in 1995, 
which applies to a large range of industrial products (i.e. foodstuffs, 
kitchen devices, medicines, electrical equipment, engineering products, 
agricultural machinery, plastics, paints, polishes, cosmetics, sporting 
goods etc.) was foreseen as a temporary measure pending alignment of 
Slovak legislation with Community Directives. Despite repeated 
promises to align to the "new approach" of voluntary certification 
practiced in the EU, the Slovak Government has not yet adopted the 
relevant framework legislation. Furthermore, the Slovak Republic has 
continued to introduce a number of pre-market testing and mandatory 
certification procedures on a wide product range. Especially as of 1997 
technical trade barriers started to be applied an a wider scale, which 
took the form of veterinary and phyto-quarantine measures and 
requirements on certification of imported goods (EU 1999d: Non-Tariff 
Barriers; USSD 1999d: Chapter VI). 
 
 
6. Labeling requirements 
 
Another set of discriminating technical measures refers to labeling 
requirements. In many instances additional information is required 
which is not needed or applicable in the country of origin (e.g. the name 
of the importer of a respective shipment) or the use of other than the 
local language is restricted. 
 
Czech Republic 
EU exporters as well as certain member states of the EU report that 
certificates for food products are not valid for all regions of the Czech 
Republic and that certification procedures are lengthy (3 - 6 month). 
Sweets are subject to specific local labeling requirements. EU exporters 
face problems in exporting agricultural food products which contain 
additives forbidden in the Czech Republic, but authorized in the EU 
(EU 1999c: Non-Tariff Barriers; Andrecs 1997: Beilage 3). 
 
A European Producers Association has raised the issue of Czech 
definition and labeling requirements for whisky which have negatively 
affected their exports. The Commission has urged the Czech authorities 
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to amend their legislation on definition and labeling requirements to 
bring it into line with that of the EU. The Czechs stated that an 
amendment to the relevant decree is under preparation. Full 
compatibility will be reached by the end of 2000 (EU 1999c: Non-Tariff 
Barriers). 
According to Decree 132/1996 all consumer information on product 
labels has to be exclusively in Czech language. Therefore the expression 
"100% Cotton" is not legal although internationally comprehensible 
(Andrecs 1997: Beilage 3). 
 
Hungary 
The European Commission and the American Government received 
complaints from exporters concerning the requirements of the new 
Hungarian Act 97/155 on consumer protection:  
The act lays down in §§ 9, 10 and 12 that the merchandise can be only 
commercialized in case there is a well readable, clear and unambiguous 
information for the customer which might go beyond the EU directives 
on textiles like the name and address of the manufacturer or distributor, 
technical specifications other than fiber content, the size and quantity 
level, use of energy. The Commission is examining this issue (EU 
1999a: Non-Tariff Barriers).  
The label of food products must give the following information: net 
quantity, name/address of producer or importer, consumption expiration 
date, recommended storage temperature, listing of ingredients additives, 
energy content and approval symbols from the OETI and KERMI 
(Commercial Quality Testing Institute) (compare HUN-04-81-22) 
(USSD 1999a: CH VI Trade Regulations and Standards). 
The label of cosmetics should indicate: product denomination, function, 
handling (precautionary) instructions, production date, utilization 
expiration date, quantity of product, producer/importer information. 
There are additionally specific marking and labeling requirements for 
human and animal pharmaceuticals (USSD 1999a: CH VI Trade 
Regulations and Standards) 
 
Industry associations report that there are local labeling requirements for 
sweets in Hungary. Detailed information, however, is not available (EU 
1999a: Non-Tariff Barriers). 
 
Slovak Republic 
Slovak legislation imposes for all foodstuff labeling that mentions the 
date of production and the expiry date for consumption. Other countries’ 
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legislation envisages such dates only for food items sensitive from a 
microbiological point of view. In addition, Slovak legislation imposes 
for foreign products an indication of their origin, whereas in the EU the 
indication of origin is only required when its omission would lead the 
buyer into error about the real origin of the products. The Slovak 
legislation forces producers to use different labels for this little market 
(EU 1999d: Non-Tariff Barriers). 
 
Slovenia 
According to the Slovene law on standardization, all products have to be 
labeled (producer, importer, description of the product, quantity etc.) in 
Slovene language. This labeling is checked at the border. Thus the 
foreign producer has to carry out labeling. This leads to problems in 
case one producer has more than one importer in Slovenia: The importer 
named on the declaration forms has to correspond with the importer 
named on the label. This requires the producers to make special 
wrappings or labels for every single importer (Andrecs 1997: Beilage 3) 
According to Regulation 36/78 relating to quality certification for 
imported textiles, each single consignment of imported textile products 
needs to be checked by an institute agreed on by the National 
Standardization and Measurement Office. Product components and the 
product’s compliance with Slovenian labeling requirements are checked 
Responsible for quality controls are two Slovenian Textiles Institutes. 
There are no similar obligations in the EU concerning certification. 
Such a control lasts approximately 2 weeks and costs approximately 
50 € per consignment (EU 1999e: Non-Tariff Barriers; Andrecs 1997: 
Beilage 3). 
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7. Breakdown by industry and country 
 
While product certification and labeling requirements quite often affect 
a wide range of sectors there are also numerous sector specific 
measures. Most of them are concentrated on agriculture and food, with 
emphasis on liquors with high alcohol content. Poland, however, does 
not apply such measures. 
 
The automotive industry is protected with industry specific technical 
measures by the Czech Republic and Poland. 
 
Industry specific measures are also taken in chemical industry in four of 
the five countries under consideration (not in Slovenia), textile industry 
(not in Poland), machinery and equipment (not in Poland and Slovenia). 
 
Judging by the number of measures and the fact that no complaints have 
been reported about the certification procedures applied by Slovenia the 
conclusion is that Slovenia is the least protectionist country among the 
five member candidates under investigation. Slovenia is also the only 
country which keeps its exchange rate in line with purchasing power 
parity and does not run large current account deficits. 
 
 
8. Summary and conclusions 
 
There is a clear distinction to be made between Slovenia and the other 
four EU member candidate countries. Slovenia keeps exchange rates 
much more in line with purchasing power parity change and applies 
non-tariff measures to a much lesser extent than the other four countries. 
 
Five central European member candidates aimed at undervalued 
currencies in the first or second year of economic transition and 
achieved current account surpluses. (In case of Czechoslovakia the total 
aggregate was positive, too, as the surplus achieved by the Czech lands 
was larger than the deficit of Slovakia in 1991). With the exception of 
Slovenia during 1992-1995 exchange rates became increasingly 
overvalued and were rather supporting importers and restraining 
exporters. A high protection level by customs tariffs could not be 
maintained as, due to Europe Agreements (free trade with the EU to be 
established within 10 years) and WTO commitments customs tariffs 
were losing in significance as a protectionist measure although third 
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country tariffs in numerous cases remained relatively higher as e.g. EU 
third country tariffs. 
 
As current accounts deteriorated more and more temporary measures 
(import taxes, import deposits) and numerous administrative barriers 
(mandatory product certification, labeling, packaging rules, etc.) were 
created. Since administrative barriers and temporary measures meet 
resistance by powerful trading partners (EU and USA in particular) 
these countries are increasingly under pressure to phase out such 
measures and to set up transparent and acceptable rules. 
 
Under this pressure exchange rate policy was regaining in importance to 
protect domestic industries from foreign competition. During 1996-1998 
exchange rate adjustments of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia converged much closer to purchasing power parity change as 
in the early transition period. 
 
As their current account deficits deteriorated during the 1990s the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Slovak Republic implemented more 
and more non-tariff barriers to trade. 30% of reported non-tariff 
measures are of general nature and affecting more than one industry. 
Otherwise measures are mostly concentrated on alcoholic beverages, 
tobacco products, food (these three together 30% of measures), 
chemicals, pharmaceutical products, cars and components. 
 
Technical barriers to trade play an increasing role in trade protection of 
three Central European EU member candidate countries: approximately 
40% of the non-tariff measures reported are technical measures which in 
the Czech Republic, in Poland and the Slovak Republic apply to a wide 
range of products. These measures are in contradiction with the 
obligations of these countries as WTO members and also as signatories 
of the Association Agreements with the European Union. 
 
As these countries want to become members of EU in a not too distant 
future most of the present obstacles to trade will have to be dismantled. 
Exchange rate policies of the EU member candidate countries should 
not be guided by a purely financial view of sustainability of current 
account deficits. Exchange rate policies should aim at balanced current 
account and permit to implement export led growth strategies. 
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different Internet-Sources (visited between December 1998 and August 
1999). 
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THE EIB'S POSSIBILITIES TO PARTICIPATE IN 
INFRASTRUCTURAL INVESTMENTS 
Ewald Nowotny 
 
 
1. What is the EIB? 
 
The EIB is a tool for financing investments promoting and furthering 
the European Union's major policies, maintaining in particular a high 
level of financing to strengthen the Union's economic and social fabric 
and preparing the candidate countries for EU membership. 
EIB financing may cover a wide range of investments within regional 
development, communications, energy and environment as well as 
human capital (health and education sectors) and competitiveness of 
European industry. 
The main product is loan financing, both by means of direct loans and 
also global loans, which are extended to national financing institutions 
for channelling onwards to smaller investments. In addition, the EIB can 
invest in venture capital funds thereby providing innovative and 
fast-growing small and medium-sized companies with risk capital. 
Loans signed 1999 amounted to 31.8 billion €. Of this total, 4 billion € 
went for investment outside the Union. More than half of landing 
outside the EU, or 2.4 billion €, was extended to the Central and Eastern 
European candidate countries and Cyprus to promote the integration of 
these countries into the Union. 
 
Why do states, municipalities and companies turn to the 
Luxembourg-based European Investment Bank, for financing? Mainly 
because the EIB as the financing institution of the EU, and thus owned 
by its member states, can offer long-term loans at a favourable price. 
Maturities are up to 12 years in the industrial sector and 20 years or 
even more for infrastructure projects. The EIB has due to the strength 
and commitment of its shareholders and the good quality of its loan 
portfolio the highest possible credit rating - AAA. This enables the Bank 
to borrow on the international capital markets at the finest terms, which 
the EIB passes on in the lending conditions. 
 
The EIB's shareholders, the EU Member States, reconfirmed their 
support for the Bank's activities by increasing its subscribed capital to 
100 billion € from 1 January 1999, lifting the lending ceiling to 250 
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billion € and thus enabling the Bank to continue to develop the scope of 
its activities. 
 
 
2. EIB and infrastructure investment 
 
In 1999, close to 60% or 10,3 billion € of total individual loans provided 
within the Union, went to finance communications infrastructure - 
telecommunications, rail transport, roads and motorways, air transport 
and fixed links, such as the Great Belt and Oresund bridges. 
 
The priorities for the EIB remain Trans-European networks and the 
environment, focusing in particular on qualitative adaptations and on 
continued close co-operation with the banking sector and national 
authorities. The development of EIB lending will therefore concentrate 
on those projects where the added value of the Bank will be clearly 
assessed. Major opportunities within this context are northern transport 
corridors and the support to local authorities investment programmes, 
especially in the case of localisation in the northern, less developed 
areas. 
 
The EU Summit in Cologne in 1999 stressed that "European 
infrastructure is to be further improved by Trans-European Networks –
in particular, the priority projects in the transport field as well as the 
development of projects in telecommunications and information 
technology to improve innovation and competition – with assistance 
provided by the EIB". The EU Summit in Lisbon underlined the need for 
the EU "to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion". The Summit 
welcomed the contribution the EIB had said it was ready to make in the 
areas of human capital (education and health sectors), SMEs and 
entrepreneurship, research & development, networks in the information 
technology and telecom sectors and innovation. 
 
In Spring 2000, the EIB’s Board of Governors, that is the Finance 
Ministers of the Member countries, approved a proposal by the Bank 
and its Board of Directors – the so-called "Innovation 2000 Initiative". 
The EIB will dedicate a lending programme of 12 to 15 billion € over 
the next 3 years for the above mentioned priority areas and make 
another billion euros available for venture capital operations for SMEs. 
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The first billion € within the Bank’s "SME Window" were established 
as a response to the Amsterdam EU Summit on Growth and 
Employment in 1997. 
 
The Cologne Summit also recognised the growing role of the EIB in 
assisting countries, preparing to join the Union. Also in this respect 
particular attention will be given to projects in key EU policy objective 
sectors: communications, energy and the environment, industry and 
SMEs plus, as far as possible, health and education. 
 
During the last five years, EIB lending to these countries totalled 8.4 
billion € with some 2.4 billion € for each of the last two years. The Bank 
now has at its disposal some 17 billion € to be allocated for loan 
financing in the candidate countries during the next three to five years. 
The EIB is the biggest source of international finance for projects in 
Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
3. EIB and the northern dimension 
 
One of the aims of the Northern Dimension is to emphasise the 
importance of Northern Europe and its advantages for EU development 
in the long term. The aim also includes supporting the enlargement of 
the EU and its co-operation with Russia. 
 
The EIB has, up to now, no mandate to operate in Russia. However the 
Bank follows with interest the prospects of selected projects in the 
environmental sector of great benefit for the Baltic Sea (i.e. St 
Petersburg Waste Water), and in the energy sector (i.e. the Nordic Gas 
Grid). For specific projects, where there is an additional EU interest and 
where adequate securities may be obtained (Member States or prime 
banks), the possibility exists for the EIB to engage itself in financing 
operations, given the unanimous support of its Board of Governors (i.e. 
EU Finance Ministers) under Art. 18 of the Bank's Statute. In its 
decision of 1 December 1999 the Council of the European Union 
expressed its readiness to investigate, sometime in 2002-2003, the 
possibility of extending the Community guarantee to the European 
Investment Bank to cover, among other possible countries, Russia, once 
the necessary conditions in these countries are met, in particular in 
relation to the presence of a stable working market economy in 
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accordance with the IMF programmes, which will, in turn, make EIB 
lending in these countries under the usual sound economic and financial 
conditions feasible. Should these circumstances be met and the Council 
suggest including Russia into the future set of mandates, the Bank is 
prepared to examine this possibility and the conditions attached to it 
with its governing boards. 
 
Whereas the definition of the policies and instruments required for the 
implementation of Northern Dimension pertain to the European 
Council, the EU Commission and Members States, at the operational 
level the EIB has developed its own plan of action: 
• by maintaining closer contacts with the national authorities involved 
and the EU institutions in order to maximise the synergies between 
its financing, the EU programmes and the action of international 
financial institutions (EBRD, World Bank, NIB) and local banks,  
• by channelling its loans to projects where EIB financing is the most 
appropriate because of its very long maturity, size, currencies and 
interest rates, 
• by providing promoters with the added value resulting from the 
technical and financial expertise it has acquired over 40 years of 
activity, 
• by supporting the reinforcement of basic infrastructures in Baltic 
countries and Poland as well as their process of transformation 
towards market economies. 
 
A key factor in the EIB's action has been the consideration that the 
creation and modernisation of the infrastructure needed for better 
communications between Northern Europe, the rest of the Union and the 
applicant Central and Eastern European countries were a precondition 
for a sound and sustainable economic development of the Union as a 
whole. For this reason by far the most important EIB financing has been 
concentrated on: 
• Nordic Triangle: on a total of 2.4 billion € granted to infrastructure 
projects included in the Nordic Triangle, the Oresund link between 
Copenhagen and Malmö was by its size (1.2 billion €) one of the 
largest loans ever provided by the EIB. The action in favour of 
Nordic Triangle projects was completed by the loans granted to the 
E 4 and E 6 motorways connecting Stockholm and Helsingborg and 
Malmö with the Norwegian border. Still in the road sector, the EIB 
participated in Finland in the financing of different sections of the 
East West E 18 motorway and the North South E 12 motorway, 
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linking respectively the southern road axis of Finland with Russian 
borders and providing faster and safe access to the European 
network, and the Finnish Northern regions.  
• The main projects financed in the rail sector were, in Sweden the 
modernisation of the rail line between Malmö and Göteborg, and, in 
Finland the financing of different sections along the corridor Turku 
– Russian border with the overall aim of improving the EU’s access 
to St. Petersburg through Finland. 
• TENs: financing provided to TENs projects under the EIB TEN 
window amounted to 2.8 billion €, with again a large scale financing 
to the Great Belt Link (1.9 billion €) and a number of loans covering 
airports (Copenhagen, Helsinki), ports (Göteborg, Arhus), power 
networks, roads and railways. 
 
The Nordic triangle and TENs projects absorbed around 40% of the EIB 
lending to Nordic and Baltic States. 
 
In line with the priorities set out in the Accession Partnership 
Agreements signed between the European Union and the Pre-Accession 
Countries, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, further EIB 
support will be directed towards the upgrading of the countries basic 
infrastructure. Particular attention will be paid to the investments in the 
environment and transport, energy, telecommunications and health and 
education infrastructure. Support to SMEs and small infrastructure will 
be channelled through global loans. 
 
The Bank is paying special attention to the development of the 
communications links between the countries concerned and the Member 
States. One of the priorities will be support to TEN Corridors, including 
further upgrading of the Via Baltica route (TEN Corridor 1) between 
Helsinki and Warsaw. The Bank is also following with interest the 
Baltic Ring energy sector initiatives, with particular emphasis on 
interconnection links and rationalisation of energy produc-
tion/distribution. 
 
The EIB is strongly committed to facilitating Pre-Accession Countries' 
further integration into the EU. The financial envelopes in place would 
allow the Bank to further expand and deepen its current activity in the 
candidate countries and allow the future Members to benefit from the 
valuable experience the Bank has gained from previous enlargements. 
The Bank, based on its recent experience from operations in Estonia, 
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Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and in the other countries in the region, as 
well as from its active involvement in previous enlargements of the EU, 
expects to be a valuable partner for the Pre-Accession Countries both 
during the present pre-accession phase and after membership. 
 
Of great importance in the EU’s overall pre-accession strategy towards 
Pre-Accession Countries is maximising complementarity and synergies 
between the various EU instruments. In connection with this, the Bank 
will seek to combine EU grant finance sources such as PHARE and 
ISPA. Co-financing possibilities with other international financial 
institutions, particularly the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB) and the 
Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO), which are both 
active in the region, but also with bilateral sources of finance, will 
continue to be explored, as appropriate. 
 
The examples of EIB financing in the Northern countries mentioned and 
more precisely in the northern parts of these countries, underline the 
Bank’s commitment to support regional development, which is its main 
task. The EIB must, in co-operation with the national and regional 
authorities, seek to stop up gradually its activities in these sparsely 
populated regions in support of projects that will encourage economic 
development. 
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EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE 
Robert A. Mundell 
 
 
After World War II, the war-torn countries of Europe were primarily 
engaged in economic stabilisation, and it was natural that they would 
attempt to meet that task by making their economies converge to the 
international monetary system that was being developed.  
 
The Bretton Woods arrangements were drafted in the spirit of the gold 
standard, which became the predominant element of the post-war 
system. It was then natural for the countries of Europe – not just Eastern 
Europe, but all countries of Europe, at least outside the Soviet zone – to 
move to a system of fixed exchange rates and to gradually eliminate 
capital controls.  
 
The emergence of the international monetary system and advances in 
the convertibility of the national currencies gave European economies a 
kind of signpost for economic policy: Once you fix the exchange rate to 
the world system, all other aspects of policy fall into place. Monetary 
policy becomes, or should become, automatic otherwise a country gets 
into trouble. In the long run, fiscal balance is also imperative, as 
countries with big deficits most likely run into speculative difficulties 
and their currencies will be in trouble. This system of more or less fixed 
exchange rates served the post-world war II world quite well. 
 
With the end of the cold war in 1989/90, the international monetary 
system disappeared Already in the 1970s, it had been changed into a 
system with flexible exchange rates with no link to gold any more. This 
was gradually developing, and this avoided the chaos that would have 
resulted from suddenly freeing all exchange rates. Imagine a system of 
flexible exchange rates for some 200 countries in the world, with all 
countries more or less of the same size: this would mean complete 
chaos. Actually, no chaos emerged because the configuration of powers, 
economies and transaction areas was very skewed. There was a 
dominant currency, the US dollar. The dollar gave much coherence to 
the world currency system in the 1970s, and still to some extent in the 
1980. 
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As a consequence of this change, the role of the international monetary 
authorities, in particular that of the IMF, has greatly changed. 
Immediately after world war II, it was easy for the IMF to follow a 
coherent policy. In a way, fixing the exchange rate substitutes for using 
monetary policy instruments. The inflation rate will anyway be 
determined in the currency area the country is part of. But in the 1990s, 
when the powers of the international monetary authorities were spread 
between the IMF, the World Bank, the EBRD and the OECD, they 
found themselves in a no-man’s land of economic policy. They acted 
eclectic, did not really know what to do, and there was no coherence to 
the system. 
 
In the 1990s, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe dropped into a 
great depression in which, with very few exceptions, still are. Only now 
two or three of them have returned to higher growth rates and higher 
output levels – according to the way we measure it – than they had in 
1989.1  
 
The important fact is that the 10-year transition experiment was a 
debacle. The depression, measured in terms of per capita output 
compared to the 1989 level (if we believe in those figures), was much 
greater than in the great depression in the 1930s.  
 
Part of the reason has probably been the policy prescriptions and the 
lack of coherence of monetary policy. Nearly all reforming countries 
went through long bouts of inflation, which destroyed their credit 
mechanisms. In case of hyperinflation, as one of the countries 
experienced, no efficient investment system seemed feasible. In the 
latter part of the 90s they gradually returned to stability, but there was 
still no coherence to their policies.  
 
Another important change, also associated with the cold war, was the 
development and advent of the euro and the euro area. The euro makes a 
big difference to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It 
represents a very clear-cut system at least compared with the rather lose 
ERM system. Eleven currencies have locked their exchange rates, and 
the euro instantly has become the number two currency in the world. It 
comprises a big currency area, which has the prospect – if Britain and 
                                                     
1 Of course, there are lots of arguments why these figures may not be 
completely realistic. 
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some other countries join – of becoming as big as the dollar area. 
Taking into account that 13 African countries are already locked into the 
euro area, plus the one or the other pre-in country, as well as the 13 
more CEE countries that have been invited to apply for EU membership, 
then all in all about 41 countries will participate in the euro system. 
Another 10 countries in Northern Africa and the Middle East and maybe 
other Eastern European countries may want to lock their currencies in. 
By 2010, some 50 to 60 countries might be part of the euro area. Thus, 
one can imagine that the euro area will be of the same order of 
magnitude as the dollar area, maybe even somewhat bigger. Meanwhile 
of course the dollar area is going to expand into Latin America, and 
there may also be a yen area forming, or some other currency areas in 
Asia. But the pure existence of the euro gives important impulses to the 
development of the international monetary system. 
 
Now, for the reforming countries of Central and Eastern Europe the 
question is what the best way would be to conduct their monetary 
policies to approach EU membership. I think in terms of the monetary 
policies of the transition countries, without exception, the best way of 
achieving convergence is fixing the exchange rates of their currencies to 
the euro and letting that become the monetary policy of the country. 
Let’s for a moment use the term "currency board", although it does not 
have to be a currency board proper. Currency boards are an extreme 
form of fixing the exchange rates. On the other hand, pegged exchange 
rates are the worst of all systems. A pegged exchange rate means that a 
country intervenes in the foreign exchange market to stabilise the 
exchange rate, but at the same time wants to maintain an independent 
monetary policy. In contrast to this, a fixed exchange rate serves as a 
monetary rule.  
 
There is no point in asking the question: "Which currency regime 
should be preferred – fixed or flexible exchange rates?", because fixed 
exchange rates represent a monetary rule, and flexible exchange rates do 
not. Quite contrary to that: flexible exchange rates are equivalent to 
removing a monetary rule.  
 
Fixed exchange rates should only be compared with another monetary 
rule. It is perfectly legitimate and logical to say: Let’s compare fixed 
exchange rates or exchange rate targeting with inflation targeting or 
monetary targeting. These are three monetary rules, but such 
comparison does by no means address the question of fixed versus 
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flexible exchange rates. With monetary targeting a country must have a 
floating rate, with inflation targeting it must have a floating rate, with 
fixed exchange rate targets it has to let the other goals go. A country can 
at a time pursue only one of these goals.  
 
Now anyway, when talking about fixed exchange rates or currency 
boards I really mean an exchange rate system of the kind that Austria 
had vis-à-vis the Mark for two decades and the kind that Holland had 
and most of the time Belgium had against the Mark. In practice one 
advantage of such an inter-currency area with almost fixed exchange 
rates is that there is no big speculation about it. Speculative capital 
movements are absent unless there is the suspicion that one of the 
countries is going to change its monetary policy.  
 
So the main point is that any "fix" has to fulfil two criteria: it has to be 
credible and it should not further expectations that policies are going to 
change. Here look at the example of the currency board of Argentina or 
Hong Kong. These currency boards ran into trouble in one or two points 
in time. Hong Kong has had a currency board with the US dollar at an 
exchange rate of 7.8 Hong Kong dollars since 1983 when John Green  
established that currency board. It worked famously successfully until 
1997. That currency board was run by three commercial banks. The 
government was not involved in it, and the board was perfectly 
successful with no speculation about the exchange rate. But when the 
British set up the Hong Kong Monetary Authority several changes in 
policy precluded it from accumulating credibility: it switched, e.g. from 
buying and selling foreign assets to support the stock markets or 
something like that. As a consequence, speculation started. As soon as 
policy is changed, the country loses credibility. They only re-established 
their credibility when they stopped changing the exchange rate. The key 
message therefore is that policy has to be credible. Only a credible 
monetary policy yields the benefits of low interest rates and low 
inflation rates in the long run.  
 
The Maastricht Treaty requires member countries to have independent 
central banks. Now the implications of that in Europe are interesting. 
Let’s explore this by a few examples. First of all, what did it mean for 
Luxembourg. Luxembourg has had a monetary union with Belgium 
since the 1920s. Luxembourg francs circulate in that area but there 
aren’t too many of them. A monetary institute cared for monetary 
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policy. Suddenly Luxembourg had to upgrade its monetary institute to a 
central bank which, however, was never contested.  
What would the independency rule mean for other countries, let’s say, 
for Estonia? Estonia fixed the crown to the DM in 1992 and has kept 
that policy since. What does it mean for a country that has a currency 
board and the unique policy of having a requirement of 125% reserves, 
or an extra of 25%, to act in lieu of the lender of last resort for some 
additional protection. 
 
Why does Estonia need – its currency fixed to the DM and now to the 
euro – to have an independent central bank? A currency board, or a 
central bank, that is following a really automatic policy can be classified 
as independent, although it avails of zero options. There is no degree of 
freedom and therefore there is no independent judgement. It is never the 
central bank, even if it is independent, that is the authority to control the 
exchange rate. It is rather the government that controls the exchange 
rate. On the way to the EU a lot of countries have taken this route and 
have set up an independent central bank. Then for a while they practised 
something like inflation targeting. I think this is the slow way to reach 
convergence. It is a very inexact and a very difficult way: We all know 
how difficult it is for the European Central Bank to judge whether they 
should expand or contract, raise or lower interest rates, and how difficult 
it is for the Open Market Committee in the US to make a decision. Why 
should every single country make decisions with officials who do not 
have experience comparable to that of the staff of the ECB or of the 
Federal Reserve System. If they would fix the exchange rate that would 
require just a single decision. I am not saying that fixing the exchange 
rate is an easy decision. It has to be done properly, and the rules and the 
mechanism have to be set up with respect to the currency board. But 
once this system is in place the fixed costs are paid and monetary policy 
becomes automatic. That automatically also drives convergence in all 
ways.  
 
Let’s suppose that the central bank chooses the exchange rate 
"correctly", fixes it and commits itself to buy and sell euros for local 
currency at that fixed rate. What will happen? That is exactly the 
position that the countries of the euro area are in now. They have only 
very limited degrees of freedom in their basic policies. What will 
determine the supply of money in such a country? If a country grows 
rapidly, it will need more money. As it grows, the demand for money 
will increase, expenditures will be a little bit less than income, and there 
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will be a bit of an inflow or outflow of capital (i.e., the country will 
import the money it needs). That is how Hong Kong has been successful 
all way though since 1983 and how other currency boards for long 
periods of time were successful. Once the country has got through that 
currency board stage, then convergence to the EMU zone is very easy. 
All the work has been done. The only thing that is needed now is to 
replace the national currency with the Euro. When countries fix the 
exchange rate credibly by currency board or alternative mechanisms, as 
a rule the Central Bank interest rate – if it is credible – comes quickly 
down. The interest payments on the public debt go down and reduce the 
budgetary burden. What then is only left is to balance the budget. If that 
becomes credible, a lot of these countries which have not had developed 
capital markets will quickly establish capital markets. There is some 
leeway then for expanding the public debt. 
 
Should EU countries be allowed to have whatever monetary policies 
they want to have or should they be subject to the conditions that the 
other members of the EU have. When Britain got a derogation, this was 
a very special case. Denmark may be viewed as another special case. 
But why should all the 13 applicant countries all be special cases. 
Especially for the smaller economies applying now for EU membership, 
it seems much more efficient for them to conduct their monetary and 
fiscal policies under fixed rates than under floating rates. It would lead 
them in the right direction towards stabilising their economies. 
 
In this context the issue of the "holy trinity" comes up again: Can a 
country follow an independent monetary policy with fixed exchange 
rates and in the face of free capital movements? Some people attribute 
this issue to Padoa-Schioppa, and I was really surprised when I read an 
article by Milton Friedman where he attributed this holy trinity to 
Keynes. The issue is, you cannot have fixed exchange rates and an 
independent monetary policy. Forget about free capital movements, free 
goods movements, and anything else. It is irrelevant to it. You can 
choose between fixed exchange rates and an independent monetary 
policy. That is exactly what Keynes said. I went back to look very 
carefully at the passage that Friedman was quoting and he misquoted 
Keynes. I think we should stop talking about the "holy trinity". We may 
talk about the "holy duality", then we are in a Zoroastrian world in 
which trinities do not exist. 
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I am not saying that a country should fix the exchange rate in a currency 
board when the conditions are not right for it. If a country has a big 
budget deficit and has to use the inflation tax to finance it, then it cannot 
stabilise the currency and the country should not be part of the European 
Union. The European Union should accept only countries that have 
achieved their convergence with respect to inflation targets and have 
been inside the ERM.  
 
The route to go for the accession countries is the following: They cannot 
fix their exchange rates immediately, but will first have to stabilise the 
macroeconomic situation of their economies. If a country fixes the 
exchange rate when the inflation rate is 10%, 15%, or 20% – as it might 
be in one or the other of these countries – the establishment of a rigid 
currency board will automatically drive down the inflation rate and thus 
disinflate the economy. Almost inevitably, the exchange rate will be 
overshooting. In addition, stabilisation will lead to bank problems. It is 
not the currency boards per se that causes bank crises, but stabilisation 
initiated by an institution. Stabilisation by a currency board and fixing 
the exchange rate will usually cause a bank crisis because banks are not 
able to cope with disinflation. Disinflation raises the expected real 
interest rate, creates sudden weakness in the bank assets, which may be 
followed by a run on banks. But currency boards themselves or fixed 
exchange rate systems should not directly be associated with bank crisis. 
 
Anyway, there is also a legal question involved that as far as I know, 
has not been answered yet. Will the accession countries to the EU be 
required to be part of EMU or not? It is not clear from the arrangements 
of the Maastricht Treaty because at that time the EMU did not exist, so 
it was not part of it. In my opinion, the accession countries should be 
required to join the EMU. It would be a terrible thing to have another 13 
or 15 countries coming in with flexible exchange rates. Really I do 
believe you cannot have a common market when you have fluctuating 
exchange rates in an area. This would be ridiculous. 
 
One of the great advantages of joining the EU for the Central and 
Eastern European countries, that are poor relative to the countries in 
Europe now, are very large transfers. The resulting benefit for them 
should have a quid pro quo in the form of convergence of their 
economies and the required tough political decisions. The best way to 
achieve this is certainly by a fixed exchange rate arrangement, which is 
also the final criteria of entry into the EMU area. I put it in the form of a 
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quid pro quo, but it is like telling a country they should move towards 
freer trade. I think the country will benefit from being suddenly part of 
the euro area. Suddenly they have a first-class currency. They give up 
currencies that are useless, destroyed by inflationary policies in the past. 
They are getting something very important, they are getting something 
that will give them capital markets and an efficient monetary and 
financial system. 
 
To sum up, the formation of the euro area will present an attractive new 
option for countries in Central and Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The 
size and long run promise of stability will make it an attractive anchor 
for neighboring countries, none of whom are likely to achieve 
comparable stability on their own. Most of the countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe that are candidates or potential candidates for joining the 
European Union will see it in their interest to fix their exchange rates – 
perhaps through some variant of a currency board – as a prelude to 
euroization. 
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WHAT MONETARY REGIME FOR ACCESSION 
COUNTRIES? 
Jürgen von Hagen 
 
 
The prospect of accession to the European Union raises the question of 
what kind of monetary regime is most appropriate for the transition 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This choice has to be made in 
view of a number of constraints. The first is that countries joining the 
European Union will have to liberalize their capital accounts both for 
capital flows from and to other the incumbent European Union member 
states and for capital flows to and from other countries and regions. 
Second, the accession countries should choose a monetary regime that 
provides macroeconomic stability despite large and lasting differentials 
in the growth rates between these countries and the incumbent European 
Union countries. This is necessary to reduce the large gap in per capita 
incomes between the current and the prospective new members of the 
Union. Third, the monetary regime should be a credible one, avoiding 
frequent disruptions or changes in regimes. 
 
Obviously, these three conditions speak strongly against conventional 
fixed exchange rate regimes for the accession countries. The exchange 
rate crises of the 1990s have reminded us of the fact that fixed exchange 
regimes combined with a high degree of capital mobility are extremely 
fragile. To maintain credibility, central banks could often be forced to 
raise interest rates to very high levels, thus disrupting growth. This 
experience has lead an increasing number of countries to turn away 
from fixed exchange rate regimes and adopt one of two alternatives 
instead. 
 
The first alternative is a currency board. Under this approach, the 
exchange rate is fixed completely by legal mandate that ties the growth 
of the money supply to the inflow of foreign exchange reserves. In 
theory, this resolves all credibility problems. In practice, as we have 
seen in the cases of Argentina and Estonia, credibility problems may 
remain for quite a long time, keeping interest rates at high levels. 
Furthermore, the case of Argentina has shown that the usefulness of a 
currency board depends critically on economic developments in 
neighboring states competing in the same export markets. Since the 
accession countries all compete jointly in the product markets of the 
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incumbent European Union member states, any one of them that adopts 
a currency board could face dire hardship after a strong devaluation by 
another country of the region. This possibility of a severe economic 
disruption following a devaluation of a neighboring state would also 
make countries adopting a currency board less attractive for foreign 
investors. 
 
The second reason why a currency board is inappropriate for accession 
countries is that the process of real economic convergence to the current 
European Union members is likely to come with a strong real 
appreciation of their currencies, the so-called Samuelson-Balassa effect. 
With a completely fixed exchange rate, the real appreciation can only 
come through inflation rates above those of the European Union. This 
would contradict the goal of macroeconomic stability and at the same 
time the conditions for entering the European Monetary Union at a later 
stage.  
 
In his speech at this seminar, Professor Mundell argued in favor of 
immediate euroization of the accession economies. The main difference 
between this and a currency board with the euro as reference currency is 
that the governments would forego revenue from money creation. It is 
possible of course, as Professor Mundell argues at the seminar, that 
running a central bank is so costly, that seignorage will not cover the 
costs. Yet, most central banks make profits, so that euroization would 
imply a loss of resources for the governments. 
 
The other alternative is floating exchange rates. This is indeed the 
solution many countries in the region have adopted in recent years. The 
main difficulty there is to maintain a stable and credible nominal anchor 
for monetary policy. Experience shows that this can be achieved by 
means of monetary targets or inflation targets. Such a regime poses no 
contradiction to a large degree of capital mobility and it can 
accommodate large and lasting growth differentials with low inflation 
rates. 
 
An important argument in support of euroization, mentioned also by 
Professor Mundell, is that the accession states will have to adopt the 
euro upon accession, anyway. Much as the merit of this argument is 
questionable, it is certainly much weaker now that Denmark has voted 
against the euro. The Danish referendum signals that the European 
Union will not be the same as the European Monetary Union for the 
 Exchange rate regime   168 
foreseeable future. Thus, accession without adopting the euro is a real 
option now. The accession countries will think carefully about what is 
the best monetary regime accommodating rapid economic growth, 
modernization free movement of productive factors. It is unlikely that 
euroization or currency boards will be the answer. 
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EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPE – COMMENTS 
Laszlo Halpern  
 
 
Accession countries aim at becoming full members of the European 
Union, monetary union included. That will bring about all the expected 
benefits what a successful integration can offer to its member states. The 
end of the road of the integration process from the viewpoint of 
Mundell’s paper is clear, the legal currency will be the common 
currency: the euro. Its exchange rate belongs to the competence of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) with all the institutional support from the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The present situation with 
respect to the exchange rate arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe 
covers all the spectrum from a fixed-currency board type arrangement to 
a purely floating exchange rate regimes. As it is observed, the middle of 
the spectrum includes decreasing number of countries, that is, there is a 
clear tendency of polarization due to recent crises and increasing 
mobility of capital. There is no clear preference in favor of any 
exchange rate regimes, countries tend to choose between more flexible 
or more rigid exchange rate regimes with comparable frequency. There 
are two questions related to the topic of the paper, first, how these 
different exchange rate regimes will converge toward monetary 
integration, and second, whether the best way along this road is to fix as 
early as a country can, as it is suggested in the paper. 
 
Accession countries are free to choose their exchange rate regime, both 
extremes are compatible with all the criteria of accession conditions, 
while countries should be able to meet the Copenhagen criteria. All the 
EU official documents and statements assert that accession countries 
cannot join EU and EMU in the same time. Entering EU new member 
countries are assuming all the legal constraints, the acquis 
communautaire, the obligation to join EMU. It is implicit in this 
procedure that countries far away from being able to meet the 
Maastricht criteria will not be eligible for EU accession. 
 
The next step in the integration process is to join ERM II as a necessary 
prelude to test the ability to cope with all the challenges the economy 
has to face. ERM II prescribes a fixed central parity – what can be 
adjusted by revaluation of the central parity – and a wide band around 
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the central parity. During this phase of integration EU institutions 
(especially ECB) are actively participating and take responsibility in 
relevant questions of common interest. 
 
In principle ERM II is not compatible with currency board, but in this 
respect considerations raised in the paper may lead to different outcome 
as further experience will be available with respect to the functioning of 
ESCB. It is also clear that early unilateral euroization is now regarded as 
a violation of the Treaty. However, one can easily foresee developments 
what may modify this firm position, namely, bilateral dollarization 
backed by agreement on seigniorage revenue may get momentum and 
EU may support euroization in less developed countries. 
 
There are, however, other issues what may have impact on the choice of 
exchange rate strategies. The EMU is evolving and looking for answers 
to its own challenges. Inflation differentials within EMU are now much 
larger than expected and views are quite divided whether they call for 
action. Inflation is larger in countries growing faster. Any fiscal 
stringency would have negative effect on growth. In some countries this 
faster growth is accompanied with sound fiscal position making fiscal 
action unnecessary. 
 
Accession countries are in different phase of their real and nominal 
convergence. Most of them are now growing faster than EU average and 
successful in fighting inflation. Their medium term perspective requires 
a credible exchange rate strategy what is able to incorporate real 
appreciation due to faster growth and leads to further disinflation. 
 
Small countries with sufficient flexibility in their labor and capital 
markets can achieve it by choosing currency boards. As recent 
experience during crises has showed countries with pegged exchange 
rates were obliged to seek greater exchange rate flexibility. This 
demonstrates that during pre-accession stage different exchange rate 
regimes can respond to different needs without endangering the final 
objective of these countries. 
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THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF EURO-ISOLATION IN 
CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE BEFORE OR INSTEAD OF 
EMU MEMBERSHIP 
D. Mario Nuti1  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The current simultaneous EU enlargement and monetary unification are 
about to create an unprecedented economic segmentation in Europe. 
Previous instances of enlargement and deepening treated equally old 
members among themselves and, subject to short-lived transition 
arrangements, old and new members. Countries were either in or out of 
the EC; any other diversification pre-existed and was not actually 
generated by the progress and pattern of European integration. 
 
Membership of the European Monetary Union  (EMU) is an integral 
part of the acquis communautaire, which new and old members alike 
are committed to implement – subject to three qualifications (see 
Temprano-Arroyo/R.A. Feldman, 1999):  
 
1) possible "derogations", such as those negotiated by the UK and 
Denmark, which at present no new member is expected to request, let 
alone necessarily obtain if they did;  
2) before joining EMU, at least two year successful participation in the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism2, which Sweden has failed to implement 
to date; 
                                                     
1 Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the Sixth Dubrovnik Economic 
Conference, on "Exchange Rate and Financial Vulnerability in Emerging 
Markets", 29-30 June 2000; and at the 12th Annual Meeting of the Society for 
the Advancement of Socio-Economics, London School of Economics, 7-10 
July 2000, Panel on "The Economic Impact of Exclusion from EU and 
EMU". Acknowledgements are due to to Vincent Koen, Jacek Rostowski and 
Milica Uvalic, as well as participants in both Conferences, for useful 
comments and suggestions. Financial support from the ESRC Programme 
"One Europe or Several?", Project n. L213 25 2003, is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
2 The ERM to which the Maastricht Treaty referred was replaced from 
1.1.1999 by ERM II, including criteria such as the development of market 
integration, current-account balance, monitoring of unit labour costs and 
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3) before examination of a country’s application to join EMU, 
achievement of the other Maastricht Treaty standards for monetary 
and financial convergence, in terms of public debt and deficit, 
inflation and interest rates3; failure to achieve these standards 
delayed Greece membership of EMU until the Lisbon summit of 
June 2000. 
 
Europe, therefore, even if all new members opted to join EMU at the 
earliest possible date (and a fortiori if they did not), in the European 
Union’s transition to a fully integrated and enlarged Monetary Union is 
going to be segmented into at least four groups: 
• members of both EU and EMU (at present 12 including Greece); 
• members of the EU which are either excluded (Greece until 
recently) or self-excluded from EMU (UK and Denmark; Sweden), 
soon to be joined by the next batch of new members for at least their 
first two years ERM participation after accession (unless a record of 
exchange rate stability was treated as equivalent to ERM, see 
below); 
• 10 applicant countries from central Europe already engaged or soon 
to be engaged in detailed accession negotiations: Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia; plus Cyprus and Malta 
and, more recently, Turkey, followed – or perhaps overtaken , for 
instance in the possible case of Croatia – by other countries from 
south-eastern Europe. All these countries’ admission to EU is 
subject to economic and political conditions and will be staggered 
over time beginning not earlier than 2003-4;  
                                                                                                                     
other price indices. 
3 More precisely, in addition to two year ERM II membership: 1) an average 
rate of inflation over a period of one year before the examination, not 
exceeding the average of the three best performing member states by more 
than 1.5 percentage points; 2) an average nominal long-term interest rate on 
government bonds, also over a period of one year before the examination, not 
exceeding by more than two percentage points the average of the three best 
performing member states in terms of price stability; 3) a government deficit 
of at most 3% of GDP and 4) a government debt of at most 60% of GDP – 
unless the ratio for both deficit and/or debt is close to the reference values 
and either has already declined substantially or exceeds the reference value 
only temporarily.  
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• the rest of Europe and of the FSU, excluded from EMU at least for 
the foreseeable future.  
Union and Euroland enlargement is going to have – in the words of 
ECB President Wim Duisemberg – "deep and wide-ranging 
consequences" for the ECB (The Economist, 29-1-2000; see also Bekx 
1998). 
 
Before EMU membership or, for the excluded or self-excluded, instead 
of EMU membership, there are two possible and, most important, 
unilateral ways for countries to secure a closer monetary integration 
with the EMU area if they wish: 
 
The first is the adoption of a currency board managing a domestic 
currency linked to the euro or (until 2002 when euro coins and 
banknotes will first appear) to any of the EMU-member currencies; for 
the sake of convenience and of psychological impact the currency – 
whatever it is called – could also be scaled so as to make its unit 
equivalent to one Euro, at no extra cost.  
 
The second, more drastic alternative is the official adoption of the euro 
or, until it has a bodily existence, of any of the EMU-member currencies 
– plausibly the DM – as the exclusive or primary domestic means of 
payment, which in many countries is facilitated by already existent 
unofficial DM-isation or dollarisation.  
 
This paper seeks to identify the theoretical and empirical issues involved 
in these options, and to evaluate euroisation costs and benefits for both 
accession candidates and the EU and its member states, drawing policy 
conclusions which should be relevant also for EU outsiders.  
 
 
2. Euroisation to date 
 
Both a currency board and domestic currency replacement can be 
regarded as forms of euroisation (by analogy with the more euphonic 
dollarisation, on which see Calvo 1999, IMF 1999, US Senate JEC 
1999, Berg/Borensztein 2000). The currency board is euroisation in a 
broad sense, while the use of the actual euro or other EMU area means 
of payment are euroisation in a strict sense – though both falling short of 
the full-fledged euroisation obtained through full EMU membership.  
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Currency boards with links to the DM or the euro already exist in 
Estonia (8 kroons = 1 DM, i.e. EEK 15.6466=1 €), Bulgaria (with the 
lev in 1997 originally tied to the DM then in 1999 re-pegged to the 
Euro, which is the same thing, BGL 1.95583=1 €) and Bosnia, with the 
"Convertible Mark" equivalent to the DM. Lithuania has a currency 
board linked to the US dollar (from 1994, 4 litas = 1 US$; see Korhonen 
1999, 2000). Any currency whose exchange rate is irrevocably tied to a 
currency, the DM, which in turn is irrevocably fixed to the euro, 
obviously is already indirectly pegged to the euro. Thus these countries 
could, like Bulgaria, switch from a link to the DM to a link to the euro 
(as they would have to do anyway in mid-2002 when the DM is totally 
replaced by the euro) at a stroke. This could be followed by a re-
denomination of their domestic currency so as to equal one euro, 
opening the possibility even to beat the ECB at printing the first euro 
denominated banknotes. Indeed Estonia has put forward precisely such a 
proposal for implementation in 2001 already before its accession 
(OECD, 2000). A working group was set up by Premier Mart Laar to 
analyse the issue further; according to the vice-president of the Estonian 
Central Bank, Mr Peter Lohmus, the main issue for Estonia is ensuring 
the "smoothest, least volatile way into the euro system", but no new 
issues could possibly arise that do not arise already under the currency 
board regime.  
 
The euro is also the reference currency for the exchange rate pegs in the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia (on the extremely diversified 
exchange rate regimes in the transition, see Nuti 1996a, Backe’ 1999; 
Lavra 1997). Poland, Hungary and Romania are only partially linked to 
the euro (the first two respectively at 55% and 70% only), the residual 
still being represented by the US$ (see Nuti, 2000a).  
 
The Lithuanian currency board link to the US$ justifies the much lower 
degree of euro-optimism there (see Korhonen 1996); the same 
considerations apply to any other country which has succeeded in 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate in relation to a reference hard 
currency other than the euro or an EMU member currency, such as 
Latvia’s lat (since 1994, an informal peg to the SDR has been 
maintained, at 0.8 lats=1SDR, +/- 1%).  
It can be argued that an EMU candidate that has experienced a period of 
pre-accession euroisation in either form – currency board or currency 
replacement by an EMU currency – should have the two-year ERM II 
membership requirement shortened or even waived. Indeed the same 
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treatment may be plausibly requested by any other country that has 
maintained an exchange rate stability comparable to that of ERM II in 
the run up to accession. The Latvian Lat, for instance, having 
maintained its peg to the SDR in spite of the August 1998 Russian crisis 
and its significant impact on all Baltic economies, also deserves to have 
its two years waiting time significantly shortened; Latvia’s foreign 
minister Indulis Berzins has announced that his country hopes to join 
the euro-zone as early as 2003. Neither enlargement nor successful 
unilateral euroisation were being contemplated when the Maastricht 
Treaty was being negotiated – hence the case for relaxing the two-year 
ERM II membership, though not automatic, is exceptionally strong. 
 
Informal DM-isation already exists on a large scale in Eastern Europe 
and the FSU, though often dominated by (informal) dollarisation. In 
1995 the German Bundesbank estimated that about 30% to 40% of all 
DM notes and coins in circulation were held abroad (Seitz 1995), which 
compares with a Federal Reserve estimate of 40%-60% for the US 
dollar (corresponding to $192-288bn, Feige et al., 2000). Montenegro 
has formally adopted the DM as a dual legal tender next to the Yugoslav 
dinar; the DM is de facto the domestic currency in Kosovo. Any DM-
ised country would eventually – in 2002 – become strictly Euro-ised.  
 
Proposals for an extension of the currency board regime have been put 
forward for other EU accession candidates, e.g. by Mundell (1998), 
Gros (1999), CEPS (1999; for a similar plan for Argentina see Hanke 
and Schuler 1999; for a cautionary comment on such proposals see 
Daviddi 1999). Bratkowski/Rostowski (2000) recommend an early 
official replacement of the Polish zloty by euro. 
 
 
3. Advantages of euroisation 
 
By and large the prevailing view, both in economic literature and in 
policy circles, is that euroisation has immediate, and dominant, positive 
net advantages, especially in transition countries where government 
institutions lack the credibility and track record needed to successfully 
adopt alternative exchange rate regimes and the monetary policies 
necessary to back them.  
An argument for dollar- or euroisation is the national governments’ 
ability to overcome their inability otherwise to borrow internationally in 
their domestic currency (Hausmann, 1999, 2000). Euro-/dollar-isation 
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also avoids both the volatility and inflationary bias of floating rates, and 
the vulnerability to speculative crises of fixed rates that are not 
irrevocably fixed (see Mundell 2000). Even successful regimes of fixed 
exchange rate can be made vulnerable by their own success, as they 
attract capital inflows which lead to real revaluation undermining 
competitiveness; at some point those flows can be easily, suddenly and 
massively reversed. Irrevocably fixed rates, unlike pegs subject to 
intermittent adjustments, do not encourage speculation – as 
demonstrated by the experience of EMU members since May 1998 as 
opposed to the September 1992 ERM crisis and its abandonment by the 
UK and Italy (a difference neglected by Larrain/Sachs, 1999, in their 
feeble rehearsal of arguments against dollarisation).  
  
In addition, the benefits of euroisation, as in the case of monetary 
unification, are:  
• lower transaction costs, precisely as for the EMU members;  
• greater economic integration, through both greater trade and greater 
foreign direct investment, especially if euroisation is accompanied 
by mutual trade liberalisation or possibly a free trade area without 
the considerable restrictions still impeding trade with present 
European Associates candidates for accession (see section 9 below); 
• probably lower basic interest rates in comparable units than 
otherwise would be the case (though interest rates are invariably 
higher than in the reference country, for they are subject to risk 
premia for any individual country or borrower), in the case of a 
currency board; maybe even lower interest rates for domestic 
currency replacement by actual euros.  
Finally, euroisation would involve automatic, self-regulating 
adjustments in money supply, which in both cases – currency board and 
currency replacement – would be determined by trends in domestically 
held foreign assets, expanding for a balance of payments surplus and 
contracting at times of deficits, as it is supposed to happen under a gold 
standard.  
 
Unlike partial, unofficial euro- or dollar-isation, total and official 
currency replacement would not complicate the choice of intermediate 
targets of monetary policy by introducing a dual currency component in 
the money supply, and would not impress the shocks of exchange rate 
adjustments on producers and financial institutions.  
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Initially, euroisation might be accompanied by a degree of under-
valuation of the old currency with respect to the euro; this weakness 
may be compounded by an initial weakness of the euro with respect to 
other hard currencies (as in 1999-2000). Under-valuation might be a 
blessing in disguise for the viewpoint of competitiveness and 
employment (though not for inflation; see below).  
 
 
4. Possible disadvantages: differences from EMU 
membership  
 
While it is perfectly possible that euroisation forms should yield the 
expected net advantages, this should not be by any means a foregone 
conclusion. It is not just a question of a possible rejection of euroisation 
on grounds of national pride, with countries temporarily or permanently 
excluded from EMU hanging on to a domestic currency as a symbol of 
national sovereignty. Whether forms of euroisation can be successful is 
an empirical question, depending on the relative strength of 
accompanying disadvantages. In fact the local adoption of the euro as 
domestic currency – whether as a banknote or as a backing for domestic 
banknotes – is not at all the same thing as being a member of EMU.  
 
There are distinct disadvantages associated with the operation of a 
currency board with respect to EMU membership (see Nuti et al., 1995, 
1997). 
  
1) A currency board regime needs initial endowment with sufficient 
foreign exchange reserves to back the entire currency in circulation 
(whether new or unchanged) at the permanently fixed exchange rate 
pre-selected by the government. Estonia benefited from the return of 
11 tonnes of gold which had been sent to the West before 1940; 
Lithuania also benefited from the return of 6 tonnes of gold as well 
as purchases from the IMF (OECD 2000). Other countries might be 
less fortunate: Bratkowski and Rostowski claim that Poland (with 
US$ 26bn, i.e. twice the reserves necessary to back or replace the 
domestic currency), the Czech Republic and Slovenia certainly could 
afford euroisation, while Slovakia and Hungary are classed as 
"possible".  
Gros (1999) suggests that the resources necessary to introduce a 
currency board (which he estimates at $269mn for the Former 
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Yugoslav republics, probably an under-estimate) could be borrowed, 
but this would undermine credibility and lead to expectations that the 
exchange rate would not be permanent but would only last as long as 
the loan would last and be renewed. The arrangement would be 
indistinguishable from an ordinary fixed exchange rate regime 
subject to occasional adjustments. Instead reserves must be instantly 
and permanently available against possible requests for conversion, 
therefore a currency board cannot be run on borrowed money – 
unless, as in Bulgaria, finance is being provided only partly by 
Bretton Woods institutions, and on a long term basis, in which case 
foreign lending amounts to assistance and really might as well take 
the form not of a loan but a gift.  
2) Loss of seigniorage – the revenue obtained from issuing domestic 
currency: Such loss is sometimes under-estimated (for instance 
Bratkowski/Rostowski, 2000, neglect the loss of likely increases in 
seigniorage after shedding the domestic currency) but it can also be 
over-played (e.g. by Larrain/Sachs 1999). In the currency board case 
this loss could be offset at least partly by interest earned on reserves. 
Also, seigniorage sharing arrangement could be agreed with the ECB 
(Calvo 1999, Daviddi 1999); such an arrangement is contemplated 
for dollarised countries by the International Monetary Stability Act 
of 2000, introduced in the US Senate by the Chairman of the Joint 
Economic Committee Senator Connie Mack. According to Larry 
Summers "In the long term, finding ways of bribing people to 
dollarise, or at least give back the extra currency that is earned 
when dollarisation takes place, ought to be an international priority 
…" (Quoted in US-Senate Joint Economic Committee, 1999): the 
same argument would apply to euroisation. 
3) Lack of a lender of last resort, which would involve a considerable 
degree of financial fragility, particularly serious in the early stages of 
transition. The International Monetary Stability Act cited above 
specifically states that "The Federal Reserve System has no 
obligation to act as a lender of last resort to the financial systems of 
dollarised countries" (Section 2.b). The mythical advantage of a 
currency board is that the domestic currency is "fully backed" by 
foreign exchange (e.g. see The Economist 29-1-2000). Thus the 
board could only lend as a last resort only any excess reserves it 
might have over and above what is required to back the domestic 
currency; such reserves would be substantial in Poland but nowhere 
else in the area.  
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Unfortunately all that is backed up by foreign exchange is primary 
money, i.e. M0, whereas in a currency crisis there is absolutely 
nothing to prevent the public from wishing to convert into foreign 
exchange more than M0, up to their entire liquid assets, i.e. anything 
up to M2. In this case limits would have to be introduced – whether 
de facto or de jure – on the convertibility of bank money into cash, 
thus re-instating a monetary segmentation which was one of the 
typical features of the old-style centrally planned economy. In a 
"normal" monetary economy this occurrence is prevented – short of a 
total melt-down – by the national Central Bank acting as a lender of 
last resort, in principle standing-by to provide unlimited liquidity at a 
penal interest rate against good quality securities.  
It follows that either the country has an arrangement for the ECB to 
act as lender of last resort – which would expose ECB and ultimately 
the euro to an intolerable risk for countries not constrained to 
Maastricht Treaty parameters of fiscal and monetary convergence – 
or the ECB does not act as lender of last resort in the Euro-ised 
country, in which case its financial system will be particularly 
fragile, and a financial crisis would take the form of a premium for 
DM/euro cash over DM/euro bank money. Stand-by arrangements by 
private banks taking on a lender of last resort function (Calvo, 1999) 
may have limited effect. Banks could be bankrupted as a result, not 
for straight insolvency, which might be regarded as a necessary and 
even desirable development, but for sheer illiquidity artificially 
created by the currency board rules of monetary issue. The problem 
would be aggravated by the fact that the ECB could not take on any 
responsibility for the supervision of financial institutions in euro-ised 
countries (a provision to that effect is included in the US 
International Monetary Stability Act for the Federal Reserve 
System). 
4) Impossibility of eliminating entirely the risk of a parity change – 
whether under a currency board regime or even currency 
replacement (Larrain/Sachs 1999 regard this as irreversible, while 
Bratkowski/Rostowski 2000 contemplate the a possible reversal). By 
linking its domestic currency to a more credible currency a 
government – contrary to what is widely believed – cannot acquire 
the other currency’s credibility; government policy credibility will be 
the product of its own and the other currency’s credibility (in other 
words, the strength of a chain cannot be greater than that of its 
weakest link). Currency replacement, say, with DMs might give rise 
to a DM scarcity unless interest rates were raised (or aggregate 
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demand otherwise lowered) enough to match demand for and supply 
of cash.  
5) The transformation of current account deficits arising in a domestic 
currency at the risk of currency crises into regional under-
development risks in a single currency area, especially without the 
provisions for transfers from the EU budgets which would only 
benefit EU members. Bratkowski/Rostowski (2000) see the rise of 
current account deficits as the inevitable consequence of 
consumption-smoothing in countries experiencing or expecting 
growth acceleration, and regard the elimination of currency crises 
risk as a major benefit of euroisation. Even if this benefit was so 
obtained, it would be matched by the risk of regional under-
development instead, which may be potentially more difficult to deal 
with, and span over a longer run, than a temporary currency crisis.  
 
  
5. Possible disadvantages: unsuitability of any peg to the 
euro 
 
In addition to the disadvantages due to euroisation falling short of full 
EMU membership, there is the possible unsuitability of the euro as a 
pegging currency in any form. Namely:  
 
1) The euro may not be the preferred currency in the country’s 
invoicing practices in foreign trade. Settlement practices are often 
regarded as relevant but they are immaterial. For instance, Helmut 
Aancans, head of monetary policy at the Latvian central bank, is 
quoted as saying that "Our structure of settlement currencies reflects 
the SDR basket … When the euro goes down the dollar goes up and 
there is no net instability" (FT 16 February 2000). But such stability 
only obtains if the SDR is the currency in which contracts are 
denominated. The Lithuanian Lita, pegged to the US dollar, has 
appreciated instead in real terms with respect to other currencies used 
in its pricing and invoicing, thus incurring a large scale current 
account deficit. "Trade in Euros is not as big as trade in dollars" 
(Lithuanian CB deputy governor Arvidas Krejzde, FT 16/2/00), but 
40% of their foreign trade is with the EU and appreciation is 
therefore a non-negligible problem.  
2) Moreover, a number of countries have raised a very large part of 
their external debt in US dollar: in 1997 the share of dollar-
denominated external debt was 77.9% in the Czech Republic, 75.1% 
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in Bulgaria, 61.6% in Lithuania, 46% in Poland, against DM shares 
respectively of 4.7%, 4.7%, 6.2%, 9.9%, (Deutsche Bank Research, 
2000). For such countries any euro devaluation with respect to the 
dollar, such as it has occurred in the first eighteen months of euro’s 
life in 1999-2000, would raise the domestic burden of foreign debt 
service; a significant re-denomination of external debt would have to 
accompany their euroisation.  
3) Inflationary implications of any fixed peg to the euro (i.e. even short 
of a currency board) to the long term real exchange rate revaluation 
which has been observed and can be expected in all transition 
economies. Real revaluation is usually associated with the so-called 
Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect, of faster productivity in tradables 
driving up wages and prices in non-tradables, but this effect can 
easily be overplayed: after all, tradables are both inputs in non-
tradable goods, and substitutes for non-tradables. Regardless of this 
effect, or in addition to it, any exchange rate (whether fixed or 
floating) at which convertibility is introduced in inflationary and 
troubled times is bound to be undervalued in real terms. For a fixed 
nominal exchange rate, real revaluation can only be achieved 
through a positive inflationary differential with respect to the peg 
currency. Far from aiding the control of inflation, in such 
circumstances a fixed exchange rate regime can turn into an 
inexorable inflationary machine. The necessary real revaluation 
could be only be achieved without inflation through a nominal 
revaluation.  
Of course a real revaluation can be inconsistent with the parallel 
commitments to price stability and nominal exchange rate stability 
within the bounds of the Maastricht criteria, and unilateral 
euroisation can be seen (Bratkowski/Rostowski, 2000) as a way to 
evade those bounds. However the very broad fluctuation margins 
envisaged by ERM II (+/-15%) and the applicability of the 
Maastricht inflation limits only in the run up to EMU membership – 
for just one year before examination – should still leave large enough 
scope to accommodate the necessary real revaluation without 
violating the Maastricht criteria for price and nominal exchange rate 
stability. 
4) More generally, unsuitability of the monetary policy pursued by the 
ECB to the fundamentals of the countries undertaking euroisation. 
Apart from providing liquidity to euro-ised countries against foreign 
exchange, the ECB would have no obligation to consider their 
particular needs; just as, in the International Monetary Stability Act 
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quoted above, it is stated that "the Federal Reserve System has no 
obligation to consider the economic conditions of dollarised 
countries when formulating or implementing monetary policy" 
(Section 2.b). De Grauwe/Aksoy (1997, see also De Grauwe/Lavra 
1997) investigate whether Central European countries are part of a 
European optimum currency area (as theorised by Mundell in his 
classic 1961 article) and conclude that they are not.  
Of course the stabilisation needs of transition economies may not 
leave much margin for an independent monetary policy, which is 
totally lost for any fixed exchange rate regime, but the instant 
abatement of inflation may not necessarily be the best policy, as 
confirmed by the dominant success of the Polish economy which for 
all the talk of shock therapy has been dis-inflated at an excruciatingly 
gradual rate. Moreover, all central eastern European transition 
economy are facing extremely challenging issues of social welfare 
reform, on a greater scale than the rest of Europe (see Nuti et al., 
2000). Before worrying about convergence, many transition regions 
such as Serbia or Kosovo would have to worry about reconstruction 
(IMF and World Bank, 1999). Also, the experience of Bosnia, where 
the DM continues to circulate as a parallel currency (though to a 
rapidly diminishing extent), shows that even the adoption of a 
currency board can be ineffective unless it is preceded by extensive 
economic and political reforms.  
 
All the arguments in this section make a case not against unilateral 
euroisation per se but, more generally, against early membership of 
EMU. However, seeing that the main, indeed the only point of unilateral 
euroisation is that of replicating the effects of joining EMU earlier than 
otherwise possible, these are also arguments against unilateral 
euroisation.  
 
 
6. Costs and benefits for ECB and the EMU members 
 
Euroisation of countries outside EMU would also involve advantages 
and disadvantages for the ECB and for EMU members (on the mutual 
impact of EU and transition economies, see Nuti 1994, 1996b). The 
main advantage would be seigniorage, net of the possible net cost of 
ECB sterilisation of the currency board country’s euro bonds and 
deposits if their effects on euro monetary expansion are judged to be 
excessive. An additional advantage would be avoiding the compli-
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cations generated by the growth in ECB governing council’s 
membership following EMU enlargement (which otherwise would 
require complex solutions such as the drawing of constituencies, 
rotation, or outright exclusions). The main disadvantage would be the 
risk of a monetary expansion in the currency board country generated by 
its accumulation of non-euro assets, if it was sufficiently threatening to 
induce some loss of ECB control over the monetary mass of euros and 
euro-substitutes; in view of the small size of the accession economies, 
however, this is a remote possibility.  
 
Euroisation in the strict sense of currency replacement would have 
similar implications for the euro-ised country, except that its 
introduction would probably be partial and spontaneous at the end of a 
hyper-inflation process, its legalisation the only form of necessary 
administrative sanction; loss of seigniorage (unless it was shared out by 
the ECB) would be unmitigated; all the other drawbacks of a currency 
board would apply. For the ECB and the EMU area, the risk of 
monetary expansion originating outside would be much less likely for 
outright currency replacement than in the currency board case, because 
the ECB would retain control over primary euro-supply.  

     
    
 
Table 1: EMU convergence criteria: Central and East European accession candidates in comparison (January 2000). 
 Inflation rate, 
% p.a. 
Gvt. Balance, 
% of GDP 
Gvt. Debt, % of GDP Long-term 
interest rates 
Exchange rate regime 
 1997 19981) 1999 2) 1997 1998 1) 19992) 1996 1997 1998 1) on government bonds 1 January 2000 
Ref. Value    2.7   2.1   2.0 -3.0 -3.0 -3.0 60.0 60.0 60.0 6.77 (10Y) ERM II 
BG 1.082 22.3   2.0 -3.0   1.0   n.a.   n.a   n.a   n.a n.a currency board (€) 
CZ   8.5 10.7   2.5 -1.2 -1.5 -3.8   9.9 10.3 10.7 7.01 (5Y) flexible 
EE 11.2   8.2   3.3 2.2 -0.3 -3.0   6.9   5.6   4.6 n.a currency board (€) 
HU 18.3 14.3   9.0 -4.5 -4.8 -4.3 71.5 62.9 59.8 9.17 (10Y) peg (€) 
LT   8.9   5.1   1.6 -1.8 -5.8 -7.0   n.a   n.a   n.a n.a currency board (€) 
LV   8.4   4.7   2.2   0.1 -0.8 -3.8   n.a   n.a   n.a n.a peg (SDR) 
PL 14.9 11.8   7.0 -1.3 -1.2 -3.0 51.1 46.3 41.0 10.15 (10Y) peg (€/USD basket) 
RO 154.8 59.2 45.0 -3.6 -3.1 -5.0 24.3 26.1 26.4 n.a flexible 
SI   8.4   8.0   7.5 -1.7 -1.4 -1.0 23.2 23.5 24.0 n.a flexible 
SK   6.1   6.7 10.6 -4.4 -5.8 -3.2   n.a.   n.a   n.a. n.a. flexible 
n.a. = not available, 1)Expected, 2) Forecast 
Source: EBRD, DBR. From: Deutsche Bank Research, Euro Watch n. 82, February 2000. 
     
Table 2: Progress in transition in Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and the CIS 
  Enterprises Markets and trade Financial institutions 
 private sector 
share in % of 
GDP, mid-
1999 (EBRD 
estimate) * 
 
large-scale 
privatisation
 
small-scale 
privatisation
 
Governance 
& enterprise 
restructuring
 
Price 
liberali-
sation 
 
Trade & 
foreign 
exchange 
system 
 
Competition 
policy 
 
Banking 
reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisation 
Securities 
markets & 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
Albania 75 2 4 2 3 4 2 2  2- 
Armenia 60 3   3+ 2 3 4 2   2+ 2 
Azerbaijan 45   2- 3 2 3   3+ 1 2  2- 
Belarus 20 1 2 1  2- 1 2 1 2 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 35 2 2  2- 3  3- 1   2+ 1 
Bulgaria 60 3   3+   2+ 3   4+ 2  3- 2 
Croatia 60 3   4+  3- 3 4 2 3   2+ 
Czech Republic 80 4   4+ 3 3   4+ 3   3+ 3 
Estonia 75 4   4+ 3 3 4  3-  4- 3 
FYR Macedonia 55 3 4 2 3 4 1 3  2- 
Georgia 60    3+ 4 2 3 4 2   2+ 1 
Hungary 80 4   4+   3+   3+   4+ 3 4   3+ 
Kazakhstan 55 3 4 2 3 3 2   2+ 2 
Kyrgyzstan 60 3 4 2 3 4 2   2+ 2 
Latvia 65 3 4  3- 3   4+  3- 3   2+ 
Lithuania 70 3   4+  3- 3 4   2+ 3  3- 
Moldova 45 3   3+ 2 3 4 2   2+ 2 
Poland 65   3+   4+ 3   3+   4+ 3   3+   3+ 
Romania 60  3- 4- 2 3 4 2  3- 2 
     
    
 
Table 2 (continued): 
  Enterprises Markets and trade Financial institutions 
 private sector 
share in % of 
GDP, mid-
1999 (EBRD 
estimate) * 
 
large-scale 
privatisation
 
small-scale 
privatisation
 
Governance 
& enterprise 
restructuring
 
Price 
liberali-
sation 
 
Trade & 
foreign 
exchange 
system 
 
Competition 
policy 
 
Banking 
reform & 
interest rate 
liberalisation 
Securities 
markets & 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions 
Slovak Republic 75 4   4+ 3 3   4+ 3  3-   2+ 
Slovenia 55   3+   4+  3- 3   4+ 2   3+ 3 
Tajikistan 30   2+ 3  2- 3  3- 1 1 1 
Turkmenistan 25  2- 2  2- 2 1 1 1 1 
Ukraine 55   2+   3+ 2 3 3 2 2 2 
Uzbekistan 45  3- 3 2 2 1 2  2- 2 
* The "private sector shares" of GDP represent rough EBRD estimates, based on available statistics from both official (government) sources and 
unofficial sources. The underlying concept of private sector value added includes income generated by the activity of private registered 
companies as well as by private entities engaged in informal activity in those cases where reliable information on informal activity is available. 
Here the term "private companies" refers to all enterprises in which a majority of the shares are owned by private individuals or entities. The 
roughness of the EBRD estimates reflects data limitations, particularly with respect to the scale of informal activity. The EBRD estimates may in 
some cases differ markedly from available data from official sources on the contribution to GDP made by the "private sector" or by the "non-
state sector". This is in most cases because the definition of the EBRD concept differs from that of the official estimates. Specifically for the CIS 
countries, official data in most cases refer to value added in the "non-state sector", a broad concept which incorporates collective farms as well as 
companies in which only a minority stake has been privatised.  
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report 1999, November, London
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Legend (Table 2): 
 Large-scale privatisation 
1 Little private ownership. 
2 Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation; some sales completed. 
3 More than 25 per cent of large-scale enterprise assets in private hands or in the 
process of being privatised (with the process having reached a stage at which the 
state has effectively ceded its ownership rights), but possibly with major 
unresolved issues regarding corporate governance. 
4 More than 50 per cent of state-owned enterprise and farm assets in private 
ownership and significant progress on corporate governance of these enterprises. 
 Small-scale privatisation 
2 Substantial share privatised. 
3 Nearly comprehensive programme implemented. 
4 Complete privatisation of small companies with tradable ownership rights. 
4+ Standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies: no state 
ownership of small enterprises; effective tradability of land. 
 Governance & enterprise restructuring 
1 Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies weakening financial 
discipline at the enterprise level); few other reforms to promote corporate 
governance. 
2 Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy but weak enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation and little action taken to strengthen competition and corporate 
governance. 
3 Significant and sustained actions to harden budget constraints and to promote 
corporate governance effectively (e.g. through privatisation combined with tight 
credit and subsidy policies and/or enforcement of bankruptcy legislation). 
 Price liberalisation 
2 Price controls for several important product categories, state procurement at non-
market prices remains substantial.  
3 Substantial progress on price liberalisation: state procurement at non-market 
prices largely phased out. 
 Trade & foreign exchange system 
1 Widespread import and/or export controls or very limited legitimate access to 
foreign exchange. 
2 Some liberalisation of import and/or export controls; almost full current account 
convertibility in principle but with a foreign exchange regime that is not fully 
transparent (possibly with multiple exchange rates). 
3 Removal of almost all quantitative and administrative import and export 
restrictions; almost full current account convertibility. 
4 Removal of all quantitative and administrative import and export restrictions 
(apart from agriculture) and all significant export tariffs; insignificant direct 
involvement in exports and imports by ministries and state-owned trading 
companies; no major non-uniformity of custom duties for non-agricultural goods 
and services; full current account convertibility. 
4+ Standards and performance norms of advanced industrial economies: removal of 
most tariff barriers; WTO membership. 
 Exchange rate regime 188 
Legend (Table 2) – continued: 
 Competition policy 
1 No competition legislation or institutions. 
2 Competition policy legislation and institutions set up; some reduction of entry 
restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms. 
3 Some enforcement actions to reduce abuse of market power and to promote a 
competitive environment, including break-ups of dominant conglomerates; 
substantial reduction of entry restrictions. 
 Banking reform & interest rate liberalisation 
1 Little progress beyond establishment of a two-tier system. 
2 Significant liberalisation of interest rates and credit allocation; limited use of 
direct credit or interest rate liberalisation ceilings. 
3 Substantial progress in establishment of bank solvency and of a framework for 
prudential supervision and regulation; full interest rate liberalisation with little 
preferential access to cheap refinancing; significant lending to private enterprises 
and significant presence of private banks. 
4 Significant movement of banking laws and regulation towards BIS standards; 
well-functioning banking competition and effective prudential supervision; 
significant term lending to private enterprises; substantial financial deepening. 
 Securities markets & non-bank financial institutions 
1 Little progress. 
2 Formation of securities exchanges, market-makers and brokers; some trading in 
government paper and/or securities; rudimentary legal and regulatory framework 
for the issuance and trading of securities. 
3 Substantial issuance of securities by private enterprises; establishment of 
independent share registries, secure clearance and settlement procedures, and 
some protection of minority shareholders; emergence of non-bank financial 
institutions (e.g. investment funds, private insurance and pension funds, leasing 
companies) and associated regulatory framework. 
 
 
7. Convergence? 
 
A great deal of attention has been given both to financial and monetary 
convergence as represented by the Maastricht criteria (Table 1), and to 
the progress of systemic transition as exemplified by the EBRD 
scoreboard in the Transition Reports of 1994-1999 (Table 2). On both 
counts the picture is encouraging, at least for the front-runners lined up 
for accession, but also very misleading. The share of government deficit 
and debt in GDP are below or near the Maastricht parameters; inflation 
and interest rates are much higher but still within striking distance in 
most cases; the transition progress recorded by the EBRD, especially in 
privatisation and foreign trade, is impressive. But Maastricht criteria 
ignore essential and worrying features of transition economies such as 
quasi-fiscal deficits and debt, due to public contingent commitments, 
Nuti   
 
189 
extra-budgetary funds, hidden subsidies; they also ignore non-
performing loans in the balance sheets of state banks, or the low share of 
credit to the private sector, the low capitalisation and/or low liquidity of 
financial markets throughout transition economies, as well as the extra-
ordinary volatility of their rates of return (see EBRD, 2000). Once 
quasi-fiscal items are taken into account, even seemingly virtuous 
candidates such as the Czech Republic lose much of their attraction (see 
Drabek, 2000). The share of credit to the private sector appears to be 
inversely related to the share of bad loans (EBRD, 1997). Transition 
economies seem to have either low market capitalisation or low ratio of 
value traded to market capitalisation (i.e. illiquidity) of their stock 
markets – e.g. respectively 2.6 and 36.3 per cent of GDP in Romania, 
39.7 and 3.9 per cent in Russia – or both, e.g. 5.8 and 7.6 per cent in 
Bulgaria and 6.2 and 11.6 per cent in Latvia (EBRD, 2000). 
 
The EBRD indicators suffer from an over-optimistic bias, not least 
because of the adoption of scores ranging from 1 to 4+ instead of 
starting from zero, which therefore credit even transition non-starters 
with an achievement of over 20% of the road to a full-fledged market 
economy (see Nuti, 2000b). They also neglect any notion of minimum 
requisites for a country to operate as a market economy, or of possible 
weights to be attached to their different indicators, or of the relative 
difficulty of making progress at different points of their scores and in 
different fields. Real convergence of transition economies – apart from 
their almost instant convergence to EU unemployment average and 
variance, not requested by any treaty but promptly achieved already in 
the early 1990s – appears to be a much slower and more protracted 
process than anticipated (see Kolodko, 2000; see also Salvatore, 2000).  
 
These considerations invite greater caution in assessing the progress of 
new members’ convergence to single European Union standard – and 
therefore in evaluating the net advantages to be obtained from both their 
membership of the EMU and from possible EMU membership 
surrogates. 
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8. Improved trade access versus monetary integration 
 
The primary purpose of monetary integration, and of euroisation as its 
earlier substitute, is that of promoting the economic integration of 
central-eastern European countries with the EU. This purpose could be 
achieved, to a much greater extent than it is being achieved under 
current arrangements, simply by the EU unilaterally removing or at any 
rate reducing residual trade barriers with those countries, such as those 
of CAP, quotas for lower duty trade as in textiles, impositions of 
"voluntary" as in the case of steel, anti-dumping provisions, and other 
measures of contingent protection in case of "injury" or "likely injury" 
to national producers. The European Association Agreements signed 
with all accession candidates envisaged the creation of a free trade area 
in ten years, in two stages, with the immediate removal of quantitative 
restrictions and the gradual abatement of import tariffs at a faster rate 
(but from a higher level) in the EU, but the process – speeded up by 
only six months after the momentous Copenhagen summit that paved 
the way to Eastern Enlargement – is still incomplete and residual 
barriers, though falling, are still a significant impediment to trade. 
Meanwhile European Union members have turned their trade balance 
with the ten accession candidates from a deficit of 2 billion Ecu in 1989 
to a steadily increasing surplus up to over 21 billion Ecu in 1998.  
 
The EU surplus occurs with every single one of the ten countries; it 
originates primarily in manufacturing products, especially for 
investment and intermediate goods, but it arises even for food and 
beverages – with the exception of Hungary – and for labour intensive 
products – with the exception of the Czech Republic, Romania and to a 
smaller extent Bulgaria (see Smith, 2000).  
 
In these circumstances there is no justification for the European Union 
to resist by means of artificial barriers a higher volume of imports from 
central-eastern European countries – whether or not they are accession 
candidates. The relative impact of EU trade opening on these countries 
can be gauged by reference to the well known asymmetry in the 
importance of mutual trade turnover, amounting to 3-4% of total trade 
for the EU and around 60% for central-eastern Europe. Greater trade 
access granted by the EU could be matched by parallel, automatic or 
conditional reduction of remaining barriers to EU exports in central-
eastern European countries, such as import surcharges and other, mostly 
retaliatory restrictions. Greater central-eastern European net exports 
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would not only speed up real convergence but also alleviate social 
problems and – last but not least – presumably reduce labour migration 
pressures to the EU. 
 
The two ways to intensify economic integration – monetary unification 
or euroisation, and the removal of residual trade barriers – are not at all 
in conflict with each other, and could be pursued simultaneously, 
mutually enhancing their effectiveness. Indeed, they could be pursued 
and implemented even before accession. It is simply inappropriate – for 
the EU and accession candidates alike – to place almost exclusive 
emphasis on enlargement and monetary unification neglecting at the 
same time the existing, immediate opportunities for deeper and faster 
trade integration.    
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
To a visitor from outer space the arrangements of the present EMU area 
and those of the wider euro-area enlarged to include strict euroisation 
and/or euro-backed local currency would be absolutely indistin-
guishable. But there would be an immensely important difference, in the 
different role of the ECB, which in a strictly euroised country would not 
act as a central bank. Namely, the ECB would not be a lender of last 
resort; it would act – by definition – as an institute of issue but would 
not have any responsibility towards a euroised non-EMU member 
country in deciding its monetary or exchange rate policy.  
 
Ultimately the net balance of costs and benefits, both for the euroised 
country and for euroland and its members, is an empirical question 
depending on the degree of monetary, real, and institutional 
convergence already achieved before euroisation and its subsequent 
progress; initial endowment of currency reserves; initial currency of 
choice for invoicing and payment practices in foreign trade; the size and 
denomination of foreign debt; the already existing degree of utilisation 
of foreign exchange in the domestic economy; international credibility 
of domestic monetary institutions; the degree of co-operation between 
domestic and European institutions, both political and monetary.  
 
Current trends in financial and monetary convergence, and even more so 
in institutional and real convergence, are probably over-optimistically 
evaluated by observers and officials. Positive net advantages may well 
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derive from euroisation but should not be taken for granted. Meanwhile, 
the unexploited potential for greater economic integration through 
greater trade access to EU markets should not be neglected.  
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EXCHANGE RATE SYSTEMS AND FINANCIAL STABILITY: 
SOME GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Wolfgang Filc 
 
 
1. The role of financial markets in ensuring stable 
macroeconomic development 
 
Efficient financial markets are an essential requirement for a high level 
of employment, for adequate economic growth, for price stability. This 
is undisputed. What is disputed is whether the market system satisfies 
this requirement automatically and free of charge. Yes it does, say 
fellow economists arguing solely on the basis of neoclassical 
equilibrium theory, firmly entrenched behind their dogma of constantly 
infallible price signals from unregulated markets given the rational 
forming of expectations by economic agents. Others contest such 
automatism. For if the expectations of economic agents are 
heterogeneous, if the forming pattern changes, if elements of adaptive or 
extrapolative forming are occasionally identified, expectations will 
sometimes be determined by a single dominant issue rather than by all 
the information relevant to evaluation; information will be ignored; 
information uncertainties will increase to an extent where information 
fails to trigger appropriate transactions; the markets in a macroeconomic 
system will be linked at least intermittently by quantitative restrictions 
instead of by allocation-optimising relative price shifts, hence placing 
exclusively private-interest optimisation endeavours into a risky and 
thus not precisely known conjunction with results that are not fully 
informative; all this will trigger sequences of prices and yields in 
financial markets resulting in misdirected macroeconomic trends. 
 
We must then say goodbye to the idea that financial markets steered 
solely by private striving to optimise potential yields will consistently 
produce results that are also efficient in macroeconomic terms. There is 
no longer any justification for the reliance on consistently correct price 
signals, given unrestricted price formation, that has hitherto been the 
basis for deregulation on financial markets if the financial markets fail 
to process information efficiently. Configurations of interest rates, 
exchange rates and wage rates that are necessary to achieve non-
inflationary growth at a high level of employment can be established 
only by chance if economic policy accepts price movements in financial 
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markets even when such acceptance sows the seeds of undesirable 
macroeconomic trends. If distortions in financial markets are also 
attributable to threatened changes in assets values having been caused 
by forgoing economic policy measures with the aim of checking interest 
and exchange rate fluctuations as well as to the reduction of institutional 
provisions, then these causes must be targeted in order to limit 
misdirected financial market trends. Only then will financial markets be 
able to fulfil their intended function, namely that of internationally 
reconciling planned investments with planned savings, guiding capital 
to the places where it will contribute most effectively to non-inflationary 
growth and maximising world-wide prosperity. The international 
financial system should advance rather than impede the international 
division of labour oriented to economic fundamentals. 
 
Interest and exchange rate movements should reflect and not determine 
international factor allocation. Greater stability in financial markets and 
international capital movements presupposes steady price developments 
in foreign exchange markets geared to monetary and real economic 
fundamentals. If exchange rate volatility increases and exchange rate 
trends depart from fundamental factors, the foreign exchange market 
can become the source of misdirected macroeconomic trends, can 
trigger external and internal imbalances, can contribute to recession and 
unemployment of boom and inflation and in the final analysis can 
severely damage a country's financial system. 
 
A retrospective look at the financial market crisis of countries in south-
east Asia since 1997 can show what effects massive exchange rate shifts 
between the currencies of major industrial economies can have on the 
stability of a country's financial system (Eichengreen 1999). The finan-
cial crisis was preceded by a substantial move into deficit in the current 
accounts of these countries since 1993, financed by dollar loans from 
commercial banks, principally those in industrial economies. But the 
financial market crisis was triggered by the abrupt appreciation of the 
U.S. dollar (UNCTAD 1998, 58). 
 
To give an example: In mid-1995 a Korean exporter supplying goods to 
Germany in the value of DM 20.000 realised a yield of $ 14.400. Two 
years later this export yield had declined to $ 11.100 for the sole reason 
that the dollar had appreciated against the D-Mark. Korea's foreign debt 
turned into a debt overload. Thus the ability of a country to service a 
foreign debt denominated in dollars is determined less by the rate of 
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exchange between the dollar and its own currency than by the rate of 
exchange between the dollar and the currencies in which that country 
realises export yields. 
 
The intention is neither to disregard nor to play down the economic 
policy errors and omissions on the part of Korea and other tiger 
economies in the run-up to the financial market crisis. But it must be 
acknowledged that there can be no stability in global financial and for-
eign exchange markets unless monetary relations between the major 
currency areas of the world are placed on a more stable footing.  
 
 
2. Requirements for financial market stability 
 
2.1. Microeconomic requirements 
 
The recent financial market crises in south-east-Asia, Russia and Brazil 
have dramatically underscored the potential threat from instability in 
national financial markets and international financial relations. Financial 
market crises lead to sudden impoverishment of broad sectors of the 
population and undermine the political and social foundations in the 
countries concerned. Moreover, market globalisation means that 
regional financial market crises develop world-wide impact. 
 
Thus a central task is to identify and to eliminate structural weaknesses 
in national financial markets and international financial relations. In 
particular, the aim must be to adapt the institutional framework to 
conditions in globalised financial markets. Reform efforts are at present 
concentrated in the following areas: 
• Improving the transparency of national economic and monetary 
policy, of the policy of international organisations (in particular of 
the IMF and World Bank) and of the activities of the private sector 
(corporate governance, accounting). 
• Intensifying the supervision of financial markets at national and 
international level: building up reliable supervisory structures for 
the national financial markets in emerging and transition economies 
and closer cooperation between national and international 
supervisory authorities. 
• Continuing the liberalisation of capital movements hand in hand 
with the creation of stable national financial sectors and the 
concomitant supervisory structures. 
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• Improving crisis management, among others by involving the 
private sector at an early stage. 
• Strengthening the role of the financial institutions: ensuring that 
they work together effectively and that they are capable of taking 
action, inter alia by providing them with adequate funding. 
• Institutional reforms to strengthen the international financial 
institutions, in particular in view of their role as global fora for 
discussion. 
It should be noted that until recently many of these reforms were still 
being rejected as representative of outmoded ways of thinking because 
trust was placed in principle in the efficiency of market allocation. It has 
now been generally accepted that there is no automatic guarantee of 
liberalisation having an impact conducive to stable economic growth.  
 
The need for reform along these lines is uncontested. Progress has been 
made in these fields in the past few years, and further measures are soon 
to be implemented. But it has also become apparent in the course of past 
years that such structural reforms are not sufficient to ensure the 
stability of financial markets. Microeconomic reforms are not capable in 
themselves of eliminating systemic risks that are generated and 
nourished by strongly and indeterminably volatile interest and exchange 
rates. Therefore the indispensable structural reforms of the financial 
architecture must be backed up by a stable macroeconomic framework 
adapted to the liberal environment of international economic relations. 
This is doubtless the point that marks the parting of the ways. 
 
2.2. Macroeconomic requirements 
 
One view is that economic activity and growth are a reaction to real 
exogenous shocks reflected both in price and yield changes in financial 
markets and in non-monetary adjustments. There is no scope for policy 
measures. If all financial market prices and yields are fully flexible and 
correctly reflect all relevant determinants currently obtaining and 
expected to obtain in the future, there can be no misdirected trends in 
the financial markets on the one hand, and on the other financial 
relationships cannot give rise to any effects resulting in misdirected 
macroeconomic developments. 
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The conclusion drawn from this is that efficient results cannot be 
improved by economic policy measures, financial markets should be left 
to themselves and regulations should be eliminated, because only then 
will the prosperity-optimising allocative function of the financial 
markets take full effect. Thus far the one way of looking at the issue. 
 
Another view refers to the growing inherent dynamism of the financial 
markets, to the decoupling of the financial from the non-monetary 
sector, to price trends in financial markets that cannot be explained on 
the basis of generally accepted economic theory. Hence it is assumed 
that financial markets are susceptible to speculative excesses and by 
extension to price and yield movements causing economic distortion - 
current account imbalances, recessions with rising unemployment, 
cyclical booms accompanied by inflationary growth. 
 
Both interpretations are founded on what are, in themselves, consistent 
concepts drawing non-contradictory conclusions from given data. But 
this alone is not sufficient to serve as orientation for an economic policy 
solution. It must always be asked whether theoretical concepts are 
capable of reflecting reality. The evidence is disillusioning, as far as the 
reliance on consistently correct price signals from deregulated financial 
markets with fully flexible price formation is concerned. 
 
For decades, the point of reference in the study of financial investment 
had been the capital market model, stipulating that investors build 
efficient portfolios on the opportunity line. This provides diversification 
benefits and reduces the relevant risk. Of the aggregate risk, only the 
systematic risk component plays a part after diversification. 
Accordingly, systematic risks are the central factors accounting for 
observed divergences in returns from different securities. In theory, 
high-risk securities compensate investors by affording higher risk 
premiums on the risk-free component; low-risk securities compensate 
only with small premiums. These interactions were held to be assured. 
 
The empirical evidence looks different. Fama/French found in 1992 that 
in the normal case the risk parameters, how ever they were measured, 
displayed no statistically significant interaction with differences in 
returns. With this, the entire concept collapses. It was further found that 
in exceptional instances there is a statistically significant risk-return 
link, though in a direction contrary to that postulated in the theory: high-
risk instruments have a small return (growth stocks), while low-risk 
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instruments have a high return (value stocks). It may be concluded from 
this that no instrument is on the securities market line. This implies that 
several central assumptions of the capital market model must be invalid 
(Haugen 1995; Cochrane 1999). Experts in financial investment are 
therefore agreed that the crucial assumption of the information-
efficiency of securities markets must be relinquished (Haugen 1996). 
 
Empirical studies on the efficiency of the dollar exchange market in 
Germany point in the same direction (Filc 1997, Frömmel/Menkhoff 
1999). The results clash with the supposition of constantly rational 
forming of expectations on the part of economic agents as the keystone 
in the concept of information-efficient markets. 
 
All this gives reason to refrain from regarding as set in stone, as it were, 
the permanent efficiency of deregulated, speculative competitive-
bidding markets, such as foreign exchange and bond markets. But if 
there is justifiable reason to doubt the information efficiency of financial 
markets, even greater reserve should be entertained with regard to the 
contribution that price formation in financial markets governed solely 
by private-interest optimisation endeavours can make towards 
promoting employment and economic growth with stable prices. 
 
In non-informative efficient markets there are multitudes of 
asymmetrical situations blocking profitable transactions. Institutional 
designs are needed if partial or total market failure in securities 
transactions is to be avoided. The purpose of such designs is to bridge 
information asymmetries. However, inefficiency requires design 
considerations not only for securities but for organisations and for the 
institutional embedding of trading in financial markets as well. This also 
holds in particular for foreign exchange markets as interface between 
monetary and non-monetary sectors and for the linkage between 
economic and currency areas. 
 
Thus structural or microeconomic reforms alone are not enough to 
ensure stability in the financial markets and the international financial 
system. In particular, these microeconomic reforms are not a suitable 
means of eliminating or at least reducing systemic risks. A dependable, 
global macroeconomic framework is needed. The question is how to 
shape institutions and the macroeconomic policy mix in order to take 
account of the globalisation of markets and the resulting challenges. 
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Bank risks that spread to a banking system have both microeconomic 
causes and a macroeconomic dimension. Banking system crises are a 
manifestation of the past two decades. Up to the mid-seventies bank col-
lapses occurred only as very isolated events. There were no instances at 
all of bank crises affecting entire banking systems. This phase of 
stability in banking systems is the outcome of a special historical 
constellation of stable macroeconomic conditions underlying the 
financial sector (Hellwig 1998). This includes exchange rates that can 
be approximately assessed as being geared to economic fundamentals. If 
these are lacking, misdirected trends in foreign exchange markets will 
trigger similar trends in other financial market segments, causing 
distortions throughout the economy. With the advance of globalisation, 
the impact may be felt world-wide. 
 
 
3. The contribution of the international monetary system 
to a stable international financial architecture 
 
3.1. The role of exchange rates for aggregate economic stability 
 
Exchange rate changes in response to economic policy measures that are 
not agreed between the countries in question and result in very 
unbalanced economic development constitute the free formation of 
prices as a consistent market reaction. But experience also reveals as 
misleading the belief that foreign exchange markets will constantly and 
as it were automatically lead to stable exchange rate patterns in line with 
fundamental factors. Given a high degree of uncertainty about the future 
course of the economy there have time and again been instances of 
erratic fluctuations or lengthy misalignment of exchange rates, 
especially when individual market participants made use of differing 
information or when information gave rise to ill-defined conclusions for 
price formation. Hence the possibility of exchange rates in future 
repeatedly following the principle of self-justifying expectations cannot 
be ruled out. This will result in misdirected trends affecting the 
economy as a whole, with other financial market sectors being drawn 
into the wake of the foreign exchange markets.  
 
Therefore interest rates in a specific country may rocket or plunge 
dramatically in contrast to aggregate economic requirements and against 
the monetary policy course, given a fortuitous, damaging constellation 
of exchange rates, exchange rate expectations, international interest rate 
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differentials and quickly reversible changes in the assessment of the risk 
of exchange rate shifts. Hence it is an extremely risky undertaking in all 
circumstances to leave prices and returns in the financial markets in the 
hands of an "autopilot" designed to steer the world economy with 
complete reliability into the future. This holds true for interest 
movements as well, because central banks exert a fundamental influence 
on the entire range of interest in monetary markets by setting interest 
rates for the central bank money supply (Filc 1998 b, 110 ff.). Scarcely 
any need to take action is perceived as far as price movements in foreign 
exchange markets are concerned, presumably because it is realised that 
monetary policy solo flights are destined to fail. 
 
The major industrial economies, however, must not shirk their joint 
responsibility to adopt countermeasures in response to perceptible, 
severely misdirected trends in foreign exchange markets both in their 
own best interests and as a requirement of global economic stability. 
This is at the core of a system of "managed exchange rate flexibility" 
that has been under discussion in several countries, Germany among 
them, for some time now.  
 
3.2. The system of "managed exchange rate flexibility" 
 
3.2.1. For reference: Cyclically neutral exchange rate movements not 
affecting capital transactions 
 
Where countries have approximately equal levels of economic growth, 
exchange rate trends should be geared to international inflation 
differentials which in turn reflect the interest rate differentials between 
currency areas. Real exchange rates will then be constant, nominal 
exchange rate movements will offset differences in the yield from 
financial assets and exchange rate movements in the foreign exchange 
markets will be cyclically neutral (in relation to current transactions 
with other countries, to economic growth, employment and the rate of 
inflation) and will not affect capital transactions. In this case, price 
movements are systematically geared to underlying fundamentals 
without generating exchange rate risks. Exchange rate shifts then reflect 
the optimum international allocation of goods and capital. 
 
Accordingly, exchange rate trends decoupled from international 
inflation and interest differentials will become a disruptive factor for 
progress towards macroeconomic objectives in individual countries and 
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for the world economy. They generate tension that can subsequently 
lead to abrupt price adjustments in foreign exchange markets and 
overshooting exchange rates. Welfare losses are the outcome. 
 
Trends in the European Monetary System (EMS) up to the currency 
crisis in the summer of 1992 may be cited as an example. The last 
preceding general realignment of central rates in the EMS had been 
made in early 1987. The impact of the single European market and plans 
for the completion of European Monetary Union caused the spread of an 
exchange rate illusion. It was thought that transition to a common 
European currency could be effected at the prevailing central rates 
despite the fact that price and cost trends still differed substantially as 
between the countries at the centre of the EMS, which had long enjoyed 
virtual price stability, and those on the periphery. In the course of time, 
an appreciable real depreciation of the D-Mark developed within the 
EMS matching a real appreciation of the currencies of other countries, 
for instance Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. International current 
transactions displayed a text-book response: record surpluses in 
Germany's foreign trade, especially with European Union countries, 
increasing current account deficits and appreciable loss of growth in 
those countries opposing the realignment of central rates despite 
diminishing ability to compete on prices. 
 
In the summer of 1992 the exchange rate illusion faded away. This was 
followed by a series of central rate realignments in the EMS and by the 
withdrawal of the lira and the pound sterling from the exchange rate 
mechanism, preceded initially by severe and overshooting devaluations 
of both currencies. The necessary adaptation of the exchange rate 
structure of European currencies was quickly followed by adjustments 
in the countries' external positions, with the current account of Italy 
moving from a deficit of 2.5% of GDP in 1992 to a surplus of 0.9% in 
1993 and that of Great Britain from a deficit of 1.7% in 1992 to a 
surplus of 0.3% in 1994. This example shows that with an 
approximately equal level of economic growth, exchange rates should 
follow a trend set by international price and cost differentials. In this 
case, real exchange rates will be virtually constant, international current 
transactions will be determined by the underlying economic 
fundamentals and exchange rates and their movements will have no 
effect on the ability of businesses in different countries to compete at 
international level. 
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In a rather longer-term perspective, exchange rate movements must also 
be approximately in line with international interest rate differentials. 
Given the globalisation of international financial relations and the 
almost complete liberalisation of capital transactions, substantial 
divergences in yields from similar financial assets of different countries 
with equal debtor ratings cannot be permanently upheld. If capital is 
perfectly mobile, international interest rate differentials are fully offset 
by matching shifts in exchange rate expectations, which determine ex-
change rate movements. In such case it is immaterial whether financial 
assets are purchased in a high-interest or low-interest country because 
the expected rates of yield adjusted to take account of exchange rate 
movements are the same. Time-limited deviations from this norm can 
occur only in the case of an exchange rate illusion, i.e. the conviction 
that given exchange rates will be maintained. Once the exchange rate 
illusion vanishes, the subsequent exchange rate adjustments will be all 
the more drastic. 
 
There are examples of this as well. Since the early nineties it was 
possible on purchasing South Korean financial assets and taking account 
of shifts in the exchange rate of the won against the dollar to achieve 
yields far in excess of those obtainable from investment in other 
national markets. In this way it was possible for the rapidly growing 
current deficits to be financed without the need for devaluation of the 
won. This illusion vanished on reorientation of expectations as to 
exchange rate movements, leading to a drastic and overshooting 
devaluation of the won. High interest rates to finance a rising current 
account deficit, as in the case of South Korea, are an acceptable means 
only when they go hand in hand with appropriate, credible domestic 
measures to reduce internal and/or external imbalances. If these 
measures are lacking, the exchange rate illusion will sooner or later be 
dispelled by a sober evaluation of facts and turbulence on foreign 
exchange and financial markets will be the result (Furmann/Stiglitz 
1998, 72 ff.). Developments in Brazil from 1998 on provide a further 
example of these interrelationships. 
 
Thus in a somewhat longer-term perspective and given approximate 
cyclical consistency, exchange rate trends should follow the course set 
by international price increase differentials as also reflected by 
international exchange rate differentials. 
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3.2.2. The machinery of the system 
 
This calls for a suitable institutional design. It should aim to prevent 
excessive volatility and different forms of exchange rate misalignment. 
There are two starting-points. Firstly, consideration should be given to 
the possible effects of central bank interest policy measures on exchange 
rate movements. There is a need for international discussion here. 
Secondly, operators in foreign exchange markets should be afforded 
guidance on the price trends in foreign exchange markets that are in line 
with the aggregate economic environment in the major currency areas. 
This could be undertaken by the finance ministers and central bank 
governors of G 7 countries, possibly with support from international 
institutions such as the IMF. This body should collect, evaluate and 
publicly interpret information relevant to exchange rates, in other words 
it should assume the role of an information broker. Thus the Financial 
Stability Forum launched in February 1999 at the meeting of finance 
ministers and central bank governors of G 7 countries, the function of 
which is to monitor the microstructure of international financial 
relations, should be backed up by a macrostructure forum. 
 
In the event of abrupt changes in nominal or real exchange rates, this 
body should publicly comment on the course taken by exchange rates 
and, where necessary, explain what form the possible economic policy 
response could take. If there is a lack of clearly-defined pointers for the 
formation of market expectations, guidelines must be set to ensure that 
expectations remain stable. In particular, where the available 
information is indefinite, credible statements by an international body of 
high repute can provide essential guidance in shaping exchange rate 
expectations and stabilising foreign exchange markets. Moreover, it is 
important for this body to be assigned decision-taking powers on 
economic policy, as debate and the exchange of views cannot by 
themselves resolve any problems (Eatwell/Taylor 1999). 
 
On this basis the system could be designed as follows: 
• The current market rates of the currencies in the system should be 
taken as a starting-point in the initial phase. Upper and lower 
reference values are to be established around these rates which, 
while leaving adequate scope for the necessary alterations to ex-
change rates, would also trigger timely consultations between the 
participating countries. 
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• Moreover, reference values for real rates of exchange should be 
determined. The method of computing real exchange rate changes 
remains to be discussed. While different procedures of deflating 
exchange rates produce matching trend results (revaluation or 
devaluation in real terms), they also produce differing values 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 1998). 
• The reference values for nominal and real exchange rates must be 
made public. 
• The reference values should be reviewed at regular intervals, say 
every six months.  
• When the lower or upper reference values are reached, compulsory 
consultations should lead the central banks and finance ministries of 
the participating countries, possibly with the involvement of 
international institutions, to a joint interpretation of exchange rate 
trends and if necessary to a joint strategy aiming to stabilise 
exchange rates. The interpretation and any economic policy 
measures regarded as practicable must be made public in order to 
provide guidance for and to steer the expectations of market 
participants.  
 
One objection to this concept arises from the target zone debate of the 
mid-eighties. At that time, Williamson (1983) proceeded from the 
assumption that it was possible to define fundamental equilibrium 
exchange rates. The problem is that equilibria or disturbances of 
equilibria in monetary markets or in the foreign exchange market attain 
a comprehensible dimension only if their impact on other markets, 
above all product markets, on output and employment is taken into 
consideration. 
 
The problem of defining equilibrium exchange rates, a problem 
admitting of no satisfactory solution, also arose in connection with the 
EMS. For this reason, the preceding day's rates were used when the 
EMS was put into effect, rather than equilibrium exchange rates 
determined on the basis of model calculations, because those rates were 
perceived as appropriate by the governments and monetary authorities 
of the participating countries. Thus the determination of reference rates 
in the foreign exchange market should be geared to a common 
perception of their appropriateness rather than to conceivable 
equilibrium exchange rates. 
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The procedure is similar to that by which central banks set money 
supply targets. When they went over to announcing such targets, central 
banks did not attempt first of all to determine the "equilibrium money 
supply" but defined an "appropriate" money supply that was then rolled 
forward using data on expected aggregate economic development for 
the period under review. "Soft" limits for monetary expansion were set 
around the central figure in the form of upper and lower limits to the 
envisaged money supply growth. It is not evident why the central bank 
procedure of setting money supply targets with the aim of stabilising 
financial systems has so often proved successful in the past, while a 
comparable procedure for determining practicable reference values for 
exchange rates is destined to fail. 
 
3.2.3. Economic policy measures 
 
Hence the most important element in a system of "managed exchange 
rate flexibility" is a compulsory consultation process between central 
banks and finance ministers of the G 7 countries. Other than with fixed 
exchange rate or target zone systems there are no strictly defined and 
binding economic policy measures to be taken in response to specific 
developments in foreign exchange markets. But in the event of acute 
volatility in foreign exchange markets and marked divergence from the 
entry rates the system should require readiness on the part of the world's 
major industrial economies to study the causes in detail and to submit a 
joint interpretation of the trends. 
 
If the outcome of such analysis and interpretation is that current 
developments are justified on account of changes in the underlying 
fundamentals, for example currency appreciation in the wake of 
vigorous economic growth, this should be noted in the comments. 
Moreover, reference values could be adapted to take account of 
exchange rate trends. 
 
But if the body of central bank governors and finance ministers reaches 
the conclusion that there are clear signs of currency misalignment in the 
foreign exchange markets, further steps will need to be taken in the 
monetary cooperation process. 
 
• In some instances it may be sufficient to issue credible statements in 
order to talk down economically unwarranted trends in foreign 
exchange markets. This will be the case where the information 
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provided exerts selective influence on the expectations of market 
participants. 
• In addition, it should be examined whether economic policy 
measures are considered appropriate to stabilise exchange rates 
without triggering other target infractions, and if so, what measures 
these should be (Filc 1998a, p. 35 ff.). 
• In exceptional circumstances, the necessary measures should 
include, as ultima ratio, concerted interventions by central banks in 
foreign exchange markets, provided this does not jeopardise price 
stability. Both sterilised and non-sterilised interventions can give 
important signals influencing expectations of exchange rate 
changes, and by extension exchange rates themselves, whereas 
market interventions through the portfolio channel are likely to be 
of less significance for exchange rates. 
 
Market globalisation as now established is to be reinforced and secured 
by international non-market institutions, hence by an adequate 
institutional design at international level. It may be debatable whether 
the proposed approach is sufficient to achieve the desired results. But it 
does point in the right direction, namely to reinforce the necessary 
structural and thus microeconomically-oriented reforms of the 
international financial architecture with a macroeconomic stabilisation 
policy more effectively coordinated between the world's major 
economic and currency areas and an institutional design at international 
level, in order to ensure that foreign exchange markets do not again 
become the source of misdirected economic trends. There is of course 
no royal road to this end, but progress must be made if future financial 
market crises are to be averted.  
While this kind of institutional framework to enhance exchange rate 
stability is founded on the existing monetary policy cooperation 
between G 7 countries, it serves also to intensify such cooperation. In 
contrast to earlier phases of monetary policy cooperation, a mandatory 
consultation machinery between the three major currency areas on the 
basis of constant surveillance of exchange rate trends should be capable 
of averting any substantial exchange rate misalignment in its initial 
stages. Greater exchange rate stability between the "big three" is also 
essential for enhancing financial market stability in the emerging 
economies. Moreover, well-founded decisions on suitably stable 
currency regimes for these countries cannot be taken until the core area 
itself is sufficiently stable. 
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But there can be no disputing the fact that the international system is 
best served if each of the major players keeps its own house in order. 
Macroeconomic policy must accordingly be geared to attaining strong, 
employment-promoting growth while maintaining price stability. The 
USA and the EU are largely in agreement on this. The extent to which 
this consensus also applies to price movements in the foreign exchange 
markets is less evident. The introduction of the euro could prove a 
means of deepening transatlantic relations in this respect. To this end it 
must be acknowledged that the world economy is better served by 
policy cooperation between the major currency areas of the world than 
by a strategy of benign neglect of misalignments in foreign exchange 
markets. 
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THE EXPERIENCE WITH EXCHANGE RATE 
ADJUSTMENTS DURING TRANSFORMATION: 
THE CASE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC 
Marie Vavrejnova 
 
 
On the way to the EU the stabilization of exchange rate, the functioning 
banking sector, and the right regulation of fiscal balance is one complex 
of the main tasks that are to be solved. The experience of the Czech 
Republic demonstrates what kinds of difficulties can be met in 
determining the proper regime of exchange rate. It testifies that the 
exchange rate problems reflect on the one hand the problems of entire 
course of economic transformation both in macro- and microsphere, on 
the other hand the changes in external capital market situation.  
 
As in other countries from the previous Soviet Union block, the Czech 
Republic had different exchange rates before 1990, which were created 
by administrative acts: 
• commercial payments exchange rate (in 1989 15 Kcs/1 USD),  
• non-commercial payments exchange rate (in 1989 approximately 12 
Kcs/ 1USD),  
• tourist exchange rate (in 1989 about 31.50 Kcs/1 USD.  
 
Above this tourist exchange rate level a black market exchange rate 
reigned. In the beginning of 1990, the exchange rates of commercial and 
non- commercial payments were unified at the level of approximately 
17 Kcs per 1 USD. 
 
Two stages of crown devaluation took place at the end of 1990 within 
the framework of preparations for an important reform step, namely for 
the internal convertibility of the crown. First, the exchange rate of 
Kcs/USD was lowered by 54.5%, i.e. 24 Kcs/1 USD. Then, two months 
later, to the level of 28 Kcs/1 USD. Great discussions about the level of 
the devaluation rate took place among economists. 
 
The crown devaluation created a favourable situation for exports in 
conditions when the soft eastern markets of Comecon collapsed and we 
had to enter the hard western markets. In addition, a twenty per cent 
import surcharge rate to protect the fragile domestic market was 
approved (it was abolished in 1992).  
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Many further circumstances of the transformation process, especially 
inflation as a consequence of price liberalization, the deep decline of 
GDP (during the first three years of transformation 60% on average) as 
a consequence of changing markets and the decreasing purchasing 
power of the population, influenced the economic development during 
the first three years of the transformation. Also, the influence of the split 
of Czechoslovakia must be mentioned. During the first three years, in 
the course of substantial geographical and commodity structural 
changes, the trade balance was positive. But, already since 1991, a long 
term cause of exports decline was a continuous real revaluation of the 
Czech currency (CZK). Under the conditions of a fixed nominal 
exchange rate the revaluation was caused by the inflation differential 
between the rate of inflation in the Czech Republic and in Western 
countries.  
 
Year-to-year changes of the real exchange rate of the CZK to the 
currencies basket (DM 5%, USD 35%) were as follows (in %, 
December of the previous year = 100): 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
-32.4  17.1   8.9     14.7        7.6     6.6   7.8  -8.6   18.4 
 
This development gradually removed great advantages for exporters 
from the deep devaluation in 1990. Also, the decline of foreign demand 
in connection with the decline of boom in the country of our biggest 
trade partner – Germany, the share of which in the foreign trade 
turnover has gradually grown to present 40%, the deficit of the Czech 
trade balance began to grow. In 1996 it was not longer possible to cover 
the deficit with the positive results of services and capital account and 
the foreign currency reserves were decreased. At the end of 1996, the 
government adopted an export promotion policy and the export support 
became one of four priorities of the state budget for 1997. In the field of 
exchange rate policy, it was clear that it was not possible to keep the 
fixed nominal exchange rate introduced in 1990, and the Czech national 
bank (CNB) extended the fluctuational band along the central parity 
exchange rate to plus or minus 7.5%. Neither this measure nor other 
measures of export promoting policy and restrictive policy of CNB 
(increasing minimum obligatory bank reserves, augmenting interest 
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rates) helped and the currency crises in 1997 took place, followed by a 
stagnation and even recession of the economy in 1998. 
 
The managed float rate was introduced ( from 27/5/1997), accompanied 
by nearly 9% of the CZK devaluation. The currency basket was 
abolished, and currency movements were coupled to DEM.  
 
In 1998 the crown began to appreciate, which means the imports 
became cheaper and exports more difficult. 
 
In 1999 the CNB continued to liberate the restrictive policy of currency, 
in conditions of low inflation rate: twice it lowered the obligatory 
minimum reserves, so that they are on a level near to the EU. Also, 
interest rates were lowered, and together with the growing interest rates 
abroad it led to the diminishing interest differential. The prevailing 
tendency was a mild appreciation of the CZK. But in the first quarter of 
2000, a strong depreciation of the CZK in relation to USD took place, 
which was negatively affected, among others, by the price of oil and 
gas.  
  
This was a very short overview of the exchange rate regime changes in 
the Czech Republic. 
 
However, the hidden cause of growing current account deficit, and 
connected exchange rate problems, was the unfavorable situation in 
microsphere: the stagnation of labour productivity under conditions of 
rapid growing wages in state and partial state enterprises and banking 
sector, reflected the bad quality of their management which did not 
manage the restructuring process. Then, the poor regulation of capital 
market played its role. The connection between banks and their 
investment funds contributed to the support of bad working enterprises 
and lowered the transparency of ownership relations. In such conditions, 
also the low unemployment rate became more and more the indicator of 
delay in the process of restructuring. (And this is also one of the 
reasons, why in the last period the unemployment rate began to grow, 
due to quicklier restructuring, especially in North Bohemian and North 
Moravian regions).  
 
No doubt that such mistakes and little care of microsphere in general, 
slowed down the development of transformation. To rectify the situation 
is the precondition for standing macroeconomic development. 
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What are the main lessons, which follow, in my opinion, from our 
experience? 
 
• The deep devaluation of the crown in the beginning of the 
transformation was a good measure which indisputably supported 
the quick changes in geographical structure of the foreign trade, 
keeping its sufficient volumes and positive balance. Foreign trade 
was one of factors which influenced the economic situation in a 
positive way during the difficult first transition years. 
• The fixed exchange rate, which was introduced in 1990 and kept to 
May 1997 was changed into a floating rate too late and also the 
export promoting measures, and the lowering of interest rates and 
minimum obligatory reserves of banks were introduced all too late. 
There was not enough discussion, or willingness by politicians and 
different groups of economists to make clear the needs of the 
economy in time.  
• In transition economies the situation changes very quickly and it is 
very difficult to find the right time for changes in economic policy. 
Therefore, it is not only the question what measures to choose and 
introduce, but also when. 
• Because everything is changing, it is not possible to precisely 
separate the influence of individual components on the whole, in our 
case, the influence of the exchange rate regime on foreign trade 
results and vice versa, and also the influence of external and internal 
factors. All of the known factors and their role must be analyzed to 
discover the causes of the difficulties. 
• Especially difficult is (and really was) to find under quickly 
changing conditions the right rate of restriction of monetary policy 
not to hinder the economic activities, but to stimulate them. There 
were (and are) different meanings for this problem in the Czech 
Republic. A great effort of different groups of responsible people 
should be put in, to find the right common way out for a concrete 
time and situation.  
• It is not sufficient to take care only of the macroeconomic 
indicators. They themselves reflect reliably the situation in 
microsphere whose development is in certain moments dominant for 
the stable macroeconomic development both in short and long term 
period. 
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EASTERN ENLARGEMENT AND THE EVOLVING GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 
Sven W. Arndt 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The proposed entry of a new member into a preferential trade 
arrangement is viewed by many insiders as a mixed blessing. On the 
plus side is the reduction of trade barriers on exports to the entrant’s 
markets, but that sense of gain is attenuated by concerns about added 
competition from imports. Even when overall welfare is expected to 
increase, there is the usual distributional conflict between the interests 
of winners and losers. The prospective Eastern Enlargement of the 
European Union (EU) certainly gives rise to considerations of this sort.  
There is, however, much less to fear – and to gain – than would have 
been the case prior to implementation of the association agreements 
between the EU and the countries in question. Those agreements have 
cleared away a variety of trade barriers across a broad range of 
industries, with the well-known exception, of course, of the so-called 
sensitive sectors. Completion of the Uruguay Round, too, helped reduce 
barriers and led to markets around the globe that are more open than 
before. These accomplishments diminish the gains (and pains) to be 
expected from further liberalisation, albeit much more so with respect to 
trade in goods than in services. 
 
It is perhaps too restrictive to see the proposed enlargement as mere 
orthodox preferential trade liberalisation. At the optimistic end, its 
potential may be closer to a merger operation that facilitates the 
integration across national frontiers of economic activities and thus 
raises productivity and competitiveness in more than the directly 
affected export industries. Such a merger presents opportunities for the 
more efficient allocation of productive resources throughout the 
enlarged region, particularly if it succeeds in fostering cross-border 
sourcing of parts and components and in integrating production across 
national frontiers.  
 
The welfare effects of enlargement depend on whether the arrangement 
is mainly one of traditional trade liberalisation, in which entrants join 
the customs union, or whether it accomplishes the integration of the 
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Eastern countries into the network of EU economic activities and 
thereby draws them more fully into the internal market.  
 
This paper explores the main features of the latter perspective. Section 2 
sketches some relevant recent developments in the world economy. 
Section 3 sets out the conceptual framework in the context of a 
preferential trade agreement. Section 4 draws some implications and 
concludes. 
 
 
2. Recent developments 
 
Traditionally, the analysis of preferential trade areas has focused on 
trade liberalisation and then mostly on liberalisation of trade in final 
products. This is especially true of the more theoretical literature, where 
comparative advantage is measured at the level of national industries 
engaged in trading final goods. Trade in intermediate products has, of 
course, been studied by economists, but it has not played a significant 
role in the analysis of preferential trade arrangements. Policy analysts 
have been more aware of the importance of trade in intermediate goods, 
but the possibilities inherent in integrated production systems have not 
received the attention they deserve. 
 
In recent years, cost-saving innovations in transactions, communi-
cations, and transportation technologies, as well as the gradual reduction 
around the globe of policy-based barriers to trade and investment, have 
facilitated the greater integration of economic activities across national 
frontiers. The recent wave of cross-border corporate mergers is one 
consequence of these developments. Among other beneficiaries have 
been offshore procurement of intermediate products, offshore 
production of parts and components, and offshore assembly.  
 
In this new world, goods entering international trade contain parts and 
components from all over the globe, with imported final products full of 
exported components and exported final products equally full of 
imported components. As a result, the "national" identity of products 
becomes increasingly blurred and the "Made In ..." label loses its 
meaning. In North America, for example, components "Made in the 
USA" are a significant part of the automobiles imported from Mexico 
into the United States. In the bilateral trade between the two countries, 
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the value of motor vehicle parts shipped to Mexico is around 50 percent 
of the value of motor vehicles imported from Mexico.  
 
These cross-border relations may occur at arms length, as in the 
interaction between Austria’s auto-parts suppliers to Germany’s auto 
makers, or as part of the internationally integrated operations of 
multinationals, as in the aforementioned motor vehicle example from 
North America. Full coordination implies a degree of integration that is 
deeper and more complex than arms-length cross-border procurement. It 
places a greater burden on a company’s financial and organisational 
resources and is thus more likely to involve multinationals.  
 
In addition to the extent of cross-border procurement, the type of part 
and component that is procured abroad matters. It is important to 
distinguish trade in intermediate products that have become standardised 
and are used in a variety of applications from trade in specialised, 
custom-made parts and components. The former tend to be bought and 
sold in markets at prices that are determined by the interaction of supply 
and demand. The characteristics and specifications of such intermediate 
products are standardised and well-established and competition on the 
basis of comparative advantage determines the pattern of trade much as 
it does in the markets for final goods.  
 
On the other hand, customised parts and components cannot in general 
be expected to be traded in organised markets. They are made to order 
with specifications that are product-specific and thus have no ready 
alternative uses. Hence, their offshore procurement or production places 
greater demands on cross-border coordination of product design and 
product development, on finance, quality control, and other pertinent 
considerations. Offshore sourcing of this type is often preceded by flows 
of foreign direct investment and technology transfer. For it to flourish, 
not only trade must be liberalised, but foreign direct investment as well. 
Furthermore, since this type of cross-border coordination often involves 
the on-site presence of foreign service professionals, liberalisation of 
trade in services is another essential prerequisite.  
 
Of course, the operation in one country of manufacturing and service 
companies headquartered in another is in itself not a new phenomenon. 
Multinationals have been producing all over the world for decades – in 
industries ranging from automobiles to electronics to pharmaceuticals to 
tourism services. But when the traditional multinational went abroad its 
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objective was to produce final products or services for sale mainly in the 
country or region in which production was taking place.  
 
The new multinational, on the other hand, obtains parts and components 
in many countries, sometimes at arms length, sometimes from its own 
affiliates, bringing everything together for assembly in still other 
locations. Final assembly may or may not take place in the country in 
which the company is headquartered. In North America, Boeing 
assembles airliners in the U.S. with parts made all over the world, while 
General Motors assembles cars in Mexico with parts that come mainly 
from outside.  
 
The modern multinational thus manages a complex network of 
economic activities, that are strung out all over the globe and that 
require an extensive system of service links (Jones/Kierzkowski, 1990). 
This holds not only for firms in goods-producing industries, but for 
suppliers of services as well. The major U.S. airlines, for example, now 
perform relatively labour-intensive operations like reservations, 
bookkeeping, and accounting at offshore locations in countries with 
abundant supplies of inexpensive labour.  
 
Thus, an important element in any assessment of the costs and benefits 
of enlargement are the opportunities it offers for the cross-border 
dispersion of economic activity and the effect of this dispersion on 
competitiveness in the broadest sense. This perspective expands the 
issue beyond the traditional question raised at the outset, namely, by 
how much will EU exports to and imports from the new members 
change as a consequence of enlargement?  
 
It is, of course, to be expected, that the competitiveness of EU exporters 
will improve in the new markets relative to non-members, because non-
members will have to pay prevailing EU tariffs. But will 
competitiveness be enhanced in terms that go beyond specific export 
industries? Will EU producers who do not export to the Eastern entrants 
and who are not directly threatened by imports from those entrants be 
better able to compete in the home market against imports from third 
parties as a result of the integration of the Eastern countries into the EU 
economy? Will they become more competitive in world markets as a 
result?  
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As just noted, the narrower definition of competitive improvement, 
which is the focus of received customs union theory, is simply the result 
of preferential tariff treatment of EU products in Eastern markets. 
Improving competitiveness in the more comprehensive sense, on the 
other hand, requires efficiency-raising changes in the overall 
organisation of production in the enlarged European Union. Like the 
success of a corporate merger, it is predicated on the effective 
absorption and integration of the new entrants into the EU economy .  
 
Thus, if enlargement leads to efficiency-enhancing, cost-reducing 
reorganisation of production in the region, then the competitiveness of 
final goods from the EU relative to those made by global rivals will be 
enhanced. The welfare effects of this deeper integration may be 
expected to be important, relative to those of traditional customs union 
analysis.   
 
The expected improvement in competitiveness flows in part from the 
additional degree of specialisation, which is now pushed beyond final 
products into the realm of component activities, and in part from 
enlarged opportunities for the exploitation of scale economies at the 
level of component production. The next section presents a non-rigorous 
discussion of the basic conceptual framework. 
 
 
3. The gains from component specialisation and 
production sharing 
 
Trade is welfare-enhancing because it facilitates specialisation. 
Specialisation improves the efficiency of resource use by allowing 
producers to focus on what they do best. This principle has not only 
allowed analysts to understand and explain the beneficial effects of 
international trade, but it has been an important guide to post-war trade 
policy and trade negotiations.  
 
The basic idea is that countries should specialize in the making of 
products which use intensively the productive resources with which they 
are relatively well endowed and leave to others the making of products 
which require resources with which they are not well endowed. There is 
no inherent reason why this principle should not apply to production 
decisions involving parts and components. What is required to push 
international specialisation to the level of components is that production 
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processes be capable of "fragmentation" and geographic and functional 
dispersion, that factor intensity vary across components, and that 
technical and policy-based barriers to cross-border cooperation be 
absent.  
 
Most products are made up of large numbers of parts, but those parts do 
not necessarily have to be produced in proximity of each other. The mix 
of resources required to make parts varies widely. Some parts and 
components tend to be relatively skill-intensive, others relatively 
capital-intensive, and still others are relative heavy users of standard 
production labour. Hence, the "factor-intensity" of a product made up of 
several components is some weighted average of the factor-intensities of 
those components. A firm’s competitiveness in marketing a particular 
product thus depends on the weighted average of its competitiveness in 
making the various components. If the firm lacks competitiveness in a 
key component, its overall ability to compete will suffer. One way to 
improve product competitiveness, therefore, is to abandon production of 
the disadvantaged components in favour of procurement from lower-
cost sources.  
 
Thus, if components are subject to different input requirements (that is, 
to different factor intensities), and if across countries there exist 
differences in skills and resource endowments, then matching the locus 
of production to the efficiency of available productive resources would 
be expected to raise competitiveness and hence welfare.  
 
As such, this idea is hardly new, given that outsourcing of parts and 
components has been around for a long time. What is relatively new is 
the spread of the phenomenon to cross-border applications. This 
development has been facilitated by the gradual reduction of barriers to 
international trade and investment and by cost-cutting innovations in 
transportation and telecommunications technologies. It is, today, far 
easier and less costly than it has ever been to manage global production 
networks and to coordinate production across long distances. 
 
This form of intra-product specialisation has been shown theoretically to 
raise output and employment in industries in which it takes place 
(Arndt, 1997, 1998; Jones/Kierzkowski, 2000). It has also been shown 
to raise wages across a wide range of situations. It has been shown to be 
welfare-enhancing when it takes place in conditions of free trade or in 
the context of preferential trade arrangements, but its welfare effects are 
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ambiguous when it takes place in the presence of MFN tariff structures 
(Arndt, 2000).  
 
The basic intuition is simply that when producers make use of offshore 
sourcing of components to reduce end-product costs, those cost-savings 
either generate new profit opportunities at given world prices of end-
products or allow producers to offer their end-products at lower prices 
and thus increase market share. In either case, industry output and 
employment tend to rise. 
 
The existence of overall welfare gains does not, of course, imply that 
those gains will be uniformly distributed and that there will be no losers. 
Workers producing the components which are moved to cross-border 
sourcing or production will lose their jobs and this will create burdens 
of adjustment and change. But the predicted overall expansion of the 
industry implies that new jobs are created within the industry, which 
may ease the cost of adjustment.  
 
At the empirical level, there are many well-known examples of cross-
border production integration. In North America’s automobile sector, 
intra-industry trade has taken place in parts as well as final products. 
Such cross-border integration has a long history between the U.S. and 
Canada and it has in more recent years been of growing importance in 
trade between the United States and Mexico.  
 
In other industries as well, maquiladora operators in Northern Mexico 
import capital- and skill-intensive components from the United States 
for labour-intensive assembly in Mexico. In Europe, the relationship 
between Austrian parts suppliers and German auto makers represents a 
well-established example of cross-border intra-product specialisation. In 
both Europe and North America, aircraft makers bring together parts 
and components made all over the world for capital- and skill-intensive 
assembly at home. 
 
From the point of view of the EU’s Eastern Enlargement the essential 
idea is quite straightforward: if EU producers of final products can 
reduce costs by sourcing or producing certain parts and components in 
Eastern regions, then doing so will increase their overall 
competitiveness in markets for end products. Analogous considerations 
apply to improving the competitiveness of firms in the acceding 
countries.  
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As already noted, the gains to be expected from traditional sources of 
trade liberalisation are likely to be quite modest. The overall welfare 
effect of Eastern Enlargement will depend on the extent to which it 
facilitates reorganization of production in the EU and its new members. 
Given the relative size of the EU, this effect is bound to be more 
important for the entrants than the EU as a unit. For any individual 
current member of the EU, and for Austria in particular, cross-border 
economic integration may offer some firms and industries non-trivial 
opportunities to reduce costs by shifting production of selected 
components or by relocating assembly to the new entrants. In a system 
of cross-border production-sharing Austria is likely to possess 
comparative advantage in design, engineering, analysis, skill-intensive 
components, etc., but to face disadvantages in operations that require 
large inputs of production labour.  
 
In addition to differences in resource endowments as sources of 
competitiveness, improved opportunities to exploit scale economies may 
bring cost savings. Consider the following hypothetical example. When 
two countries both produce two products in their entirety, neither may 
have production runs long enough to capture scale economies. When the 
two countries engage in component specialisation, with one of them 
producing all of some components and the other all of the remaining 
components, production runs in component manufacture will be longer 
and thus offer greater access to scale economies.  
 
It is clear that cross-border integration of production is a more 
demanding scenario and represents a deeper form of integration than 
trade liberalisation of the traditional variety. Companies must now 
manage relations with foreign suppliers and, in the case of cross-border 
production, managements must solve more complicated problems of 
coordination and control. There is no doubt that multinational 
companies (MNCs) have an important role to play here.  
 
This is especially true whenever foreign production must be preceded by 
foreign investment, as is typically the case when the prospective partner 
operates in a developing country. The maquiladora operations of 
multinationals in northern Mexico absorb large quantities of investment 
(FDI)  not only from the United States, but from Japan and other 
countries. Similarly, the large manufacturing base which Hong Kong 
firms have established in the Pearl River Delta required massive 
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amounts of capital and technology transfer. Analogous comments apply 
to the Irish electronics industry. 
 
The Eastern European countries are a slightly more mixed case. They 
are certainly better endowed with skilled workers and some useful 
capital appears to be in place, but it is also doubtless true that full 
exploitation of this new form of intra-industry trade based on intra-
product specialisation will require significant transfers of capital and 
technology. Unlike Switzerland, Austria does not possess an abundance 
of multinationals. Austrian firms wishing to play in this game can resort 
to arms-length relationships with Eastern suppliers, or as suppliers to 
Eastern firms. Where investment is required, arms-length relations with 
third-party investors from the EU or outside may be appropriate. In 
other cases, however, some degree of capital-participation will be a 
better model.  
 
When we think about the opportunities for intra-product specialisation 
and cross-border production offered by Eastern Enlargement, the 
dominant scenario probably is one which has Eastern countries 
supplying most current EU members with parts, components and 
assembly requiring abundant input of middle-range labour and 
engineering skills, but relatively moderate capital structures. Relocation 
of certain types of assembly from the EU to the new members is also 
likely to offer significant cost-saving opportunities.  
 
For their part, the acceding countries need to think about the benefits of 
component specialisation relative to specialisation in complete products. 
That is, they, like many other countries around the world, need to think 
more about the costs and benefits of becoming part of a global 
production network and less about starting entire industries of their own.  
 
On both sides, one objective will be to increase market share. That goal 
will often be easier to reach when it is initially pursued at the level of 
component specialisation. It requires less up-front investment and 
mastery of fewer skills and technologies and plays more fully into 
strength and comparative advantage. Since much of the competition 
which EU firms face, in both their own and third markets, comes from 
the United States, Japan, and other non-member countries, the benefits 
of cross-border production networks rise as they involve privileged 
relationships which cannot be matched by external rivals. 
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4. Concluding remarks 
 
The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union comes at a time of 
significant change in the world economy. Joining the European Union is 
more than joining a customs union and it involves more than trade 
liberalisation. A key source of potential benefits resides in the cross-
border integration of production. Inasmuch as the gains from more 
traditional trade integration have already been substantially exploited in 
all but the sensitive sectors and in services, it is in the area of production 
integration that the benefits of enlargement must be sought. 
 
The trade patterns examined above represent a new form of intra-
industry trade. Whereas the traditional model of intra-industry trade 
centered around the flow in opposite directions of different varieties of 
the same end-product, the present perspective allows for the possibility 
of final goods and some of their components moving in one direction, 
while the rest of their components move in the other direction. 
 
In assessing the potential benefits of Eastern accession, it is useful to 
view it not only as expansion of the customs union, but as an operation 
akin to a corporate merger whose objective it is to integrate economic 
activity across national frontiers in order to improve efficiency 
throughout the expanded entity and thereby to increase its ability to 
compete more effectively in world markets.  
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INTERNATIONAL FRAGMENTATION: A POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE1 
Wilhelm Kohler 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The turn of the century has witnessed at least three dominant 
perceptions of change in a typical European economy. First, there is the 
demise of socialism in eastern Europe, followed by a rapid 
transformation of eastern European economies. Second, we observe an 
ever increasing obsession with a phenomenon dubbed economic 
globalization. And finally, there is the alleged emergence, originating in 
the US and fostered by rapid progress in information technology, of the 
"New Economy" as a whole new paradigm of how market economies 
might work.  
 
Only the first of these phenomena is unquestioned in its existence, and 
fairly precise in its meaning. The second no doubt exists, but appears to 
have a somewhat unclear and arbitrary meaning, and there is much 
controversy regarding its effects. As to the third, many of us are in 
doubt on both, what it might mean, and whether it exists at all. 
 
As always when we are uncertain about the existence and precise nature 
of a phenomenon, our views of, and attitudes towards, it are susceptible 
to manipulation, or at least to predispositions on the part of those who 
venture a description. Thus, globalization is sometimes described as a 
dreadful process which a) implies that our wages are set in Beijing2, 
which b) increasingly leads neighboring low-wage countries to chop 
slices off our domestic value added chain, c) exposes our domestic labor 
markets to floods of immigration from low wage countries, particularly 
from eastern Europe, which d) endangers cherished public goods, such 
as a clean environment and food safety, or health and labor standards, 
and which e) displaces our governments from the driver's seat regarding 
the course of economic policy. 
 
                                                     
1 A revised version of this paper will appear in the Journal of Policy Modeling. 
2 See the provocative title of Freeman (1995). 
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Economists who are believers in the free market would probably find 
clever responses to each of these points. They might, in turn, hold that 
a) our wages are primarily determined by our own productivity, that b) 
outsourcing of value added components is but a new and beneficial form 
of international division of labor, c) inward flows of factors (labor and 
capital) are typically associated with an overall welfare gain for the host 
country, albeit coupled with potentially controversial redistribution 
effects, that d) employing restrictive policies towards trade, migration, 
and investment are at most second-best policies to treat problems of the 
environment, health and social standards, and that e) enlightened 
governments may view international restrictions on domestic policy as a 
useful commitment device, and a welcome disciplinary measure vis á 
vis domestic interest politics.  
 
These are but two extreme views. Can we take the easy route and simply 
hold that the truth lies somewhere in the middle? This would surely be 
unsatisfactory. We need to have a clearer understanding of the 
underlying phenomenon that may usefully be called globalization, 
instead of simply listing its alleged effects. 
 
 
2. Is there a clear and useful meaning of "globalization"? 
 
Observers often take the empirical route, presenting impressive figures, 
usually focusing on world trade and investment flows, and intended to 
suggest that a new and powerful force is at work. But staring at detailed 
numbers, without a clear idea as to the phenomenon we are trying to 
look at, is a questionable exercise. Lacking such a clear idea, data may 
often be interpreted in rather different ways (see, for instance, 
Kleinknecht/ter Wengel, 1998). Or even worse, they may not be 
interpreted in any meaningful and disciplined way. 
 
Instead of detailed numbers, I therefore propose that we venture cursory 
look at the broad lines of modern history, in order to obtain a first and 
very rough idea as to what may, or may not, usefully be associated with 
the term globalization. Temin (1999) observes that the notion of 
activities spanning the whole globe probably dates back to the 17th 
century when technological advances in shipbuilding lead European 
emperors to embark upon global exploration, conquest, and expansion. 
But while this may mark the beginning of global thinking, a modern day 
economist is sure to point out that such activities have very little to do 
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with what we now perceive as the essence of economic globalization. It 
took two more centuries, witnessing the formation of the modern nation-
state, until we observe the first appearance of what, I would submit, is at 
the heart of economic globalization: The notion, and to a significant 
extent, also materialization of world-wide arbitrage on markets for 
certain goods and assets. 
 
By arbitrage, we mean activities which exploit price differences with the 
final result that a good cannot command different prices at different 
locations for prolonged periods of time. The same can be said, mutatis 
mutandis, for the return yielded by assets traded at different locations. 
Note that such activities need not actually take place on a massive scale, 
in order to prevent such price differences from arising. Tradability is 
important, not actual trade. Similarly, it is the "prospect of being 
arbitraged in a global economy" (Rodrik, 1998) which worries people, 
more than the immediate appearance of foreign goods and services in 
domestic shops. 
 
Hence, when turning to data we should focus on price differences that 
indicate the presence of arbitrage, or lack thereof, rather than the 
quantities actually traded. And it is on this account that the turn of the 
19th-20th century marks the first period in history of economic 
globalization, comparable in broad terms to the level we observe today3. 
However, it took a further half-century until the word globalization 
made its first appearance (see Temin, 1999). This is surprising, because 
in the 1960s one could, by any conceivable standard, hardly speak of 
globalization. Quite to the contrary, after the First World War the world 
had seen a prolonged period of a globalization backlash (Williamson, 
1998), from which it had not yet fully recovered in the 1960s. 
 
Globalization is thus new only as a word, but not as a phenomenon. This 
begs the question of what is responsible for the fearful apprehension 
now associated with the phenomenon, and apparently absent in earlier 
periods of similar globalization? Three reasons, it seems to me, may be 
put forward. First, globalization now features new forms of 
internationalization that extend into realms of the economy long thought 
beyond the reach of international arbitrage. Second, globalization is now 
re-emerging after a long period of retreat to economic nationalism 
                                                     
3 See, for instance, Irwin (1996), Williamson (1996), Obstfeld (1998), and 
Temin (1999). 
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which was provoked by earlier globalization, and which had a 
devastating effect on the world economy. This latter aspect is 
particularly worrisome, as it raises the specter of a future and similarly 
devastating globalization backlash if we do not take care to prevent 
history from repeating itself. A crucial point of concern, then and now, 
is a significant degree of income inequality that coincides with 
globalization, and is therefore often perceived as being caused by it (see 
Williamson, 1998). The third point relates to policy. In a world where 
private activities are governed by world-wide arbitrage, the set of policy 
options that may be simultaneously, and independently, pursued by 
national governments is severely restricted. In a sense, the idea of 
arbitrage gets extended to the realm of policy. In principle, of course, 
this was no less true 100 years ago than it is today. However, the 
principle has now become a constraint which is much more severely 
binding, for the simple reason that modern governments want to do, and 
achieve, much more than in earlier times. 
 
 
3. Fragmentation: A new form of globalization 
 
According to the traditional view of production and specialization, the 
principle of arbitrage is applied to a well defined value added process as 
a whole. The new feature of globalization which we term fragmentation 
now arises whenever arbitrage is applied to ever smaller slices of the 
value added process, instead of the value added process as whole. The 
extent to which the value added process is amenable to such separation 
is, of course, determined by technology. The extent to which it actually 
takes place across borders is governed by economic considerations, 
featuring in particular the costs of linking such separated slices towards 
effective supply of the final product, and the cost advantages arising 
from separation, say from carrying out individual fragments of value 
added offshore, as opposed to doing everything in an integrated way at 
home. 
 
It is important that the significance of fragmentation is not limited to 
multinationals outsourcing certain services to their foreign subsidiaries. 
Much of it takes place at arms length, relying on contracts with 
independent firms. Obviously, a driving force behind fragmentation is a 
reduction in the costs of linking such fragments across borders, so as to 
guarantee a steady supply of the final product to the buyer. Advances in 
the communications technology, as well as a reduction in formal and 
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technical barriers to trade, are responsible for fragmentation to happen 
where it was economically unreasonable before (see Harris, 1993 and 
Jones/Kierzkowski, 2000). If such costs are higher for cross border links 
than for domestic links, as it is often argued, then there must be an 
offsetting cost advantage for producing individual fragments offshore. 
These can be due to superior technology, but also to an interplay 
between factor price differences and factor intensities of these fragments 
which may even compensate for a backward technology. And if costs of 
cross border trading and linking are progressively reduced, which for 
our purpose is the operational description of globalization, without at 
the same time also annihilating international differences in technology 
and factor prices, then an increase in fragmentation is the outcome. 
 
Did this happen to an observable extent? One may try to crudely 
measure this by appropriately modifying the traditional measure of 
openness, trade in percent of GDP, so that merchandise trade is 
expressed in percent of merchandise value added. Feenstra (1998) 
observes that on this account trade has increased much more rapidly 
than if trade is expressed in percent of GDP. Table 1 compares these 
two measures for a few European and non-European economies. While 
trade as a percent of GDP did increase for all economies except 
Australia and the UK, trade in percent of merchandise value added has 
increased much more dramatically. This is, admittedly, a very indirect 
way of measuring the prevalence of the phenomenon of fragmentation. 
But it is at least "strongly consistent" with the view that the international 
division of labor has moved into the real of value added processes. 
Additional evidence on the commodity composition of US-trade support 
this view (see Feenstra, 1998 and Irwin, 1996). Adding more direct, 
although partly anecdotal, evidence, such as the maquiladora example in 
the US-Mexican case, it is hard to avoid the overall conclusion that a 
convincing story of fragmentation does, indeed, become apparent from 
the data. 
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Table 1: Traditional trade versus fragmentation 
 Trade in % of GDP Trade in % of Value Added 
Country 1890 1990 %-change 1890 1990 %-change 
Australia 15.7 13.4 -14.6 27.2 38.7   42.3 
Canada 12.8 22.0   71.9 29.7 69.8 135.0 
Denmark 24.0 24.3     1.3 47.4 85.9   81.2 
France 14.2 17.1   20.4 18.5 53.5 189.2 
Germany 15.9 24.0   50.9 22.7 57.8 154.6 
Italy   9.7 15.9   63.9 14.4 43.9 204.9 
Japan   5.1   8.4   64.7 10.2 18.9   85.3 
Norway 21.8 28.8   32.1 46.2 74.8   61.9 
Sweden 23.6 23.5   -0.4 42.5 73.1   72.0 
United Kingdom 27.3 20.6  -24.5 61.5 62.8     2.1 
United States   5.6   8.0   42.9 14.3 35.8 150.3 
Source: Feenstra (1998). 
 
Assuming that the existence of the phenomenon is unquestioned, what is 
its policy relevance? I shall restrict myself to two issues: a) factor prices 
and aggregate welfare, and b) the role that preferential trade 
arrangements play for fragmentation. It is important to be clear about 
the question asked. Specifically, the following questions need to be 
distinguished: 1) How does fragmentation affect the domestic 
distribution of income? 2) Does fragmentation enhance international 
factor price equalization? 3) How does it affect employment? 4) How 
does it affect aggregate welfare in the economies involved? And 5) 
Does fragmentation enforce the process of catching up by countries, 
such as the transition economies in the European context? 
Unfortunately, the answers to the first three questions are unclear and 
importantly dependent on the kind of model that one relies upon. The 
answers to questions 4 and 5 are likely to be in the affirmative, and less 
sensitive with respect to the model used, at least in the long run. I shall 
now try to shed some light on these issues, relying on abstract 
theoretical reasoning and using a simple graphical tool.  
 
 
4. Outsourcing: A trade off between cost savings and loss 
of employment? 
 
Interest in fragmentation has arisen primarily from concern about a 
persistent decline of certain types of wage income relative to others, and 
relative to non-wage income. Factor price effects, therefore, seem of 
particular policy relevance. Unfortunately, however, robust results are 
hard to come by. Feenstra/Hanson (1996, 1997) argue that fragmen-
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tation is responsible for an increase in the gap between high- and low-
skilled labor. Arndt (1997, 1999) presents a counter-argument that 
fragmentation may just as well increase income of labor relative to 
capital in both Mexico and the US. Moreover, Deardorff (2000) and 
Jones/Kierzkowski (2000) argue that the incremental effect of 
fragmentation on international factor price equalization is ambiguous. 
Thus, the overall impression one obtains from this literature is that 
almost anything can happen regarding questions 1 and 2 above. Too 
much, it seems, depends on the details for these questions to be 
amenable to a theoretical treatment of reasonable generality.4 
 
However, it should nonetheless be possible with some modeling effort 
to identify some of key channels and trade-offs involved. All models 
rely on assumptions, the art of modeling is choosing them in a well-
guided and useful way. From a policy perspective, it is probably 
important to depart from the long run perspective and the full 
employment assumption that the literature has so far relied upon. I 
therefore assume that each industry relies on a given stock of sector 
specific capital stock which may be moved across the border in the 
process fragmentation, but which is useless in other industries, whether 
at home or abroad. By way of contrast, labor is mobile across sectors 
domestically, but immobile across national borders. In such a situation, 
capital owners earn a rent which is determined by the price of the 
commodity produced in a given industry and the prices that are charged 
for its inputs, including the ongoing wage rate. Depending on labor 
market frictions, labor may or may not be fully employed. Without 
going into the details of labor market imperfections, I will address the 
implications of possible unemployment in the context of international 
fragmentation.  
 
                                                     
4 A general treatment of the factor price effects encompassing the above 
mentioned special cases is presented in Kohler (2000). 
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Figure 1: Welfare and distributional effects of outsourcing 
 
In figure 1, the line V1 depicts the marginal value added of employment 
in industry 1, given a pre-determined stock of industry-1-capital. 
Assuming that firms perceive the wage rate as beyond their control, we 
may read this line as a labor demand curve for industry 1, with the wage 
rate – expressed in the same unit as value added – read on the vertical 
axis. We add a similar labor demand curve V2 for the rest of the 
economy, with the origin placed at the lower right-hand corner, and with 
the horizontal difference between the two origins measuring overall 
labor supply L . For simplicity, we assume labor supply to be given in 
fixed amount. We thus obtain a labor market equilibrium, featuring 
industry-1-employment equal to L1, with the rest of the economy's labor 
force employed in industry 2, i.e., L2= L -L1. The wage rate in this 
equilibrium is w*. Value added in industry 1 is measured by the area 
A1BL101, while the rest of value added is given by the area A2BL102. 
 
We now consider fragmentation, assuming that it may take place only in 
industry 1. This is but a stylized way to say that for fundamental reasons 
of technology, different industries are susceptible to international 
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fragmentation and outsourcing in very different degrees. We interpret 
the line V1 as a result of two different value-added-fragments which 
may be carried out separately, but which nonetheless depend on each 
other in that they derive their value only from being "assembled" 
towards the final product. Suppose, then, that V11 depicts the marginal 
value added of labor employed in fragment 1 of industry 1, while V12 
depicts a similar schedule for fragment 2, with V1 the horizontal sum of 
the two. It is of vital importance to be clear about the precise meaning of 
these schedules. Specifically, V11 is the marginal value added of 
fragment 1 labor, given that the profit maximizing amount of labor, read 
off the line V12 for alternative wage rates, is employed in fragment 2, 
and given that the two fragments thus obtained are then "assembled" to 
a final product which is sold at the prevailing market price. Thus, total 
value added created in industry 1 is the sum of area 
A1B11L1101(fragment 1) and area A12BL1L11 (fragment 2). Either of 
these areas, however, exists only in connection with the other.5 Each 
fragment in an essential way derives its value from the existence of the 
other. We shall therefore call these areas the derived values of fragment 
1 and 2, respectively. 
 
Suppose now that due to some advance in transactions and 
communications technology, firms are actively seeking to take 
advantage of cheap foreign labor by outsourcing individual fragments. 
Let us assume for simplicity that for some reason no such outsourcing is 
possible for fragment 1.6 Our aim here is thus not a full-fledged 
explanation of international fragmentation. Instead, we are interested in 
an account of its effect on the home country. With this in mind, suppose 
that there is a neighboring country, which for concreteness we now call 
an eastern European country, where the wage rate is wE<w*. Will home 
                                                     
5 Conceivably, either fragment may also have further uses in other value added 
processes which we do not explicitly model here. However, if fragments are 
tradable, as we assume here, then the derived value added of any alternative 
use cannot exceed the respective area mentioned above, for otherwise profit 
maximizing firms would not use it in industry 1. 
6 Again, this is a matter of simplification. For the issue of outsourcing to arise, 
we must obviously preclude industry 1 leaving the home country altogether. 
A reasonable interpretation is that final assembly as well as production of 
fragment 1 rely on both, technological knowledge which is specific to firms 
presently residing in the home economy, and on some form of country-
specific advantage, such as for instance the presence of specific 
infrastructure. 
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firms consider moving production of fragment 2 to the eastern country 
where they find cheaper foreign labor to produce fragment 2? If they do, 
we call it "outsourcing" of fragment 2. We first note that in this way it is 
possible to secure the derived value of fragment 2 at lower cost, the 
cost-advantage being B11BDC. However, it is important to realize that 
domestic firms will only go for outsourcing, if they can appropriate at 
least some of this advantage for themselves. Several interpretations are 
possible. For the sake of a clear argument, we assume for now that 
fragmentation, if taking place at all, is carried out to full extent, meaning 
that all of fragment 2 formerly produced at home is now produced 
abroad. We shall return to partial fragmentation below. We must now 
make an important distinction.  
 
1. If capital is immobile across national borders, then home firms may 
secure fragment 2 at arms length from foreign subcontractors who 
rely on foreign capital in production of this fragment.7 The question, 
of course, arises how domestic firms may in this case appropriate 
the cost-advantage. In other words, if the foreign subcontractors 
produce a fragment worth A12BL1L11 to home firms, what prevents 
them from charging an amount equal to this value? Here, we must 
remember that under our assumptions this value derives exclusively 
from subsequent assembly with fragment 1. If a firm-specific and/or 
country-specific asset confers an effective "ownership advantage" to 
domestic firms,8 then it seems reasonable that the home firms can 
appropriate at least some of this cost-advantage. For simplicity, we 
assume they can fully appropriate it. The result is that they obtain a 
fragment worth A12BL1L11 at a cost which is lower than this value 
by the amount B11BDC. 
 
2. If capital may be moved abroad, home firms, of course, have an 
incentive to guarantee appropriation of the cost-advantage by 
foreign direct investment. They would then use their capital to do 
what they did before, i.e., producing fragment 2, but using foreign 
labor receiving wE, instead of domestic labor which would cost w*. 
Fragmentation in this case is thus associated with foreign direct 
                                                     
7 We do not look at the foreign economy in any detail and simply assume that 
such capital is available in the required amount. 
8 Ownership advantage is a concept used in the theory of the multinational 
enterprise. It means that a firm has exclusive access to some asset, in our case 
fragment 1. 
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investment. We could now say that the capital invested abroad earns 
a higher rent than it did before when using domestic labor. But a 
preferable interpretation is that the implicit rent is equal to A12BB11, 
and that the fragment is shipped to the parent firm at a transfer price 
totalling A12BL1L11-B11BDC. Again, domestic firms obtain a 
fragment with derived value equal to A12BL1L11 at a cost which falls 
short of this value by the amount B11BDC.  
 
Whatever the interpretation, fragmentation confers an advantage to 
domestic firms similar to a price cut for some intermediate input that 
they use. This is the good news. However, the bad news is that the 
domestic economy loses employment. If all of fragment 2 is moved to 
the eastern country, then all of former fragment-2-employment, L1-L11, 
is lost. Moreover, in the case of immobile capital, domestic capital is 
similarly set idle. At first sight, this looks like a rather unattractive 
scenario for the home economy, as it raises the specter of losing a whole 
slice of industry-1-value-added to the neighboring country. Does this 
country need to worry? 
 
 
5. Gain and pain: Overall welfare and redistribution 
 
As regards overall welfare, the crucial question is whether the domestic 
resources released through outsourcing find alternative domestic 
employment where they create an output value which is equal to that of 
their previous use. In the case where outsourcing is coupled with foreign 
direct investment, the answer is in the affirmative regarding capital, 
since all domestic capital formerly employed in domestic production of 
fragment 2 is now employed in foreign production of the same 
fragment. The same does not necessarily hold true if outsourcing relies 
on foreign capital in which case domestic fragment-2-capital is indeed 
released from its former use. And similarly, it does not necessarily hold 
for domestic labor, which is set free in the amount L1-L11 if full 
outsourcing takes place, whether coupled with foreign direct investment 
or without. 
 
In its entirety, the immediate cost-savings effect from outsourcing, 
CB11BD, will show up as an overall welfare gain for the home economy 
at large only if all of this domestic labor finds alternative use where it 
creates value added equal to its former income, measured by the 
rectangle (L1-L11)xw*. Remember that CDL1L11 is now income paid to 
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foreign labor. To the extent that this alternative value added is lower 
than (L1-L11)xw*, the welfare gain is reduced or may vanish altogether. 
Indeed, the gain may even turn to a welfare loss if this value added is 
sufficiently low. 
 
There are two possible reasons why the alternative value added 
generated by domestic resources that are set free through outsourcing 
may fall short of (L1-L11)xw*. First, some of these resources may end up 
not being employed at all, due to some market imperfection. And 
secondly, if employed, they may be subject to the "law" of diminishing 
marginal returns. In the first case the overall welfare effect is clearly 
negative. One for one, each step of outsourcing would then generate 
domestic unemployment. It is still true that for every unit of labor 
released through outsourcing, the economy saves w*-wE on fragment 2, 
but at the same time it loses domestic income in the amount of BL1. This 
obviously generates a welfare loss of DL1. But this is surely a very bad 
assumption to rely upon for a reasonable policy view on outsourcing. 
 
Let us, then, assume case 2 above. Under three additional assumptions, 
we may conclude that outsourcing has an unambiguously positive 
efficiency, or welfare, effect: 1) Outsourcing is a continuous process and 
not subject to any indivisibility. 2) Firm behavior is governed by profit 
maximization. 3) There are no market imperfections. These assumptions 
are by no means innocuous, but they nevertheless represent a useful 
benchmark case. The crucial point is that if they are met, then 
outsourcing will not be carried out to an arbitrary extent. Instead, firms 
will determine an optimal degree of outsourcing which will guarantee an 
efficiency gain for the economy at large. However, this gain is coupled 
with a redistribution effect at home. Hence we observe the familiar 
tension between efficiency and distribution. To quote Rodrik (1998): 
"No pain, no gain". 
 
Once more, we look at figure 1. Consider alternative foreign wage rates, 
starting with w*, i.e., an equal wage rate at home and abroad, and then 
continuously falling below w*. As the foreign wage rate falls below w*, 
home firms will want to move fragment-2-production to the foreign 
economy, in order to utilize this lower wage cost. Suppose that they do 
so by relying on foreign direct investment, thus using their own 
fragment-2-capital alongside foreign labor. The home economy loses 
fragment-2-employment through outsourcing, and there is excess supply 
of labor with an ensuing downward pressure on the wage rate. However, 
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the cost reduction on fragment 2 acts like a price cut for an intermediate 
input, and it therefore increases the marginal value added for fragment 1 
which, together with fragment 2, goes into production of the final good. 
Profit maximizing firms will therefore increase labor demand for 
domestic fragment 1 production, sliding down the labor demand 
schedule V11 to B
~ 1
1, as outsourcing takes them down to DE along V12. 
Notice, however, that as firms move on V11 the origin for V12 moves to 
the right. Notice also that demand for foreign labor in fragment-2-
production increases beyond former domestic employment L1-L11, 
depending on the foreign wage rate in line with V12 (with origin L11). 
One may call the line segment of V11 starting at point B11 as the "cum 
outsourcing" labor demand curve of industry 1. For successively lower 
foreign wage rates, the cost advantage from outsourcing is increased 
which is mirrored by an increase in demand for domestic labor towards 
production of fragment 1. 
 
At the same time, a falling wage rate increases labor demand in industry 
2, moving along V2 to B~ 2. Combining this with "cum outsourcing" labor 
demand by industry 1, it is easy to see that for all domestic wage rates 
above wE there will be domestic excess supply of labor. Suppose this 
causes the wage rate to fall right down to the foreign level wE. At this 
point, the domestic industry 2 has increased its labor demand to 02 L~ 2, 
while industry 1 employs 01 L~ 11. One may now argue that there is still 
excess supply of labor in the amount of L~ 11 L
~ 2, but if the domestic 
wage rate falls further, then the whole cost-advantage of outsourcing 
will disappear at once. If it is possible to split fragment-2 between 
offshore production and domestic production, relying on split use – 
foreign direct investment and domestic use – of the specific domestic 
capital stock, then domestic firms will be indifferent between full 
outsourcing and partial outsourcing, meaning that they use L~ 11 L
~ 2 of 
domestic labor (plus the required amount of capital) for domestic 
production of fragment 2, and producing the rest "offshore" with foreign 
labor input of CDE- L~ 11 L
~ 2 (plus the required amount of foreign direct 
investment). 
 
In this latter case, there is a clear welfare gain from outsourcing. The 
opportunity cost of the former level of fragment 2 production is reduced 
by CB11BD. Moreover, there is an additional outsourcing surplus equal 
to the triangle BDDE, due to increased employment of foreign labor 
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which is paid its marginal contribution to value added. But this is partly 
offset by the falling marginal value product that domestic labor finds in 
its alternative domestic use, and which may be read off the line V2 from 
point B to point D~ , and line V11 from point B11 to point B
~ 1
1. The 
aggregate welfare gain, therefore, is equal to the sum of the two 
triangles B11C B
~ 1
1 and BDE B
~ 2. This substantiates the argument 
indicated in the introduction that fragmentation is but a beneficial form 
of international division of labor. But, as with other forms of trade, the 
efficiency gain comes with a potentially troublesome redistributive 
effect. In the example of figure 1, domestic labor is arbitraged by cheap 
foreign labor and the possibility to rely on such labor for "offshore" 
production of fragment 2.  
 
A natural question to ask is what might have precluded this kind of 
arbitrage before, and what has lead it to be a significant element of 
modern economic globalization. On a general level, we may refer to 
improvements in the technology of communication which makes it less 
costly to separate the value added process across national borders (see 
Harris, 1993 and Jones/Kierzkowski, 2000). In addition, a reduction in 
formal and technical barriers to trade may play a role, since a fragment 
which is produced abroad is often subject to such barriers when 
imported back to the home country for assembly to the final good. 
Turning back to figure 1, we may, for instance, envisage a situation 
where such transaction costs first annihilate the cost advantage of 
outsourcing afforded by the wage gap w*-wE, but are gradually reduced 
by a policy of integration and/or improved communications and 
transport technology, so that a fragmentation incentive arises. However, 
policies of integration, like the Eastern Enlargement of the EU, are also 
likely to narrow the international wage gap. More generally, while 
globalization may be associated with a world-wide increase in the gap 
between certain types of wage income, or between wage income and 
other incomes, it is likely to close the gap between wages earned for 
similar labor in adjacent countries. Only if this latter effect materializes 
at a lower pace, will the overall development be conducive towards 
international fragmentation. 
 
It is important to realize that the redistributive effect need not 
necessarily be to the disadvantage of labor. The example so far 
portrayed by figure 1 is quite extreme in that labor is the only domestic 
factor which is effectively released through outsourcing. The 
assumption was that domestic fragment-2-capital, rather than being set 
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free, is moved across the border to work with foreign labor. Suppose, 
instead, that outsourcing takes place in an environment where no foreign 
direct investment is possible, or where firms for some other reason 
choose to use of foreign, rather than domestic, capital when producing 
fragment 2 "offshore". Then domestic capital is affected much like 
labor, and the outcome is much more favorable for labor. For instance, 
if capital is industry-specific but may nonetheless be used equally for 
different fragments, then the "cum outsourcing" labor demand curve 
exhibits a discrete jump at L11, up to V 11. The reason is that, with all 
industry-1 capital now available to support employment for fragment-1-
production alone, all labor input L11 becomes more productive. It is 
quite clear that if "cum outsourcing" labor demand follows the line V 11, 
the domestic wage will not fall all the way down to wE. Not 
surprisingly, if domestic capital is released alongside labor, then 
outsourcing has a much less severe domestic wage effect. Outsourcing is 
thus more likely to be harmful for domestic labor if it is associated with 
direct investment than in the case of trade only in goods. 
 
A final remark is in order regarding the low wage country. The above 
argument assumes that outsourcing may draw upon a completely elastic 
foreign labor supply at a wage rate wE. This is a rather optimistic view. 
If labor in the eastern European country is likewise employed subject to 
diminishing marginal value added, then any additional demand arising 
from international fragmentation can only be met by bidding up eastern 
wages. This is good news if one is concerned with catching-up, but at 
the same time it implies that the welfare gain that western countries may 
reap from outsourcing is reduced. It does, however, also mean that the 
distributional effect within the western country is mitigated. 
 
 
6. Fragmentation barriers: The role of preferential 
trading agreements 
 
Outsourcing has first caught economists' attention in the case of the 
maquiladoras appearing at the US-Mexican border as a result of 
NAFTA (see Arndt, 1997). In Europe, the fall of the "iron curtain" has 
generated a similar situation in that western European firms may find 
neighboring low wage countries as attractive targets for outsourcing. 
Indeed, there are reasons to believe that the European case of market 
integration is even more prone to fragmentation than the NAFTA. After 
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the Second World War, Europe has long been characterized by a 
complex system of independent rules of origin pertaining to its 
preferential trading blocs (EC and EFTA) and a host of bilateral 
association treaties. This system has undergone repeated change through 
new association agreements and changing membership constellations. 
Such rules of origin are inherently arbitrary and susceptible to 
protectionist abuse (see Bhagwati et al., 1998). Among other things, 
they promote local parts industries (see Komuro, 1997). It is to be 
expected, therefore, that an Eastern Enlargement of the EU, which does 
away with such rules for trade between incumbent member states and 
low wage new member countries, will enhance an efficient sourcing of 
inputs (see Anell et al., 1998). 
 
A good case in point is the textiles industry where subcontracting has a 
long tradition. Typically, when a fragment of textile production is 
subcontracted to a foreign firm, this fragment will also require certain 
material inputs – for instance yarn, fibre or thread – in addition to 
foreign labor and capital. These materials may not always be available 
most cheaply in the subcontractor country, but may instead be imported 
from a third country. If the trading environment is characterized by 
preferential agreements, then the fragment may be denied preferential 
treatment when imported back to the outsourcing country, because the 
use of third country materials violates existing rules of origin. 
 
To be more specific, this was of practical concern for Swiss suppliers of 
yarn and other textile materials when the EU15 had reached preferential 
trading agreements on a bilateral basis with several central and eastern 
European countries (CEECs), the so-called Europe Agreements. In the 
1990s, textile fragments subcontracted across different EU15 countries 
and incorporating Swiss-made materials have obtained preferential 
treatment under existing EU-EFTA rules of origin. Such was often not 
the case, initially, for the same fragments when subcontracted to 
CEECs, because relying on Swiss-made materials has implied that an 
insufficient amount of original working or processing was applied to the 
fragment in the relevant CEEC. If preferential treatment was decisive, 
the result was that outsourcing either did not take place at all, or that the 
fragment itself has relied on an inefficient sourcing of material inputs. In 
either case the welfare gains identified above do not materialize to their 
full potential. 
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The EU has acknowledged this problem by implementing what is 
known as diagonal (or pan-European) cumulation through the so-called 
"Harmonized Protocol" in 1997 (see Komuro, 1997). This implies that 
the use of EFTA-made materials confers originating status to the 
fragment on the same footing with EU materials (bilateral cumulation). 
This point is illustrated by figure 2. An important message to be drawn 
from this figure is that any further trade agreement between the EU and 
other countries, say the Maghreb, Mexico, South Africa, or the 
Mercosur, will put the CEECs in a position similar to Switzerland prior 
to diagonal cumulation, unless the CEECs become full members. 
Incidentally, this may also be a crucial incentive for Switzerland to join 
the EU. 
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Figure 2: Fragmentation and European preferential trading agreements 
 
 
I cannot indulge into detailed modeling here, but it is quite clear even 
from these cursory observations that the co-existence of several 
preferential trading arrangements entails significant fragmentation 
barriers. Cumulation provisions may be suitable instruments to avoid 
these barriers if perceived unwelcome because of their detrimental 
distortionary effects. But in addition to creating pure distortions, rules of 
origin are also costly to administer and susceptible to protective abuse. 
Hence, relying on bilateral or regional agreements plus subsequent 
cumulation protocols strikes one as a grossly inefficient strategy for 
international trade policy. To give a rough impression on just how 
inefficient the present situation is likely to be in this regard, we may 
briefly look at figure 3, which is adapted from Snape (1996). It depicts 
the bewildering multitude of existing trade agreements which Bhagwati 
has aptly likened to a spaghetti bowl (see Bhagwati et al., 1998). 
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Figure 3: Multiplicity of existing trade arrangements 
 
 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
What can we learn from this analysis? I submit that the following 
general conclusions can be drawn. First, although outsourcing carries a 
rather direct flavor of the home economy losing some of its value added, 
there is a clear potential that this is associated with a welfare gain. It is 
somehow less obvious than for trade in final goods, but outsourcing of 
parts and components is an instance of potentially beneficial 
international division of labor. 
 
As in many other cases, the efficiency gain comes with a pain in the 
form of a redistributive effect on incomes. There is no general rule to 
diagnose, let alone predict, how outsourcing affects wages and other 
forms of income. But it is possible to give precise meaning to the 
potential welfare gain, even in the presence of severe income 
redistribution. One may identify conditions under which the incomes 
lost in some parts of the economy are overcompensated in the aggregate 
by income gains in other parts. These conditions are far from innocuous 
and even if they are met, the redistributive effect may make the 
efficiency gain difficult to obtain for political or normative reasons. 
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Any unemployment which may arise from outsourcing due to the 
presence of market frictions partly offsets the above mentioned welfare 
gain. If all labor previously employed in the activity which has moved 
offshore ends up unemployed, then the direct effect of outsourcing on 
domestic welfare is clearly negative. However, if wages are flexible, 
some of the incipient unemployment is absorbed by additional 
employment in the remaining fragments of the outsourcing industry, and 
in other industries of the domestic economy. 
 
The effect of outsourcing on international factor price differences is not 
clear-cut. I have touched upon this issue only in a rather cursory 
manner, but it transpires that one should not jump to quick conclusions 
arguing that outsourcing is conducive to international factor price 
equalization. Much detail that I have deliberately kept in the background 
above becomes relevant for this issue. Initial progress has been achieved 
by Deardorff (2000), but the question clearly needs further analysis. 
 
Whether or not fragmentation is conducive to closing gaps between 
different countries' income levels, such as eastern and western European 
countries, is an altogether different question. As with factor price 
equalization, I have not explicitly dealt with this issue in the present 
paper. A few remarks are nonetheless warranted in closing. In principle, 
the level of real income per capita, or welfare, may rise in CEECs by the 
virtue of them receiving western outsourcing, even if their relative 
factor prices do not therewith approach those observed in the west. 
However, the specific conditions under which outsourcing occurs, in 
particular the firm-specific and country-specific advantages involved, 
are likely to be such that the potential efficiency gain will mostly be 
appropriated by the western country where outsourcing originates. At 
the same time, production of individual fragments in the east may be an 
effective vehicle of technology transfer, particularly if coupled with 
foreign direct investment. 
 
The co-existence of several preferential trading agreements is a 
powerful barrier against fragmentation and outsourcing. This is a 
detrimental effect which existing theory, focusing on creation and 
diversion of trade in final goods, has not sufficiently acknowledged. 
Governments have tried to at least partly avoid the unwelcome effects of 
these barriers by complex cumulation provisions in the rules of origin 
pertaining to these preferential agreements, but this is an inherently 
inefficient way to deal with the problem. Indeed, it is hard to avoid the 
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general conclusion that the emergence of outsourcing and international 
fragmentation reinforce the case for a return to multilateralism, as 
opposed to regionalism as the driving paradigm of international trade 
policy. 
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OUTSOURCING OF AUSTRIAN MANUFACTURING TO 
EASTERN COUNTRIES: EFFECTS ON PRODUCTIVITY AND 
THE LABOR MARKET 
Rene Dell'mour, Peter Egger, Klaus Gugler, Michael Pfaffermayr, 
Yvonne Wolfmayr-Schnitzer 
 
 
1. Introduction1 
 
Since the opening up of the East at the beginning of the nineties Austria 
witnessed a massive re-orientation of trade and a substantial increase of 
FDI both primarily to the neighboring transition countries. On the one 
hand, Austrian exporters gained access to new markets reachable at low 
transportation costs and relatively small trade barriers. Direct investing 
firms have been able to exploit first mover advantages (from the 
proximity and the special knowledge of the neighboring transition 
countries) and managed to gain − compared to the size of Austria − a 
prominent market position (see Stankovsky − Pfaffermayr, 1999). On 
the other hand, there are still huge differences in wages and productivity 
providing potentials for further specialisation. Above all, with the 
neighboring transition countries specialisation has developed beyond the 
conventional interindustry trade in end products. Now more and more 
firms, by splitting up their value added chain internationally, outsource 
part of their production lines and import intermediates that have 
formerly been sourced domestically. This process of vertical 
fragmentation of the production processes occurs both via increased 
imports of intermediates and via subsidiaries which export intermediates 
back to the Austrian headquarters (or assemble the product for direct 
exports to third countries, mainly the EU-market). Austrian FDI into 
these countries now seems more and more efficiency seeking rather than 
market oriented and contributes to the process of fragmentation of 
production. 
 
From an economic policy perspective it is an open question whether 
Austria gains or looses from this process of international fragmentation 
of production and whether there are distributional consequences with 
                                                     
1 We wish to thank Wilhelm Kohler and Kurt Kratena for helpful comments 
and discussions. We also are grateful to Irene Langer and Gabriele Wellan for 
their assistance with the organisation of the database. 
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some groups gaining and others loosing in terms of their wages and/or 
employment prospects. Additionally, since the process of fragmentation 
exploits comparative advantages more intensively a deep restructuring 
process in Austrian manufacturing has been initiated. Whereas some, 
mostly labor intensive production lines are closed down and delocated 
to low wage countries, more skilled labor and capital intensive ones are 
expanding. 
 
From the perspective of a single firm the deepening specialisation 
inherent to the fragmentation process induces productivity gains, 
decreases costs and thus fosters the market position on the world 
markets. To some extent this gain in competitiveness is expected to 
increase also domestic production and thus some of the employment lost 
due to fragmentation may be compensated. On the other hand firms 
which do not follow the international trend of fragmentation of 
production are likely to loose shares in world markets or even have to 
shut down altogether. 
 
In the short run when structural change has not re-established a new 
equilibrium in the labor markets, fragmentation is expected to reduce 
employment (increase unemployment, respectively), if there is 
insufficient compensation by increased output in the domestically active 
production lines and if intersectoral movement of labor is hard to 
accomplish. As a response to enhanced international outsourcing (and 
trade volumes in general), economic policy thus has to seek measures to 
speed up structural adjustment, but also has to assist those groups 
loosing most in the course of these adjustment processes, so that the 
economy as a whole can gain from these new potentials of specialisation 
at acceptable social and distributional consequences. 
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This study takes a trade theory perspecitve and aims to empirically 
assess the effects of outsourcing to Eastern countries2 It is organized as 
follows: We will first describe the main stylized facts concerning the 
volume and structure of trade in intermediates with the transition 
countries as well as intrafirm trade induced by efficiency seeking FDI, 
both measuring the extent of international fragmentation of production. 
Using a small panel of two-digit industries for the period 1990 to 1998, 
we econometrically investigate the effect of fragmentation on 
productivity and on relative demand for skilled and unskilled labor in 
Austrian manufacturing. Additionally, we estimate mandated wage 
equations. The last section summarizes the main findings and dicusses 
the implications for economic policy. 
 
 
2. The main stylized facts for Austrian manufacturing 
 
In the nineties Austrian manufacturing experienced a marked increase in 
both export and import growth which significantly surpassed that of 
gross production. The result was an increase in export (import) openness 
in terms of gross production of about 3.9 percent (2.8 percent) p.a. As a 
possible force towards higher x-efficiency more openness would be 
expected to stipulate some impact on the (skill-specific) labor market in 
terms of wages and employment (see Greenaway et al., 1999). 
Additionally, the direction of exports and imports provides some 
relevant information as e.g. openness vis-à-vis low-wage (maybe low-
skilled intensive) trading partners could differ in its effect on the labor 
market from openness to high-wage (maybe high-skilled intensive) 
countries. 
 
                                                     
2 Eastern countries comprise: East Central Europe (Hungary, Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovak Republic); South East Europe (Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, 
former Yugoslavia and former USSR). 
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Table 1: Openness in Austrian manufacturing 1990-1998 
 Total 
exports 
Total 
imports 
Exports to 
Eastern 
countries 
Imports from 
Eastern 
countries 
Outsourcing to 
Eastern 
countries 
 Shares in gross output Shares in total Shares in total Shares in gross 
 as percent export as % import as % output as % 
1990 43.8 48.7 10.1   5.9   0.6 
1991 43.1 49.6 10.8   6.2   0.5 
1992 43.3 49.9 11.5   6.5   0.6 
1993 42.4 48.8 12.7   6.8   0.5 
1994 44.5 51.6 13.6   7.7   0.8 
1995 48.1 53.1 14.1   7.0   0.7 
1996 49.9 55.4 15.4   8.2   0.9 
1997 55.1 58.0 17.7   9.3   1.1 
1998 59.5 60.6 16.6 10.0   1.2 
      
 Average annual percentage change 
1990/1998   3.9   2.8   6.4   6.8 10.7 
 
In the case of Austria, openness in the manufacturing sector vis-à-vis the 
East increased substantially more than vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
(including the EU-member countries). Moreover, this increase was even 
larger for imports than for exports. The share of the Eastern countries in 
overall manufacturing imports increased by 6.8 percent p.a., that of 
exports by about 6.4 percent p.a. on average between 1990 and 1998. 
This increase in imports is also due to the enlargement of outsourcing 
activities of Austrian firms. Within the same period (1990-1998) we 
observe an increase in outsourcing to the East in terms of Austrian gross 
production by about 10.7 percent p.a. Since the fall of the iron curtain 
outsourcing activities, like FDI activities, developed far more 
dynamically than trade in final goods. 
 
2.1. Magnitude of international outsourcing 
 
Several different approaches as well as data sources have been used to 
measure the extent of international fragmentation of production. 
International outsourcing, first of all generally not only refers to an 
international splitting up of production processes that occurs within a 
multinational firm but also between firms that are completely 
independent from each other. In line with the trade models the usual 
presumption is that outsourcing of production leads to increased imports 
of intermediate products. Accordingly, outsourcing is measured by the 
amount of all imported intermediates that are used in the production of 
domestic firms, in addition to intrafirm trade of multinationals. Note 
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however, that besides an increase in intermediate imports outsourcing 
can also lead to increased imports of final products, if outsourcing 
occurs at the final stage of production and the final good is re-imported. 
On the other hand, the mapping between outsourcing and imports is not 
that clear at all. Outsourcing could also involve a setting where the 
assembly of a product is done in a foreign country, but the final 
manufactured good instead of being re-imported is directly shipped to a 
third country. International fragmentation then would not lead to higher 
imports it would instead lead to smaller exports of the outsourcing 
country. It is clear that there exists no single indicator on international 
outsourcing that can take account of all these aspects and activities 
under the heading of outsourcing. Despite that, all measures adopted in 
the literature indicate that international outsourcing has increased in the 
last two decades and has become quite important (e.g. Feenstra, 1998, 
Yeats, 1999, Campa/Goldberg, 1997, Hummels et al., 1998, Diehl, 1999 
and Görg, 1999). 
 
There are four main sources of information from which outsourcing 
indicators have been constructed in the literature: international trade 
statistics, statistics on inward and outward processing trade, FDI 
statistics and Input-Output tables or "proxies" thereof from statistics of 
input purchases by firms. Insights on outsourcing derived from 
international trade statistics relate either to trade in raw materials and 
semi-finished goods or to intra-industry trade. Both can only be very 
rough proxies for outsourcing, since trade in final and intermediate 
goods (parts and components) are not systematically separated in the 
trade classification systems and measures on intraindustry trade also 
include trade in differentiated final products. Statistics on outward 
processing trade, on the other hand are incomplete as only those 
activities are covered which are supported by trade policy concessions 
and above that the sensibility of the indicator to changes in content 
requirement regulations, tariffs and other trade related regulations limits 
its comparability over time. 
 
Indicators based on the information of Input-Output (I-O) tables 
probably come closest to the definition of international outsourcing at 
least for countries where the information on intermediate input flows is 
disaggregated into domestic products and imports, which is the case for 
Austria. These tables indicate, in a matrix fashion, the value of 
intermediate inputs that each manufacturing industry purchases from 
every other industry. Information on imported intermediate inputs 
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within each industry is usually not further disaggregated by importing 
countries so that it is not possible to directly distinguish between 
intermediate imports from advanced and less advanced countries. We 
derive a regional breakdown of intermediate imports by multiplying 
each type of imported input for each industry by the respective country 
(regional) import shares for total imports. That is, imported 
intermediates purchased by industry i, from country (country group) c 
are given by: 
(1) O ic = ∑
j = 1
N
  MI ij * 
M jc
M j   
where MI ij denote imports of intermediate good j by industry i and 
Mjc/Mj the share of imports of good j from country (group) c in total 
imports of j (see the Appendix on further details). We distinguish 
between the three regions, East, OECD and the Rest of the World. Note, 
that the underlying implicit assumption in the calculation of 
intermediate imports by country groups is that for each good the country 
import shares are the same across input purchasing sectors. 
 
An I-O table for Austria is available for 1990 and a preliminary version 
for 1995 which we constructed from the usual make and absorptions 
matrices. Information from these two years were taken to construct a 
time series for imported intermediate flows at the 2-digit NACE level 
for the in between years as well as 1997 and 1998. Details are again 
described in the Appendix. 
 
The outsourcing indicator introduced in table 2 is the share of imported 
manufactured inputs (derived from the Austrian I-O table) in the value 
of gross output. Based on this indicator, various studies for other 
countries have shown that international outsourcing is quite important 
(Campa/Goldberg, 1997, Diehl, 1999). Table 2 reproduces the results as 
calculated in Campa-Goldberg and Diehl for Canada, Japan, the UK, the 
US and Germany and compares them to our results for Austria. 
Fragmentation in Austria has already been at a comparable high level of 
17.5 percent in 1990 and has been increasing since to 21.7 percent for 
total manufacturing and in all of the selected industries. This 
outsourcing indicator represents a very broad measure of outsourcing 
since it includes purchases from an industry from any other industry. 
Table 2: Share of imported intermediate inputs1) in manufacturing 
industries of industrial countries 
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 USA Canada United 
Kingdom 
Germany Japan Austria 
 1995 1993 1993 1990 1993 1990 1998 
 Shares as percent 
Manufacturing   8.2 20.2 21.7 15.2 4.1 17.5 21.7 
  Chemicals   6.3 15.1 22.5 16.7 2.6 26.6 19.8 
  Machinery 11.0 26.6 31.3 10.3 1.8 30.2 36.4 
  Road vehicles 15.7 49.7 32.2 14.0 2.8 33.3 40.3 
  Electrical products 11.6 30.9 34.6 11.8 2.9 21.2 28.9 
  Leather products 20.5 21.8 35.6 24.2 2.6 32.2 32.2 
  Clothing   3.2 21.6 24.2 24.6 4.8 25.5 28.0 
1) Percent of gross output value; only inputs of manufactures. Except for Germany and 
Austria, imports of intermediate inputs are crude estimates based on total intermediate 
input coefficients (domestic and imported inputs) and the respective input sectors' 
import shares in apparent consumption.  
Source: Campa-Goldberg (1997), Diehl (1999) and own calculations for Austria.  
 
A second, narrow measure of outsourcing is obtained by including only 
purchases of an industry from industries which are in the same industry 
class. The difference between the broad and the narrow measure of 
outsourcing then represents the intermediate inputs from outside the 
two-digit purchasing industry that are sourced abroad. Narrow 
outsourcing took a value of 9.3 percent in 1990 and increased only 
slightly to 10.4 percent in 1998, so that most of the increase in total 
intermediate inputs sourced from foreign countries came from outside 
the two-digit purchasing industry class. Throughout the paper we use 
the narrow measure as our main indicator of outsourcing as it best 
captures the idea of outsourcing. For example, we would not define the 
sourcing of packaging material by the food industry to reflect 
fragmentation of the value added chain as would be the case if we took 
the wide measure. This is even more important as we have to rely on the 
relatively high aggregation level of two-digit industries. 
 
Austrian international outsourcing to the East grew at an average rate of 
10.7 percent p.a. over the period 1990 to 1998 and thus increased 
significantly stronger than for any of the other regions considered. It 
reached a level of 1.24 percent in 1998, which accounts for a regional 
share of 12 percent (Table 5) in total intermediate imports. Within the 
group of Eastern countries, trade in intermediates has most dynamically 
developed for East Central European countries, which accounted for a 
share of 8.6 percent in total Austrian intermediate trade in 1998, 
compared to 2.1 percent and 1.3 percent for South East Europe and the 
former USSR. 
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Table 3:  Manufactured intermediate inputs and international 
outsourcing in Austrian manufacturing 1990-1998 
Imported 
inputs 
Imported 
inputs from 
 Total 
inputs 
Imported 
inputs 
Imported 
inputs from
the OECD 
Imported 
inputs from
Eastern 
countries 
Eastern countries 
Shares in gross output as % Shares in total inputs as % 
1990 16.18    9.33 8.27   0.55 27.75   1.64 
1991 14.39   8.36 7.39   0.50 27.17   1.64 
1992 13.96   8.23 7.22   0.56 27.03   1.85 
1993 13.40   7.90 6.86   0.55 26.36   1.83 
1994 13.43   8.50 7.20   0.75 28.12   2.49 
1995 14.05   9.11 7.93   0.70 28.39   2.19 
1996 13.68   9.13 7.81   0.88 28.66   2.76 
1997 13.64   9.83 8.23   1.11 30.57   3.45 
1998 13.71 10.44 8.67   1.24 31.70   3.77 
Average annual percentage change 
1990/1998  -2.05   1.42 0.60 10.71   1.67 10.99 
Difference in percentage points 
1990/1998  -2.47   1.12 0.40   0.69   3.94   2.13 
 
The observed increase in total international outsourcing is mainly 
accounted for by a structural shift in outsourcing, that is, a substitution 
of formerly domestically sourced inputs by international purchased 
inputs, rather than increased fragmentation per se. This can be seen by a 
comparison between the share of total material inputs in gross 
production which has been decreasing over the period 1990 to 1998 and 
the share of imported inputs in total material inputs which has been 
rising. At the industry level, substitution away from domestic inputs to 
foreign inputs is most pronounced for food products, apparel, leather, 
wood, pulp and paper, chemicals and the communication equipment 
industry. Total materials as a share of gross output increased only in 
some industries (e.g. basic metals, office machinery and computers). 
Again, the shift towards a higher share of internationally sourced inputs 
is mainly due to increased outsourcing to the East, which was especially 
pronounced in the communication equipment industry, and the leather 
and wood industry. 
 
International outsourcing is most prominent and way above average in 
the production of other transport equipment, basic metals, and 
communication equipment, but also important for the motor vehicle 
industry, the leather, chemical, paper, the computer and textile industry. 
Out of those industries the communication equipment industry as well 
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as the basic metals and the electrical machinery industries are the sectors 
for which outsourcing to the East has also become relatively important 
over the last period. One can observe the highest increases in 
outsourcing to Eastern countries as a share of total outsourcing by 
industry for those sectors as well as for the clothing industry (Table 4). 
The respective country shares stood well above 15 percent in 1998. 
Apart from those industries the East, while remaining an important 
sourcing country for the refined petroleum industry, the East is an 
important provider of inputs for wood products, the leather industry as 
well as for non-metallic mineral products (Table 5). 
 
      
Table 4: Development of Austrian outsourcing1) to Eastern Countries by industries, 1990-1998 
 1990 1998 1990/1998 1990/1998 
 Outsourcing Outsourcing Outsourcing Outsourcing 
 Total to Eastern 
countries 
Total to Eastern 
countries 
Total to Eastern 
countries 
Total to Eastern 
countries 
 Shares in gross output as % Difference in %-points Average annual %-change
Basic metals 17.17 1.35 31.55 5.73 14.39   4.38     7.91   19.82 
Communication equipment 24.50 0.13 30.20 4.67   5.70   4.54     2.65   56.16 
Leather 19.45 1.44 17.23 2.75  -2.22   1.31   -1.50     8.40 
Electrical machinery   9.35 0.30 13.92 2.39   4.57   2.10     5.10   29.70 
Wood. products   4.16 0.88   5.01 1.51   0.85   0.63     2.35     6.97 
Textiles 21.97 0.55 14.92 1.41  -7.06   0.87   -4.73   12.57 
Other transport equipment   5.33 0.08 40.62 1.32 35.29   1.24   28.89   41.66 
Pulp and paper 13.60 0.84 15.37 1.27   1.77   0.43     1.54     5.31 
Clothing   2.57 0.13   4.44 0.89   1.87   0.76     7.08   27.33 
Motor vehicles 18.82 0.11 17.47 0.87  -1.35   0.77    -0.93   29.90 
Chemicals 22.31 1.39 16.24 0.80  -6.08 -0.59    -3.90    -6.66 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
  3.85 0.17   4.87 0.68   1.02   0.51     2.98   18.99 
Fabricated metal products   5.00 0.18   4.82 0.58  -0.17   0.40    -0.44   15.65 
Machinery and equipment n. e. c.   6.77 0.17   5.48 0.39  -1.29   0.22    -2.60   10.96 
Furniture; manufacturing n. e. c.   1.98 0.05   3.40 0.37   1.42   0.32     7.02   27.28 
Office machinery and computers   6.82 0.02 15.27 0.25   8.45   0.24   10.60   41.80 
Coke, refined petroleum, nuclear 
fuel 
  3.38 2.24   0.72 0.24  -2.67 -2.00 -17.63 -24.49 
Food products and beverages   2.90 0.36   3.45 0.22   0.54 -0.14   2.17   -5.80 
Rubber and plastic products   1.16 0.02   2.75 0.19   1.59  0.17  11.43   31.12 
    
     
 
Table 4 (continued): 
 1990 1998 1990/1998 1990/1998 
 Outsourcing Outsourcing Outsourcing Outsourcing 
 Total to Eastern 
countries 
Total to Eastern 
countries 
Total to Eastern 
countries 
Total to Eastern 
countries 
 Shares in gross output as % Difference in %-points Average annual %-change
Medical instruments 5.63 0.03   5.61   0.15 -0.02 0.12 -0.04 21.04 
Publishing, printing and 
reproduction 
0.61 0.00   0.32   0.01 -0.29 0.00 -7.75  9.40 
Tobacco products 0.00 0.00   0.00   0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
         
Total manufacturing 9.33 0.55 10.44   1.24  1.12 0.69  1.42 10.71 
         
Industry rank correlation with 19902)     0.869  0.577     
Industry rank correlation of outsourcing       
to the East with total outsourcing2)  0.495   0.753     
1) Imported intermediates purchased from within the same statistical industry category. - 2) Spearman correlation coefficient.       
      
Table 5: Regional structure of Austrian outsourcing by industry, 1990-1998 
 1990 1998 1990/1998 
 Outsourcing to Outsourcing to Outsourcing to 
 OECD Eastern 
countries 
other 
countries 
OECD Eastern 
countries 
other 
countries 
OECD Eastern 
countries 
other 
countries 
Shares in total imports of manufactured intermediate inputs Difference in percentage points
Coke, refined petroleum, nuclear fuel 33.3 66.2   0.5 66.7 33.1   0.2   33.4 -33.2 -0.2 
Wood products 72.1 21.2   6.7 67.0 30.2   2.8   -5.1    9.0 -3.9 
Clothing 76.6   5.0 18.2 59.9 20.0 19.9 -16.6  15.0   1.6 
Basic metals 90.7   7.9   1.4 79.6 18.1   2.2 -11.1  10.3   0.8 
Electrical machinery 93.6   3.2   3.1 77.9 17.2   4.8 -15.8  14.0   1.7 
Leather 76.8   7.4 15.7 68.3 16.0 15.7   -8.5   8.5   0.0 
Communication equipment 81.5   0.5 17.9 71.3 15.5 13.2 -10.2  14.9 -4.7 
Other non-metallic mineral products 93.7   4.4   1.9 82.9 14.0   2.3 -10.8   9.6   0.4 
Fabricated metal products 93.9   3.6   2.4 83.9 12.1   3.3 -10.0   8.4   0.8 
Furniture; manufacturing n. e. c. 87.9   2.7   9.4 79.7 10.9   9.4   -8.2   8.1   0.0 
Textiles 86.7   2.5 10.8 80.2   9.5 10.2   -6.6   7.0 -0.6 
Pulp and paper 92.5   6.2   1.3 88.1   8.3   3.6   -4.4   2.1   2.3 
Machinery and equipment n. e. c. 96.5   2.5   1.0 91.0   7.0   1.7   -5.5   4.6   0.7 
Rubber and plastic products 96.1   1.9   1.9 89.9   7.0   3.0   -6.2   5.1   1.1 
Food and beverages 76.8 12.4 10.7 89.4   6.5   4.1   12.6  -5.9 -6.6 
Motor vehicles 99.2   0.6   0.2 93.4   5.0   1.5   -5.8   4.4   1.3 
Chemicals 91.8   6.2   2.0 92.7   4.9   2.3     0.9 -1.3   0.3 
Other transport equipment 93.9   1.5   4.6 93.0   3.3   3.7   -0.8   1.7 -0.9 
Medical instruments 94.1   0.6   5.3 90.9   2.7   6.1   -3.1   2.1   0.9 
Publishing, printing and reproduction 98.4   0.7   0.9 96.3   2.6   1.0   -2.1   1.9   0.1 
Office machinery and computers 85.9   0.2 13.9 87.3   1.6 11.1    1.4   1.4 -2.8 
Tobacco products   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0    0.0   0.0   0.0 
Total manufacturing 88.6   5.9   5.4 83.0 11.9   5.0   -5.6   6.0 -0.5 
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A comparison over time shows that the industries that had a relatively 
high imported intermediates share in 1990 were still the most important 
outsourcers by 1998 (see the bottom row of table 4)3. While the relative 
pattern of total international outsourcing across industries has been very 
stable over time this is not true for outsourcing to the East as indicated 
by the lower Spearman correlation coefficient of 0.58. Industry rank 
correlations for Eastern countries with other regions show that the 
industry structure of outsourcing to the East has become more similar to 
total international outsourcing, with the correlation coefficient 
increasing from 0.50 to 0.75 over the period 1990-1998. 
 
2.2. Magnitude and development of intrafirm trade 
 
The international fragmentation of the value added chain also takes 
place within the organization of the firms and it must be seen as part of 
the outsourcing measure introduced above. Multinational firms (MNEs) 
set-up affiliates in several countries to perform different stages of 
production and to combine (or assemble) them to an end product 
thereby generating intrafirm trade. Thus, besides cost differences which 
make it attractive for firms to fragment production processes across 
countries according to their comparative advantages, MNEs prefer to 
pursue fragmentation within their own organization (i.e. within the 
boundaries of the firm) rather than contracting it out. Therefore, in 
contrast to the pure theory of trade an additional condition is introduced. 
In terms of Dunning's (1979, 1988) terminology this condition is 
referred to as the internalization decision, which says that a precondition 
for firms to become an MNE, i.e. organizing production within the firm, 
is that this form of organization of production yields higher profits than 
outsourcing part of it to foreign firms via contracts. In this case the 
fragmentation of the value added chain is accomplished by vertical 
foreign direct investment and it is simultaneously the decision for 
vertical integration across borders. In contrast, horizontal FDI − which 
is mainly analyzed in the models of MNEs and trade introduced by 
Markusen/Venables (1996, 1998) − refers to the case when production 
of the same product occurs in several, foreign and domestic plants. Here 
MNEs are multi-plant firms which trade off transportation costs of 
                                                     
3 This comparison is done using Spearman Rank Correlation Statistics. These 
statistics measure the correlation between two variables based on the ordinal 
positions of the observatios, without otherwise considering the level of the 
variables. 
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exports or more generally market proximity to fixed plant set-up costs. 
The impact on the structure, wages and employment for the home 
country for these types of FDI are quite different. 
 
Information on the importance of vertical direct investment is available 
from the Austrian National Bank's database which provides data for the 
period 1990-1997 for 10 manufacturing industries (combined from two-
digits, see Austrian National Bank, 1999). For an interpretation of the 
data a few remarks are in order. First, there are a few manufacturing 
firms which are classified as holdings in the service sector and are not 
included. The unit of observation of the survey is the ultimate owner of 
the foreign affiliate which is sometimes a holding without activities in 
manufacturing4. Therefore, there may be an underestimation of foreign 
activities. Second, the foreign affiliates are classified by their activity 
abroad and not according to the activity of the parent firm. This rules 
out vertical FDI in services and distribution and makes intrafirm imports 
compatible with the narrow measure of outsourcing (intermediate 
manufactured imports). Horizontal FDI, however, cannot be identified, 
so we concentrate on intrafirm imports of goods from the ten Central 
and Eastern European accession countries (10 CEEC) to measure the 
extent of fragmentation within the firm. 
 
Table 6: Regional structure of Austrian intrafirm imports 1993-1998 
 Western countries 1) 10 CEEC Total 
 Shares in gross output as percent 
1993   0.01   0.12   0.34 
1994   0.02   0.15   0.33 
1995   0.02   0.14   0.48 
1996   0.02   0.22   0.56 
1997   0.04   0.31   0.93 
    
 Average annual percentage change 
1993/1998 30.9 27.2 28.4 
1) EU15, Switzerland, USA and Canada.    
 
                                                     
4 The domestic manufacturing activities are organized in a separate corporation 
also owned by the holding in this case. 
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At the beginning of the nineties intrafirm imports from the 10 CEECs 
(as was FDI into these countries in general) have been negligible in size, 
but looking at the period 1993-1997 illustrates dynamic growth at 
27.2 percent p.a. stemming from both, increases of intrafirm imports of 
existing firms and the increasing number of new affiliates. In 1997, the 
year with the latest available figures, in most industries, intrafirm 
imports mainly came from the 10 accession candidates, with the 
chemical and oil sector forming the only exception. The intrafirm trade 
balance with the 10 CEECs amounted to 2.6 billion ATS (the biggest 
contribution 1.8 billion ATS comes from the chemical and oil sector) 
and it has been negative only in the textiles, wood and metal industries. 
That means that FDI in the 10 CEEC also generated a relatively large 
volume of intrafirm exports. 
 
Table 7: Regional structure of intrafirm imports by industry in 1997 
 Western 
countries1)
10 CEEC Other 
Eastern 
countries 
Other 
countries 
Total 
Shares as percent  
Food, beverages, tobacco   0.0 83.6 16.4   0.0 100.0 
Textiles. clothing 15.8 83.8 -    0.4 100.0 
Wood   0.1 99.9 - - 100.0 
Paper. printing   0.0 99.7 -   0.3 100.0 
Chemicals. rubber. mineral fuels   2.6   3.3 - 94.1 100.0 
Non-metallic mineral products 20.0 69.3   0.3 10.3 100.0 
Metal products 15.9 74.7   0.0   9.3 100.0 
Machinery 10.4 49.4   0.4 39.7 100.0 
Office and electrical machinery, 
communication equipment 
  3.4 76.3   0.6 19.6 100.0 
Motor vehicles, other transport 
equipment 
- - - - - 
Furniture, manufacturing nec   0.0 35.9 63.3   0.7 100.0 
      
Total   4.3 23.0   1.0 71.7 100.0 
1) EU15, Switzerland, USA and Canada.  
Source: Austrian National Bank.  
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Table 8: Austrian intrafirm trade balance by regions and industry in 
1997 
 Western 
countries1)
10 CEEC Other 
Eastern 
countries 
Other 
countries 
Total 
mn ATS 
Food, beverages, tobacco      49.5     90.7 -30.5       38.5     148.2 
Textiles, clothing    369.4  -113.1 -      171.5     427.8 
Wood      22.5  -259.4 - -    -236.9 
Paper, printing        0.0    898.4 -       19.0     917.4 
Chemicals, rubber, mineral 
fuels 
2,565.4 1,770.5 - -7,100.7 -2,764.8 
Non-metallic mineral products       0.7   118.9  81.9     -35.6     165.9 
Metal products   849.4   -43.5   2.2    875.0   1,683.1 
Machinery     33.7    99.0 39.3    558.4     730.4 
Office and electrical 
machinery, communication 
equipment 
1,318.3    20.5 12.5    375.3   1,726.6 
Motor vehicles, other transport
equipment 
-    12.0 -       26.1       38.1 
Furniture, manufacturing nec   115.6      1.8 -29.9     281.5     369.0 
      
Total 5,324.5 2,595.8  75.5 -4,791.0 3,204.8 
1) EU15, Switzerland, USA and Canada. 
Source: Austrian National Bank.  
 
The database is too small for a more detailed econometric analysis. The 
relation between foreign activities and domestic performance can only 
be assessed on a descriptive basis. We observe that employment in the 
parent firms and in foreign affiliates has grown complementarily at a 
rate of 10.4 percent and 9.2 percent p.a., both mainly driven by new 
investors coming into the sample. In contrast, overall, employment in 
total manufacturing decreased by 2.3 percent on average. However, the 
five sectors with the highest increase in intra-firm trade witnessed an 
above average decrease in overall domestic employment. A significant 
shift to more skill intensive domestic production occurred only in one of 
these five sectors (electronics) and to a smaller extent in non-ferrous 
minerals. The correlations in table 9 indicate a loose relationship 
between domestic and foreign employment. The only (weak) stylized 
fact is that growth of foreign activities in the 10 CEEC tends to increase 
the skill intensity of domestic production, but it does not seem to be 
associated with a general decrease in domestic employment5. 
                                                     
5 In Pfaffermayr (1999) further evidence is provided by estimating bilateral 
Dell’mour et al. 
 
265 
Table 9:  Correlation between domestic and foreign activities in the 10 
CEEC (growth rates) 
 Domestic employment     
 Total  Parent firms with FDI in 
the 10 CEEC 
 High-skilled/Low-skilled 
 Pearson Kendall-t Pearson  Kendall-t  Pearson  Kendall-t  
    
Outsourcing -0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.12 0.18 0.14  
Employment 
in foreign 
affiliates 
-0.08 -0.07   0.41 **)   0.38 **) 0.23 *) 0.16 *) 
Intrafirm 
imports 
-0.01   0.02   0.03   0.09 0.07 0.05  
**) significant at 5 percent; *) significant at 10 percent.         
 
2.3. Evidence on employment of direct investing firms at the firm 
level 
 
In addition to aggregate figures on FDI and intrafirm trade an 
unbalanced panel of direct investing firms is available at the Austrian 
National Bank. It is based on surveys and includes annual foreign direct 
investment on a stock, balance sheet basis. The data base covers only 
FDI where the investor holds at least 10 percent of equity and total 
invested equity capital exceeds 1 million ATS (since 1995 companies 
with total assets in excess of 100 million ATS are also covered even if 
the equity capital is below 1 mn ATS). The data base starts in 1980, 
where 325 domestic direct foreign investors are covered, and extends to 
the present, where around 900 domestic direct foreign investors are in 
the sample. 
 
Table 10 exhibit summary statistics about the size and growth of firms 
engaging in (active) FDI. The sample includes only Austrian 
manufacturing and mining companies and covers the period 1989 to 
1997. The total number of firms involved in the calculations is 222. 
 
Table 10 displays summary statistics for all firms and aggregates each 
firm's employees across all subsidiaries abroad. On average, the firms 
covered employed 613 (median 263) workers at home and 232 (median 
52) employees abroad. The annual average percentage rate of growth in 
                                                                                                                     
relative labor demand (domestic over foreign affiliates). It is found that there 
is a general shift to foreign production but no substitution between domestic 
and foreign employment in Eastern European affiliates at the margin. 
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employees was negative at home (-3.1 percent, median -0.1 percent), 
however positive abroad (9.8 percent, median 0.0 percent). Over time, 
the median firm retained its 1989 home employment in 1997, however, 
expanded from 23 to 100 employees abroad. Note however that sample 
composition changes between 1989 and 1997, since new firms start 
investing abroad and some firms are divesting. 
 
Table 11 displays summary statistics only for those firms that undertake 
FDI in Eastern countries. The number of employees are again 
aggregated to the firm level by summing over all employees across all 
subsidiaries in Eastern countries. The median firm investing in Eastern 
countries starts out with much less employees in 1989 than all firms 
from table 10 (104 versus 278), but, ends up with an equal number of 
employees at home in 1997 (278 versus 280). This could be due to the 
fact that also smaller firms started to invest in Eastern countries after the 
fall of the iron curtain. The median size of foreign employment 
increased by a factor of six from 1989 to 1997. The number of firms 
investing in Eastern countries increased dramatically during the sample 
period from 14 in 1989 to 81 in 1997. 
 
Firms investing in Western European countries6 are larger than investors 
in Eastern countries (see table 12). The dynamics over time concerning 
both the number of FDI-investments and employee growth abroad is 
less pronounced than for Eastern countries. 
 
Table 13 exhibits the statistics for firms investing in the rest of the 
world. These firms are the largest, and they experience the largest 
decline in domestic employment. 
 
                                                     
6 Western Europe includes Germany, Italy, France, Netherland, Belgium, 
Luxemburg, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, Ireland, Greece, Sweden, 
Finland, Denmark, Switzerland, Norway, Island. 
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Table 10:  Summary statistics about 222 Austrian manufacturing and 
mining firms over 1989-1997, total 
 Austria Abroad 
1989/1997-Number of employees  
  Mean     613    232 
  Median     263      52 
  Number of observations  1.594 1.594 
1989/1997-Average annual percentage change of number of employees 
  Mean -0.031 0.098 
  Median -0.001 0.000 
  Number of observations  1.303 1.278 
1989-Number of employees   
  Mean    824   117 
  Median    278    23 
  Number of observations    118  118 
1990-Number of employees   
  Mean    725 140 
  Median    275   33 
  Number of observations    141 141 
1991-Number of employees   
  Mean    659 212 
  Median    261   41 
  Number of observations    169 169 
1992-Number of employees   
  Mean    603 222 
  Median    255   44 
  Number of observations    190 190 
1993-Number of employees   
  Mean    565 229 
  Median    247   52 
  Number of observations    218 218 
1994-Number of employees   
  Mean    561 233 
  Median   255   69 
  Number of observations    208 208 
1995-Number of employees   
  Mean    568 275 
  Median    265   80 
  Number of observations    198 198 
1996-Number of employees   
  Mean    575 301 
  Median    265 102 
  Number of observations    181 181 
1997-Number of employees   
  Mean    563 299 
  Median    280 100 
  Number of observations    171 171 
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Table 11:  Summary statistics about 222 Austrian manufacturing and 
mining firms over 1989-1997, Eastern Countries 
 Austria Abroad 
1989/1997-Number of employees  
  Mean      681      296 
  Median     215     102 
  Number of observations     606     606 
1989/1997-Average annual percentage change of number of employees 
  Mean -0.034 0.124 
  Median  0.000 0.009 
  Number of observations      521     490 
1989-Number of employees   
  Mean     496     158 
  Median     104        23 
  Number of observations       14       14 
1990-Number of employees   
  Mean      462      215 
  Median     106       27 
  Number of observations       29       29 
1991-Number of employees   
  Mean     419     335 
  Median     185       50 
  Number of observations       49       49 
1992-Number of employees   
  Mean     830     300 
  Median     213      86 
  Number of observations       67      67 
1993-Number of employees   
  Mean     737     303 
  Median     206      93 
  Number of observations       90      90 
1994-Number of employees   
  Mean      708     288 
  Median      236     108 
  Number of observations       93       93 
1995-Number of employees   
  Mean      698      293 
  Median      225      119 
  Number of observations        95          95 
1996-Number of employees   
  Mean      685      313 
  Median      213      152 
  Number of observations        88        88 
1997-Number of employees   
  Mean       711       308 
  Median       278       143 
  Number of observations         81          81 
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Table 12:  Summary statistics about 222 Austrian manufacturing and 
mining firms over 1989-1997, Western Europe 
 Austria Abroad 
1989/1997-Number of employees  
  Mean      745    136 
  Median      339     42 
  Number of observations     967    967 
1989/1997-Average annual percentage change of number of employees 
  Mean -0.027 0.025 
  Median -0.005 0.000 
  Number of observations      801    807 
1989-Number of employees   
  Mean      892     95 
  Median      449     23 
  Number of observations        85     85 
1990-Number of employees   
  Mean      864   102 
  Median      324     29 
  Number of observations        97     97 
1991-Number of employees   
  Mean      781   131 
  Median      305     40 
  Number of observations      105   105 
1992-Number of employees   
  Mean      750   139 
  Median      298     43 
  Number of observations      111   111 
1993-Number of employees   
  Mean      679   125 
  Median      302     41 
  Number of observations      127   127 
1994-Number of employees   
  Mean      671   122 
  Median      339     40 
  Number of observations      120   120 
1995-Number of employees   
  Mean      703   163 
  Median      341     50 
  Number of observations      113   113 
1996-Number of employees   
  Mean     719   179 
  Median     362     58 
  Number of observations     106   106 
1997-Number of employees   
  Mean     709   161 
  Median     363     52 
  Number of observations     103   103 
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Table 13:  Summary statistics about 222 Austrian manufacturing and 
mining firms over 1989-1997, other countries 
 Austria Abroad 
1989/1997-Number of employees  
  Mean     923     151 
  Median     500      42 
  Number of observations     390    390 
1989/1997-Average annual percentage change of number of employees 
  Mean -0.052 0.083 
  Median -0.013 0.000 
  Number of observations     324    312 
1989-Number of employees   
  Mean 1.315     92 
  Median    590     36 
  Number of observations      38     38 
1990-Number of employees   
  Mean 1.256     91 
  Median    577     31 
  Number of observations     39     39 
1991-Number of employees   
  Mean 1.139   138 
  Median    545     50 
  Number of observations      41     41 
1992-Number of employees   
  Mean 1.045   149 
  Median    560     52 
  Number of observations     44     44 
1993-Number of employees   
  Mean 900   139 
  Median 547     50 
  Number of observations    48     48 
1994-Number of employees   
  Mean 849   157 
  Median 495     48 
  Number of observations   45     45 
1995-Number of employees   
  Mean 688   180 
  Median 448     46 
  Number of observations   46       46 
1996-Number of employees   
  Mean 664   173 
  Median 402     31 
  Number of observations   46     46 
1997-Number of employees   
  Mean 584   223 
  Median 345     34 
  Number of observations   43     43 
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Table 14 exhibits a correlation matrix of the employee growth rates at 
home and abroad, and broken down into growth in Eastern countries, 
Western Europe, and growth in the rest of the world. The table shows 
that annual growth rates at home and abroad are not significantly 
correlated. One interesting fact to note is that employment growth in the 
Western European countries is positively correlated to employment 
growth in Eastern countries (Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.31, p-
value = 0.00). 
 
Table 14: Correlation matrix of average annual percentage changes 
1989/1997 
Austria Eastern countries Western Europe 
Abroad  
  Pearson correlation coefficient   -0.0027   
  p-value    0.9247   
  Number of observations 1.213   
Eastern countries    
  Pearson correlation coefficient   0.0041   
  p-value   0.9285   
  Number of observations   471   
Western Europe    
  Pearson correlation coefficient -0.0234 0.3094  
  p-value  0.5161 0.0003  
  Number of observations   770   132  
Other countries    
  Pearson correlation coefficient -0.0536 0.0629 -0.0209 
  p-value  0.3569 0.6390  0.7697 
  Number of observations   298 58   198 
 
2.4. Outsourcing and total factor productivity growth 
 
According to the theory of international trade, outsourcing may affect 
the home country by increasing its overall productivity. Feenstra–
Hanson (1997, 1999) show that empirically the effects of outsourcing 
are similar to those of a (possibly non-neutral) technical change. 
 
As a measure of productivity growth we use the Tornqvist-index of total 
factor productivity which is defined as the volume of output in relation 
to an index of inputs (weighted by shares in total variable costs, see 
Appendix). In contrast to labor productivity this index additionally 
accounts for increases in capital and intermediate inputs. Over the 
period 1991-1998 we observe a median increase of the total factor 
productivity (TFP) of 0.9 percent p.a. (Table 16 below). 
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There are differences in TFP-growth, however not significant, across 
industries with the highest productivity increases in refined petroleum, 
electrical machinery, communication equipment and medical precision 
instruments and decreases in office machinery (which seems to be an 
outlier) and textiles. At the pure descriptive level no differences in TFP-
growth between those industries with a high and a low outsourcing ratio 
to the East can be detected. Below, we will analyze this issue in more 
detail econometrically, controlling for industry and time specific effects 
as well as for other exogenous determinants. 
 
We do not analyze the impact of fragmentation on structural change in 
detail. However, looking at the growth rates of real value added reveals 
pronounced changes in industry structure in the nineties. Textile, 
apparel and leather undergo a deep restructuring process with real value 
added shrinking by 2.3%-7.5% p.a.; the other transport equipment 
industry is also shrinking on average. The highest growth rates can be 
found in refined petroleum, in the technology and human capital 
intensive industries (NACE 29-32) and in the motor vehicles sector. 
With respect to the degree of outsourcing table 16 below indicates that 
the industries with a high degree of outsourcing to the East are at least 
partly those which are under pressure of restructuring and exhibit slower 
growth. According to the Kruskal-Wallis test the growth differentials 
are not significant, however. 
 
2.5. Outsourcing and the labor market 
 
2.5.1. Relative wages and employment of skilled and unskilled workers 
 
One of the central issues in the debate on potential detrimental effects of 
increased trade on national labour markets has been whether increased 
trade has hurt unskilled workers by lowering their wages and increasing 
the skilled-unskilled wage differentials. Research on the this issue has 
been most intense for the US and then the UK and less so for other 
advanced economies. To date, with some exceptions (Wood, 1995) the 
broad consensus of the research on the US is that import competition 
accounts for only a small part of the declining relative wages of the less 
skilled workers. The estimates rage from zero to one-third for the US 
(Slaughter, 1999). For the other advanced economies, the evidence so 
far suggests a similarly small effect of imports on wages but possibly 
larger effects on employment in Europe, which is likely in part a 
reflection of structural rigidities in European labour markets. 
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For Austria table 15 reveals virtually no rise in relative wages but a 
quite large increase in the skilled-unskilled employment ratio of 
4.4 percent p.a. on average over the period 1990 to 1998. 
 
Table 15:  Growth of total employment and ratio of wages and 
employment of skilled and unskilled workers in Austrian 
manufacturing 
 Total employment Ratio of skilled and unskilled workers 
  Wages Employment 
1990 100.0 1.39 1.54 
1991 100.1 1.39 1.59 
1992   97.2 1.39 1.62 
1993   93.0 1.41 1.83 
1994   90.4 1.41 2.01 
1995   89.8 1.40 2.02 
1996   87.0 1.42 2.15 
1997   85.2 1.42 2.25 
1998   85.4 1.40 2.19 
 Average annual percentage change 
1990/1998  -2.0 0.0 4.4 
 
As a first glance at the possible impact of fragmentation, in tables 16 
and 17 we split the file into industries with high outsourcing and 
industries with low outsourcing to the East and perform a Kruskal-
Wallis test to see whether there has been a systematically different 
development across these industry groups in such variables as (value 
added) prices, wages of low-skilled and high-skilled workers, cost of 
capital, value added and employment. While we find no significant 
differences in the development of wages and any of the other variables 
considered, outsourcing results to make a difference to employment. 
High outsourcing industries have been subject to significantly higher 
negative employment responses than low outsourcing industries. That 
outsourcing leads to negative volume effects rather than price (wage) 
effects is consistent with the hypothesis that under unionized wage 
setting mechanisms and a preference for not too large skilled to 
unskilled wage differentials, possible negative impacts of trade are more 
likely to be absorbed in form of employment losses. While 
disaggregation of employment into skill types shows significantly 
higher employment losses for low-skilled workers, a significant 
difference between low and high outsourcing industries results only for 
high-skilled employment. Note however, that the difference in the 
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median of employment changes across the two industry groups is higher 
for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers. 
 
Table 16: Outsourcing to Eastern Countries 
Median of log change of  
TFP value 
added 
total 
employment
low-
skilled 
workers
high-
skilled 
workers
Test on difference 
between 
low- and high-
skilled 
workers1) 
Degree of outsourcing 
   high-above 
industry 
average 
0.009 0.019 -0.014 -0.026 -0.012 0.02 
   low-below 
industry 
average 
0.009 0.013 -0.026 -0.033 -0.018 0.00 
   total 0.009 0.017 -0.023 -0.030 -0.016  
       
Difference between high and low oursourcing,    
Kruskal-Wallis 
test, p-value 
0.580 0.790 0.080 0.140 0.080  
1) two sided p-value 
 
Table 17: Outsourcing to Eastern Countries 
 Median of log change of 
 Value added 
prices 
Wages of Cost of 
capital 
  low-skilled high-skilled  
  workers 
Test on difference 
between 
low- and high-
skilled 
workers1) 
Degree of outsourcing  
   high-above 
industry 
average 
0.017 0.044 0.044 -0.011 0.700 
   low-below 
industry 
average 
0.014 0.043 0.041 -0.016 1.000 
   total 0.015 0.043 0.041 -0.014 0.810 
      
Difference between high and low oursourcing,   
Kruskal-Wallis 
test, p-value 
0.850 0.760 0.390   0.800  
1) two sided p-value 
2.5.2. The labor content of Austrian intermediate imports from the 
Eastern countries 
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A distinguishing feature of the literature on the labour market impacts of 
trade is the diverse set of methodologies and empirical research 
strategies. One of these have been factor (labor) content calculations 
(e.g. Borjas/Freeman/Katz, 1997, Wood, 1994 and 1998). Basically, this 
is an exercise which amounts to computing the quantity of labor 
embodied in net trade and so estimating the effect of trade on the 
demand for (skilled and unskilled) labor at given factor prices by 
comparison with what it would have been in a hypothetical situation 
without any trade, or where trade is reduced to a level of some earlier 
year, assuming technologies as constant. More specifically, while for 
exports one calculates the actual labor content, a counterfactual factor 
content is calculated for imports, that is, how much of labor would have 
been employed to produce the imported goods domestically. 
 
We calculated the labor content of intermediate imports from the East. 
The results are displayed in table 18 and give the additional amount of 
labor (persons) that would have been demanded in 1990 and 1995 if 
intermediate imports from Eastern countries were reduced to zero and 
substituted by domestic input production. Having in mind all the 
possible sources of bias, and given wages and factor supply, we see that 
in both years the effects on labor diplacements from outsourcing to the 
East is relatively small affecting in total 3880 employees in 1990 and 
5363 in 1995. The third column in table 18 gives an alternative 
calculation of the labor content of intermediate imports from the East by 
applying 1990 sectorial input coefficients to 1995 imports (the 
assumption being that these would more correctly reflect the technology 
before outsourcing to the East became important). We see that estimates 
for 1995, applying this alternative calculation go up by 1865 persons to 
7227. 
 
Factor content calculations have been subject to wide criticism for a 
number of reasons, so that the figures should be interpreted with due 
care to their limitations and the underlying assumptions. Apart from 
theoretical considerations and criticisms widely discussed Deardorff–
Hakura (1994), Deardorff (2000), Kohler (1999), Leamer (2000) and 
Krugman (2000) there is an important problem in the empirical 
application. The results depend crucially on the assumptions made in 
calculating the labor content of the hypothetical domestic production 
that would substitute for intermediate imports (see e.g. Wood, 1991 and 
1998). Factor contents of imports are estimated from domestic sectoral 
factor input coefficients. This assumes that all imports are competing, 
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that is, imported intermediates in a given statistical category are taken to 
be goods of the same type, and in particular of the same labor and/or 
skill intensity as those produced in the corresponding domestic sector. 
This is an assumption specifically unreasonable for outsourcing to the 
East where it is more likely that the most labor intensive and most low 
skill intensive fragments of production are outsourced so that the factor 
intensities of the fragment outsourced certainly differ from that of the 
integrated process as well as from the fragment remaining in the 
country7. This is an important source of underestimation of the impact 
of outsourcing on labor demand. The higher the level of statistical 
aggregation at which factor input coefficients are observed the higher 
degree of underestimation. 
 
On the other hand there is also a possibility of overestimation, that could 
arise, if domestic equivalents of imports are higher priced, which would 
deter consumers so that the impact of labor displacement is overstated. 
 
Furthermore, the above calculation of factor contents does not take into 
account the adjustment processes on the labor and product markets 
induced by outsourcing. So, the calculated figures can at very best only 
be interpreted as "very short-run" effects of outsourcing with complete 
intersectoral immobility of factors and constant wages (see Kohler, 
2000). 
 
                                                     
7 Note that the fragmentation technology, i.e. the input coefficients, are 
unobservable, both in the domestic and foreign country at the two-digit 
industry level. 
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Table 18: Labor content of intermediate inputs imported from Eastern 
Countries 
 1990 1995 1995 
(1990 input 
coefficients) 
Persons   
Food and beverages     393      211   262 
Textiles    247     349   416 
Clothing      46       71   140 
Leather     195     195   266 
Wood products    505     690   849 
Pulp and papter    206    154   234 
Publishing, printing and reproduction       0        0       0 
Coke, refined petroleum, nuclear fuel     89      13     18 
Chemicals    651    412   469 
Rubber and plastic products      31      42     83 
Other non-metallic mineral products   104     271   340 
Basic metals   726  1343 2037 
Fabricated metal products   193    450   556 
Machinery and equipment n. e. c.   203    305   332 
Office machinery and computers      0        0       0 
Electrical machinery   179    441   590 
Communication equipment     38    205   294 
Medical instruments      9     23     26 
Motor vehicles     28     88    130 
Other transport equipment      6     18    47 
Furniture; manufacturing n. e. c.     31     79   136 
   
Total manufacturing 3880 5362 7227 
  High outsourcing industries 3383 4582 6192 
  Low outsourcing industries   497   780 1035 
 
 
3. Econometric estimates of the impact of outsourcing for 
Austrian manufacturing 
 
3.1. Productivity effects 
 
To analyze the impact of outsourcing on changes in total factor 
productivity we specify an econometric equation based on a translog-
production function (see Appendix). The dependent variable is the 
Tornqvist-index of TFP-growth and we concentrate on the effects of 
intermediate imports as a measure of fragmentation. Data on intrafirm 
trade are too highly aggregated and cannot be used in the econometric 
exercise. 
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Outsourcing is introduced as the lagged ratio of our proxy for 
intermediate purchases from Eastern countries relative to total expenses 
for intermediates. The full specification of the translog function as 
proposed, for example, in Feenstra/Hanson (1997) cannot be estimated 
since the interaction terms of outsourcing and inputs which should 
capture non-neutral technical change induced by outsourcing are highly 
collinear rendering precise estimation impossible. Rather we introduce 
two interaction terms of the outsourcing measure with dummies, the first 
taking the value 1 if an industry is classified as skill intensive, Dhigh skill, 
and the second if it is capital intensive, Dcapital. Additional controls are 
included to avoid that all productivity changes are erroneously 
associated to outsourcing. Summing up, the estimated specification 
reads: 
 
(2) ∆TFPit = βo + β1Oit + β2OitDhigh skill + β3OitDcapital + β '4Xit + µi + 
λt + εit 
 
where i is the index for two-digit industries and t the time-index. X 
comprises the R&D to output ratio as well as general export and import 
openness with respect to Eastern countries as additional controls. µi are 
fixed industry effects capturing exogenous neutral technological 
progress and λt denote fixed time effects which control for yearly 
influences like the business cycle common to all industries. 
Additionally, we account for outliers by introducing outlier dummies 
whenever the studentized residuals turn out to be greater than 3 in the 
basic specification (see Belsley/Kuh/Welsch, 1980). 
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Table 19: Pooled regressions for total factor productivity growth 
 Log change in TFP Log change in pV+TFP-e 
 b t-value b t-value 
   
Outsourcing to Eastern 
countries - base  
0.54 2.4 **) 0.86 1.6 *) 
Interaction with  
Dlow-skilled/high-skilled 
-0.12 -0.2 -0.47 -0.3  
Interaction with 
Outsourcing*Dcapital/employment 
0.31 1.0 0.04 0.1  
   
Prediction (weighted average 
across industries and time) 
0.009 0.023   
Predicted overall effect of outsourcing 
compared to 1990 
  
(weighted average across 
industries and time) 
0.002 0.002   
   
Statistics   
N=18, T=8   
R2 0.57 0.59   
s 0.01 0.04   
Reset-Test, F-test 1.32 (3, 103) 1.56 (3, 104)  
Heteroskedasticity, c2 1.62 (1) 1.81 (1)  
Normality, c2 1.44 (2) 10.99 **) (2)  
   
F-tests   
  Time dummies  2.5 **) (7, 106) 1.35 (7, 107)  
  Industry dummies 1.6 *) (16, 106) 2.73 **) (16, 107)  
  Interaction terms 0.5 (2, 106) 0.04 (2, 107)  
Note: Control variables for export and import openness, R&D intensity (all 
insignifcant), outsourcing to OECD (significantly negativ), outlier dummies, fixed 
industry and time effects are not reported. NACE 16, 30, 35 and 36 are omitted because 
of data quality or because the majority of observations within the 2-digit industry level 
have been classified as outliers (absolute value of studentized residuals above 3). 
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust using the White-procedure (White, 1980). 
**) significant at 5 percent; *) significant at 10 percent.      
  
The estimation results in table 19 indicate that outsourcing exerts a 
significant, positive, technologically neutral effect on TFP-growth8. 
Note the Tornqvist-index implicitly controls for changes in inputs and in 
their intensity in usage (change in weights) as a result of changes in 
technology induced by outsourcing. So specification 2 is measuring 
                                                     
8 We also estimated fixed effects regressions without additional control 
variables as well as robusts median regressions in order to assess the 
robustness of our estimates. For both equations we derive comparable results. 
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only overall changes in production technologies. The interaction terms 
suggest that the positive impact of outsourcing is possibly less 
pronounced in high-skilled and more capital intensive sectors than in 
low-skilled intensive industries. However, the parameters could not be 
estimated precisely and so it is impossible to draw firm conclusions on 
this. In assessing the impact of outsourcing we ask what would be the 
effect on TFP-growth, if outsourcing is reduced to its 1990 level and 
compare the difference in the prediction of the estimated equation. 
Table 19 shows that on average 0.2 percent of the 0.9 percent average 
increase in TFP can be attributed to outsourcing. 
 
3.2. Outsourcing and the effects on skill-specific employment 
 
The literature on the labor market effects of increased openness (mostly 
measured either in terms of overall trade or multinational activities, less 
often directly in terms of trade in intermediates, i.e. outsourcing) to a 
large extent is only concerned with the effects on wages. This is driven 
by the fact that traditional trade models assume full factor market 
clearing in the sense that there is perfect intersectoral (not international) 
labor mobility, wages are fully flexible and unemployment is 
impossible. Under such circumstances the Heckscher-Ohlin model of 
trade allows for a valid analysis of the effects of trade (and also 
multinational activities, if the model is extended to non-perfect market 
structures, see Helpman, 1984 and 1985, Helpman/Krugman, 1985, 
Markusen/Venables, 1996 and 1998, among others) on factor income 
e.g. of the high-skilled relative to the low-skilled. This type of analysis 
was seen to be suitable for integration processes which occur without 
large changes of factor employment (for instance as in the case of 
Northern American integration with the foundation of NAFTA). In such 
a case it is sufficient to concentrate on the effects of falling trade 
barriers and other trade impediments on relative factor rewards. 
However, it was mentioned several times (Krugman, 1995, Wood, 
1998) that for countries − usually associated with Europe − which are 
facing some form of wage rigidities this might be an incomplete 
analysis. In that case one would have to allow for the possibility of a 
change in relative factor employment (high-skilled versus low-skilled in 
our case). Rigidities of relative wages between the high-skilled and the 
low-skilled in Europe often were associated with preferences for not too 
large wage differentials and unionized wage-setting mechanisms within 
the respective economies. 
Dell’mour et al. 
 
281 
The stylized facts for Austria give some support to a theoretical 
foundation which is based on the latter arguments, remember the 
relative small rise of relative wages and the relative large increase in 
relative employment of high-skilled and low-skilled over the last 
decade. 
 
In this chapter we will search for the effects of fragmentation 
(outsourcing) on the relative employment of high-skilled to low-skilled 
by Austrian industries. In order to isolate this effect, we also have to 
control for changes in other variables which would generate a similar 
impact on this relation. Therefore, we shall demonstrate the effect on 
high-skilled relative to low-skilled employment in a particular industry 
remembering the well-known labor supply and demand diagram (Figure 
1) which for our purpose is drawn for relative employment. 
 
Figure 1: Outsourcing and the effects on relative employment and wages 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initially, the economy faces the relative labor demand curve (H/L)D. As 
usual, ω = ωH/ωL refers to the relative wage rate of high-skilled and low-
skilled. What are the candidates for a shift of the depicted relative labor 
demand curve? The literature provides us with a couple of explanations: 
First, non-neutral (unskilled labor augmenting) technological change 
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tends to change the input mix and shifts the relative labor demand curve 
outwards. Second, increased efficiency in the production process might 
change the input-factor mix, increase exports and presumably shift 
relative demand outwards. Third, increased competition via imports in 
final goods might reduce relative demand for that factor which is more 
extensively contained in imports resulting in either an inward or an 
outward shift of the relative labor demand curve (this remains an 
empirical question). Fourth, increased competition from foreign 
suppliers of intermediates might (at least relatively) reduce the demand 
for that factor which is intensively used in the production of 
intermediates. Hence, outsourcing into low-wage countries would 
presumably result in an outward shift of the relative demand curve. In 
the case of opening-up of the East the driving forces behind arguments 
(2)-(4) could be the decline in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, 
increased multinational activities, etc. 
 
Of course, the effect on relative employment (H/L) and wages (ωH/ωL) 
crucially depends on the shape and slope of the relative labor supply 
curve. As mentioned above, traditional models of trade assume a 
vertical (relative) labor supply curve which is due to fully flexible 
relative wages. Hence, any outward shift in relative labor demand (e.g. 
because of increased outsourcing) would only cause an increase in the 
wages for high-skilled relative to low-skilled employees (from ω  to ω* 
in figure 1), leaving relative employment unchanged (at H /
...
L in figure 
1). In contrast, if relative wages were fully rigid this would be due to an 
infinitely elastic relative labor supply curve. Therefore, any shift in 
relative labor demand would result in a change in relative employment 
(in figure 1 from H /
...
L to H /
~
L) leaving relative wages unchanged (at ω  
in figure 1). However, if there is some wage rigidity in the economy, the 
new equilibrium after an exogenous outward shift of relative labor 
demand would take place somewhere between point B (i.e. zero-elastic 
relative labor supply) and point C (i.e. infinitely elastic relative labor 
supply) in figure 1. We would therefore expect a rise in both relative 
employment and relative wages in favor of high-skilled employment. 
 
In order to isolate the effect of outsourcing on relative employment 
between the high-skilled and the low-skilled, we have to control for the 
effects of the several explanatory variables which are capable to shift 
relative labor demand. Hence, industry-specific openness to exports and 
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to imports, and the capital-output ratio enter the equation. On the other 
hand, fixed industry and time effects are included in order to control for 
exogenous non-neutral technological progress (reflected by time effects) 
and to be able to interpret the coefficients "within" industries. This 
would lead us to the following econometric specification estimated with 
a panel of two-digit industries for the period 1990-1998: 
(3) ln
Hit
Lit = β0 + ln
ωHit
ωLit + ln XOPit + ln MROPit + ln KY + ln Oit + 
µi + λt + εit 
 
where subscript i refers to industry and t to time (years). H and L are 
high-skilled and low-skilled employment, ωH and ωL are the respective 
wages, XOP is export openness and MROP is import openness 
(measured in terms of gross production), where the "R" indicates that 
this measure contains only imports minus outsourcing to Eastern 
countries. KY is the capital-output ratio. Finally, O is our outsourcing 
measure9 and µi and λt are group-specific (industry and time) fixed 
effects. 
 
Of course, relative wages and relative employment face an endogeneity 
problem and the same holds true for outsourcing to the East, as we 
presume that this is production which intensively uses unskilled labor. 
We therefore instrument both variables (in an alternative specification 
we treat outsourcing as exogenous) to obtain unbiased and consistent 
estimation results. We find trade impediment measures (applied most 
favored nation tariff rates, TB, and non-tariff barriers to trade, NTB) as 
well as union power measures (degree of organization of trade unions, 
ORG, median firm size, MSIZE, and price cost margins, PCM) to be 
appropriate instruments from a theoretical point of view (see Egger-
Egger, 2000). 
 
Table 20: Skill-specific relative labor demand and outsourcing in 
Austria 1990-1998 
Two-stage least squares estimation results (dependent variable 
is high-skilled relative to low-skilled employment in heads) 
                                                     
9  Of course, fragmentation of the value added chain was to some extent arm's 
length and to some extent it was of an intra-firm type. In the analysis of the 
effects on relative employment we will not distinguish between the two and 
remember that trade statistics do not discriminate between intrafirm and other 
trade. 
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 Specification I1)2) Specification II1)3) 
 b Std. error b Std. error 
Dependent Variable4)   
  Relative wage rate (RWAGE) -0.07 0.850 -1.36 1.232  
  Export openness (XOP)5)   0.28 0.066 **)   0.20 0.070 **) 
  Import openness (MOP)5) -0.36 0.069 **) -0.25 0.086 **) 
  Capital intensity (KI) -0.22 0.096 **) -0.07 0.115  
  Outsourcing (OUT)   0.08 0.031 **)   0.02 0.209  
  Constant   1.49 0.717 **)   1.34 0.755 *) 
  
Statistics (N=20; T=9)6)   
Observations 179 179  
Adj. R2 0.98 0.98  
Time effects: F (8, 146)7) 0.89 1.31  
Industry effects: F (19, 146)7) 464.45 **) 311.49 **) 
Outlier Effects: F(3, 143)7) - -  
Normal Distribution I: adj. c2 () 8) 4.64 4.64  
Normal Distribution II 9) 0.43 0.43  
Instrument Relevance: R2p (RWAGE)10) 0.26 0.19  
Instrument Relevance: R2p (OUT)10) 0.57 -  
RESET:  F(3, 144) 11) 6.69 **) 6.69 **) 
1) Outsourcing to Eastern countries measured as percent of intermediate inputs.  
2) Relative wages and outsourcing are instrumented by unit labour costs in Eastern 
countries (ULCOST),  organisation degree of trade unions (ORG), price cost margin 
(PCM), median firm size (MSIZE), trade barriers (TB), non-tariff barrier dummy 
(NTBD), non-tariff barrier interaction term (NTBI). 3) Only relative wages are 
instrumented by organisation degree of trade unions (ORG), price cost margin (PCM), 
medium firm size (MSIZE). 4) All variables are in logs. Parameter estimates for fixed 
time and industry effects as well as for outlier dummies are not reported in order to save 
space. 5) Exports (imports) as percent of  industry gross output. 6) Degrees of Freedom 
in parentheses. 7) F-tests for testing the restriction of joint zero parameters for the 
respective effects (outlier dummies, fixed time and industry effects). 8) Combined 
Skewness/Kurtosis test for normality, Royston (1991). 9) Shapiro-Wilk test for normal 
residuals(Royston 1991). 10) Partial R2 diagnostics testing for instrumental relevance, 
Shea (1997). 11) Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of the 
dependent. **) significant at 5 percent; *) significant at 10 percent. 
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The econometric estimates provide the following relatively robust 
results: 
• an increase in overall export openness increases relative 
employment in favor of high-skilled; 
• an increase in overall import openness increases relative 
employment in favor of low-skilled; 
• an increase in outsourcing increases relative employment in favor of 
high-skilled. 
 
This on the one hand supports the stylized fact that Austria seems to act 
as an importer of relatively skill-intensive goods from abroad. On the 
other hand, it is an exporter of skill intensive goods itself. Outsourcing 
works in the same direction as was supported by other empirical 
contributions (e.g. Anderton/Brenton, 1999). However, this has nothing 
to say about the impact of outsourcing on overall employment which − 
as has been demonstrated − depends on general equilibrium effects. But 
it can help to underpin the role of labor market policy in the process of 
increasing integration. In so far as Eastern Enlargement would be 
related to outsourcing (via the reduction of trade impediments and 
differences between standards, etc.) one would expect a ceteris paribus 
decrease in the relative demand for unskilled labor. This would claim 
for accompanying labor market policies (financial support for training 
and education programs, etc.) in order to minimize welfare losses for the 
respective people in the adjustment process. 
 
3.3. Induced mandated wage changes 
 
In this chapter we analyze the impact of outsourcing to the East on the 
labor market from yet another angle. We ask, how outsourcing to the 
Eastern countries would affect relative wages of skilled and unskilled in 
a world of fully flexible wages and no unemployment. In the light of 
specific labor market developments in Austria (virtually no increase in 
relative wages of skilled workers, relatively large rise in relative 
employment of skilled) one could then ask, to what extent possible 
negative pressures from outsourcing to the East on wages of skilled and 
unskilled are absorbed in the form of employment losses due to the 
inflexibility of wages. 
 
Mandated factor price regressions, which are sometimes also referred to 
as "price studies" have been widely used in the empirical trade and 
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wages literature to study the impact of trade competition from low wage 
countries in general10 and outsourcing to low wage countries in specific 
(Feenstra-Hanson, 1999), on the skilled-unskilled wage gap. The 
theoretical framework for these studies is the production side of the 
standard, perfectly competitive Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory model and 
the Stolper-Samuelson link between product prices and factor prices that 
results from totally differentiating a set of zero profit conditions 
equating price with average costs for all perfectly competitive 
industries. Expressed in terms of percentage changes this yields (e.g. 
p* = dp/p): 
 
• holding technology constant:  
(4) p* = θω* 
 
• allowing for technological progress: 
(5) p* = θω* - TFP* 
 
where p* is a vector of product price changes, ω* is a vector of domestic 
factor price changes, θ is a cost-share matrix and TFP is total factor 
productivity. 
 
The basic intuition of the Stolper-Samuelson link between product and 
factor prices is the following: international trade affects product prices 
across countries, and this affects factor prices within countries by 
influencing relative factor demands. At initial factor prices, any change 
in product prices or technology means that zero profit conditions do not 
longer hold. Producers expand output in sectors which have become 
profitable and reduce output in unprofitable sectors. Relative labor 
demand increases for the factors employed relative intensively in 
expanding sectors and reduces for factors intensive in contracting 
sectors. To restore equilibrium, relative factor prices must adjust in 
response to these demand shifts. 
 
The Stolper-Samuelson equations (4) or (5) form the basis for the 
mandated wage regressions: changes in industry prices are regressed on 
the level of sector cost shares for various factors of production. The 
coefficient estimates on the cost shares are then interpreted as the 
                                                     
10 For an overview see: Slaughter (1999), Huber/Wolfmayr-Schnitzer (1999). 
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predicted factor price (wage) changes, that are mandated by the change 
in product prices to maintain zero profits in all sectors. 
 
Three important points are worth noting at this stage. First, as already 
pointed out, the underlying Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory takes a long 
run view and assumes fully flexible factor prices and perfect 
intersectoral mobility of factors, so that unemployment is impossible. 
Second, mandated wage regressions seem to suggest that goods prices 
are exogenous (given by world market prices) and can thus be 
influenced only by international trade, but this is only true for a small 
country. Note, that the Stolper-Samuelson mechanism holds whether 
product-price change are due to international trade or any other force 
(technological change). Thus, if technological changes are passed 
through to industry prices and productivity changes are happening 
across countries or happening in a large country which by virtue of its 
size can alter world prices the relation between international trade and 
industry prices is not that straightforward anymore. One needs a way to 
determine empirically what portion of the observed product price 
changes are attributable to international trade and what to technology. 
As Feenstra (1998) has noted, however, the distinction between trade 
versus technology becomes misleadig in the case of increased trade 
through outsourcing. The reason for this is that outsourcing of labor-
intensive production stages has a similar effect as sector specific skill-
biased technological change in that it reduces the demand for unskilled 
relative to skilled labor (see also Kohler, 2000). The third important 
point is, that the Stolper-Samuelson mapping describes no causal 
relationship, but a general equilibrium relationship between two sets of 
endogenous variables. Attributing causality from international trade 
(which itself is an endogenous phenomenon) to product price changes 
and factor price changes requires reference to some exogenous aspect of 
international trade. Thus, empirically, the important question is, what 
are the exogenous forces that jointly drive goods and factor prices. 
 
Feenstra/Hanson (1997, 1999) make this point very clear. They 
explicitly show, that when the price regression is fully specified, taking 
into account interindustry wage differentials, due e.g. to variation in 
factor quality or industry specific rents, the estimated coefficients just 
reproduce the factor price changes actually observed in the data, 
therefore only summarize how prices and productivity commove with 
factor prices, and can thus be no analytical device to calculate the effect 
of international trade on factor prices. Treating industrial prices as well 
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as productivity changes as endogenous, the authors therefore propose a 
two-step estimation procedure, where in a first step the features that 
contribute to changes in prices and productivity are disentangled, and 
then, as a second step it is asked how these individual features affect 
factor prices (wages). 
 
In our estimation of the effects of Austrian outsourcing to Eastern 
countries we adopt their two stage estimation procedure. Thus, in a first 
step we decompose price and productivity changes into portions 
attributable to structural variables according to : 
 
(6) ∆ ln pVit  + ∆TFPit + eit = γo + γ1Oit + γ2OitDhigh skill + γ3OitDcapital + 
γ4Xit + µi + νt + εit 
 
which regresses the change in industry (value added) price (pV) and total 
factor productivity (TFP) corrected for interindustry wage differentials 
(e) on outsourcing to the East (O), interaction terms of outsourcing to 
the East with dummies for skill intensive industries (ODhigh-skill) and 
capital intensive industries (ODcapital) and a variable X comprising the 
R&D to output ratio as well as overall export and import openness with 
respect to Eastern countries as additional control variables. µi and νt are 
industry and time specific fixed effects. Subscript i refers to industry 
and t to time (years) and ∆ indicates first differences. The last term on 
the left hand side corrects for interindustry-wage differentials and is 
defined as eit = 
1
2(υi, t − 1+υit)' (∆ ln ωit - ∆ ln ωt) where υit is the vector of 
cost shares of primary inputs, ∆lnωit are industry specific factor price 
changes and ∆lnωt the average factor price change across industries. 
Note that the right-hand side of equation 6 is identical to that one in 
equation 2 explaining total factor productivity. See the Appendix for an 
exact derivation of regression equation 6. An important point is that 
outsourcing besides influencing total factor productivity and thereby 
indirectly influencing the product price, has a direct feedback on 
product prices through its factor bias. So the coefficient on outsourcing 
resulting from the first regression includes a component measuring the 
direct effect of outsourcing on productivity, a second one measuring 
how much of that productivity influence is passed through to prices, and 
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a third component measuring the direct impact of outsourcing on prices 
(see Appendix and Feenstra–Hanson, 1997 and 1999)11. 
 
The corresponding estimation results are reported in the third and fourth 
column of table 19 above. Our results are consistent with that of TFP-
growth indicating a pronounced positive and neutral impact of 
outsourcing on combined TFP- and industry price changes. Directly 
estimating the pass-through coefficient of TFP-growth on price chances 
(not reported) shows that the direct effects of outsourcing on value-
added prices are small. Instead, the major impact comes from the 
indirect effect via productivity growth. 
 
As a second stage we isolate the impact of outsourcing to the East on 
price and productivity changes (also reported in column 3 of table 19). 
That is, we calculate the difference between the overall prediction of 
equation 6 and the prediction for a hypothetical situation where 
outsourcing is constrained to its 1990 value other determinants being 
constant. We denote this by (∆ ln pV,Oit  + ∆ TFPOit - ∆ eOit). The prediction 
for overall growth is 2.3 percent for the typical industry out of which 
0.2 percent (about one tenth of this overall change) are attributable to 
the outsourcing effect. Taking these results as a left-hand side variable, 
we regress this decomposed price and productivity change arising from 
outsourcing on the primary factor cost shares in order to estimate the 
mandated changes in factor prices consistent with outsourcing alone.  
 
This regression is specified as follows 
 
(7) ∆ ln pV,Oit  + ∆ TFPOit - ∆ eOit = ω' cs + ϕi + ψt + ζit 
 
where cs denotes cost shares for unskilled and skilled labor and capital. 
ϕi and ψt capture group specific (industry and time) fixed effects. The 
vector of coefficients, ω, obtained from this regression represents the 
change in primary factor prices that are explained (mandated) by 
outsourcing to the East. That is, the wage changes caused by a change in 
outsourcing to the East (in our case to the value of 1990) which should 
be observed if factor markets were perfect (no unemployment and the 
HO-model holds). Although the regression diagnostics indicate some 
                                                     
11 Note that under the assumption of exogenous prices the pass-through 
coefficient, as well as direct impact of outsourcing due to the factor bias of 
outsourcing would both be zero. 
 Fragmentation of the value added chain 290 
specification problems (possibly arising from endogeneity) and the 
estimates thus should be interpreted with care, we derive sufficiently 
robust results which are consistent with the hypotheses. In accordance 
with Feenstra/Hanson (1997, 1999), mandated changes are significantly 
negative for low-skilled workers and physical capital and positive − as 
expected − for high-skilled workers. However, the effect on the latter is 
less robust and possibly overestimated as the median regression in 
table 21 indicates. 
 
Table 21: Pooled mandated wage regressions 
Log change in pV+TFP-e
due to outsourcing 
Median regressions1) 
 b t-value b t-value2) 
  
Wages of low-skilled workers1) -0.11 -2.5 **) -0.14 -2.4 **) 
Wages of high-skilled workers1) 0.08 2.2 **) 0.02 0.4  
Rental rate of capital1) -0.15 -4.3 **) -0.23 -4.5 **) 
  
Statistics   
N=17, T=8   
R2 0.94 -   
Pseudo-R2 - 0.58   
s 0.03 -   
Reset-Test, F-test 14.90 **) (3, 99) -   
Heteroskedasticity, c2 28.00 (1) -   
Normality, c2 10.11 **) (2) -   
  
F-tests   
  Time dummies  4.24 **) (7, 102) 3.35 **) (7, 109)  
  Industry dummies 72.22 *) (15, 102) 11.85 **) (15, 109)  
Note: Outlier dummies, fixed industry and time effects are not reported. Standard errors 
Heteroskedasticity robust using the White-procedure (White, 1980). NACE 16, 27, 30, 
35 and 36 are omitted because of data quality or because the majority of observations 
within the 2-digit industry level have been classified as outliers (absolute value of 
studentized residuals avbove 3). 1) Deviation from total mean. 2) Based on residuals  
from bootstrapping (200 replications). 
 
Compared to the actual movement of skilled and unskilled wages in 
Austria these results give some indication that the existing wage 
flexibility has been insufficient to prevent some employment losses that 
were due to outsourcing the East. To a certain extent wage policies 
aiming at more equality seem to have worsened the employment 
prospects especially for low skilled labor consistent with our findings in 
calculations on relative labor demand. 
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4. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
In the nineties Austrian manufacturing experienced a marked increase in 
both export and import growth which significantly surpassed that of 
gross production and in this way enhanced openness to trade in Austrian 
manufacturing. This phenomenon was even more pronounced for 
economic relations with the Eastern countries than with the rest of the 
world. Especially, intermediate imports (outsourcing) from the East and 
FDI activities − although low in levels − have been rather dynamic 
forces since the fall of the iron curtain and have been important enough 
to exhibit an impact on the Austrian economy. Concentrating on 
manufacturing, empirical evidence shows that the observed increase in 
outsourcing to the East is mainly due to a substitution between formerly 
domestically sourced inputs and international (non-East) purchased 
inputs, rather than increased fragmentation per se. The comparison over 
time shows a stable pattern across industries for total international 
outsourcing, that is, the industries that had a relatively high imported 
intermediates share in 1990 were still the most important outsourcers by 
1998. In contrast, the industry structure of outsourcing to the East 
changed significantly over the period becoming more similar to 
Austrian sourcing from other countries. Looking at the correlations with 
domestic activities motivates our empirical analysis, showing that 
outsourcing to Eastern countries is related to changes in the volume and 
structure of employment in Austrian manufacturing. There seem to be 
almost no effects on factor prices. 
 
The econometric analysis derived three main results: 
• Outsourcing to the East significantly improves domestic growth in 
total factor productivity (possibly less pronounced in high-skilled 
and more in capital intensive industries). 
• It increases domestic employment of the high-skilled relative to the 
low-skilled. 
• Estimates of the mandated wage regressions lead to the conclusion 
that in the presence of perfect factor markets wages of the unskilled 
should be lower and higher for the high-skilled in response to 
outsourcing. As wages are not fully flexible one would expect to 
observe both (less pronounced) wage and employment effects. 
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The main conclusion is that the overall labor market effects from 
outsourcing to the Eastern countries are small. The most important 
impact will be on the structure of employment and wages (low-skilled 
versus high-skilled) as it is widely discussed in the literature on trade 
versus technical progress as the sources of increasing wage differentials 
(unemployment). The majority of the related literature on this topic has 
only been concerned with the effects on wages (having in mind the US 
situation) and less the employment effects (being in the center of 
European interests). However, independent of the causes of the 
pressures on the labor market (either trade or technological progress) 
and the expected effects (either mainly on wages or employment), most 
researchers agree that there is a substantial need for labor market policy 
in order to facilitate the adjustment process to the new equilibrium. The 
latter would be one with a higher proportion of high-skilled employees. 
There seems to be a consensus that trade restrictions and protection is an 
inadequate measure to avoid increasing wage differentials and 
unemployment (Krugman, 1995, Wood, 1995, Deardorff, 1999). 
Moreover, researchers also widely agree about the possible measures 
which are capable to ensure, that along the adjustment process distorting 
distribution effects on relative wages and/or employment (both in favor 
of the high-skilled) are kept as small as possible. In the literature the 
following policy measures in this debate are discussed: 
• Upgrading the labor force skills (Burda/Dluhosch, 1998) also by 
government action to improve education and training is ranked 
highest in the agenda (in order to fasten and amplify the skill 
acquiring process; Wood, 1995). 
• The deregulation of consumer services should enable this sector to 
absorb former production workers. This could also help to reduce 
possible income inequalities as it would tend to exhibit rising wages 
in flexible labor markets (Burda/Dluhosch, 1998). 
• Tax cuts, cash supplements to wages, better public services, and 
other subsidies to improve the living standards of workers who take 
low-paying jobs (Wood, 1995). 
• Subsidies to employers to encourage them to hire more unskilled 
workers, especially in non-traded services (Wood, 1995). 
• Immigration policy in favor of high-skilled immigrants (Srinivasan, 
1995). It was observed that certain low-skilled jobs in the 
nontradable sector seem to be performed disproportionately by 
immigrants. 
• Subsidies particularly on the education of the children of the 
unskilled. 
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• Taxes on wages of the skilled (or on the production of skill-
intensive goods) in order to finance the subsidies for the unskilled 
(Wood, 1995, Deardorff, 1998) 
 
From a trade theory perspective our results suggest that policies towards 
higher wage flexibility and intersectoral mobility of workers could have 
some moderating effects on employment losses, especially for the low 
skilled. Finally, public policy should support structural change that gets 
an additional impetus from outsourcing. Of course, the optimal policy 
will vary from country to country, and no specific policy will be the 
correct one for all countries (Wood/Ridao/Cano, 1999) and theory does 
us not provide with a clear-cut solution which policies will handle the 
problem best (Deardorff, 1999). Nevertheless, policy makers are 
requested to prevent low-skilled workers from too severe welfare losses 
in the adjustment process. 
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6. Appendix 
 
6.1. Measuring international outsourcing by imports of 
intermediates 
 
In our calculations of imported intermediates we rely on the Austrian I-
O table for 1990 and preliminary I-O data constructed from the usual 
make and absorption matrices for 1995, that were just made available to 
us by Statistics Austria. While the 1990 table disaggregates intermediate 
input flows in domestic products and imports, this information was not 
available for 1995. Thus for each missing year as well as for 1995 the 
intermediate import matrix was calculated by the following formula: 
 
(8) 
MIij
Iij  
Iij
∑j Iij ∑j  Iij 
 
The first term describes the share matrix of each type of intermediate 
import j of each industry i (MIij) in total intermediate purchases of type j 
of industry i (Iij). This matrix is known for 1990 and was extrapolated 
by yearly growth rates of import quotas (share of total imports in gross 
production) for each good, derived from yearly national account figures. 
The underlying assumption is that the development of the imported 
intermediate share of each good is the same across sectors. 
 
The second term gives the share of purchases of each type of input j in 
total intermediates sourced by industry i. This information is given by 
the respective I-O data for 1990 and 1995 and interpolated for the other 
years. 
 
Finally, data for the last term (total intermediate purchases of each 
industry i) is derived from national account figures. 
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6.2. Estimating the impact of fragmentation on total factor 
productivity 
 
Following Feenstra/Hanson (1997, 1999) and others we assume that 
outputs and inputs of manufacturing industries are related by a translog 
production function (skipping the time and industry index): 
(9) ln f (z) = A0 + (α + A)' ln z + 12 ln z' γ ln z 
where z = (x, y) is a vector of primary inputs x and intermediate inputs 
y. The scalar A0 captures neutral technical progress and the vector 
α + Ai, ∑N + Mi = 1 Ai=0, represents non-neutral technical change. 
Additionally, ∑N + Mi = 1 αi = 1 and the rows and columns of γ sum the zero 
if the production function is linearly homogenous which is assumed 
through out. The discrete change in output, input and technology, the 
latter stemming inter alia from outsourcing, is given by  
 
(10) ∆ ln f (z) =  ∆ A0 + ∆ A' 
1
2 (ln z−1 + ln z)  +  α + (A−1 + A) 
1
2
'
 ∆ 
ln z + ∆ 12 ln z' γ ln z 
 
and provides a decomposition in: 
• technological change (e.g. induced by outsourcing) evaluated at 
average levels of the inputs; 
• change in inputs evaluated at average technology parameters; 
• change in the quadratic input terms. 
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The change of total factor productivity (TFP) is given by the first 
component of (10):  
(11) ∆ TFP = ∆ A0 + ∆ A' 12 (ln z−1 + ln z) 
and using the first order condition for cost minimization it can be shown 
that the change in TFP can be represented by the Tornqvist index which 
substracts the growth of inputs weighted by observed cost-shares from 
total output growth. 
(12) ∆ TFP = ∆ ln Y - 12 (s + s−1)' ∆ ln z 
We follow Feenstra–Hanson (1997, 1999) and postulate that ∆A0 and 
∆A are functions of outsourcing, exogenous technological change and 
other determinants (τ). i.e.:  
 
(13) Ai = Bτi + ui 
 
(14) Aj0 = ßτi + vi 
implying 
(15) ∆ TFPi = β∆τi + 12 ∆τ'iB' (ln zi,−1 + ln zi) + εi 
We can the isolate the impact of outsourcing on (denoted by 
determinant k) on ∆ TFP: 
(16) ∆ TFPik = βk∆τik + 12 ∆τik ∑
j = 1
M + N
 bjk (ln zijk,−1 + ln zijk) 
In the empirical exercise this specification cannot be estimated since the 
interaction effects (second part of 16) are highly collinear. Rather we 
classify industries as skill intensive if the median skilled to unskilled 
ratio is higher than that of total manufacturing and as capital intensive if 
the median of the ratio of the real stock of capital to total employment is 
above the median of total manufacturing. These two dummies are 
interacted with the outsourcing measure and introduced instead of the 
second term in 16. 
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6.3. Measuring the effects of outsourcing on wage inequality − 
mandated factor price changes. 
 
In accordance to Feenstra/Hanson (1997, 1999) we adopt a modification 
of the conventional mandated factor price regression and use a two stage 
approach: 
 
1) In a first step the total changes in productivity and price changes, 
corrected for interindustry wage differentials is decomposed into 
different structural components, specifically, into an outsourcing 
component and an R&D component denoted by vector τ: 
Changes in total factor productivity (TFP) are decomposed according to: 
(17) ∆ TFPit = β ' ∆τit + 12 ∆τ 'it B' (ln zi, t − 1 + ln zit) + εit 
which is the same as equation (15). 
 
Changes in value added prices and industry specific wage changes are 
decomposed according to: 
 
(18) ∆ ln pVit  - eit = δ ' ∆τit + λ∆TFPit + υit 
 
where λ is the pass-through coefficient, measuring how much of the 
productivity change is passed through to industry value added prices, δ 
is a vector of coefficients measuring the direct impact of outsourcing on 
industry prices. eit is defined as: eit = 
1
2 (υi, t − 1 + υit)' (∆ ln ωit - ∆ ln ωt) 
where υit is the vector of cost shares of primary inputs, ∆ ln wit are 
industry specific factor price changes and ∆ ln ωt the average factor 
price change across industries. This term corrects for the fact that factor 
prices are not the same for all industries as it is assumed in trade theory. 
Both equations combined give: 
(19) ∆ ln pVit  + ∆TFPit - eit = γ ' ∆τit + 12 ∆τ 'it A' (ln zi, t − 1 + ln zit) + ηit 
where 
 
(20) γ = [β(1 + λ) + δ]; A' = B' (1 + λ); ηit = εit (1 + λ) + vit 
 
The regression again includes an interaction term of the structural 
variable τ and the primary factor quantities (z), whereby A is the matrix 
of coefficients measuring this interaction and should give evidence on 
the magnitude of nonneutral changes in technology due the factor bias 
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of outsourcing to the East and other structural variables. Again, these 
interaction effects turn out to be highly collinear in our regression 
analysis and are dropped. As before, we define dummies for skill 
intensive industries (Dhigh skill) and capital intensive industries (Dcapital) 
and interact these two dummies with our outsourcing measure for 
Austrian sourcing from the East. We then arrive at the following 
specification for our first stage regression: 
 
(21) ∆ ln pVit  + ∆TFPit + eit = γo + γ1 Oit + γ2 Oit Dhigh skill + γ3 Oit 
Dcapital + γ4 Xit + µi + vt + εit 
 
The variable matrix X comprises the R&D to output ratio as well as 
overall export and import openness with respect to Eastern countries as 
additional control variables. µi and vt are industry and time specific 
fixed effects. Subscript i refers to industry and t to time (years) and ∆ 
indicates first differences. 
 
2) As a second step, the decomposed price and productivity changes are 
regressed on factor cost shares to estimate the changes in primary factor 
prices attributable to (mandated by) outsourcing alone. The second stage 
regressions for each structural variable k are: 
(22) ∆ ln pVAitk  + ∆TFPitk - ∆eitk = 12 (υi, t − 1 + υit)' ωk 
υ denote factor cost shares of primary factors and the coefficients ωk 
obtained are the change in primary factor prices that are explained by 
determinant k, that is, outsourcing to the East and other possible 
determinants. 
 
For our regressions we use the following specification: 
 
(23) ∆ ln pV, Oit  + ∆TFPOit  - ∆eOit  = ω ' cs + ϕi + ψt + ζit 
 
where pV, O, TFPO and eO are the changes in value added prices, total 
factor productivity and industry specific wage differences due to 
outsourcing, cs denotes cost shares of primary factors. Finally, the 
coefficients ω obtained from these regressions are the change in primary 
factor prices that are explained (mandated) by outsourcing to the East. 
 
 
   
 
6.4. Variables and data sources 
 
Table 22: List of variables and their definition 
Variable Symbol Definition 
Relative skill-specific employment H/L High-skilled employment in heads divided by low-skilled employment in heads 
Relative skill-specific wages wH/wL Wage per high-skilled person divided by wage per low-skilled person 
Export openness XOP Exports as percent of gross production 
Import openness MROP Imports minus outsourcing to Eastern countries as percent of gross production 
Capital output ratio KY Real capital stocks divided by real gross production 
Degree of organisation of trade unions ORG Union members' share in industry (i) in overall industry members divided by 
employment share of industry (i) 
Median firm size MSIZE Median size of firms in industry (i) 
Price cost margin PCM Value added minus wage costs as percent of gross production 
Total factor productivity TFP Tornqvist index: growth of inputs weighted by observed cost-shares minus total 
output growth 
Outsourcing to Eastern Countries O Austrian imports of manufactured intermediates from Eastern countries as percent of 
gross production 
Dummy variable for skill intensive industries Dhigh skill value = 1 if the median skilled to unskilled ratio is higher than that of total 
manufacturing 
Dummy variable for capital intensive industries Dcapital 
intensive 
value = 1 if the median of the ratio of the real stock of capital to total employment is 
that of total manufacturing 
Value added industry price pV 
change in interindustry-wage differentials e Cost-share weighted difference between industry specific factor price changes and 
the average factor price change across industries 
cost shares of primary factors cs Wage costs for unskilled and skilled, as well as total capital rents, respectively, 
divided by total costs 
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Table 23: Data sources 
Variable Source 
Real value added Statistics Austria, Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1998  
Nominal value added Statistics Austria, Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1998  
Nominal gross production Statistics Austria, Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1998  
Real gross production Statistics Austria, Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1998  
Total employment Statistics Austria, Österreichs Volkseinkommen 1998  
Exports Statistics Austria and reclassified to NACE 2-digit 
industries by WIFO 
Imports Statistics Austria and reclassified to NACE 2-digit 
industries by WIFO 
Real stock of capital Own calculations using the nominal stock of capital and the 
user costs of capital 
Nominal stock of capital Statistics Austria, We are indebted in K. Schwarz who 
kindly provided the unpublished figures 
User costs of capital Prime rate (WIFO) plus depreciation rate (15%) plus 
change in investment prices (investment deflator from the 
capital stock series, Statistics Austria) 
Intrafirm imports  Austrian National Bank, we are grateful to R. Dell'mour for 
providing the detailed databasis 
Intrafirm exports See intrafirm imports 
Employment in foreign 
affiliates  
See intrafirm imports. The figures in table 10-14 are based 
on figures at the firm-level of these database 
R&D-Intensity Chamber of Commerce, reclassified to NACE 2-digit 
indiustries, values for 1997 from Statistics Austria, 
interpolated in between. 
High-skilled workers and 
employees 
"Lohnerhebung", Austrian Chamber of Commerce; 
blue colour workers of the categories "Besonders 
qualifizierte Arbeiter", and "Qualifizierte Arbeiter" and 
white colour workers of group IV to VI, 
 reclassified to NACE 2-digit industries 
Low-skilled workers and 
employees 
blue colour workers and white colour workers of the 
remaining categories, reclassified to NACE 2-digit 
industries 
Manufactured intermediate 
imports 
Statistics Austria, Austrian Input-Output table 1990 and 
(preliminary) 1995, interpolation and extrapolation  
Degree of organisation of 
trade unions 
Austrian Trade Union Federation 
Median firm size WIFO Investment Survey 
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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT OF AUSTRIAN FIRMS IN 
THE CEECS 
Christina Burger 
 
 
In May and June 2000, an opinion poll was carried out among 88 
Austrian enterprises which have foreign direct investment in the central 
and eastern European countries.1 Most of these enterprises founded their 
subsidiaries in Hungary followed by the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Poland, Slovenia, Rumania and Bulgaria. Most subsidiaries (67%) were 
established during the first five years after the fall of the iron curtain. 
18% were founded later, but 15% of the Austrian enterprises started 
their activities in the CEECs already in the communist era before 1989. 
 
As regards production sectors, the core of activities took place in 
manufacturing industries and trade enterprises. Of the subsidiaries 
newly established in the CEECs, 33% belong to the manufacturing 
industry, 28% to the trade sector and 6% to other services. 
 
Among the parent enterprises, the larger companies dominate. 41% of 
the enterprises interrogated employ more than 200 persons, 26% less 
than 50 employees. Smaller firms, however, have been quicker in 
starting their activities than larger firms in the CEECs. 26% of the small 
firms have founded their branch before 1989, while only 7% of firms of 
medium and 14% of large size have done so. 28% of large firms have 
started their activities in the CEECs between 1994 and 1999. Medium-
sized enterprises have done so at a much lower proportion (17%), with 
small-sized falling much behind (4%).  
 
                                                     
1 Due to the small size of the sample, general conclusions cannot be drawn 
from the survey. All statements in the text refer exclusively to the enterprises 
questioned and not to the Austrian enterprises with branches in the CEECs as 
a whole. 
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Figure 1: Time of FDI by size of the Austrian enterprise 
 
Concerning the field of business which is carried out in the CEECs, 
trade and distribution dominate (68%), followed by 
advertising/marketing (27%) and administration/accounting (16%). 
R&D plays only a minor role (7%), as does the production of inputs and 
raw materials (9%). 10% of enterprises indicate that they assemble 
components in the CEECs, while 36% carry out the whole production 
process.  
 
The turnover is on average (60%) lower in the CEECs than in Austria.  
 
Figure 2: Turnover in the CEECs and in Austria 
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The main findings concerning the transfer of jobs are the following: 
Jobs are simply shifted to the CEECs only at a very small degree. 52% 
of the enterprises state that they have increased employment in the 
Austrian mother firm during the last 5 years, 19% that it has remained 
constant and 28% that it has decreased (the enterprises were, however, 
not questioned as to the reason of job reduction in Austria). In their 
subsidiaries, the employment since the foundation of the branch has 
increased in 43% of the cases, stayed constant in 15% and decreased in 
42%.  
 
Figure 3: Development of employment 
 
In 74% of the enterprises, production in the CEECs is not in any way 
connected with their production in Austria, while in 24% the Austrian 
production is partly and in 2% completely substituted by the activities in 
the CEECs. In 82% of the subsidiaries, goods are produced which are 
comparable to finished products manufactured in Austria. 8% of the 
CEEC-branches produce intermediate goods which are used as an input 
in the Austrian production. 10% of the CEEC-branches produce both – 
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would tentatively conclude that the more successful enterprises expand 
their activities and explore new markets in the CEECs.  
 
Figure 4: Employment in Austria... 
 
This is quite in line with the intention stated by the entrepreneurs as 
regards their eastern activities: Estabilishing a market position, 
exploiting the high demand potential and in general co-operating with 
neighbouring countries are seen as the main reason for outsourcing. In 
contrast low labour costs play a rather subordinate role for FDIs in the 
CEECs, even although 98% of enterprises face a lower wage level in 
their eastern subsidiarities than in Austria (see table 1).  
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Table 1: Advantages of FDI in the CEECs 
 very large 
advantages 
rather large 
advantages 
rather small 
advantages 
no 
advantages 
Knowledge of local markets  59% 34%   5%   2% 
Working on local markets, 
neighbourhood to clients 
 
81% 
 
14% 
 
  1% 
 
  5% 
Neighbourhood to local 
subcontractors etc 
 
23% 
 
23% 
 
33% 
 
22% 
Early market intrusion, 
establishing a market 
position 
 
 
59% 
 
 
28% 
 
 
10% 
 
 
  2% 
Shorter transport routes 15% 25% 23% 38% 
Lower labour costs 23% 27% 39% 11% 
Lower taxes   8% 14% 45% 33% 
Qualified employees   5% 31% 41% 24% 
Unbureaucratic admini-
strative procedures 
 
  5% 
 
  9% 
 
30% 
 
57% 
Easy legal conditions   5%   9% 26% 60% 
Larger market, neighbour-
hood to neighbouring 
countries in the CEECs 
 
 
39% 
 
 
41% 
 
 
  9% 
 
 
11% 
Less entrepreneurial risk 26% 53% 15%   6% 
 
The main disadvantages of foreign direct investment are seen in 
problems concerning tariffs and border controls, an unprofessional 
public administration, low purchasing power and the exchange rate risk. 
Much less do entrepreneurs complain about problems concerning the 
missing network of subcontractors, insufficient channels of distribution, 
the often unclear legal situation and the lack of information about 
market conditions (see table 2). 
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Table 2: Disadvantages of FDI in the CEECs 
 very large dis-
advantages 
rather large 
disadvantages
rather small 
disadvantages
no dis-
advantages 
Lower purchasing power 13% 39% 35% 14% 
Mentality of customers 
(less awareness of quality 
etc.) 
 
 
  9% 
 
 
26% 
 
 
43% 
 
 
22% 
Problems with sub-
contractors 
 
  0% 
 
15% 
 
49% 
 
36% 
Bad, insufficient infra-
structure 
 
  1% 
 
22% 
 
58% 
 
19% 
Legal and tax framework 
not sufficiently developed 
 
  6% 
 
31% 
 
51% 
 
13% 
Quick and unmotivated 
changes of the legal 
framework 
 
 
11% 
 
 
30% 
 
 
50% 
 
 
  9% 
Political risks in general 11% 14% 60% 15% 
Unprofessional public 
administration 
 
  8% 
 
45% 
 
41% 
 
  6% 
Problems of tariffs and 
borders 
 
20% 
 
34% 
 
30% 
 
16% 
Exchange rate risk 18% 25% 51% 16% 
Trade, distribution 
insufficiently developed 
 
  0% 
 
18% 
 
56% 
 
26% 
Lacking qualification of 
employees 
 
  7% 
 
18% 
 
53% 
 
22% 
Lacking working moral 
and readiness to achieve 
good performance 
 
 
  2% 
 
 
22% 
 
 
53% 
 
 
23% 
Problems of languages   5% 24% 52% 19% 
Confused market situation    2% 17% 58% 23% 
 
Summing up the main points concerning outsourcing, one can argue that 
employment in the Austrian firms included in the survey has not 
decreased significantly but rather increased due to the foundation of a 
subsidiary in the CEECs. Outsourcing is not so much driven by the 
reduction of wage costs, but by the larger sales potential in new markets. 
Outsourcing may thus be a win-win-situation for both, Austria and the 
CEECs. 
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